T. MEENA KUMARI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a paid Secretary in manthena P. A. C. S. , Kankipadu Mandal, krishna District. The petitioner questioned the action of the 2nd respondent in issuing the proceedings in P. S. No. 138/2002-A2 dated 4-5-2002 proposing to dismiss him from service and also to declare all the proceedings including the issuance of charge Memo dated 3-11-2002 as illegal. ( 2 ) WHEN the matter has come up for hearing, both the counsel agreed that the writ Petition may be disposed of finally at the admission stage. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel Sri A. Satya prasad has argued that the petitioner has been working as Paid Secretary and a surcharge order has been passed on 15-9-1988 fixing liability of Rs. 15,849. 50 ps. in the proceedings issued by the fourth respondent in Rc. No. 4297/87-C dated 15-9-1988. Aggrieved by the issuance of surcharge proceedings, the petitioner has preferred CMA No. l of 1989 before the Cooperative tribunal and District Munsif at nuzvid. The Co-operative Tribunal in its judgment in CMA No. l of 1989 dated 2-3-1995, the surcharge proceedings and other proceedings dated 18-8-1988 and 23-8-1988 have been set aside. It is also further argued that the Co-operative tribunal directed the fourth respondent to provide another opportunity to the petitioner herein and pass appropriate orders. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel also submits that after lapse of four years i. e. , on 3-11-1992, the second respondent has issued show-cause in ps No. l40/92-A2 issuing notice charging the petitioner that during his tenure as a paid Secretary, there was a misappropriation of Rs. 15,849. 50 ps. It has been further argued that the charge-sheet has been replied by the petitioner and it is also brought to the notice of the Enquiry officer regarding filing of CMA No. l of 1989 and also the orders in C. M. A. wherein the surcharge Proceedings have been set aside. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that no enquiry conducted nearly for a period of 10 years. But, the 2nd respondent set in motion the enquiry by appointing another enquiry officer, namely, ch. A. Srinivas, a local advocate after a period of 10 years and he has commenced the enquiry. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that no enquiry conducted nearly for a period of 10 years. But, the 2nd respondent set in motion the enquiry by appointing another enquiry officer, namely, ch. A. Srinivas, a local advocate after a period of 10 years and he has commenced the enquiry. The learned counsel has also further argued that the petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer on 30-12-1998 and he has given written explanation along with the judgment of the designated Court in cma No. l of 1989 dated 2-3-1995. It is argued that the 2nd respondent issued the impugned proceedings dated 4-5-2002 basing on the report submitted by the enquiry Officer dated 2-6-1999 wherein he proposed to dismiss the petitioner from service and also directing him to pay the surcharge amount with 18% interest within a period of 10 days. The said proceeding has been questioned in the present writ petition. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner argued that there is delay of 10 years in issuing the impugned notice dated 4-5-2002 after issuance of the show-cause notice dated 3-11-1992. It is submitted that the petitioner has been participating in the enquiry and that there is no delay or lapse on the part of the petitioner in concluding the enquiry. It is an admitted fact that the alleged irregularities were committed in the year 1988 and show-cause notice has been issued in the year 1992. It is also an admitted fact that the CMA No. l of 1989 filed by the petitioner against the surcharge proceedings was allowed on 2-3-1995 and even after allowing the CMA, the respondents initiated enquiry in the year 1998 and after completion of enquiry, impugned notice was issued on 4-5-2002. Thus, there is delay of 14 years from the date of committing of the alleged irregularities and 7 years from the date of delivery of judgment in CMA no. l of 1989. The learned Counsel also further argued that the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 2-6-1999 and the respondents passed the impugned order on 4-5-2002 nearly after a period of 3 years. l of 1989. The learned Counsel also further argued that the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 2-6-1999 and the respondents passed the impugned order on 4-5-2002 nearly after a period of 3 years. Altogether, the learned counsel submits that there is delay of 14 years from the date of alleged irregularities and such delay has disabled the petitioner to put forth his defence effectively and the petitioner was put to prejudice in concluding the enquiry after lapse of 7 years and therefore the impugned proceedings dated 4-5-2002 is liable to be quashed. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, the learned government Pleader for Co-operation submits that there is no delay on the part the respondents in concluding the enquiry and that due to filing of CMA by the petitioner; the enquiry could not be completed. ( 8 ) IT is to be seen that the judgment in cma No. 1 of 1989 was rendered on 2-3-1995 by the Co-operative Tribunal and later the petitioner appeared before the enquiry officer on 30-12-1998 and on 4-5-2002 the impugned proceedings were issued. Thus, there is delay of 7 years in concluding the enquiry after the judgment in CMA No. l of 1989. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention that delay on the part of the respondents in concluding the enquiry caused great prejudice to the defence of the petitioner relies on the judgment rendered by me (as a Judge of high Court of Madras) in the case of krishnan v. The Chief Engineer (U and S), tnws and DB, Madras wherein I have taken a view that the delay occurred in initiating the enquiry without any satisfactory explanation of such delay, the departmental proceedings are liable to be quashed. ( 10 ) THE said decision was rendered by me relying upon the judgment of the supreme Court in the case of State of M. P. v. Bani Singh and another wherein the Apex court held that initiation of the departmental enquiry after 12 years without any satisfactory explanation for such delay, the departmental proceedings are liable to be quashed. ( 10 ) THE said decision was rendered by me relying upon the judgment of the supreme Court in the case of State of M. P. v. Bani Singh and another wherein the Apex court held that initiation of the departmental enquiry after 12 years without any satisfactory explanation for such delay, the departmental proceedings are liable to be quashed. ( 11 ) IN the instant case, the irregularities were said to have been committed in the year 1988 and surcharge proceedings were initiated in 1989 and later the said proceedings were quashed in 1995 and fresh enquiry was initiated in 1998 and the impugned order was issued on 4-5-2002. Thus, there is delay of 7 years from the date of quashing of the surcharge proceedings by the orders of the Co-operative Tribunal in 1995. Placing reliance on the above judgments i. e. , Krishnan (supra) and State of M. P. v. Bani Singh (supra), it has to be held that there is no satisfactory explanation whatsoever from the respondents for such abnormal delay in concluding the proceedings. ( 12 ) IN view of the forgoing discussion, it has to ,be held that the impugned proceedings dated 4-5-2002 of the 2nd respondent in PS No. l38/2002-A2 are liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed. ( 13 ) IN the result, the Writ Petition is allowed at the admission stage.