S. R. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are an accused in C. C. No. 120/2000 on the file of xvii Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad invoke the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings. ( 2 ) A brief resume of background of facts is necessary. 2nd respondent herein filed a complaint under Section 200 Cr. PC before the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, hyderabad who in turn forwarded the same to police for investigation. The police received the complaint on 26-4-1997 and registered a case in Cr. No. 127/97 under sections 120 (B), 406, 418, 420, 199. 200, 177,181, 169, 423, 426 and 511 IPC. After the investigation, the police have submitted a final report stating that the case is of civil nature. It appears that the police have served a notice on the defacto-complainant. It appears that the learned Magistrate closed the matter by accepting the final report of police. Thereafter, a protest petition was presented by the defacto-complainant. 2nd respondent presented in Crl. MP. 663/ 2000 in Cr. No. 127/97 praying the Court to take up the protest petition and dispose of the same in accordance with law. The learned Magistrate set aside the earlier order passed by him after recording the sworn statement of defacto complainant and another witness by name R. Ratnakumari and tookup the case on file for the offence under sections 420 and 120 (B) IPC and issued summons to the petitioners. The said order has been passed on 18-2-2000. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the said order on the ground that the Magistrate has no power to review his own order passed earlier and seeks for quashing of the proceedings. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision reported in State of Kerala v M. M. Manikantan Nair, AIR 2001 SC 2145 . He has also placed reliance on another decision reported in Bhagawant Singh v. Commissioner of Police and another, (1985) 2 SCC 537 . The learned Public Prosecutor contends that since no final orders have been passed in the private complaint presented before the Court, the Court has got jurisdiction inspite of accepting the police report and closed the matter. She further contends that before accepting the police report, the defacto-complainant has to be heard. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that since no final orders have been passed in the private complaint presented before the Court, the Court has got jurisdiction inspite of accepting the police report and closed the matter. She further contends that before accepting the police report, the defacto-complainant has to be heard. ( 4 ) THE learned senior Counsel for the 2nd respondent has relied on the following catena of decisions. (1) 2002 (1) Supreme 192 (2) (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 652 (3) 2002 (2) Supreme 261 (4) U. J. (SC) 1985 (5) 1997 CRL. LJ. 4636 ( 5 ) ADVERTING to the said contentions, the entire law has been summarized in a decision reported in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) supreme 192 . The Supreme Court framed certain guidelines and principles while considering the cases under Section 482 cr. PC as can be seen from paragraphs 6 to 9. The relevant portion in the said paras is extracted hereunder. Para-6: Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the court possessed before the enactment of the code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislature enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of high Courts. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of high Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quande lex aliquid aliqui concedit, concedere videtur in sine que ipsa, esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist ). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised exdebite justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court, would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of process bf Court or quashing, of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. Para-7: In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ), this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash proceedings. Para-7: In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ), this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash proceedings. (I) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e. g. , want of sanction; (ii) Where the allegation in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. para-8: In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. Bhajan Lal and others ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: - (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F. I. R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the F. I. R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act. providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Were a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Para-9: As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Para-9: As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [see: the Santa Bai etc. v. B. S. Chowdhary and others etc. ( AIR 1993 SC 892 ), Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another, ( AIR 1964 SC 1 )]. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding. [see: mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prassnna Kumar and others, ( AIR 1990 SC 494 ), Slate of bihar and another v. P. P. Sharma IAS and another (1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 222), Rupan deo Bajaj (Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar pal Singh Gill and another, (1995 [6] SCC 194), State of Kerala and others v. OC kuttan and others (1999 [2] SCC 651), State of V. P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996 [7] SCC 705), rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar bhada (1997 [2] SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another (1999) [8] SCC 728), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others ( AIR 1999 sc 1216 )]. ( 6 ) IT is clear from the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court that inherent powers have to be exercised sparingly and cautiously and that too in rarest of rare cases. It is clearly stated by supreme Court that the authority of Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce, injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. It would be an abuse of process of Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Keeping in view the principles and guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, it is necessary to judge the validity of the orders passed by the learned magistrate. It is clearly stated by Supreme court in a decision mentioned (supra) above at para-6 which is as follows. Para-6:"that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorize the High Court to review its judgment or order passed whether in exercise of its appellate, revisional or original jurisdiction. Section 362 of the Code prohibits the Court after it has signed its judgment or final order disposing a case from altering or reviewing the said judgment or order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. This prohibition is complete and no criminal court can review its own judgment or order after it is signed. By the first order, the High Court rejected the prayer of the respondent for quashing the criminal proceeding. This order attained its finality. By the impugned order, the High Court reversed its earlier order and quashed the criminal proceeding for want of proper sanction. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that by the impugned order the high Court only corrected any clerical or arithmetical error. In fact the impugned order is an order of review, as the earlier order was reversed, which could not have been done as there is no such provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but there is an interdict against it. " ( 7 ) IT is clear from the impugned order that the learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent herein has advanced argument before the lower Court that even though the final report is accepted by the Court, it can be reviewed and placed reliance on a decision reported in 1997 Crl. LJ page 4636. He also placed reliance on another decision in UJ (SC) 1985. I have perused those two decisions. The learned Magistrate has misled that he has got power to review the order and proceeded with the complaint. The Supreme Court has interpreted section 173 of Cr. P. C in a decision reported in Bhagawant Singh v. Commissioner of police, UJ (SC) 1985, and framed guidelines. It is relevant to extract the relevant portion at para-4. . . . The learned Magistrate has misled that he has got power to review the order and proceeded with the complaint. The Supreme Court has interpreted section 173 of Cr. P. C in a decision reported in Bhagawant Singh v. Commissioner of police, UJ (SC) 1985, and framed guidelines. It is relevant to extract the relevant portion at para-4. . . . . . . "in a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information report, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of the consideration of the report". It is clearly stated by Supreme Court in union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah, 1997 Crl. LJ 4636, that the learned magistrate cannot accept the report and order for dropping of proceedings without giving notice to the de facto-complainant. It is further observed that the Magistrate could not in any event deligate to the investigating agency its function of issuing notice. Moreover, when law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner and in no other manner. So that was a case where the Supreme Court was dealing with the final report submitted by CBI. The Supreme Court has categorically stated that the Magistrate may direct for further investigation as provided under section 173 (8)Cr. PC. ( 8 ) OBVIOUSLY, in this case, the guidelines provided by Supreme Court are not followed by the learned Magistrate. He has not served any notice on the de facto-complainant before accepting the report and closing the proceedings. Even though, the magistrate cannot assume the power of recording sworn statement by ignoring his earlier order passed under the guise of review. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the 2nd respondent has to work out his remedies provided under law by approaching the higher Court and get them set aside. This has not been done in this case. Insofar as taking of the complaint on file after recording the sworn statement and that too after reviewing the order make the impugned order illegal. This has not been done in this case. Insofar as taking of the complaint on file after recording the sworn statement and that too after reviewing the order make the impugned order illegal. This is a case where the learned Magistrate failed to follow the guidelines and legal principles enunciated by Supreme Court. There is miscarriage of justice occurred in this case and it needs interference by this Court. In that view of the matter, I have no hesitation to say that the order of review passed by the learned Magistrate has to be set aside including taking the case on file after recording the sworn statement since he has no jurisdiction to do it. ( 9 ) SUFFICE it to say that he has to be given certain directions in this case to follow strictly the procedure mentioned for closure of the matters. Hence, I direct the learned Magistrate to serve a notice of the final report to the 2nd respondent. He shall record the sworn statement once again including the witnesses and consider the case afresh. He shall also decide whether the matter comes under civil nature or not. ( 10 ) IN the result, these criminal petitions are allowed while directing the Magistrate to take the case on file once again and decide the matter as per the directions issued by this Court mentioned supra after following the guidelines and principles laid down by the Supreme Court.