K.Sampath, J: The plaintiff in O.S.No.92 of 1981, on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge’s Court, Tuticorin, is the appellant in the appeal. The suit for partition declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/11th share in the plaint schedule properties, for final decree by appointing an Advocate Commissioner for dividing the schedule mentioned properties by metes and bounds and converting joint family possession into separate possession and also allotting separate portions to the plaintiff, for a preliminary decree directing defendants 1 to 3 to render accounts for the past and future income and for profits from 31.10.1976, and for passing a final decree ascertaining the amount due to the plaintiff by appointing a Commissioner, has been dismissed by the lower Court. 2. Her case in the plaint is as follows: She was the eldest daughter of late V.T.V.T.Kanagasabapathy Pillai, the first defendant being his widow, defendants 2 and being his sons, and defendants 4 to 10 being his other daughters; the suit properties belonged to Kanagasabapathy Pillai, who died intestate on 31.10.1976 leaving behind the plaintiff and the defendants as his heirs; the properties set out in the schedule were Hindu joint family properties of plaintiffs and defendants and separate properties of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai - most of them were self-acquisitions of Kanagasabapathy Pillai; the plaintiff and the defendants being co-owners were in joint possession; defendants 1 to 3 were managing the properties, and they agreed to render accounts to the plaintiff; a sum of Rs.4,000 was standing to the plaintiff’s credit in the family accounts and was payable to her forthwith - it was an item of accounting by defendants 1 to 3; defendants 1 to 3 were trying and about to sell the properties without the plaintiff’s consent for a song and complicate matters and multiply litigation; the plaintiff demanded partition and separate possession as also accounting from the defendants, but they were delaying the partition fraudulently with oblique and sinister motives; and, she sent a suit notice on 14.9.1981 to defendants 1 to 3, who received the same on 15.9.1981 did not send any reply. 3. 3. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a common written statement contending as follows: Properties, set out in the schedule, were the ancestral and joint family coparcenary properties of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai and defendants 2 and 3; they were not the self acquired properties of Kanagasabapathy Pillai, the plaintiff, if at all, would be entitled to 1/33rd share only; in view of the fact, that the shares the daughters were entitled to, were only a flea-bite and in view of the fact that the daughters had been well provided with jewels at one time of marriage, all the daughters gave up their rights in the estate by way of a family arrangement in favour of defendants 1 to 3 in Vaikasi 1979, and also in view of the involvement of estate duty and other financial commitments including family debts to the tune of about Rs.1.5 lakhs - the debts included othi (for the marriages of D.9 and D.10) debt of Rs.17,000 and odd, for payment of estate duty got from Parvathi (D.5), insurance amount of D.1 spent for the family and the debts due to the depositors; a provision had to be made for the discharge of these debts before a partition as per law; no question of management by these defendants arose in view of the fact of ‘release’ by the daughters in their favour; there was no question of rendering accounts; the plaintiff was not entitled to Rs.4,000 as it was only an adjustment of the accounts; even if there was one, the claim was time barred; the alleged sale agreement was got through to discharge the family debts, which were mounting like anything by way of principal and interest, and also in view of the threatened action by the creditors; 14th item in the first schedule, and the second schedule had been sold to Bakyalakashmi and two others, and Varuvel respectively, to the knowledge of the plaintiff’s husband who took active part for the discharge of family debts; the seventh Schedule was not liable for partition as it was a specific endowment for religious and charitable purposes; the alleged movables shown in Schedule VII did not exist at all except the iron safe; cash of Rs.10,000 and jewels worth Rs.1 lakh were only the imagination of the plaintiff to boost up her claim; the amounts shown in schedules VIII and IX were not correct; and, the Court fee paid was not correct. 4. 4. The plaintiff filed a reply statement denying the various averments in the written statement and reiterating the contents in the plaint: The properties were the separate properties of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai and there was no Hindu Mitakshare coparcenary property; he kept all his earnings separately; he had no intention to show the into the common stock of the joint family there was no acquisition with the aid of income of ancestral assets or the proceeds of sale of such properties; there was no income-yielding nucleus; the first defendant was a non-earning widow and defendants 2 and 3 were mentally weak and affected, and there was, therefore, no question of joint properties; a share was a share, whether it was 1/2 or 1/33; to site it as a flea-bite was wrong and meaningless; partition by metes and bounds was a statutory right; marriage was a Samaskara and a Secrament for any Hindu for getting salvation; once a girl was born to a Hindu, he must provide her with jewels and get her married - it was not a ground to sent her statutory share; no daughters gave up their rights in the estate by way of family-arrangement in the month of Vaikasi, 1979; the alleged family arrangement was false; the estate duty was a small amount; the income from the properties was large to pay the duty and there was no need to reserve that for final partition; Parvathi did not pay any amount for that nor had claimed any amount from the family; the family debts were hoax; the particulars of creditors and the amounts were not given; the defendants wanted to create debts and ante-dated documents; othi debt of Rs.17,000 was already discharged; the defendants were retaining the insurance amounts to secrete illegality; they must account for the receipts; no provision need be made to discharge the alleged debts as they were bogus debts and imaginary; the true debts were already discharged from the income of the properties; defendants 1 to 3 had to render accounts; the amount of Rs.4,000, referred to in para III(8) of the plaint, was a deposit-amount to the credit of the plaintiff in defendants’ accounts; interest was payable at 12% per annum; there was no bar of limitation; no creditor had filed any suit or issued any notice demanding bona fide debts; the sale agreement was liable to be set aside as all the sharers were not consenting parties and it was not for the benefit of the estate; every legal heir was entitled to demand partition under the Hindu Succession Act - it was a statutory right; the right to demand an account was an incident to partition under the Hindu Law; the plaintiff’s husband did not take part in the discharge of family debts nor in the execution of sale deeds; the defendants’ allegations to the contra were denied; the sixth schedule was not a specific endowment for religious and charitable purposes; there was only a charge for the performance of certain charities; the defendants had misappropriated the movables, cash of Rs.10,000 and jewels worth Rs. 1.5 lakhs; the family accounts and the list of jewellery would disclose their existence and misappropriation; and, the Court fee paid was correct. 5. On the above pleadings, the lower Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the suit properties are the joint family properties of Kanagasabapathy Pillai, if so what is the share of the plaintiff? (2) Whether the family arrangement set up by defendants 1 to 3 is true and whether the daughters of Kanagasabapathy Pillai released their rights in favour of defendants 1 to 3? (3) Whether the claim by the plaintiff for Rs.4,000 is barred by limitation? (4) Whether defendants 1 to 3 are to render accounts to the plaintiff? (5) Whether the 14th item in the first schedule and the second schedule properties had been sold for the discharge of family debts?(6) Whether there are debts due from the family, if so how much? (7) Whether the seventh schedule property is endowment property and whether it is not liable to partition? (8) Whether the seventh schedule movables exist? (9) Whether eight and ninth schedules’ amounts are correct? (10) Whether proper Court fee has not been paid? (11) To what relief parties are entitled to? 6. On the side of the plaintiff her husband has been examined as the only witness and Exs.A.1 to A.6 have been marked. On the side of the defendants, the second defendant has examined himself as D.W.1 and one Amirtha Ganesan as D.W.2. Exs.B.1 to B.42 have been marked. 7. On issue No.1, the learned Judge found that the suit properties were the ancestral joint family properties of Kanagasabapathy Pillai, and that the plaintiff was entitled to 1.3rd share. On issue No.2, the learned Judge held that the family arrangement set up by defendants 1 to 3 was true and as per the terms of the family arrangement the daughters of Kanagasabapathy Pillai had released their rights in favour of defendants 1 to 3. On issue No.3, the learned Judge held that in Ex.B.21 the amount was reflected in the accounts of defendants 1 to 3 in the name of the plaintiff. However, in as much as the plaintiff had not demanded the money within three years after the death of Kanagasabapathy Pillai, the claim was barred by limitation. On issue No.3, the learned Judge held that in Ex.B.21 the amount was reflected in the accounts of defendants 1 to 3 in the name of the plaintiff. However, in as much as the plaintiff had not demanded the money within three years after the death of Kanagasabapathy Pillai, the claim was barred by limitation. On issue No.4, the learned Judge held that in as much as the plaintiff along with her sisters/defendants 4 to 10 had orally released their rights in favour of defendants 1 to 3, the plaintiff could not ask for accounts from defendants 1 to 3. On issue No.5, the lower Court held that item 14 in the first schedule, and the second schedule properties had been sold for discharging the family debts and therefore those two items were not available for division. On issue No.6, the learned Judge found that there were debts due from the family as would be evident from Ex.B.16/Day book. On issue No.7, the sixth schedule property was an endowed property. On issue No.8, the seventh schedule movables were non-existent. On issue No.9, the figures given in schedules 8 and 9 were not correct. On issue No.10 the learned Judge found that the plaintiff had not paid Court fee for return of Rs.4,000 and it had to be held that proper Court fee has not been paid. So holding, by judgment and decree, dated 19.7.1985, the lower Court dismissed the suit. 8. It is as against that the present appeal has been filed. 9. Mr.T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel for the appellant, made the following submissions: The lower Court was in error in holding that the suit properties were not the separate properties of Kanagasabapathy Pillai. In this connection, the lower Court overlooked that Kanagasabapathy Pillai was a very enterprising man and carrying on business in which he was earning substantial amount, and that most of the items were purchased out of such earnings. There was nothing to show that there was sufficient ancestral nucleus, and that the income therefrom would have been available for Kanagasabapathy Pillai to acquire properties. There was nothing to show that there was sufficient ancestral nucleus, and that the income therefrom would have been available for Kanagasabapathy Pillai to acquire properties. The lower Court ought to have held, on the basis of the oral evidence of the second defendant as D.W.1, that the income from the joint family properties was not adequate to give support to the family and therefore, the properties standing in the name of Kanagasabapathy Pillai must be deemed to be his separate self acquired properties, in which event the plaintiff’s 1/11th share should have been declared and she should have been given a decree for partition. As regards relinquishment, the lower Court had proceeded on a misapprehension and held that the plaintiff as also her sisters had released their rights in the properties. Absolutely no material evidence had been produced regarding the family arrangement set up as to how it was arrived at, who were the mediators that brought about the family arrangement, and what were the circumstances under which it was brought about. The learned Senior Counsel also made his submissions with regard to the release in respect of immovable properties of the value of over Rs.100/-, without a registered instrument; as there was inconsistency with regard to the release, how, in any event the plaintiff not being a party to the alleged release, it would bind on her, and the lower Court was in error in upholding the release set up by defendants 1 to 3. As regards the finding that proper Court fee had not been paid, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the amount claimed was found in the accounts of the family and as per the accounts the amount was payable to the plaintiff and no separate Court fee was payable. As regards bar of limitation, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that it was only a deposit and under Art.22 of the Limitation Act, the limitation would commence only from the date of demand and the suit having been filed within three years from the date of demand, it could not be said that the claim was out of time. As regards bar of limitation, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that it was only a deposit and under Art.22 of the Limitation Act, the limitation would commence only from the date of demand and the suit having been filed within three years from the date of demand, it could not be said that the claim was out of time. As regards dedication in respect of Schedule VI property, there was no evidence whatsoever and even conceding that there was any dedication it was only partial dedication and the parties would be entitled to partition of the properties set apart from dedication and they could be asked to perform the charities jointly. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that there ws no proof of debts and as regards marriage expenses of D.9 to D.11, there was evidence to show that the mother/first defendant provided jewels for their marriages. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to a number of authorities as to the nature of the properties that had to be inferred from the available materials. 10. Mr.P.Jayaraman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.A.Amalraj for the contesting respondents, submitted that the plaintiff having come forward with a specific case that the properties were self acquired properties of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai, it was incumbent to prove her plea through documents and also through oral evidence and there was absolutely no evidence produced by her to show that the properties were the self acquired properties of Kanagasabapathy Pillai. In this connection, the learned senior counsel referred to plaintiff’s husband/P.W.1’s oral evidence and submitted that the presumption would be that the properties were all ancestral properties. As regards debts, Mr.Jayaraman submitted that there was enough proof that the family was indebted and P.W.1 himself had signed as witness in Ex.B.36/Othi document on 14.5.1979, and that would conclusively prove that the family was heavily indebted after the death of Kanagasabapathy Pillai. Further, defendants 9 and 10 were unmarried at that time and the family had to incur expenses for celebrating their marriages. As regards family arrangement, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that after the death of Kanagasabapathy Pillai there was a family arrangement and the properties were released by female members in favour of defendants 1 to 3, and it was binding on the plaintiff as well. As regards family arrangement, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that after the death of Kanagasabapathy Pillai there was a family arrangement and the properties were released by female members in favour of defendants 1 to 3, and it was binding on the plaintiff as well. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish her case, that she had to stand or fall on the strength of her case and could not pick holes in the case of the defendants. The learned Senior Counsel referred to a number of authorities which will dealt with in the course of the judgment. 11. The points for consideration can be broadly set out under the following heads: (1) Nature of the properties - whether joint family or individual properties? (2) What are the properties available for partition? (3) Whether the release set up by defendants 1 to 3 is true and valid? (4) If it is held to be not true and valid, what share the plaintiff would be entitled to? (5) Whether any provision is to be made, if there were debts in the family? (6) Whether Court fee paid is correct? 12. As to the nature of the properties, in para 5 of the plant it is stated that “all are Hindu Joint family properties of plaintiff and defendants and separate properties of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai and most of them are self-acquisitions of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai”, and in para 6 it is stated that “the defendants and the plaintiff are co-owners and are in joint-possession from 31.10.1976”. In para 4 of the written statement of defendants 1 to 3 it is stated that “the properties are the coparcenary joint family properties acquired out of and from the joint family income and nucleus, defendants 2 and 3 are entitled to 1/3rd share each, while the 1/3rd share of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai is to be divided among his legal heirs including all.” In the reply statement, in para 3, it is stated that “the plaint schedule properties are the separate properties of late Kanagasabapathy Pillai, that they are not ancestral and coparcenary properties, and that there was no Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property. Further, he kept all his earnings separately. He had no intention to throw them into the common stock of the joint family”. Further, he kept all his earnings separately. He had no intention to throw them into the common stock of the joint family”. And in para 5(d) it is stated that “It is for the Court to decide which are ancestral and which are his self-acquisitions”. 13. Ex.B.1 is the relevant document to find out whether Kanagasabapathy Pillai had any ancestral joint family properties. Ex.B.1 is a partition deed entered into between Kanagasabapathy Pillai and his paternal uncle Govindasamy Pillai. This is what is recited in the document: 14. It is seen from the document/Ex.B.1 that the family had ancestral business in money lending, and that the said business as also the movables had been partitioned already by the parties. Under the said document, only the immovable properties were being partitioned. At least four immovable properties were allotted to the share of Kanagasabapathy Pillai under the said partition and it is seen that they tally with items 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint schedule. It is further seen that each item has several door numbers and that explains how line such schedule in the plaint there are several door numbers given as comprised in that particular item. It can be reasonably presumed that the family had ancestral properties, that they were quite substantial, that there was ancestral business, and unless the plaintiff had shown that the business of her father was an independent business, that he had adequate income from that business, and that he had acquired the said properties from and out of the same, the normal presumption would be that all the properties were either joint family properties. The learned Senior Counsel Mr.T.R.Mani in this connection submitted that there was vital admission on the part of the second defendant as D.W.1 that the family was a large family, and that the income was hardly adequate to maintain the family. No doubt, D.W.1 in the course of his evidence has said- But P.W.1’s evidence is to the following effect- 15. P.W.1 is not sure of plaintiff’s case. In the pleading it is said that it is for the Court to find out which are the self-acquired properties and which are the joint family properties. He knew Kanagasabapathy Pillai only through his marriage. He also says that he does no know whether Kanagasabapathy Pillai had any separate income. 16. Let us now find out what the legal position is. He knew Kanagasabapathy Pillai only through his marriage. He also says that he does no know whether Kanagasabapathy Pillai had any separate income. 16. Let us now find out what the legal position is. 17. In Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurti, (1947)2 M.L.J. 138 : A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 189: I.L.R. 1948 Mad. 440, it has been held as follows: "Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property is joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relatives value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property." 18. In Mallapa Girimallappa Betgeri v. Yellapagounda Patil, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 906 the Supreme Court held as follows: "Where the manager of a joint Hindu family acquired certain properties in his own name and there was sufficient nucleus of joint family property out of which those properties might have been acquired and apart from those properties the manager had no other source of income, the presumption arises that the newly acquired properties were the properties of the joint family. Unless that presumption was rebutted, it must prevail." 19. In Dhanwatey v. Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P., (1968)2 S.C.R. 62 : A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 683 it has been held as follows: "The general doctrine of Hindu Law is that the property acquired by a karta or a coparcener with the aid or assistance of joint family assets is impressed with the character of joint family property. To put it differently, it is an essential feature of self-acquired property that it should have been acquired without assistance or aid of the joint family property. The test of self-acquisition by the Karta or coparcener is that it should be without detriment to the ancestral estate. Before an acquisition can be claimed to be a separate property, it must be shown that it was made without any aid or assistance from the ancestral or joint family property." 20. The test of self-acquisition by the Karta or coparcener is that it should be without detriment to the ancestral estate. Before an acquisition can be claimed to be a separate property, it must be shown that it was made without any aid or assistance from the ancestral or joint family property." 20. In P.N.Krishna Iyer v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Kerala, (1969)1 S.C.R. 943 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 893 the Supreme Court held as follows: "Income received by a member of a Hindu undivided family from a firm or a company in which the funds of the Hindu undivided family are invested, even though the income may be partially traceable to personal exertion of the member, is taxable as the income of the Hindu undivided family, if it is earned by detriment to the family funds or with the aid or assistance of those funds; otherwise it is taxable as the member’s separate income." 21. In Mudigowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ramchandra Revgowda Sankh, (1969)3 S.C.R. 245 : A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1076 the Supreme Court held as follows: "There is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint, possesses any joint property. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property, is, therefore, in the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparcenary property. But if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. This is however subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate." (See also Venkatramayya v. Seshamma, I.L.R. 1937 Mad. 1012: A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 538 and Vythianatha v. Varadaraja, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 841) 22. 1012: A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 538 and Vythianatha v. Varadaraja, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 841) 22. In Baikuntha Nath v. Sashi Bhusan, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2531 it has been held as follows: "When a joint family is found to be in possession of nucleus sufficient to make the impugned acquisitions then a presumption arises that the acquisitions standing in the names of the persons who were in the management of the family properties are family acquisitions." 23. Under Ex.B.1, Kanagasabapathy Pilai and his paternal uncle Govindasamy Pillai partitioned the immovable properties. It is specifically mentioned in Ex.B.1 that they had partitioned the movables either as also their business. We find, that the immovable properties, which Kanagasabapathy Pillai got under Ex.B.1 are substantial properties. Not only that, he had also divided the business which was one of money lending, and he had, for his joint family, a business in Colombo also, though D.W.1 had, in the course of his evidence, stated that the business had been closed twenty years prior to his giving evidence. We are not concerned whether the business still continued, but, the family had a joint family business in money lending and it is not the case of the plaintiff that Kanagasabapathy Pillai had any independent source of income apart from the income from the immovable properties and from the business in money lending. There is also some evidence to show that in 1964 Kanagasabapathy Pillai, his sons, namely defendants 2 and 3, formed a partnership and continued the original business which had fallen to the share of Kanagasabapathy Pillai in the 1951 partition under Ex.B.1. Merely because in the course of his evidence D.W.1 had said that the income from the lands was just enough to maintain the family, it would not mean that Kanagasabapathy Pillai utilised the income from the ancestral properties and business just for the maintenance of the family and had been carrying on separately any other business and the income therefrom he was utilizing for purchasing and improving his properties. No dicthotomy appears to have been made by Kanagasabapathy Pillai. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that Kanagasabapathy Pillai had any independent business other than the joint family business which he got or about the time of Ex.B.1. No dicthotomy appears to have been made by Kanagasabapathy Pillai. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that Kanagasabapathy Pillai had any independent business other than the joint family business which he got or about the time of Ex.B.1. The law is well settled and defendants 1 to 3 have been able to show that the family was in possession of sufficient ancestral nucleus to make acquisitions from the income there from. The plaintiff has not been able to show that any particular acquisition was made by Kanagasabapathy Pillai from out of any separate income from any separate business of his own. It has been clearly established that there was a joint family, that is possessed some joint properties which from its nature and relatives value might have formed the nucleus from which the properties in question, subject matter of the suit, might have been acquired, and that the burden, which shifted to the plaintiff, who alleged that the properties were acquired without the aid of the joint family property, had not been discharged. She had not shown that there was any independent sources of income from her father. All the properties were impressed with the character of joint family properties and, as already pointed out, the plaintiff had also not been able to pin point which were the properties acquired with the separate funds of the father. The conclusion is inescapable that the properties are the joint family properties. The conclusion reached by the lower Court in this regard is correct and is therefore affirmed. If it is found that the properties are joint family properties, the plaintiff will be entitled to an 1/11th share in the 1/3rd share of the father, i.e, her share would be 1/33 in the properties available for partition. 24. The next question relates to what are the properties available for partition. As regards the properties available for partition, it is the case of defendants 1 to 3 that some of the items had been sold away in particular item 14 Schedule I had to be alienated long prior to the suit also the second schedule item. The necessity for selling the second item was not disclosed in the pleading. Merely stating that the second Schedule Item had been sold is not enough in the absence of any further material to show that it is not available for partition. The necessity for selling the second item was not disclosed in the pleading. Merely stating that the second Schedule Item had been sold is not enough in the absence of any further material to show that it is not available for partition. In any event if it is found that it had been sold away, in the final decree proceedings the property should be allotted to the shares of defendants 1 to 3. There is no other material to show that any other property was alienated. Even while injunction was in force. Defendants 1 to 3 had created othi in respect of two items in Vathiyar Street together given as plaint first Schedule item 8. None of the other items has been shown to have been alienated. As regards schedule sixth item, it is an extent of five acres in Iron S.No.10 in Veepankulam village. According to the defendants, the properties had been dedicated to endowment. D.W.1 in the course of his evidence has stated as follows: It is also admitted by him that the Hindu Religious nd Charitable Endowments Department had not been notified that this property was endowed property, and that there was no record to show which were the charities to be performed. In these circumstances, we have to conclude that it was only a partial dedication. The said properties were burdened with trust and not a total dedication. The plaintiff is entitled to her share in the said properties, subject to the contributing for the performance of the charities. 25. The next question is regarding the “release” In para 4 of the written statement defendants 1 to 3 have stated that the plaintiff if at all would be entitled to 1/33 share only which was no negligible as anything, that taking into consideration of the flea-bite of the share to which the daughters were entitled to and in view of the fact that the daughters were well provided with jewels at the time of marriage, all the daughters gave up their rights the estate by way of family arrangement in favour of the defendants in the month of Vaikasi, 1979, and in view of the involvement of estate duty and other financial commitment including the family debts to the tune of Rs.1.5 lakhs. The plaintiff in her reply statement has categorically denied para 5(g) that none of the daughters gave up her rights the estate by way of family arrangement in the month of Vaikasi, 1979, that the alleged family arrangement was false and the biggest candard of the times, and that it was a hoax. Defendants 1 to 3, besides setting an early release by the daughters, have produced Exs.B.9 to B.11, they being the release deeds stated to have been executed by D.4 to D.6, D.8 and D.9. These documents do not refer to the alleged oral evidence by the daughters. These documents are unregistered. It is the contention of Mr.T.R.Mani, that there could be no release in respect of immovable property of the value of over Rs.100 except by way of registered instrument, and, in any event, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, she had not executed away release deed. 26. In Muniapa Pillai v. Periasami, (1975)1 M.L.J. 236 it was held that a release after getting a sum of money from the release is a transfer under Sec.5 of the Transfer of Property Act. If it is a transfer in respect of immovable property it goes without saying that it has to be by a registered instrument. 27. In The Official Assignee Of Madras v. Tehmina Dinshaw Teherani, (1972)1 M.L.J. 48 it has been held that the word ‘convey’ is used in a wider sense to include a release also, and that the word ‘transfer’ in Sec.53 of the Transfer of Property Act is wide enough to take in all kinds of transfers including release. 28. In Kasinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishweshwar, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 153 the Supreme Court held as follows: “If the document itself creates an interest in immovable property, the fact that it contemplates the execution of another document will not exempt it from registration under Sec.17(2)(V) of the Registration Act.” 29. We therefore differ from the conclusion reached by the lower Court that the daughters executed release deeds in favour of defendants 1 to 3 giving up their rights in the properties of their father. In any event, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, we hold that it cannot be said that she had given up her right even earlier and that the plaintiff cannot be non-suited on that ground. 30. In any event, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, we hold that it cannot be said that she had given up her right even earlier and that the plaintiff cannot be non-suited on that ground. 30. It is not shown satisfactorily as to what are the debts due from the family to any other creditor. On the contrary, it would appear from the evidence of D.W.1 that there was some case filed by defendants 1 to 3 against a debtor for recovery of some money due. In these circumstances, it is not possible to direct any provision to be made for any alleged debts. However, it is left open to defendants 1 to 3 take up the question relating to the debts due from the family in the final decree proceedings. Subject to their satisfactorily establishing that there are debts due from the family, adequate provision shall be made in the final decree proceedings for discharge of the same. 31. The next question relates to the deposit claimed to have been made by the plaintiff in the family fund. It is not disputed a sum of Rs.4,000 is entered in the accounts and standing to her credit. It is a partition action. The lower Court was clearly in error in holding that the plaintiff had not paid the Court fee for this amount. When the suit had been valued under Sec.37(2) of the Court Fee Act and this part of the claim relates to accounting, no separate Court fee fee need to be paid by the plaintiff. Again, the lower Court was in error in holding that the claim for this amount is barred by limitation. This is a deposit and the amount is repayable on demand and from the date of demand, the claimant will have three years period as limitation. Art.22 of the limitation is the relevant article. It provides for three years from the date of demand for instituting any action. The conclusion reached by the lower Court cannot, therefore, be sustained. 32. The learned Senior Counsel were at pains to point out that the parties must stand or fall on the strength of their own case and cannot rely on the weakness of the other side. Particularly when the plaintiff comes to Court with a specific case, he/she cannot pick holes in the case of the defendants. 33. 32. The learned Senior Counsel were at pains to point out that the parties must stand or fall on the strength of their own case and cannot rely on the weakness of the other side. Particularly when the plaintiff comes to Court with a specific case, he/she cannot pick holes in the case of the defendants. 33. Again, arguments were advanced regarding getting in evidence in the absence of specific plea raised. Let us refer to the various decisions relied on by counsel. 34. In Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa, (1953) S.C.J. 345: A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 235 it has been held that there could be no relief outside the pleadings and Mr.T.R.Mani, learned Senior Counsel, relied on this judgment in support of his contention that defendants 1 to 3 had not pleaded that there was surplus money available from the joint family properties and that the same was utilised for acquiring more properties. As a proposition of law, it is beyond dispute. But then, we have found that there was adequate ancestral nucleus out of the income from which acquisitions were made. We have also referred to the very admission by P.W.1 in this regard. We have also pointed out that the plaintiff herself is not sure about her case. Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar, (1957)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 28: (1957)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 28: (1957) S.C.J. 75: A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 133 is for the proposition that finding not based on pleading or evidence is not justified. To the same effect is Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand, (1968)2 S.C.J. 807: A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1083 “The ordinary rule of law is that evidence is to be given only on a plea properly raised and in contradiction of the plead”. (See also Mangal Sen v. Kanchhid Mal, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1726.) 35. In Jagdish Narain v. Ahmed Khan, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 59, relied on by Mr.Jayaraman, learned counsel for contesting respondents, is for the proposition that where a plaintiff sues in ejectment, he has to succeed or fail on the strength of his own title. There is no obligation upon the defendant to plead possible defects in the plaintiff’s title which might manifest themselves when the title is disclosed. It is sufficient that in the written statement the defendant denies the plaintiff’s title, and under this plea he can avail himself of any defect which such title discloses. 36. There is no obligation upon the defendant to plead possible defects in the plaintiff’s title which might manifest themselves when the title is disclosed. It is sufficient that in the written statement the defendant denies the plaintiff’s title, and under this plea he can avail himself of any defect which such title discloses. 36. In Nagayasami Naidu v. Kochadai Naidu, 81 L.W. 436 it has been held - “A party cannot be awarded relief on a basis not pleaded by him and on which there is no issue, merely taking advantage of some statements in the pleadings or in the evidence made or given for different purpose and with reference to a different issue. Such deviation from the pleadings is permissible very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances, if it can be postulated that the other side has unambiguously and unequivocally admitted completely factual or the legal basis on which relief could be moulded.” 37. In P.Saraswathi Ammal v. Lakshmi Ammal @ Lakshmi Kantam, (1977)2 M.L.J. 179 : A.I.R. 1978 Mad. 361 it has been held that a plaintiff cannot abandon his case and seek relief accepting the respondent’s case since it is more convenient and suitable to him. It is further held in that it is not open to the plaintiff as a party to the litigation to allege one set of facts as against the other side and after being confronted with a denial of such facts by the opponent make a volte-face and attempt to sustain the case of the plaintiff on the facts alleged by the opponent and seek for relief on such an inconsistent stand. 38. We have referred to the various decisions cited by counsel more for the sake of completeness than for drawing inspiration from them for adjudicating the points for determination in the appeal. It is now well established that the principle that a party abandon his case and claim relief on the basis of the other party’s plea, is not applicable where one party does not seek relief on the basis of the plea of the order party but only on the facts established on record, though they are at variance with his own pleading. 39. We therefore hold on the basis of the facts established on record as follows: (1) The suit properties are joint family properties. 39. We therefore hold on the basis of the facts established on record as follows: (1) The suit properties are joint family properties. (2) All the items in the plaint schedules except item 14 of Schedule I, Schedules VII to IX are available for partition. (3) The release set up by defendants 1 to 3 is not true and valid and in any event it is not binding on the plaintiff. (4) The plaintiff is entitled to 1/33 share in the properties held to be available for partition. (5) It is open to defendants 1 to 3 to prove the debts in the full decree proceedings and seek appropriate provision to be made for the same. (6) The Court fee paid is correct and the plaintiff is entitled to be repaid her Rs.4,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit till payment. Provision is to be made in the final decree fro repayment of this amount. (7) Schedule VI is only burdened with trust. It is divisible. The parties shall pay their share of the amount for the performance of the Ubhayams. 40. Consequently, the appeal shall stand allowed. There will a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff’s 1/33 share in the suit properties as indicate above. It is open to the parties to apply for final decree before the lower Court. There will be no order as to costs.