G. ROHINI, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff is the appellant in this appeal which is filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 21-10-1992 in A. S. No. 1513 of 1989 confirming the judgment and decree dated 14-2-1989 in O. S. No. 149 of 1983 on the file of the Court of the subordinate Judge, Nizamabad. ( 2 ) THE appellant herein filed O. S. No. 149 of 1983 seeking a declaration that he is the owner of the suit schedule property and recovery of possession of the same by evicting the 1st defendant. He also sought a further declaration that the order of the 2nd defendant dated 10-12-1971 allotting an extent of 500 sq. yards out of the suit schedule property to the District Medical and Health Officer is illegal and without jurisdiction. ( 3 ) THE suit schedule property is an extent of Ac. 3. 05 guntas of vacant land situated in survey No. 173/1 within the limits of kamareddy Gram Panchayat, Nizamabad district. The 1st defendant in the suit is the gram Panchayat, Kamareddy and the district Collector, Panchayat Raj, nizamabad is the 2nd defendant. ( 4 ) THE plaint averments are as follows: the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule land which forms part of Ac. 6. 35 gts. having purchased the same from one k. Rajeshwar Rao under a registered sale deed. The said land originally belonged to one Smt. Aishabee from whom the vendor of the plaintiff purchased under registered sale deed dated 22-2-1966. The suit schedule land which is an extent of Ac. 3. 05 gts. situated to the east of Ac. 6. 35 gts. of land and purchased by the plaintiff in the year 1971 was being used by his predecessor in title to collect cow dung for the purpose of using it as manure. The neighbouring cultivators and the Gram Panchayat, kamareddy also used to dump cow dung and garbage on the said land with the express permission of the plaintiff s predecessor-in-title and also with the permission of the plaintiff after he purchased the same. The plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title regularly paid the land revenue for the suit schedule land. The plaintiff started cultivating the land after purchase and when he wanted to develop and cultivate the suit schedule land by removing the garbage and cow dung etc. The plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title regularly paid the land revenue for the suit schedule land. The plaintiff started cultivating the land after purchase and when he wanted to develop and cultivate the suit schedule land by removing the garbage and cow dung etc. deposited thereon, the Gram Panchayat started obstructing the plaintiff from doing so. The plaintiff was constrained to make a complaint to the police, in pursuance of which, the Executive Magistrate initiated proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. and issued notice to the Gram Panchayat, kamareddy. At the instance of the Gram panchayat, Kamareddy, the said proceedings pending before the Sub- divisional Magistrate, Kamareddy in M. C. No. 5 of 1973 were transferred to the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, kamareddy and numbered as M. C. No. 14 of 1973, and were finally disposed of by order dated 12-2-1974 holding that the Gram panchayat, Kamareddy is entitled to possession of the land in question until ousted by due process of law. Aggrieved by the said orders, the plaintiff filed Criminal m. P. No. 4 of 1974 in Sessions Court, nizamabad which was dismissed by order dated 26-10-1974. Even before initiating the said proceedings the plaintiff issued a notice dated 13-12-1971 to the Gram Panchayat, kamareddy to vacate the suit schedule land and to deliver vacant possession. The Gram panchayat issued a reply dated 27-12-1971 pleading ownership to the suit land by way of purchase. That apart in M. C. No. 14 of 1973 before the Judicial First Class magistrate, the Gram Panchayat pleaded that the suit schedule land was purchased by the Gram Panchayat from the agent/ general Power of Attorney of Aishabee on payment of Rs. 300/- for the purpose of using the same as trenching ground. The plaintiff contends that under the guise of the proceedings issued under Section 145 of cr. P. C. the plaintiff was dispossessed of his lawful possession in respect of the suit schedule land and subsequently he was compelled to sell the remaining land situated on the western side. ( 5 ) ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff filed O. S. No. 149 of 1983 seeking the aforesaid reliefs of declaration of title as well as recovery of possession. It has also been pleaded that in view of the assertion of the Gram Panchayat that the District Collector (Panchayat Raj), nizamabad allotted an area of 500 sq. ( 5 ) ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff filed O. S. No. 149 of 1983 seeking the aforesaid reliefs of declaration of title as well as recovery of possession. It has also been pleaded that in view of the assertion of the Gram Panchayat that the District Collector (Panchayat Raj), nizamabad allotted an area of 500 sq. yards out of the suit schedule land in favour of the district Medical and Health Officer for construction of a Post-mortem shed through its letter dated 10-12-1971, a further declaration is sought that the proceedings of the District Collector dated 10-12-1971 are illegal and without jurisdiction. ( 6 ) THE 1st defendant filed a written statement denying the plaint averments and specifically pleading that the 1st defendant has been using the suit schedule land as trenching ground since 1957. Thereafter in august, 1958 the 1st defendant purchased the said land for Rs. 300. 90 ps. from Aishabee who is the pattedar and owner, through her attorney Zakria. The 1st defendant-Gram panchayat is having garbage pits in the suit schedule land which were being put to public auction regularly for use as manure and the amounts realized in the public auction are being deposited to the credit of the Gram Panchayat. Thus the 1st defendant pleaded continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule land since 1957 and also claimed that their right to the suit land was protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is also claimed that since they have been in possession for the past more than 12 years to the knowledge of the plaintiff s predecessor- in-title as well as the plaintiff they have perfected their title by adverse possession. The 1st defendant also specifically pleaded that their possession is not permissive and that they are in continuous possession of the said land in their own right as owner. They also asserted that the suit schedule land has never been cultivated since 1958. The proceedings initiated under Section 145 of cr. P. C. ended in M. C. No. 14 of 1973 also made it clear that the 1st defendant is in possession of the suit schedule land. They also asserted that the suit schedule land has never been cultivated since 1958. The proceedings initiated under Section 145 of cr. P. C. ended in M. C. No. 14 of 1973 also made it clear that the 1st defendant is in possession of the suit schedule land. It is further contended by the 1st defendant that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title purchased the suit land as a speculative deal in collusion with Aishabee ignoring the sale transaction already effected in favour of the 1st defendant and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought. ( 7 ) THE 2nd defendant also filed a separate written statement on the same lines and reiterated that the plaintiff is neither owner nor possessor of the suit schedule land. It is also stated that no mutation was effected in the name of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule land and at any rate the plaintiff has not acquired any right, title and interest. It is further stated that in the year 1971 itself the Gram Panchayat, Kamareddy gave 500 sq. yards out of the suit schedule land to the Government for the purpose of construction of Post-mortem shed and accordingly Post-mortem shed was constructed which was in existence even by the date of the proceedings under section 145 of Cr. P. C. Therefore, the 2nd defendant contended that the suit is barred by limitation and the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. ( 8 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues for trial. (1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land and entitled for declaration of title? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the suit land? (3) Whether the D-1 perfected his title by adverse possession? (4) Whether the D-1 is entitled for the protection of Sec. 53-A of T. P. Act? (5) To what relief ? ( 9 ) BEFORE the trial Court six witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and exs. A-1 to A-35 documents have been marked in support of the plaint averments. On behalf of the defendants 3 witnesses were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-28 documents have been marked. ( 10 ) THE trial Court on appreciation of the entire evidence on record held on issue nos. A-1 to A-35 documents have been marked in support of the plaint averments. On behalf of the defendants 3 witnesses were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-28 documents have been marked. ( 10 ) THE trial Court on appreciation of the entire evidence on record held on issue nos. 3 and 4 that the 1st defendant is entitled for protection under Section 53-A of transfer of Property Act, 1882 and that the 1st defendant has perfected its title by adverse possession by being in continuous possession for more than 12 years. In view of the said findings, it has been held on issue nos. 1 and 2 that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession of the suit land from the defendants and he cannot be declared as owner of the suit land. Accordingly the trial court dismissed the suit with costs by judgment dated 14-2-1989. ( 11 ) IT maybe mentioned that pending the said suit, the 1st defendant Gram Panchayat has been substituted as Municipal Council, kamareddy. ( 12 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 143 of 1983 the plaintiff filed A. S. No. 1514 of 1989 in this Court. A learned single Judge of this Court on consideration of the entire material on record by judgment dated 21-10-1992 dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. ( 13 ) ASSAILING the judgment of the learned single Judge, the plaintiff preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. ( 14 ) HEARD both the parties. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant sri M. Surender Rao, submits that the findings recorded by the trial Court, as confirmed by the learned single Judge are unsustainable and not based on the evidence on record. He contends that the document marked as Ex. B-3 under which the 1st defendant claims title to the suit schedule land is neither an agreement of sale nor a sale deed and it can only be treated as a permission granted by the plaintiff s predecessor-in-title to defendant No. 1 for dumping the garbage in the suit land. Therefore according to the learned counsel the possession of the 1st defendant is only permissive and it is not open for them to claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. Further contention of the learned counsel is that Ex. Therefore according to the learned counsel the possession of the 1st defendant is only permissive and it is not open for them to claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. Further contention of the learned counsel is that Ex. B-3 document can under no circumstance be treated as an. agreement of sale, and therefore, the defendant No. l is not entitled to the protection under Section 53-A of Transfer of property Act, 1882. The learned counsel would also contend that mere long possession is not sufficient to prefect title by adverse possession and since the 1st defendant failed to plead and prove the ads, which constitute adverse possession,it must be held that they failed to discharge the burden to establish that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. ( 16 ) ON the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents sri V. Viswanadham while supporting the findings recorded by the trial Court, as confirmed by the learned single Judge, contended that the concurrent findings of fact do not warrant any interference and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. ( 17 ) FOR proper appreciation of the rival contentions raised by either side, it is necessary to analyse the relevant facts as pleaded by both the parties and the evidence adduced by them in support of their respective claims. ( 18 ) THE claim of the plaintiff broadly is that under a registered sale deed he acquired title to the suit schedule land and that the 1st defendant has been using the said land as trenching ground with the permission of his predecessors-in-title Ashia bee and Rajeswara Rao and also with his permission after he purchased the same. According to the plaintiff the claim of the 1st defenda. it that they acquired title to the suit schedule land by purchase is without any basis and cannot be accepted. The contention of the plaintiff is that since he acquired title to the suit land under a registered sale deed he is entitled to the reliefs sought in the suit. In support of the plaint averments the plaintiff got himself examined as P. W. I. His vendor Rajeswara rao was examined as P. W. 2. The sale deed dated 22-2-1966 under which Rajeswara Rao purchased the suit schedule land from Asha bee has been marked as Ex. A-9. In support of the plaint averments the plaintiff got himself examined as P. W. I. His vendor Rajeswara rao was examined as P. W. 2. The sale deed dated 22-2-1966 under which Rajeswara Rao purchased the suit schedule land from Asha bee has been marked as Ex. A-9. The registered sale deed dated 27-8-1971 under which the plaintiff purchased the said land from Rajeswara Rao has been marked as ex. A-2. According to the plaintiff after he purchased the suit land under Ex. A-2, he issued Ex. A-3 notice dated 13-12-1971 calling upon the 1st defendant to vacate the same and when they issued Ex. A-5 reply dated 23-12-1971 asserting their ownership, he came to know that the 1st defendant is claiming title to the suit land. ( 19 ) IT is pertinent to note that there is no documentary evidence to substantiate the plea of the plaintiff that the possession of the 1st defendant is permissive. Both the plaintiff and his predecessor in title, rajeswara Rao, who deposed as P. Ws. 1 and 2 respectively did not state in their evidence that the 1st defendant has taken any permission from them for storing garbage. They only stated that they were informed that the 1st defendant obtained permission from one Zakaria, the General Power of attorney holder of Aisha Bee. However the plaintiff examined P. W. 3 to P. W. 6, who deposed that about 30 years ago the then Chairman of the Municipality, k. R. Rajireddy was granted permission by zakaria orally to store garbage in the suit land. As rightly found by the trial Court as well as the learned single Judge, P. Ws. 3 to 6 are only chance witnesses and their evidence with several inconsistencies cannot be believed to substantiate the plea of the plaintiff that the possession of the 1st defendant is only permissive. ( 20 ) ON the other hand, it is the specific case of the defendants that the Gram panchayat, Kamareddy has been using the suit schedule land for dumping the garbage and cow dung from the year 1957. In support of their case, the Manager of the municipality, Kamareddy has been examined as D. W. I and a Sanitary Inspector who joined the Gram Panchayat in the year 1966 deposed as D. W. 2. In support of their case, the Manager of the municipality, Kamareddy has been examined as D. W. I and a Sanitary Inspector who joined the Gram Panchayat in the year 1966 deposed as D. W. 2. That apart, another sanitary Inspector of Town Committee, kamareddy, who worked as such from 1955 to 1958 and 1960 to 1974 was also examined as D. W. 3. From their evidence it can be noted that after the Gram Panchayat started using the suit land as trenching ground the original owner Aisha Bee raised an objection and she made Ex. B-4 application dated 2-7-1957 to the Deputy Collector seeking compensation for the land occupied by the gram Panchayat. Thereafter a sum of rs. 300. 90 ps. was paid to Aisha Bee by the gram Panchayat and in pursuance thereof under Ex. B-3 dated 8-8-1958 the possession of the suit land has been delivered to the gram Panchayat through V. M. Zakaria, the general Power of Attorney of the original owner Aisha Bee. Further Ex. B-27 the contingent bill through which the amount is drawn from the Treasury by the Town committee, Kamareddy and Ex. B-28 which is the relevant entry in the kirdi book support the payment of Rs. 300. 90 ps. to Smt. Aisha Bee. Thus it is the specific case of the defendants that their possession is not permissive and that the 1st defendant acquired title to the suit land and from 1958 onwards they have been in possession and enjoyment of the land asserting their own right. It is also relevant to note that the defendants have been putting the garbage pits to public auction regularly as evident from Ex. B-11 and Exs. B-14 to 19 and exs. B-20 to B-26. The defendants also relied upon the orders in M. C. No. 14 of 1973 dated 12-2-1974 and Crl. R. P. No. 4 of 1974 dated 16-10-1974 marked as Exs. B-1 and B-2 respectively under which their possession was protected in the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of Cr. P. C. ( 21 ) ON a careful consideration of the aforesaid evidence on record, we are of the view that the plaintiff failed to prove his plea that the 1st defendant was permitted by the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-title to use the suit schedule land for storing garbage. ( 22 ) FURTHER a plain reading of the recitals of Ex. ( 22 ) FURTHER a plain reading of the recitals of Ex. B-3 clearly shows that the possession of the suit schedule land has been delivered in favour of the 1st defendant with absolute rights through the General Power of attorney of Aisha Bee. The said document if read along with Ex. B-4 which is an application made by Aisha Bee to the deputy Collector as well as the documents marked as Exs. B-27 and B-28 made it clear that Aisha Bee, original pattedar of the land was paid a sum of Rs. 300. 90 ps. and in pursuance thereof Ex. B-3 document has been executed conferring absolute right on the Gram Panchayat, the 1st defendant. In our considered opinion, the recitals in ex. B-3 document do not indicate even remotely granting permission to the 1st defendant for using the suit schedule land as trenching ground. On the other hand the said document is enough proof to substantiate the plea of the 1st defendant that they acquired absolute rights in respect of the suit schedule land. Therefore the contention of the appellant that the possession of the 1st defendant under ex. B-3 is permissive in nature cannot be accepted. ( 23 ) THE further contention of the appellant is that Ex. B-3 document, not being an agreement of sale; the first defendant is not entitled to the protection under Sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It is pertinent to note that the specific case of the 1st defendant is that they have been in possession of suit schedule land from the year 1957 and subsequently in the year 1958, under Ex. B-3, they purchased the said land from the original pattedar Aisha Bee through her Attorney Zakaria, on payment of Rs. 300. 90 ps. Ex. B-3 titled as receipt of delivery of possession clearly evidences the transfer of suit schedule property in favour of the 1st defendant with absolute rights. The consideration paid to Aisha Bee i. e. , the plaintiff s predecessor-in-title by the defendant is proved by Exs. B-27 and B-28 read with Ex. B-4. Thus the transaction of transfer of suit schedule property in favour of the 1st defendant is complete. The 1st defendant never claimed Ex. B-3 document as an agreement of sale. The consideration paid to Aisha Bee i. e. , the plaintiff s predecessor-in-title by the defendant is proved by Exs. B-27 and B-28 read with Ex. B-4. Thus the transaction of transfer of suit schedule property in favour of the 1st defendant is complete. The 1st defendant never claimed Ex. B-3 document as an agreement of sale. It is clear from a reading of Section 53-A of Transfer of property Act that it applies not only to contract to transfer but also to instruments of transfer. Though Ex. B-3 is not a registered document and no title is passed on in favour of the 1st defendant, certainly it entitles the 1st defendant to the protection under section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act. Thus the 1st defendant is entitled to resist the claim for recovery of possession either by the transferor Aisha Bee or any person claiming under her including the plaintiff. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is without any merit. ( 24 ) REGARDING the challenge as to the correctness of the finding that the defendants perfected their title by adverse possession, the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant are three fold. Firstly the learned counsel while relying upon S. M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina; Parsinni v. Sukhib; Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari sharma and Abubakar Abdul Inamdar v. Harun Abdul Inamdar, submitted that to constitute adverse possession there should be specific plea and proof that the possession of the person pleading adverse possession is adverse to that of the real owner. While elaborating his contention the learned counsel submits that the first defendant except asserting their long possession of the suit schedule land failed to plead and prove the acts, which constitute adverse possession. Therefore according to the learned counsel the first defendant failed to discharge the burden placed on them to establish that their title to the suit schedule land is perfected by adverse possession. ( 25 ) THERE cannot be any dispute as to the principles laid down in the above decisions. As held by the Supreme Court it is for the party who claims adverse possession to show when his possession became adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be made out. ( 25 ) THERE cannot be any dispute as to the principles laid down in the above decisions. As held by the Supreme Court it is for the party who claims adverse possession to show when his possession became adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be made out. The burden of proof is always on the party claiming adverse possession and it should be established by specific pleading that his possession is open, continuous and hostile to the real owner and it should be supported by clear evidence. ( 26 ) IN the instant case admittedly the first defendant has been in possession of the suit schedule land from the year 1957 and has been using the same as trenching ground. The 1st defendant specifically pleaded in their written statement that on 2-7-1957 the original owner Aisha Bee made a complaint to the Deputy Collector, Kamareddy, that her land is being used by the 1st defendant unauthorisedly for storing the garbage. Thereafter under Ex. B-28 she was paid rs. 300. 90 ps. and Ex. B-3 was executed by the general Power of Attorney of the original owner transferring the possession to the first defendant. Thus the possession of the first defendant was adverse to the real owner even by the year 1957. It is also the specific plea of the first defendant that it has been in continuous possession of the suit land from the year 1957 and has been using the same as trenching ground openly and also putting the garbage pits to public auction regularly and that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in- title Rajeswara Rao purchased the suit land in collusion with the original owner Aisha bee without obtaining the delivery of the possession. The evidence adduced on behalf of the first defendant shows that even by 1966 when Rajeswara Rao purchased the suit land from Aisha Bee the possession remained with the first defendant who has continued to use the same for storing the garbage and Rajeswara Rao himself deposed that he has not permitted the first defendant for using the land as trenching ground. Thus it is clearly established that the possession of the first defendant became adverse to the plaintiff s predecessor-in-title. Thus it is clearly established that the possession of the first defendant became adverse to the plaintiff s predecessor-in-title. Similarly when the plaintiff purchased the suit land together with other adjacent extent from rajeswara Rao and he was not delivered possession of the suit land and admittedly when the first defendant continued to use the suit schedule land as trenching ground without any permission from the plaintiff, it must be held that the possession of the first defendant is adverse against the plaintiff as well. ( 27 ) THE 1st defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule land from the year 1957 without any let or hindrance. On a careful analysis of the material on record we are satisfied that there is sufficient pleading on behalf of the 1st defendant that they perfected their title by adverse possession and the same has been proved by producing clear evidence oral and documentary. ( 28 ) THE next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff came to know that the first defendant is asserting ownership to the suit schedule land only when he received Ex. A-5 reply notice dated 23-12-1971 and thereafter the suit has been filed within 12 years and therefore it cannot be said that the 1st defendant perfected their title by adverse possession. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel. The specific pleading coupled with the evidence on record adduced on behalf of the defendants make it clear that the 1st defendant has been in continuous possession of the suit schedule land from the year 1957 onwards to the knowledge of the original owner and subsequent purchasers. The 1st defendant was openly asserting their own right. Either the original pattedar or the purchaser Rajeswara Rao did not make any attempt to take possession from the 1st defendant. Thus even by the date of purchase by the plaintiff under Ex. A-2 dated 27-8-1971 the 1st defendant acquired title by adverse possession and therefore the plaintiff cannot claim any title to the suit schedule land under the sale deed obtained from the original owner. ( 29 ) THE third submission of the learned counsel that the possession of the first defendant being permissive in nature he is not entitled to claim adverse possession does not carry any weight. ( 29 ) THE third submission of the learned counsel that the possession of the first defendant being permissive in nature he is not entitled to claim adverse possession does not carry any weight. The trial Court as well as the learned single Judge recorded a specific finding that the possession of the 1st defendant is not permissive in nature. As expressed above we are satisfied that the said finding is based on proper appreciation of the material on record. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel is untenable and is liable to be rejected. ( 30 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we hold that even if Ex. B-3 does not confer any title on the first defendant, their title to the suit land has been perfected by adverse possession by being in open and continuous possession for more than 12 years even by the date of purchase by the plaintiff. ( 31 ) FOR the reasons stated supra, we do not see any ground to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court as affirmed by the learned single judge. The Letters Patent Appeal is devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. ( 32 ) WE accordingly dismiss the Letters patent Appeal but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.