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2002 DIGILAW 785 (PAT)

Bhagwanjee Prasad v. State Of Bihar

2002-07-23

NARAYAN ROY

body2002
Judgment 1. Heard Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. B.P.Pandey, learned senior counsel for the Vigilance. 2. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the criminal prosecution launched against him pending in the court of the Special Judge, Patna in Special Case No. 2/95 appertaining to Vigilance P.S. Case No. 15/95 for the offence under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act only on the ground of delay of the investigation. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first information report was lodged in the year, 1995 and in course of investigation, the petitioner has already accounted for known sources of his income, investigation of the case has not yet been completed and thus, the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner must be held to be illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. It appears that the petitioner has been made accused in this case for the allegation that he acquired property disproportionate to known source of his income. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Vigilance that on 17.12.1999 the Investigating Officer submitted his last progress report and on 31.1.2000 he submitted his investigation report to the Inspector General of Vigilance which, on examination, was not accepted and further investigation was directed to be made. Due to rush of work and shortage of staff, investigation of this case could not be completed. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that investigation of the case is almost complete and final form will be submitted within four weeks. 5. Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that inordinate delay in completion of the investigation of the case would be a ground to quash the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner as it invades upon personal liberty of the petitioner, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner retired in the year 1991 and thereafter this case has been lodged against him. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner retired in the year 1991 and thereafter this case has been lodged against him. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon decisions of the Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh V/s. P.V. Pavithran (AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1266); in the case of Ramanand Chaudhary V/s. The State of Bihar and others (AIR 1994 Supreme Court 948) and in the case of Seeta Hemchandra Shashittal V/s. State of Maharashtra and another (AIR 2001 Supreme Court 1246). 6. It would be pertinent to mention here that the petitioner is being prosecuted for an offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act punishable with an imprisonment up to seven years but no period has been fixed in the Code of Criminal Procedure to take cognizance of the offence if punishment prescribed thereto exceeds imprisonment for three years and in that view of the matter, delay in conclusion of the investigation would hardly be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner. 7. now coming to the cases relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh V/s. P.V. Pavithran ( AIR 1990 S.C. 1266 ), the Apex Court held that no general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that whenever there is inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such delay, ipso facto, would provide grounds for quashing of the first information report or the proceedings arising therefrom. The Apex Court, however, refused to interfere with the order of the High Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case where the accused at the first instance was put under suspension and after submission of the enquiry report the State Government ordered for stopping further action and directed reinstatement of the accused into service with immediate effect and again order of reinstatement was cancelled and show cause notice was served upon the proceedee. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the facts of this case are not identical to the facts as noticed above. 8. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the facts of this case are not identical to the facts as noticed above. 8. In the case of Ramanand Chaudhary V/s. The State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1994 S.C. 948 ) the Apex Court quashed the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner as the same was pending for more than 13 years coupled with the fact that there was consistent opinion of the public prosecutor that no criminal case was made out and the sanctioning authority on independent consideration, refused to grant sanction but later on, changed his view on asking by the Deputy Inspector of General. The decision rendered in the case of Ramanand Chaudhary V/s. The State of Bihar & others (supra), in my opinion, therefore, is of no avail to the petitioner in the given facts and circumstances of the case. 9. In the case of Seeta Hemchandra Shashittal V/s. State of Maharashtra and others ( AIR 2001 S.C. 1246 ), the Apex Court held : "If this was a case which needed no sanction from the Government for submitting the charge-sheet before the Court, the investigating agency could have filed the charge-sheet at the end of four years from the lodgment of FIR. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the legislative fixation of periods for taking cognizance of different offences. An offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years has to be taken cognizance of by the Court concerned within three years of the date of registration of the FIR. Of course, this is subject to certain other exceptions. As pointed out earlier, the legislature has not chosen to fix any period to take cognizance of the offence if the punishment prescribed thereto exceeds imprisonment for three years. The offence alleged against the appellant is punishable with imprisonment upto seven years. Of course, this is subject to certain other exceptions. As pointed out earlier, the legislature has not chosen to fix any period to take cognizance of the offence if the punishment prescribed thereto exceeds imprisonment for three years. The offence alleged against the appellant is punishable with imprisonment upto seven years. These aspects were highlighted by us for the purpose of satisfying ourselves that criminal proceedings pending against the appellants cannot be quashed on the mere ground that the investigation consumed a period of four years." The Apex Court, however, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, quashed the criminal prosecution of two ladies accused holding : "Nonetheless, we are told that the only offence alleged against the two senescent lady appellants is that they abetted the public servant to commit the offence under Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. For two reasons we are disposed to quash the criminal proceedings as against those two ladies. First is, the materials are too insufficient to prove that those two old ladies intentionally abetted the public servant in acquiring assets which are disproportionate to his known source of income. If that is the position, why should those two old ladies be compelled to embark upon a trial which, in all probabilities, cannot end in conviction against them, even assuming that the octogenarian ladies would be able to survive till the end of the trial. Second is, the trial is not likely to end within one or two years. Even if the Special court would strictly adhere to the directions issued by this Court in Rajdeo Sharmas case (supra) we reasonably foresee that the prosecution would be able to complete the evidence only within the farthest time permitted in Rajdeo Sharma as we can have a glimpse of the volume of documents and of the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. We feel that it would be unfair and unreasonable to compel the two ladies, who by the advancement of old age would possibly have already crossed into geriatric stage, to stand the long trial have no reasonable prospect of ultimate conviction against them. We are, therefore, inclined to delink them from the array of accused and quash the criminal prosecution so far as those two ladies are concerned. We do so." 10. We are, therefore, inclined to delink them from the array of accused and quash the criminal prosecution so far as those two ladies are concerned. We do so." 10. In the case of Seelta Hemchandra Shashittal V/s. State of Maharashtra (supra), the Apex Court only delinked two ladies accused persons from the array of the accused and the prosecution of rest of the accused persons, however, was allowed to continue. 11. The case at hand, in my opinion, is dissimilar to the cases, as referred to above, and in view of the statements made by the Vigilance in the counter affidavit that investigation would be completed within four weeks, it would not be appropriate at this stage to interfere with the investigation/ proceedings of the case. 12. In the result, this application is dismissed.