JUDGMENT - D.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---This petition is filed by the wife of the detenu. The detenu being Rajeev M. Pathak. The detention order is dated 16-8-2000 as per Annexure 'A' of the petition and grounds of detention are of even date as per Annexure 'B'. He is detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short "COFEPOSA Act"). 2. We have heard Mr. Keswani for the detenu and Mr. R.M. Agarwal for Union of India-respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 3. The facts and the background in which the detention order came to be passed in short are as under: An intelligence was received by the Officers of Directorate of Vigilance, Mumbai, indicating that certain persons/firms were misusing DEPB Scheme by manipulating/forging the particulars of the shipping bills and obtaining DEPB benefits therefrom. Initially those firms were M/s. Samarth Enterprises, M/s. Sharp Medicals, M/s. Pragati Sales Corporation, all from Dombivali. These premises were searched and it was revealed that one firm known as Knomo Exports Ltd. (name later changed to M/s. KEL Exports Ltd. located at 130-132, Greater Western Building, S.B. Singh Marg, Mumbai, was also related to these exports. Further investigations revealed that the detenu was full and sole in charge of this Knomo Exports Ltd. and he had by forging and fabricating 127 shippings bills committed fraud and loss to the exchequer. Those 127 shipping bills were tendered to different authorities. Forgery of shipping bills was in respect of description, value, quantity of the exported goods and also in respect of signatures of concerned officers. It was also transpired during investigation that the detenu had been successful in getting advance remittance of Rs. 110 crores from Dubai and this advance remittance was siphoned away by the detenu within 4-5- days in the names of persons who had no concern with the business, but all of whose addresses were shown as the address of the detenu. Detailed probe and through investigation was made and thereafter proposal was sent by the Sponsoring Authority for detention of the detenu in respect of 127 shipping bills and the forgery or fraud committed regarding thereto, and consequently the detention order came to be passed against the detenu. 4. The detention was challenged by the detenu on number of grounds as per the petition and Mr. 4. The detention was challenged by the detenu on number of grounds as per the petition and Mr. Keswani appearing for the detenu raised almost all the grounds in his attack to the detention order. He however classified his grounds of objections into two categories, namely, grounds relating to legal position and grounds based on facts. So far as first category is concerned, Mr. Keswani contended that there was delay in issuance of the detention order from the time of the proposal. Secondly, there was delay in execution and thirdly all steps necessary for enforcing the order were not taken by the Detaining Authority. The other grounds of attacks were taken by Mr. Keswani from the petition itself, therefore, we will refer to those grounds as and when we deal with them. 5. While elaborating his legal position or submissions on legal grounds, Mr. Keswani contended that proposal was sent to the Detaining Authority on 6-6-2000 and order of detention is dated 16-8-2000, therefore there is delay of 70 days. He contended that 70 days delay without any explanation was fatal and even if explanation was given by the Detaining Authority there was no explanation about delay of every day and therefore the explanation was liable to be rejected. 6. Regarding delay in execution he contended that the detention order was passed on 16-8-2000 but it was served upon the detenu on 12-3-2000 therefore there was delay of 19 months and on this ground alone the detention order was liable to be vitiated. 7. He tried to refute the contention of the Detaining Authority in this regard and stated that it was not that the detenu was absconding for this period as is tried to be urged by the Detaining Authority. He drew our attention to certain summons which are issued and certificate given by the authorities which shows that the detenu attended before those authorities on 28-3-2002, 12-3-20002 and 3-3-2002 and therefore according to him if the detenu had attended the said authorities on three dates and also was present at the time of the panchanama on 3-3-20002 it could not be said that the detenu was absconding. He further contended that if at all the detenu was absconding it was obligatory on the part of the Detaining Authority to take steps for cancellation of the bail of the detenu which was granted to the detenu in two cases on condition of giving surety of Rs. 3 lacs each. He urged that no steps in this regard for cancellation of bail and forfeiture of surety were taken by the authorities during all this period of 19 months. He further contended that even though the attachment order was obtained under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, was never executed till the day nor 50% share of the detenu in his ancestral property in Konkan was attached. Therefore, according to him when the Supreme Court had directed that every possible attempt should be made to trace the detenu and secure his presence by such coercive methods and since they were not followed, contention of the Detaining Authority that the was absconding during all this period was liable to be rejected. 8. Mr. Keswani relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his aforesaid contentions: 1) A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 1455 (Mahesh Kumar Chauhan alias Banti v. Union of India and others)1; 2) A.I.R. 1975 Supreme Court 1408 (Rabindra Kumar Ghosel v. State of West Bengal)2; 3) 1991 Cri.L.J. 1481 (Dinesh Kumar Jain v. Union of India and another)3, 4) A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court 2998 (Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh v. District Magistrate, Ahmedabad and others)4; 5) 2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 648 (V.C. Mohan v. Union of India and others)5 and 6) Unreported judgment of the Delhi High Court in (Criminal Writ Petition No. 143 of 1984)6, decided on 14-1-1985. 9. As against these three legal grounds, it was contended by Mr. Agarwal that proclamation under section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act was issued in the Government Gazette on 15-9-2000 and once the proclamation is issued, burden shifted on the detenu to satisfy and prove that it was not possible for him to comply with the requirement of attendance within the stipulated period and if he fails to discharge that burden he was liable for punishment with imprisonment which may extend to one year etc. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Agarwal therefore contended that once a notification under section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act was published in Government Gazette on 15-9-2000 then non-appearance of the detenu before the concerned authority or Court thereafter was clear indication and proof that he was absconding and in that situation the detenu could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. He also pointed out that 68 attempts in all were made to trace and find out the detenu, during this period surveillance was kept at his house and office but all proved to be futile till ultimately the detenu was apprehended on 12-3-2002 on secret information at a place at Andheri. Mr. Agarwal relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 541 (Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another)7, wherein the Supreme Court has held that where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the 'link' not snapped but strengthened. In that case the detention order was served after a gap of four years because the detenu was absconding and could not be traced inspite of all necessary efforts. Detention order was made on 19-12-1974 and he could not be arrested till 1-2-1978 but since the detenu was found absconding the Supreme Court held that the delay was not fatal and the live link was not snapped. Relying upon this judgment, Mr. Agarwal contended that the detention order was passed on 16-8-2000 and proclamation under section 7(1)(b) was issued on 15-9-2000 and other proclamation under section 7(1)(a) was issued on 25-10-2000 but even then the detenu did not make himself available and did not satisfy the concerned Court issuing the proclamation about the reasons of his absence when the burden was cast upon the absconding detenu by the provisions of section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act in that regard, then it could not be said that there was any delay in execution and when all the particulars of the steps taken, namely, 68 attempts and the surveillance and vigilance have been given in the affidavit, the contention of the detenu was liable to be rejected. 11. Regarding not making attempts for cancellation of bail in two matters, Mr. 11. Regarding not making attempts for cancellation of bail in two matters, Mr. Agarwal contended that when the steps under section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act were taken then it was not at all necessary to apply for cancellation of bail because looking to the gravity of the offence and the magnitude, the only course available to the authority was to take steps under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act and since those steps were taken cancellation of bail was not necessary. We find considerable force in these submissions. As required under section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act once the proclamation is issued and published in the Government Gazette, the burden shifts on the absconding person i.e. detenu in this case to prove that he could not remain present before the Court as required and if he fails to do so he can be punished as prescribed by the said section. Therefore, when looking to the facts of the case recourse was taken to section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act and when the detenu failed thereafter to appear also did not mark his presence even after proclamation under section 7(1)(a), then taking all steps for cancellation of bail were not necessary. We have also no hesitation to conclude that from 19-10-2000 the detenu was absconding and therefore he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong and contend that there was delay in execution of the detention order. 12. Mr. Keswani has urged as pointed out earlier that the detenu had attended on three occasions before the authorities in pursuance of the summons issued by them on 28-3-2002, 12-3-2002 and 3-3-2002 but in this regard it was contended by Mr. Agarwal that the detenu had appeared before the Vigilance Department which is totally different from the Detaining Authority. He contended that the matter in controversy required thorough probe by different departments which were doing their own efforts independently. Therefore merely because the detenu had appeared in response to the summons thrice, it could not be said that he was available and not absconding. If this was so, according to Mr. Agarwal then nothing prevented the detenu from appearing before the authority or Court which issued a proclamation under section 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(a) of COFEPOSA Act and give his explanation for his absence for such a long time. We find that the submissions are fully fortified by the facts on record. If this was so, according to Mr. Agarwal then nothing prevented the detenu from appearing before the authority or Court which issued a proclamation under section 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(a) of COFEPOSA Act and give his explanation for his absence for such a long time. We find that the submissions are fully fortified by the facts on record. Therefore no illegality is found to have been committed by the Detaining Authority nor any delay can be said to have been committed in enforcing and executing the detention order. The delay, if any, is properly explained. We are satisfied with the explanation and further the proclamation under section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act takes away the very force of the contention of Mr. Keswani about the delay. The burden shifts on the detenu which he was failed to discharge before the competent Court which issued proclamation under section 7(1)(b) of COFEPOSA Act. 13. Further in this regard it was pointed out by Mr. Agarwal that the documents showing direct connection of the detenu with the forgery and fraud in respect of 127 shipping bills came to be and were being collected and the real clue could be obtained only after recording statement of Pawan Kumar on 28-4-2002 and in process and on 1-8-2000 further statement of Pravin J. Agarwal came to be recorded. 14. The other criteria that is to be applied while considering the objection of delay is whether the delay has resulted in making the grounds stale. Looking to the facts of the case and the steps taken in recording the statements up to 1-8-2000 i.e. last statement of Praveen J. Agarwal as per Item No. 78 of the index of compilation or Annexure 'C', it cannot be said that the grounds of detention had become stale. In fact they were very much fresh and therefore it has to be held that there was no delay in issuing the detention order after the proposal and/or in executing the same. Therefore all the three legal grounds raised by Mr. Keswani are required to be rejected. 15. In view of these facts, we do not find that the delay of 70 days from the date of sending proposal and the date of detention order can be of any help to the detenu nor can detention order be set aside on that ground. Keswani are required to be rejected. 15. In view of these facts, we do not find that the delay of 70 days from the date of sending proposal and the date of detention order can be of any help to the detenu nor can detention order be set aside on that ground. The most important aspect of this fact so far as delay is concerned is the criteria as to whether the live link between the activities of the detenu and the detention order is snapped and we have no hesitation to conclude that the live link was not at all snapped. 16. Coming to the grounds raised by Mr. Keswani on facts on the basis of the grounds in petition, it was contended by Mr. Keswani that in para 5 of the affidavit of the Detaining Authority, it is stated that even though it is alleged in the said paragraph that the fraud played upon by the detenu has caused loss to the State Exchequer as reported by the Sponsoring Authority to the tune of about 86 crores, no material was placed before the Detaining Authority in that regard and this was done by the Sponsoring Authority to prejudice the Detaining Authority against the detenu. As against this it was contended by Mr. Agarwal that forgery was committed in respect of 127 shipping bills which involved the business to the tune of Rs. 110 crores and therefore in that background of the matter the aforesaid statement came to be made in the affidavit, though there is no reference to the same in the grounds of detention. He therefore contended that what was challenged was the grounds of detention and not the affidavit. This explanation needs to be accepted because the detenu has challenged the grounds of detention and in any case what is to be found whether there was material before the Detaining Authority to subjectively satisfy the Detaining Authority about the requirement of the detention and the background of the case and not as to how much amount was involved. 17. Another ground that was raised by Mr. Keswani was ground (ii)(a) on page 8 of the petition. In ground (ii)(a) facts have been reproduced from the grounds of detention as stated in paragraph 52 of the grounds of detention and ground (ii)(b)(1) is the ground raised on those facts. 17. Another ground that was raised by Mr. Keswani was ground (ii)(a) on page 8 of the petition. In ground (ii)(a) facts have been reproduced from the grounds of detention as stated in paragraph 52 of the grounds of detention and ground (ii)(b)(1) is the ground raised on those facts. The ground is that the incident referred to in paragraph 52 of the grounds of detention is of 1993, show-cause notice was issued on 2-9-1994 and therefore the incident is too stale and remote in point of time. 18. As against this Mr. Agarwal contended that the detention order is not only based on the ground referred to in paragraph 52 but mainly on the forgery of 127 shipping bills which came to the light only upon recording of the last statement of Praveen J. Agarwal on 1-8-2000 and the other investigation carried regarding them. Those instance are therefore very fresh. In this background of the matter we do not agree with the submissions made by Mr. Keswani. If the ground of detention was only based on the incident of 1993 and the detention order was passed in 2000 then the situation would have been different but new grounds which came to the light about the forgery of 127 shipping bills are also the main thrust of the grounds of detention and therefore it cannot be said that the detention order suffers from staleness or related to incident having remote connection. 19. Ground (ii)(b)(2) is also the same ground, therefore, the same is not considered separately. 20. Ground (iii) on internal page No. 10 of the petition is that the orders of detention against the co-detenu were dated 2-3-2000, whereas the detention order of the detenu was passed on 16-8-2000 and therefore there is delay of 5½ months. In this regard, Mr. Agarwal again pointed out the steps taken between the aforesaid period and particularly recording of the last statement of Praveen J. Agarwal on 1-8-2000. In view of these facts, we do not find that any delay has occasioned in the instant detention order. 21. Next ground that was raised by Mr. Keswani is ground No. (v), (vi) (a) and (b) on internal pages 12 to 15 of the petition. In view of these facts, we do not find that any delay has occasioned in the instant detention order. 21. Next ground that was raised by Mr. Keswani is ground No. (v), (vi) (a) and (b) on internal pages 12 to 15 of the petition. The objections raised in the aforesaid three paragraphs are that even though according to the Detaining Authority 127 shipping bills were forged in respect of value, quantity, price and signature of the concerned officers, the forensic expert's report does not say that the quantity was tampered with. Further the signature of Shri Srivastava also said to have been done by Srivastava who was the noticee and who admitted to have signed those documents. According to Mr. Keswani therefore subjective satisfaction is not arrived at on the basis of the facts. As against this, it was contended by Mr. Agarwal that 127 shipping bills in respect of which forgery was alleged about the aforesaid items, namely, value, quantity, quality and signatures of the concerned officers, only one shipping bill was sent to the forensic expert for comparison and it was not the only material to come to the conclusion about the forgery but as was clear from the grounds of detention nine items were considered by the Detaining Authority while coming to the conclusion of forgery and those nine items or pieces of evidence have been described in paragraph 5 of the grounds of detention, they are as under: (i) Relevant extracts from night and day attendance register for F/basin, Examination Centre, Mumbai Docks. (ii) Statement dated 30-8-1999 of the concerned appraiser Shri M.K. Shrivastava, who is shown to have finally assessed the 32 shipping bills. (iii) Fax letter dated 2-11-1999 from Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise, Shimla. (iv) Statement dated 25-10-1999 of Shri N.R. Munjal, Managing Director of M/s. Indswift Lab. Ltd., Chandigarh. (v) Statements dated 2-11-1999 and 15-2-2000 of Shri R.S. Rustogi, Factory Manager of M/s. Shanti Drugs Pvt. Ltd. (vi) Statements dated 15-11-1999 and 16-2-2000 of Dr. Tarun Bhalla, Managing Director of M/s. Tanuk Pharma India Ltd., Surajpur, Noida (U.P.) (vii) Forensic examination report of Central Forensic Laboratories, C.B.I., New Delhi dated 15-12-1999 in respect of sample shipping bills of M/s. Expire Exports and M/s. Sharp Medicals. (viii) Statement of Shri Sunil Kumar, authorised signatory of M/s. Vikram Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. dated 17-2-2000. (ix) Statement of Shri A.K. Jain, Director of M/s. Indswift Lab. (viii) Statement of Shri Sunil Kumar, authorised signatory of M/s. Vikram Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. dated 17-2-2000. (ix) Statement of Shri A.K. Jain, Director of M/s. Indswift Lab. Ltd. dated 17-2-2000. He therefore contended that even if the forensic expert has not stated anything that quantity in the shipping bills was forged and even the appraiser has made same statement which was favourable to the detenu, it was not the end of the matter and the conclusions about the forgery of 127 bills was arrived on the aforesaid nine pieces of evidence and therefore no grievance could be made by the detenu. 22. Submissions of Mr. Agarwal in this regard is well substantiated and fortified. It is not that in the circumstances we find that it is not the forensic expert's opinion that alone was relied upon for coming to the conclusion of the forgery but all the aforesaid nine relevant circumstances, statements and record were used for coming to the aforesaid conclusion. It cannot therefore be said that merely because Mr. Srivastava appraiser has made same statement or merely because forensic expert does not say anything about "Quantity being forged" the case of forgery falls to the ground. To the contrary it has to be held that there was sufficient material before the Detaining Authority in the form of aforesaid nine pieces of circumstances or documents of evidence to come to the conclusion of the forgery. We do not find therefore any merit in the contention raised by Mr. Keswani. 23. Mr. Keswani also wanted us to decide ground No. (vii) on page 15 of this petition, and according to him this Court should go through each of the 2100 and odd documents furnished to the detenu, compare all the documents with each other and either reject or accept the same and find out the contradictions therein and give the benefit thereof to the detenu. We clarified to Mr. Keswani that this Court is not sitting in an appeal over a trial where documents are proved as required by law. This is an appeal against detention and what has to be found is whether there was sufficient material before the Detaining Authority to pass the detention order. No scrutiny as prayed can therefore be necessary. 24. Mr. Keswani that this Court is not sitting in an appeal over a trial where documents are proved as required by law. This is an appeal against detention and what has to be found is whether there was sufficient material before the Detaining Authority to pass the detention order. No scrutiny as prayed can therefore be necessary. 24. Mr. Keswani's next contention was about ground (viii) and according to him Container Load Plan (CLP) was a vital document and it was not supplied to the Detaining Authority nor to the detenu and it has affected the right of the detenu to make effective representation. We do not find any substance in this contention at all. The Container Load Plan (CLP) was not at all a vital document in the circumstances of the case and non-furnishing thereof to the detenu or to the Detaining Authority does not affect the detention order. 25. Mr. Keswani's next contention was about ground (ix), according to which the documents in respect of investigation made regarding the exports made by one M/s. Empire Exports, Mumbai, were not furnished either to the Detaining Authority or to the detenu. Mr. Agarwal contended that these conclusions reproduced in ground (ix) from paragraph 47 of the grounds of detention were based on two statements dated 21-1-2000 and 15-2-2000 of Shri Ajay Vyas and they were supplied to the detenu, and whether that material was sufficient or insufficient could not be challenged by the detenu. Further according to Mr. Agarwal this reference was made only to show that prejudicial activities were conducted from the residential address of the detenu himself and the statements of Ajay Vyas referred to above were in the circumstances sufficient and they were given. We therefore do not find any substance in this ground also. 26. Mr. Keswani's next contention was about ground (x). According to him out of the 2100 and odd pages, only one document i.e. page 2037 was illegible. Mr. Agarwal contended that even if it is accepted that one page out of 2100 and odd pages was illegible, the detenu has not shown how his right of representation affected thereby. 26. Mr. Keswani's next contention was about ground (x). According to him out of the 2100 and odd pages, only one document i.e. page 2037 was illegible. Mr. Agarwal contended that even if it is accepted that one page out of 2100 and odd pages was illegible, the detenu has not shown how his right of representation affected thereby. It was also contended that the said page 2037 is a fax message which is an inter office communication and has to be read in congestion with pages 2035 and 2036 and the document was legible to the extent of disclosing its purport, effect and nature. It is merely an intimation by Joint Director, DRI to the Commissioner of Customs Jawahar Customs House, Nhava Sheva about shipment on board of 10 containers. It is therefore clear from this explanation and on perusal of the said document that the document is firstly not at all vital, secondly it has to be read along with other documents, and therefore, the document being illegible, did not at all affect the right of the detenu to make effective representation. 27. Mr. Keswani's next contention was about ground (xi), according to him report of A.D.G., D.R.I. was not submitted either to the Detaining Authority or to the detenu. Mr. Agarwal pointed out from the affidavit of the Detaining Authority in paragraph 31 that the said report was already on record and the contention is unfounded. 28. Secondly, regarding all these contentions of Mr. Keswani about non-supply of documents, Mr. Agarwal contended that the forgery was committed in respect of 127 shipping bills and the Detaining Authority should have issued 127 detention orders in that regard. However, the Detaining Authority clubbed the entire case into one case and issued a one detention order, therefore even if some documents in respect of some shipping bills were not supplied to the detenu or to the Detaining Authority, the detention order could not be adversely affected thereby. Mr. Keswani for this purpose relied upon the judgment of Delhi High Court passed in the case of co-detenu reported in 2001 Cri.L.J. 772 (Gurdev Singh v. Union of India and others)8, and then of the Apex Court upholding the judgment of the Delhi High Court as reported in 2002 S.A.R. (Criminal) 56 (Gurdev Singh v. Union of India others)9. Mr. Agarwal contended that none of these submissions made by Mr. Mr. Agarwal contended that none of these submissions made by Mr. Keswani have any force. 29. Mr. Keswani did not dispute that the aforesaid judgment of the Delhi High Court and then thereafter judgment of Supreme Court is regarding the co-detenu. However, he contended that the grounds raised by the co-detenu in the said petition and the grounds raised by the present detenu are different. 30. A perusal of the judgment of the Delhi High Court will show that it has taken recourse to section 5 of the COFEPOSA Act. It appears that in that case only 32 shipping bills were involved whereas in the instant case 127 shipping bills have been involved. Mr. V.A. Mohta who had appeared for the detenu before the Supreme Court has also raised same contentions that Detaining Authority has not verified the copies of the shipping bills to ascertain whether allegations of forgery were true or not. The Supreme Court has referred to its own judgment reported in 2000(7) S.C.C. 601 (Union of India others v. Arvind Shergil another)10, wherein the Supreme Court has held: "The High Court has virtually decided the matter as if it was sitting in appeal on the order passed by the Detaining Authority. The action by way of preventive detention is largely based on suspicion and the Court is not an appropriate forum to investigate the question whether the circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint on a person. The language of section 3 clearly indicates that the responsibility for making a detention order rests upon the Detaining Authority which alone is entrusted with the duty in that regard and it will be a serious derogation from that responsibility if the Court substitutes its judgment for the satisfaction of that authority on an investigation undertaken regarding sufficiency of the materials on which such satisfaction was grounded. The Court can only examine the grounds disclosed by the Government in order to see whether they are relevant to the object which the legislation in view, that is, to prevent the detenu from engaging in smuggling activity. The said satisfaction is subjective in nature and such a satisfaction, if based on relevant grounds cannot be stated to be invalid. The Court can only examine the grounds disclosed by the Government in order to see whether they are relevant to the object which the legislation in view, that is, to prevent the detenu from engaging in smuggling activity. The said satisfaction is subjective in nature and such a satisfaction, if based on relevant grounds cannot be stated to be invalid. The authorities concerned have to take note of the various facts including the fact that this was a solitary incident in the case of the detenu and that he had been granted bail earlier in respect of which the application for cancellation of the same was made but was rejected by the Court. In this case, there has been due application of mind by the authority concerned to that aspect of the matter as we have indicated in the course of narration of facts. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court in the circumstances of the case cannot be sustained." 31. Considering therefore all the facts and circumstances the scores of documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority and all of which were supplied to the detenu, we find that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority was based on consideration of all the relevant materials placed before him by the Sponsoring Authority. We follow the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case as "Whether the detention order suffers from non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority is not a matter to be examined according to any straight-jacket formula or set principles. It depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the activities alleged against the detenu, the materials collected in support of such allegations, the propensity and potentiality of the detenu in indulging in such activities, etc. The Act does not lay down any set parameters for arriving at the subjective satisfaction by the Detaining Authority". 32. Lastly, it was contended by Mr. Keswani while deciding the detention matters of same nature, the Court should not be sweat away by the enormity or magnitude of the activities. None of the aforesaid findings are based on enormous and magnitude of the activities of the detenu. We have considered the grounds independently without reference to the aforesaid aspect of magnitude an enormity. The authorities cited by Mr. Keswani in this regard are therefore not being considered by us. 33. None of the aforesaid findings are based on enormous and magnitude of the activities of the detenu. We have considered the grounds independently without reference to the aforesaid aspect of magnitude an enormity. The authorities cited by Mr. Keswani in this regard are therefore not being considered by us. 33. Regarding delay one more submission was made by Mr. Agarwal and that requires to be noted. According to him and which is not disputed that this detenu had filed a pre-detention petition before this Court and after taking some time the said petition was withdrawn by the detenu on oral undertaking given to the Court that he will surrender before the authorities. According to Mr. Agarwal the detenu did not keep his promise given to the Court and therefore he cannot be heard regarding his objection of delay. The fact of filing this petition and making oral statement to the Court was not disputed by Mr. Keswani. In fact on this ground alone the contentions raised by the detenu about delay could have been rejected by us but we have dealt with all the points raised by Mr. Keswani. Mr. Agarwal drew our attention to page 8 paragraph 14 of the affidavit (page 151 of this petition) wherein the aforesaid facts are stated on oath by the respondent No. 2. 34. In the aforesaid background, we hold that there is no merit in this writ petition, it deserves to be dismissed. Hence, petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed. -----