S. R. NAYAK, J, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judee dated 11. 9. 1998 made in WP no. 25679 of 1998. ( 2 ) THE appellant is the writ petitioner and she filed the above writ petition praying for the following relief:"petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit, filed herein the high Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order, or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus, (a) Directing the respondents to initiate and complete the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the land of the petitioner bearing plot No. 4 in S. No. 137 ad measuring 237. 1 square yards situated at Laxminagar, Mallapur Village, uppal Mandal, R. R. Dist, and declare the action of the respondents is illegal, arbitrary and violating the Articles 14, 31 -A and 300-A of the Constitution of India and also violating the Sections 33 and 34 of the a. P. Town Planning Act, 1920, (b) further direct the respondents to pay 80% of compensation to the acquired land of the petitioner including solatium interest and other benefits according to LA Act in pursuant to Section 17 of LA Act, (c) and also direct the respondent No. 3 to pass an award as per the provisions of L. A. Act deciding the reasonable present market value of the acquired land and providing all incidental benefits as per LA Act, (d) and further direct the respondents to pay costs of the writ petition". ( 3 ) THE case of the writ petitioner, to put it briefly, is as under: The petitioner is the absolute owner and possessor of the plot bearing No. 4 in S. No. 137 admeasuring237. 1 sq. yards, which is equivalent to 198. 16 Sq. metres of land situated at Laxminagar, mallapur Village, Uppal Mandal, Rangareddy district, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 14. 7. 1991 from one S. Srinivasa Rao s/o late Sethu Madhava rao, who was appointed as Special Power of Attorney by the said Sethu Madhava rao through document No. 42/86 of Book 4, sub-Registrar Office, Secunderabad dated 27. 2. 7. 1991 from one S. Srinivasa Rao s/o late Sethu Madhava rao, who was appointed as Special Power of Attorney by the said Sethu Madhava rao through document No. 42/86 of Book 4, sub-Registrar Office, Secunderabad dated 27. 2. 1986, Volume 19, pages 68 and 69 and since the date of sale she has been in actual possession and enjoyment of the same after erecting a temporary fence around the plot. When the writ petitioner visited the plot in the month of June 1992, she found that the boundary stones of Plot No. 4 were removed and tar and metal were dumped in the plot for the purpose of laying a road. The petitioner lodged a complaint with the Commissioner of Kapra municipality, the 1st respondent in the writ petition, and objected to laying the road across Plot No. 4. According to the petitioner, the Municipal Commissioner promised the petitioner to provide an alternative plot or to pay compensation in lieu of the plot as per market value, but the promise was not kept and no compensation was paid to her despite several representations made to the Commissioner including representations dated 13. 10. 1993 and 29. 10. 1993. It is the case of the petitioner that without acquiring the said Plot No. 4 either under the Land acquisition Act or under any other enabling statute, high-handedly the respondents have taken over the possession of the land. So alleging, the above writ petition was filed praying for the relief already noticed above. ( 4 ) THE learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition at the stage of admission itself. The order of the learned Single Judge reads as follows:"the writ petition cannot be entertained as it has been filed after considerable delay making several averments based on some oral assurances alleged to have been given. There is absolutely no material to show that any oral assurance as alleged was given by the respondents in the matter. Admittedly, the petitioner says that possession was taken by the respondents in the year 1992 of the said land. For more than six years, the petitioner has kept silent. In view of this considerable delay and in view of the fact that petition requires investigation of title which is not the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. However, the petitioner may go to appropriate forum. For more than six years, the petitioner has kept silent. In view of this considerable delay and in view of the fact that petition requires investigation of title which is not the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. However, the petitioner may go to appropriate forum. " ( 5 ) HENCE, this writ appeal by the aggrieved petitioner. ( 6 ) IN the appeal, all the three respondents are served with notice and the appeal has undergone number of adjournments. Despite granting reasonable opportunity to 2nd and 3rd respondents, they have not filed any counter-affidavit. Only the 1st respondent has filed counter. In the counter-affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, it is stated that Plot No. 20 in s. No. 137 situated in Laxminagar was handedover to the 1st respondent- municipality for construction of Mahila mandali building to an extent of 300 Sq, yards in 1996 under a panchanama and in that land a part of 100 road is laid and also a Mahila Mandali building has been constructed. In para 4 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the petition schedule land, thereby meaning Plot "no. 4, is government land. ( 7 ) ALTHOUGH respondents 2 and 3 are represented by the learned Government pleader for Revenue, they have not filed any counter affidavit nor anybody appeared on behalf of them at the time of final hearing. Heard the learned Counsel for the other parties. If the petition schedule land as claimed by the 1st respondent-Municipality is the Government land, acquiring the petition schedule land would never arise. The 1st respondent, except making self- serving statement, has not produced any satisfactory material to prove even prmma facie that the petition schedule land is the government land. However, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent would draw our attention to the order of the District collector in Proceedings No. B2/5146/96 dated 5. 10. 1996 and would maintain that the land granted by the District Collector in the said order is the same land which is the subject matter of this petition. ( 8 ) WE cannot agree with the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. What has been granted by the District Collector in his order dated 5. 10. 1996 is 300 Sq. 1996 and would maintain that the land granted by the District Collector in the said order is the same land which is the subject matter of this petition. ( 8 ) WE cannot agree with the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. What has been granted by the District Collector in his order dated 5. 10. 1996 is 300 Sq. yards of land in S. No. 110 situated in Mallapur Village of Uppal Mandal, whereas the petition schedule land is Plot No. 4 ad measuring 237. 1 Sq. yards (198. 16 Sq. metres) in s. No. 137, situated at Laxminagar, Mallapur village, Uppal Mandal. The petition schedule land is therefore totally different land not only with reference to the survey number but also area but also the village. Be that as it may, it is not for the 1st respondent- municipality to contest the claim of the writ petitioner. If it is the Government land, it is for the respondents 2 and 3 and the State government to contest the claim of the petitioner-appellant by producing acceptable substantial evidence to demonstrate that the petition schedule land is the Government land. The petitioner-appellant along with the writ petition has produced copy of registered sale deed dated 24th July, 1991 executed in favour of the writ petitioner and another copy of sale deed dated 25th August, 1967 executed in favour of her vendor. As against these two documents, which have evidentiary value, the State Government and its authorities have not placed any material before the Court. In fact, all the allegations made by the writ petitioner remain uncontested. In that view of the matter, we do not think, with respect, that the learned Judge is justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay. ( 9 ) ALTHOUGH right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it remains a constitutional right fully protected under article 300-A of the Constitution and such a right cannot be deprived by the State and state authorities without acquiring the same for public purpose by the modes known to law under the enabling statutes and without paying the compensation as required under the law. The State has not suffered any loss on account of the delay on the part of the writ petitioner in approaching this court and if there is anybody who has suffered injury or loss on that count, it is the writ petitioner. The State will never be permitted to make unlawful gain by putting forth technicalities and that Article 14 postulates do not permit us to accord our approval on such unlawful gain. Its action should satisfy reasonableness, fairness and non-arbitrariness. Therefore, mere some delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court cannot be a legal justification to deny the Constitutional rights guaranteed to the petitioner under article 300-A of the Constitution. ( 10 ) IN the result, we allow the Writ appeal and direct the respondents 2 and 3 to take immediate steps to acquire the petition schedule land and pay the compensation in terms of law. This exercise shall be carried out within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.