ORDER 1. The appellant, Bihar Caustic and Chemicals Ltd. is aggrieved by a judgment dated 12th October, 1999, CWJC No. 1608 of 1998 (R) whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the award passed by the Labour Court in Reference case No. 20/1994. 2. The respondent No. 2 Ashutosh Kumar (in short the workman) was in the employment of the appellant since 1988 and his service was confirmed in 1989. On 20.5.1990, he was on weekly off and after taking leave on 21.5.1990, the workman went to his home where he suddenly fell ill and could not report for duty. The concerned workman informed about his sickness to the management vide letter dated 22.5.1990 and the management vide its letter dated 25.8.1990 asked the petitioner to join his duty. However, the workman remained absent and according to him, he went to join his duty on 17.7.1992 but he was not allowed to join. Thereafter, industrial dispute was raised and the dispute was ultimately referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. 3. It was the case of the management before the Labour Court that as per the standing order, absence of the workman beyond the period of leave, his service will be automatically terminated and his name will be stuck off from the roll of the company. The Labour Court, after considering the entire facts and evidence, came to the conclusion which read as under : "In the instant case admittedly no enquiry was held prior to termination of service of the concerned workman. It is also not in dispute that provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. in fact, is mandatory has not been complied prior to striking of the name of the concerned workman from the rolls of the Company. Thus I find that order of termination by striking of the name of the concerned workman from the rolls of the Company is void illegal and not justified. Hence this point is also accordingly decided. In view of the fact that order of termination by striking of the name of the concerned workmen from the rolls of the company is void illegal, unjustified and improper, the concerned workman is deemed to be continued in service. He is entitled for all back wages with consequential benefits. Hence, this points is also decided," 4. In view of the fact that order of termination by striking of the name of the concerned workmen from the rolls of the company is void illegal, unjustified and improper, the concerned workman is deemed to be continued in service. He is entitled for all back wages with consequential benefits. Hence, this points is also decided," 4. The petitioner-appellant challenged the aforesaid award passed by the Labour Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 1608 of 1998 (R). The learned Single Judge after considering the facts and law. came to the conclusion that there is no perversity in the award and the conclusion of the Trial Court is based on reasons. Consequently, the writ application was dismissed. 5. This appeal was admitted only on the question as to whether the Labour Court was justified in awarding the back-wages for the period between 22.5.1990 and 17.7.1992, and whether the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act was attracted or not. 6. We have heard Mr. T.K. Das, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S.B. Gagodia, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 Mr. Gagodia seriously argued that learned Single Judge rightly held that writ court cannot sit in appellant court to appraise the evidence and come to a different conclusion unless, there is perversity in the award. There is no dispute that writ court cannot sit in appeal over the award passed by the Labour Court for the purpose of reappreciation of the evidence and for coming to a different conclusion. In the instant case, the award was pronounced on 28.4.1998 and Labour Court, while holding that the workman is deemed to be continued in service, awarded all the backwages with consequential benefits. The question, therefore, is whether the concerned workman will be entitled to all the back-wages from the first jiate when his absence became unauthorized or from the date when after long absence, he went to join and the management did not allow him to join the duty. 7. In our considered opinion, the workman will be entitled to wages from the date when his joining was not accepted by the management and he was not allowed to do duty. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner-appellant went on leave for one day only i.e. 21.5.1990. The management sent a telegram on 8.6.1990 asking the workman to join his duty. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner-appellant went on leave for one day only i.e. 21.5.1990. The management sent a telegram on 8.6.1990 asking the workman to join his duty. In response whereof, the workman informed the management vide letter dated 16.6.1990 about his sickness. However, there was no communication from 16.6.1990 till 17.7.1992. Further case of the workman is that on 17.7.1992, when he went to join his duty, he was not allowed to join. This fact was seriously disputed by the management. But in view of the finding recorded by the Labour Court on consideration of the evidence that when workman went to join the duty on 17.7.1992, he was not allowed to join, we cannot come to a different finding as to form which date the workman sought to join his duty. Certainly, the workman is entitled to wages from 18.7.1992 till date. But in our opinion, the petitioner would not be entitled to wages from the date when his absence was unauthorized till date of his joining because admittedly, the workman did not work during that period. Neither the workman worked during that period nor he was restrained by the management from doing his duty. 8. Both Labour Court and the learned Single Judge has not considered this aspect of the matter. The impugned award of the Labour Court, therefore, needs modification only to the extent that besides reinstatement, the workman shall be entitled to get back wages and other benefits for the period 17.7.1992 till date of his joining. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed in part and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall be entitled to be re-instated in the service and back wages and other benefits from 17.7.1992. 10. Before passing the judgment, we must clarify that this court by interim order 25.9.2000 directed the management to pay month to month wages in terms of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In that view of the matter, the management shall forthwith implement the award by reinstating the workman in service and paying all remaining wages with other benefits within four weeks from date of his joining. It is also clarified that non-payment of wages for the aforesaid period will not amount to any break in service of the workman.