R. M. DOSHIT, J. ( 1 ) THESE two applications have been preferred by the petitioners in the Revision Application. The revision petitioners are landlords who sought possession of the suit premises on the ground that the suit premises was required reasonably and bonafide by the landlords. The landlords failed in both the Courts below. Feeling aggrieved, they have preferred the above Revision Application No. 1743/1985. ( 2 ) PENDING the said Revision Application, the petitioners have taken out above Civil Application No. 218/1986 for permission to amend the plaint. It is stated that since the dismissal of the suit all the sons of the tenant had acquired alternative accommodation. The applicants had, therefore, become entitled to seek recovery of possession of the suit premises under Section 13 (1) (l) of the Rent Act. The applicants have, therefore, prayed that they be permitted to amend the plaint and to claim recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of suitable accommodation acquired by the sons of the defendant tenant. ( 3 ) THE revision petitioners have moved the above Civil Application No. 3804/2002 for permission to bring additional evidence on the record. According to the applicants, pending the above Revision Application, the defendant - tenant died in the year 1992. All his sons had acquired alternative suitable accommodation. His widow has been residing with one of the sons and the daughters of the deceased - tenant have been married and are residing in their respective matrimonial home. The applicants have, therefore, sought permission to bring evidence on record to establish that the sons of the deceased - tenant (the opponents nos. 1 to 4) have acquired alternative suitable accommodation. ( 4 ) MR. NANAVATI has submitted that in the matter arising under the Rent Act, additional evidence can be brought on the records at any stage pending the appeal or revision also. He has submitted that the paramount object of the Rent Act is to protect the tenants who are in need of the rented premises. However, in case where such need has ceased to exist, the landlord shall have right to recover the possession of the rented premises. He has submitted that the paramount object of the Rent Act is to protect the tenants who are in need of the rented premises. However, in case where such need has ceased to exist, the landlord shall have right to recover the possession of the rented premises. With a view to striking balance between the need of the tenant to retain the rented premises and the need of the landlord to recover possession of such premises and with a view to avoiding unnecessary delay, additional evidence is permitted to be brought on the record even at later stage. In support thereof, Mr. Nanavati has relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the matters of V. DHANAPAL CHETTIAR V/s. YESODAI AMMAL [a. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1745]; of GULABBAI V/s. NALIN NARSI VOHRA AND ORS. [a. I. R. 1991 S. C. 1760]; and of RAMESH KUMAR V/s. KESHO RAM [1992 SUPP (2) S. C. C. 623]. I am afraid, neither of the above judgments have a bearing to the matter at issue in the present applications. ( 5 ) IN the mater of V. Dhanapal Chettiar (supra), a Constitutional Bench of the Honble Supreme Court, while considering the validity of the suit notice in a suit arising under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, held that ". . . In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act it is not necessary to give notice under Section 106 T. P. Act. Determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord can not get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. " ( 6 ) IN the matter of Gulabbai (supra), recovery of possession of the suit premises was ordered on the ground of bonafide requirement by the landlord. The landlord coming into possession of alternative accommodation during pendency of appeal was held by the Honble Supreme Court to be a subsequent event which ought to have been taken notice of by the Court. The landlord coming into possession of alternative accommodation during pendency of appeal was held by the Honble Supreme Court to be a subsequent event which ought to have been taken notice of by the Court. The Honble Court observed that "it is now beyond the pale of any doubt that in appropriate cases events subsequent to the filing of the suit can be taken notice of and can be duly considered provided the same is relevant in determining the question of bonafide requirement. " ( 7 ) IN the matter of Ramesh Kumar (supra), in a matter arising under the Rent Control Act, the Honble Court has held that ". . . The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But, this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. " ( 8 ) IN the present case, as recorded hereinabove, the possession of the suit premises was sought on the ground of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord. The plea of reasonable and bonafide requirement has not been believed by the Courts below. The subsequent change which is sought to be brought before the Court is with respect to the alternative accommodation acquired by the sons of the tenant. I do not see how this subsequent change has a relevance to or a bearing on the initial cause of action i. e. the reasonable and bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord. Had the bonafide requirement by the landlord been believed by the Courts and the question of comparative hardship arose under Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act, these subsequent changes might have some bearing on the issue. In that eventuality, the Court may be required to consider the effect of such changes on the comparative hardship so as to mould the reliefs as may be necessary. In that eventuality, the Court may be required to consider the effect of such changes on the comparative hardship so as to mould the reliefs as may be necessary. However, what is sought in the present matter is recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of acquisition of alternative suitable accommodation i. e. on entirely a fresh cause of action. What is pleaded now did not exist on the date of the suit and the subsequent changes have no bearing on the reasonable and bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord. In such a case, in my opinion, the Court should not permit the landlord either to amend the plaint or to bring in the additional evidence so as to revive the suit, which has already been dismissed by the trial Court and also in appeal, on entirely a new cause of action. As recorded hereinabove, the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of Ramesh Kumar (supra) has categorically held that court should be cautious while taking cognizance of such new facts and that such new facts shall have material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief. In the present case, neither of such situations exists. ( 9 ) AS to the avoiding of delay, I do not see how delay can be avoided by permitting the additional evidence to be brought on the record or by permitting the plaint to be amended. It is not the case where the new facts sought to be brought on the record has relevance to the matter at issue in the pending Revision Application. Even if such additional evidence is allowed to be brought on the record or the plaint is allowed to be amended, the matter shall have to be remanded to the trial Court for trial in accordance with law. On the contrary, as pleaded by the applicants, the new cause of action arose in the year 1986. As the events stand today, the applicants have whiled away time in pursuing the application for amendment of the plaint instead of filing suit for eviction on the fresh ground available to them. If, there is an intention of saving the time or avoiding the delay, the same has been defeated by the conduct of the applicants. As the events stand today, the applicants have whiled away time in pursuing the application for amendment of the plaint instead of filing suit for eviction on the fresh ground available to them. If, there is an intention of saving the time or avoiding the delay, the same has been defeated by the conduct of the applicants. ( 10 ) IN the above circumstances, both these applications are dismissed. Rule nisi issued in each of these applications is discharged. .