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2002 DIGILAW 796 (PNJ)

M/s Ajai Ferti Chem (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Punjab

2002-08-13

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL

body2002
Judgment Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. 1. Proceedings under the Insecticides Act, 1968 (for short, the Act) are sought to be quashed, inter alia, on the ground that no sanction has been obtained against the petitioner under section 31(1) of the Act and that the sanction is stereotype, which does not reflect application of mind. Reference is made to the order granting sanction dated 7.8.1998, Annexure P-5, which is as under :- "On 21.1.1998, Shri Nirvail Singh, Insecticide Inspector, Rayya/Baba Bakala, visited the shop of M/s Padda Kheti Sewa Kender and took sample of Isoproturon 75%. The batch number of this insecticide is 10 and expiry date is October, 1999 and has been manufactured by M/s Ajai Ferti Chem (Bombay) Private Limited. This sample was sent to the Senior Analyst, Pesticides Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana for analysis and as per the analysis report, the active ingredients were found 35.86 and the sample was found misbranded. I am satisfied from the record which has been presented before me with regard to M/s Padda Kheti Sewa Kender, District Amritsar (dealer), M/s Anand Enterprises, Makbulpura, District Amritsar (Distributor), M/s Ajai Fertichem (Bombay) Private Limited (Manufacturer) and according to this they have violated the provisions of Section 3(k), (1) 17, 18, 29 and 33 of the Insecticides Act. Now while exercising the powers which have been conferred upon me vide Punjab Government Notification No. 15/1/93 Agri. 2(1)1132 dated 10.2.1994, I take the following action under clause 31(1) of the Insecticides Act, 1968 : I, Deep Singh Sahota, Joint Director Agriculture (Plant Protection), Punjab given my consent to Shri Nirvail Singh, Insecticide Inspector, Rayya/Baba Bakala for prosecution/institution under clause 27(5) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 and file the case in the concerned Court for violation of the above provisions against the following :- 1. M/s. Padda Kheti Sewa Kender, Baba Bakala Mour, GT Road Rayya, District Amritsar through Shri Harvinder Singh son of Shri Gurbachan Singh (Prop) resident of village Bulle Nangal, PO Cheema Bath, Tehsil Baba Bakala, District Amritsar. 2. M/s. Anand Enterprises, Makboolpura, District Amritsar through Shri Sukhdev Singh son of Sohan Singh. 3. M/s. Ajai Ferti Chem (Bombay) Private Limited, Marketing Office 3004, Sector 27D, Chandigarh through Shri Jagdish Khurana (Director) and Shri Rajiv Sharma son of Shri B.R. Sharma (Marketing Manager). Sd/- Jt. Director Agriculture (Plant Protection) Punjab, Chandigarh. Dated 7.8.1998." 2. 2. M/s. Anand Enterprises, Makboolpura, District Amritsar through Shri Sukhdev Singh son of Sohan Singh. 3. M/s. Ajai Ferti Chem (Bombay) Private Limited, Marketing Office 3004, Sector 27D, Chandigarh through Shri Jagdish Khurana (Director) and Shri Rajiv Sharma son of Shri B.R. Sharma (Marketing Manager). Sd/- Jt. Director Agriculture (Plant Protection) Punjab, Chandigarh. Dated 7.8.1998." 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the following judgments in support of his submission that proceedings will be liable to be quashed on account of non-application of mind in the order of sanction :- 1. M/s United Pesticides and another v. State of Punjab and others, 1992(1) RCR 678 (P&H), wherein it was observed that the order of sanction was passed in a cyclostyled form and there was no mention of contents of the report of the analyst nor of the provision of law under which manufacturer was sought to be prosecuted. There was no sanction to prosecute the proprietor of the firm nor it is stated as to what act was committed by the proprietor of the firm. 2. M/s Hindustan Pulverising Mills v. State of Haryana, 1992(2) RCR 313 (P&H), wherein it was observed that the sanction did not mention the name of the person to be prosecuted. 3. M/s Jot Ram Dharam Chand v. State of Punjab through Insecticide Inspector, 1993(2) RCR 456 (P&H), wherein it was observed that the sanction was granted on a printed form and did not indicate the name of the Insecticide Inspector, who took the sample. 4. Sadhu Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993(2) RCR 593 (P&H), wherein it was observed that sanction granted in a cyclostyle form, which did not contain the name of the Insecticide Inspector and other particulars, will be invalid. 5. National Organic Chemicals Industry Ltd. v. State of Punjab, 1994(1) RCR 333 (P&H) wherein the same view was taken. To the same effect are the judgments reported in Surinder Pal Singh Saini v. State of Punjab, 1994(1) RCR 338 (P&H); D.N. Chaturvedi v. State of Punjab, 1994(2) RCR 133 (P&H); M/s Pesto Chemicals India Ltd v. State of Punjab, 1994(3) RCR 483 (P&H); Tannu Galhotra alias Neeraj v. State of Punjab, 1994(3) RCR 501 (P&H); C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Punjab, 1994(3) RCR 618 (P&H); M/s. Sat Paul Rajender Parshad Sunam v. State of Punjab, 1995(1) RCR 245 (P&H); M/s Kissan Trading Co. v. State of Punjab, 1996(1) RCR 132 (P&H); Vinod Goyal v. State of Punjab, 1996(2) RCR 336 (P&H); Hari Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 1997(1) RCR 156 (P&H); Narinder Singh v. M/s. Chemico Pesticide Combines, 1999(2) RCR 311 (P&H) and Jayant Navlakha v. State of Punjab, 1999(2) RCR 764 (P&H). 6. V.K. Pahwa v. State of Punjab, 2002(1) RCR 389 (P&H), wherein it was held that the sanction has to be in respect of each individual case. To the same effect is the view taken by the Apex Court in Consumer Action Group v. Cadbury India Ltd. and another, 2000(1) RCC 548. 7. Manjit Singh Guliani v. State of Punjab, 2002(2) RCR 50, wherein it was held that where sanction is for prosecution of a company through the responsible officer, it could not be treated as sanction to proceed against the officer. 3. It is not necessary to multiply the number of other judgments. 4. Learned counsel for the State submitted that even though application of mind is required by the sanctioning authority, validity of sanction was a question of fact in each case and any irregularity in sanction cannot be crucial unless the same results in failure of justice. It was further submitted that the judgments of this Court requiring sanction of the person to be proceeded against are in consonance with the Supreme Court judgment in Consumer Action Groups case (supra) and proceedings might be liable to be quashed, if there was no sanction against the person sought to be proceeded against (except when such a person is proceeded against under Section 319 Cr.P.C.), proceedings are not liable to be quashed on account of any other irregularity, as the judgments of this Court to that extent are in conflict with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI), AIR 1998 SC 201 : 1997(4) RCR(Crl.) 788 (SC), wherein the Apex Court observed as under :- "When Parliament enacted the present Code they advisedly incorporated the words "any error or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution" in Section 465 of the present Code as they wanted to prevent failure of prosecution on the mere ground of any error or irregularity in the sanction for prosecution. An error or irregularity in a sanction may, nevertheless, vitiate the prosecution only if such error or irregularity has occasioned failure of justice." 5. An error or irregularity in a sanction may, nevertheless, vitiate the prosecution only if such error or irregularity has occasioned failure of justice." 5. It was also submitted that judgment in Manjit Singh Gilianis case (supra) was in conflict with the Supreme Court judgment in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. M/s Modi Distillery and others, AIR 1988 SC 1128, wherein it was observed on interpretation of Section 47 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, which is in pari materia with Section 33 of the Insecticides Act that where an offence is committed by a company, it is deemed to have been committed by all persons incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business. In view of this judgment, it cannot be said that where a sanction is granted against a company and some persons are specifically named, a separate sanction for their individual prosecution is required. 6. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties. In my view, proceedings may be liable to be quashed in absence of naming of individual against whom proceedings are initiated, in view of the law laid down in Consumer Action Groups case (supra), but proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the ground of irregularity in sanction, as the view taken by this court to that extent is in conflict with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Kalpnath Rais case (supra). Proceedings are also not liable to be quashed on the ground that persons sought to be proceeded against are named as representing the company and not separately and to that extent the view taken by this Court in Manjit Singh Gilianis case (supra) is in conflict with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in U.P. Pollution Control Boards case (supra). 7. In Suresh H. Rajput and others v. Bhartiben Pravinbhai Soni and others, 1996(7) SCC 199, it was held that merely because sanction order was given on a cyclostyled form, the same will not be invalid. In Food Inspector, Ernakulam and another v. P.S. Sreenivasa Shenoy, 2000(6) SCC 348 : 2000(3) RCR(Crl.) 462 (SC), it was observed that once proceedings are instituted in a Court after grant of sanction, bar of sanction will not apply on account of fresh developments, which were not taken into account by the sanctioning authority. In Food Inspector, Ernakulam and another v. P.S. Sreenivasa Shenoy, 2000(6) SCC 348 : 2000(3) RCR(Crl.) 462 (SC), it was observed that once proceedings are instituted in a Court after grant of sanction, bar of sanction will not apply on account of fresh developments, which were not taken into account by the sanctioning authority. If sanction is once granted, no fresh sanction will be required and the bar under Section 216(5) Cr.P.C. or other provision requiring sanction will not operate in respect of person against whom sanction is granted or against a person, who may appear to be guilty because the object of providing a safeguard against vexations prosecution by requiring sanction will be fulfilled by the Courts scrutiny of the material on record. This was also the view taken by the Apex court in Bhagwan Dass v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1975 SC 1309, wherein it was held that Court could add an accused on the basis of material before the Court, without a separate sanction. The said case was on interpretation of Section 20 of the P.F.A. Act, 1954, which interpretation will hold good, if power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is invoked. 8. In the present case, the name of the accused is specifically mentioned. I cannot, at this stage, say that the order of sanction is without any application of mind. 9. Further contention of the petitioners is that apart from petitioner No. 1 i.e. M/s Ajai Ferti Chem (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd., which is a company, petitioners No. 2 and 3, Jagdish Khurana and Rajiv Sharma have also been implicated as representing the company and it should be made clear that only the company was liable and the said officers were not individually liable. From the sanction order itself, it is clear that Jagdish Khurana was Director and Rajiv Sharma was Marketing Manager and in the complaint, the said two persons have been so described. Under Section 33 of the Act, apart from the company, every person, who is incharge of or is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company is deemed to be guilty. In para 12 of the complaint, allegation has been specifically made against Jagdish Khurana as being personally responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Shri Rajiv Sharma is said to be Marketing Manager in heading of the complaint itself. In para 12 of the complaint, allegation has been specifically made against Jagdish Khurana as being personally responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Shri Rajiv Sharma is said to be Marketing Manager in heading of the complaint itself. It cannot, therefore, be said that the said petitioners are not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company for the purpose of quashing at the threshold. 10. It may be clarified that mere grant of sanction will not be a bar to seek quashing on the ground that a person is not incharge of or responsible to the Company for conduct of the business of the company. In view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 1982 : 1989(2) RCR(Crl.) 494 (SC), it can be observed that proviso to Section 33 will not mean that the prosecution was not required to prove that a person proceeded against was incharge of the business of the company or was responsible to the company for conduct of the business. Where no allegation is made in the complaint or where allegation is made without any basis, person summoned can point out to the concerned Court that there was no justification for their being summoned and where such person comes from far off places, they can also be granted exemption from personal appearance in accordance with law, so that they do not suffer injustice on account of being named in the complaint without any justification. Since such a matter requires consideration of facts, prayer for quashing on such grounds is not normally entertained in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. without such a prayer having been made before the trial Court in the first instance has held by the Apex Court in P. Rajarathinam v. State of Maharashtra, 2000(10) SCC 529. 11. It may also be clarified that even if in the first instance a person is not named as being incharge of or being responsible to the company for conduct of the business or any other person falling under Section 33(2) of the Act, such a person can be subsequently summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C., if any evidence is produced warranting such a course to be adopted. Reference may be made a decision of this Court in Crl. Misc. Reference may be made a decision of this Court in Crl. Misc. No. 33360-M of 2001, Anil Puri v. Munish Aggarwal and others, rendered on 20.5.2002, wherein this aspect of the matter was considered. For the above reasons, this petition is dismissed, without prejudice to petitioners raising all relevant questions before the trial Court.