R. C. CHOPRA ( 1 ) THE petitioner, feeling aggrieved by an order dated 4/01/2001 passed by learned Additional Rent controller under Section 14-C and 14-D of the Rent Control act, 1958 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Act only), has come to this Court under Section 25-B (8) of the Act praying that the impugned eviction order may be set aside and the eviction petition tiled by respondent No. 1/landlady be dismissed. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant for the disposal of this petition, briefly stated, are that respondent No. 1 the landlady of Property No. 3435-A, Gall Bajrang Ball, Bazar Sita ram, Delhi filed a petition for eviction against the tenant, the deceased father of the petitioner, alleging that the premises in question which were non-residential in nature being a shop, were let out to the deceased tenant for commercial purposes. She alleged that she way one of the co-owners of the property in question alongwith her three sons. By virtue of an oral partition between her and her sons the ground floor, shown in yellow in the plan attached with the eviction petition, had come to her share jointly with her son Sunil Kumar. The shop in question which was under the tenancy of the petitioner had fallen to her share. She averred that she had recently retired as a Teacher from a school of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and was not having any space on the ground floor for use as a kitchen and as such she bonafide required the said shop for her residential use. ( 3 ) THE father of the petitioner i. e. the tenant, late niranjan Lal Sharma, after obtaining leave to defend the petition, filed a written statement disputing the plea of respondent-landlady that she required the premises in question for her bonafide residential need. The eviction petition was stated to be malafide and motivated with a desire to earn premium and pagri for the reason that it was a commercial area. It was also pleaded that the shop in question was incapable of being use for residential purpose. It was submitted that there were no sanitary facilities in the premises in question. The eviction petition was stated to be malafide and motivated with a desire to earn premium and pagri for the reason that it was a commercial area. It was also pleaded that the shop in question was incapable of being use for residential purpose. It was submitted that there were no sanitary facilities in the premises in question. The oral partition as set up by the respondent-landlady was disputed and it was stated to be a false and fabricated plea with a view to oust him from his shop in which he was a tenant for the last 40 years. It way added that this shop could fetch more than Rs. 15 lakhs by way of Payri, if it was to be let out today. According to him, it was unbelievable that a shop worth Rs. 15 lakhs would be used by the respondent- landlady as a kitchen. In para 4 of the written statement it was specifically pleaded that after ousting another tenant from the adjoining shop the sons of the landlady had started doing business in said shop and using the back portion as a godown for their business purposes. It was stated that the landlady and her sons were living on the first and second floor of the house and they had sufficient accommodation for their residential use in as much as the property in question was a three storeyed building comprised of 12 rooms, apart from store, kitchen, 4 bathrooms and latrine. The history of previous litigation was also given to show that respondent No. 1 landlady was hell-bent to throw the petitioner out of the shop in question as this area was Asia s biggest hardware and sanitary market and the value of the property had gone up sky high. ( 4 ) AFTER considering the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record the learned Additional Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition filed by respondent No. 1 under section 14-C and D of the Act and passed eviction orders in respect of the portion shown in Red in the site plan Ex. P-1. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent No. 1. I have gone through the trial Court records. P-1. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent No. 1. I have gone through the trial Court records. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned eviction order passed in favour of respondenl No. 1 cannot be sustained for the reason that it is absolutely malafide and the respondent-landlady neither requires nor intends to use the shop in possession or the petitioner for residential use. It is submitted that the plea that the said portion is required Lo be used as a kitchen is false and frivolous on the face of it as the said portion is abutting on the main road and has no sanitary fittings so as to use it as a kitchen. It is contended that the plea of oral partition as set up by respondent No. 1 is also sham and bogus and has been set up only with a view to create a ground for eviction in favour of respondent No. 1 landlady for the reason that otherwise the respondent No. 1 and her sons have sufficient accommodation in the building and they have the facility of so many other kitchens also. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has conlended that under Section 25-8 (8) of the Act the scope for interference by the High Court is very limited. According to him the respondent No. 1-landlady has no kitchen on the ground floor and as such her need is bonafide. Learned counsel for the respondenl relies upon the Judgements Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in 76 (1998) DLT 1 (SC), V. Rajeshwari Vs. Bombay Tyres Intl. Ltd. reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 172 and EMC Steel Limited. Calcutta Vs. Smt. Santosh Sethi reported in 43 (1991) DLT 456 and argues that this petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) IT is true that the landlords classified under sections 14-A to 14-D of the Act are a class apart and the act envisages expeditious and immediate availability of residential premises to them, but the Courts cannot lose sight of the fact that these provisions are based on the need of landlord which must be genuine. ( 6 ) IT is true that the landlords classified under sections 14-A to 14-D of the Act are a class apart and the act envisages expeditious and immediate availability of residential premises to them, but the Courts cannot lose sight of the fact that these provisions are based on the need of landlord which must be genuine. In certain cases where landlords are found wanting in bonafides and are merely making a pretence of bonafide need, the tenant cannot be thrown out as the underlying object of the Act is to protect the tenants against arbitrary and unwarranted evictions. The grounds for eviction of the tenants envisaged under the Act are in the nature of exceptions to the protection provided to the tenants and as such, have to be established strictly in terms of the letter and spirit of law. Therefore, the Courts dealing with eviction petitions are under an onerous obligation to ensure that neither a landlord legally entitled to recovery of possession of his property in the hands of a tenant is harassed by undue delay in making the premises available to him nor a tenant is victimised through eviction on grounds which are not made out as per the provisions of the Act and are a mere pretence to evict a tenant, while dealing with a petition under Section 14-C or 14-D of the act, particularly in regard to the premises being used for commercial purpose, the Courts have to be more cautious and circumspect to obviate the possibility of eviction of a tenant from his business premises inasmuch as the rents as well as the value of such properties has gone high which sometimes induces a landlord to seek eviction of his tenant on made up grounds. Therefore, in petitions under Sections 14-C as well 14-D, the Courts have to ensure that the landlord/landlady approaching the Court for eviction of a tenant is in bonafide and genuine need of the premises for residential use only. Eviction on these grounds cannot be ordered if there is something to show that the need is not bonafide. In Surjit Singh Kalra Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (1991)2 SCC p-87 (para-20), the Apex court clearly held that every claim for eviction of a tenant must be a bonafide one. Eviction on these grounds cannot be ordered if there is something to show that the need is not bonafide. In Surjit Singh Kalra Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (1991)2 SCC p-87 (para-20), the Apex court clearly held that every claim for eviction of a tenant must be a bonafide one. ( 7 ) ADVERTING to the facts of the case in hand, it is found that admittedly the premises in possession of the petitioner were let out for commercial purpose in an area, which has developed as a leading hardware market. In the eviction petition itself, respondent No. 1/landlady pleaded that the premises were non-residential and had been let out for commercial purpose. In para-8 of the eviction petition, the premises were described as a shop. It is true that the case set up by respondent No. 1 was that the premises in question were required by her for residential use as she was not having any kitchen on the ground floor, but the evidence on record shows that in the course of pendency of the eviction petition itself, respondent No. 1 had filed an application for amendment of the eviction petition with a view to plead that these premises were required for running a shop by her son. May be that this amendment was not allowed, but the plea proposed to be raised through the said amendment fully exposed the malafides of respondent No. 1 that the premises in question were not actually required for residential use, but were intended to be used for commercial purpose. It has also come in evidence that an adjoining shop shown in red in thesite plan (Exhibit AW-1/1 ) was got vacated from a tenant and is being used for commercial purpose by another son of respondent No. 1. This fact was admitted by respondent No. 1 in her cross-examination. Said shop was got vacated around the time of filing of the present eviction petition. Had the need of respondent No. 1 for a kitchen being bonafide, even that shop could have been used as a kitchen by her. This fact was admitted by respondent No. 1 in her cross-examination. Said shop was got vacated around the time of filing of the present eviction petition. Had the need of respondent No. 1 for a kitchen being bonafide, even that shop could have been used as a kitchen by her. On the question of partition between respondent No. 1 and her sons, this Court would be commenting later as the partition even appears to be only a make-believe story to make out a case of paucity of accommodation in favour of respondent No. 1 for the reason that otherwise there is sufficient accommodation and a kitchen is also available in the building in which the sons, daughters-in-law and other this Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the plea raised by respondent No. 1 that the shop in possession or the petitioner tenant is required by her for being used as a kitchen, is not at all a bonafide plea and has been raised merely as a ploy to oust the petitioner from the premises in question, which have high market value. It is also shown on record that shop in possession of the petitioner is incapable of being used as a kitchen as it has no sanitary fittings and outlets, which are essential for using it as a kitchen. ( 8 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 had based her petition under sections 14-C as well as 14-D of the Act upon an alleged oral partition under which the ground floor portion, shown in yellow in the plan attached to the eviction petition, had fallen to her share jointly with her son Sunil Kumar. The other portions in the building, which is a three-storeyed building, were stated to have fallen to the shares of other sons of respondent No. 1. The statement of respondent No. 1, who was examined as AW-1 and her cross-examination clearly shows that the plea of oral partition as set up by her is a false plea raised with a view to make out a case of paucity of accommodation in favour of respondent No. 1. No date of partition has come on record. Partition of property was unequal which also appears to have been done with a view to maintain the eviction petition against the petitioner/tenant and to offer an excuse for allowing the adjoining shop to be other sops for commercial purposes. No date of partition has come on record. Partition of property was unequal which also appears to have been done with a view to maintain the eviction petition against the petitioner/tenant and to offer an excuse for allowing the adjoining shop to be other sops for commercial purposes. AW-3 examined on behalf of respondent No. 1 admitted in his cross-examination that there was no partition and as such, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the plea of partition as set up by respondent No. 1 is a sham and bogus plea raised merely with the object of enabling respondent to file an eviction petition against the petitioner tenant. The result is that in the absence of partition, respondent No. 1 remains a joint owner of the entire property in which not only sufficient rooms are available for her use and the use of her family members, but kitchen is also available, and as such, the case set up by respondent No. 1 that she needs the portion with the petitioner for establishing a kitchen, cannot be sustained. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for respondent No. 1 vehemently argued that the scope for interference under Section 25-B (8) of the Act is limited and as such, this Court must not substitute its own opinion in place of the opinion of learned trial Court. In support of his contentions, he relies upon a judgement of the Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India insurance Co. LLd. . (supra) and V. Rajaswari Vs. Bombay tyres Intl. Ltd. , (supra ). In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta. AIR 1999 SC p-2507 also, Hon ble mr. Justice R. C. Lahoti, Judge, Supreme Court of India, speaking for the Bench had considered the parameters within which the High Courl should exercise its powers under Section 25-B (8) of the Act. There cannot be any quarrel with the legal preposition that the High Cuurt while exercising its powers under Section 25-B (8) of the Act should not enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts, but the High Court is under an obligation to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touch-stone of "whether it is according to law" or not. For this limited purpose, it may enter into reappraisal or evidence even for ascertaining if the conclusions arrived at by the Rent Controller are wholly unreasonable or such that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached those conclusions on the material available on record. If the conclusions arrived at by the Rent Controller betray lack of reason or objectivity, the same may be held to be "not according to law" calling for an interference by the high Court. Any judgement leading to miscarriage of justice is not a judgement "according to law. " ( 10 ) IN the present case, it is manifestly clear that the impugned eviction order passed by learned Additional Rent controller was not according to law inasmuch as learned additional Rent Controller had failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective and had not adverted to the fundamental question of bonafides of respondent No. 1 in the matter of claiming eviction of the petitioner from a commercial portion on the plea that she required the same for use as a kitchen. The premises in question, which have an extremely high market value, do not appear to be required by her for use as a kitchen only. This pretence of need ought to have been seen through by additional Rent Controller and he ought to have pierced the veil behind which the greed for recovering the possession of commercially exploitable property, having high market value, was lurking. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in holding that the impugned order of eviction passed against the petitioner was perverse, not in accordance with law and had resulted In miscarriage of justice. ( 11 ) IN the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned eviction order is set aside and the eviction petition filed by respondent No. 1 is dismissed.