C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF in O. S. No. 63 of 1982 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Bapatla is the appellant. He filed the suit for recovery of the balance due under a Registered Mortgage Deed dated 16. 8. 1971 executed by respondents 1 and 2 who are husband and wife in his favour for Rs. 17,000/- with interest at 12% per annum with yearly, rests hypothecating the property specified in the schedule appended to the plaint, after giving credit to Rs. 50,000/- paid there under. ( 2 ) THE case, in brief, of the 1st respondent is that he has neither title to nor has possession over the hypo- theca and never intended to create a mortgage over the plaint schedule property and that appellant by intoxicating him with liquor and other intoxicants obtained his signatures on several blank papers. 2nd respondent, who utilised his services for opening a factory, abandoned him and so he has been living separately from her by doing agricultural coolie work, and by taking the lands of others on lease. So, he has no need to borrow an amount of Rs. 17,000/. No amount was paid to him under the suit mortgage bond. One person filed I. P. No. 18 of 1971 to adjudge him as an insolvent. ( 3 ) THE case, in brief, of the 2nd respondent, is that the mortgage bond relied upon by the appellant is not true and is not supported by consideration. As she was not accustomed to come out frequently, she allowed her husband [1st respondent] to act as her agent for constructing the building in her vacant site. Taking advantage of his friendship with 1st respondent, the appellant under the pretext of taking the plaint schedule property on lease got prepared a mortgage bond and got it registered by applying fraud on her. The alleged payment of Rs. 5,000/- under the suit mortgage bond is not true I. P. No. 18 of 1971 is a make believe affair. The said debt is barred by the provisions of Act 7 of 1977. ( 4 ) BASING on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed five issues for trial. In support of his case, the appellant besides examining himself as P. W. 1 examined 8 other witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 9 and marked Exs. A1 to A36. The said debt is barred by the provisions of Act 7 of 1977. ( 4 ) BASING on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed five issues for trial. In support of his case, the appellant besides examining himself as P. W. 1 examined 8 other witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 9 and marked Exs. A1 to A36. On behalf of respondents, the 2nd respondent examined herself as D. W. 7 and six other witnesses as D. Ws. 1 to 6 and marked Ex. B-1. Ex. X1 was marked through P. W. 3 and Exs. C1 to C7 were marked from the Court record. The trial court while holding that respondents are not entitled to the benefit of A. P. Act 7 of 1977 and that the interest claimed by appellant is not unfair or unconscionable, disbelieving the suit mortgage bond and the payment of Rs. 5,000/- there under dismissed the suit. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiff. ( 5 ) DURING the pendency of the appeal, 1st respondent died. Therefore, while recognizing the 2nd respondent, his wife, as his legal representative, respondents 3 to 6, his children were also brought on record as his legal representatives. It should be mentioned that the appeal against respondents 3 and 4 was dismissed for non-payment of process, but that dismissal has no effect on the appeal, firstly because 2nd respondent is the owner of the hypothica and secondly because they were brought on record in their capacity as the legal representatives of the deceased 1st respondent whose estate is sufficiently represented by respondents 2, 5 and 6. ( 6 ) THE point for consideration if Ex. A-1 is true and if so it is not supported by consideration? ( 7 ) HEARD the learned counsel for appellant. There is no representation on behalf of respondents 2, 5 and 6 though sufficient opportunity was granted to them. ( 8 ) P. W. 1 is the appellant. PW. 2 is the scribe and PWs. 5 and 6 are the attestors to Ex. A1. PW. 3 paid Rs. 5,000/- under Ex. A1 as per Ex. X1 agreement executed by the 1st respondent in his favour. PW. 4 is the Accountant of appellant. PW. 7 is the Sub-Registrar who registered Ex. A1. PW. 8 is the Expert who gave his opinion on the signature and fingerprints of the 2nd respondent. PW. A1. PW. 3 paid Rs. 5,000/- under Ex. A1 as per Ex. X1 agreement executed by the 1st respondent in his favour. PW. 4 is the Accountant of appellant. PW. 7 is the Sub-Registrar who registered Ex. A1. PW. 8 is the Expert who gave his opinion on the signature and fingerprints of the 2nd respondent. PW. 9 is the Photographer who took Exs. A21 to A24 signatures to facilitate the comparison of signatures and thumb impressions for expert opinion. DWs. 1 to 6 are examined on behalf of the 1st respondent to show that 1st respondent was cultivating land on lease. DW. 7 is the 2nd respondent. ( 9 ) SINCE Ex. A1 is a registered mortgage bond, the fact that PWs. 2, 5 and 6 were treated as hostile witnesses and were permitted to be cross-examined by appellant would not, in my considered opinion, be a point in favour of the respondents because, admittedly, a person by name Akuthota Venkata Subbaiah, on the ground that respondents 1 and 2 executed Ex. A1 in favour of appellant, filed I. P. No. 18 of 1971 under Section 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act to adjudicate the 1st respondent as an insolvent impleading the 2nd respondent and appellant also as parties to that I. P. alleging that Ex. A1 was executed with a view to defraud the creditors and hence is an act of insolvency. 1st respondent remained ex parte therein. 2nd respondent filed a counter denying execution of Ex. A1 and contending that appellant and 1st respondent, who are close friends, by playing fraud made her execute Ex. A1 on the pretext that it is a lease deed and took her to the office of the Sub-Registrar. Since Ex. A1 is a registered document executed by respondents 1 and 2 they should be deemed to have notice of Ex. A1 from the date of its registration. Therefore, even assuming that appellant played fraud on the appellant and made her to affix her signatures to Ex. A1 representing to her that it is a lease deed, after Akuthota Venkata Subbaiah filed I. P. No. 18 of 1971 impleading her also a party thereto alleging that she and 1st respondent had executed Ex. A1 in favour of the appellant, wherein she filed a counter denying execution thereof, as an ordinary prudent person she ought to have taken steps to get Ex. A1 in favour of the appellant, wherein she filed a counter denying execution thereof, as an ordinary prudent person she ought to have taken steps to get Ex. A1 set aside by filing a suit for cancellation of Ex. A1 or getting a declaration that Ex. A1 is not binding on her. She did not do so for the reasons best known to her. When appellant issued Ex. A3 notice demanding the amount covered by Ex. A1, 2nd respondent got issued Ex. A5 reply alleging that 1st respondent and appellant with a view to knock away her property, obtained the document (Ex. A1) under the guise of obtaining a lease deed from her. In Ex. A4 reply sent by the 1st respondent to Ex. A3 notice he alleged that in view of the friendship between him and the appellant, Ex. A1 was brought into existence collusively and so it is not binding on him. So it is clear that earlier to the appellant filing this suit, 1st respondent did not take a plea that appellant obtained his signatures on blank paper by intoxicating him. In fact 1st respondent did not go into the witness box to swear to the facts stated by him in his written statement. 2nd respondent did not specifically deny her signing Ex. A1 in her Ex. A5 reply. Her stand in I. P. No. 18 of 1971, as seen from Ex. A2, is that 1st respondent and appellant by representing to her that appellant agreed to take the plaint schedule property on lease took her to the Sub Registrar s Office and made her to subscribe her signatures to a document, the contents of which were not read over to her, and because of the implicit confidence reposed by her in her husband, she signed the document and later learnt that a fraud was played on her by 1st respondent in collusion with the appellant. So, it is clear that even by the time of her filing counter in I. P. No. 18 of 1971, 2nd respondent was aware that the document (Ex. A1) taken from her and 1st respondent, is not a lease deed, but is a deed of mortgage. Then as an ordinary prudent person, the 2nd respondent ought to have filed a suit for cancellation of Ex. A1, as per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, but did not do so. A1) taken from her and 1st respondent, is not a lease deed, but is a deed of mortgage. Then as an ordinary prudent person, the 2nd respondent ought to have filed a suit for cancellation of Ex. A1, as per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, but did not do so. The period of limitation for seeking cancellation of Ex. A1 is three years from the date when 2nd respondent came to know that it was obtained by playing fraud on her, as per Article 59 of Limitation Act. 2nd respondent did not file a suit for cancellation of Ex. A1 within three years after she filed her counter in I. P. No. 18 of 1971. So now she cannot contend that Ex. A1 is not binding on her. ( 10 ) WHERE fraud is alleged, as per Rule 4 of Order VI C. P. C. details of fraud have to be mentioned in the pleadings giving details with precision. General allegations do not suffice. A bald, vague and general allegation that 2nd respondent reposing great confidence in 1st respondent and appellant, without mentioning any details, executed Ex. A1 is too much insufficient to amount to making an averment of fraud as contemplated by Rule 4 of Order VI C. P. C. (see BISHUNDEO vs. SEOGENI RAI1 and AFSAR SHAIKH vs. SOLEMAN BIBI2 ). The theory of lease set up by the 2nd respondent is improbable because appellant admittedly did not come into possession of the plaint schedule property. As owner of the plaint schedule property, the first thing the 2nd respondent would enquire is the rent payable and the terms of lease. Those details are not stated. If after getting Ex. A1 registered, when appellant did not occupy the plaint schedule property, 2nd respondent should have explained as to why appellant did not come into possession of the plaint schedule property. That was not done. So, I am not able to believe that 2nd respondent affixed her signature to Ex. A-1 under the impression that it was a lease deed. ( 11 ) THE evidence of PW. 7 shows that the contents of Ex. A-1 were read over to the executant, and that the executants admitted the contents as true and correct. So, I am not able to believe that 2nd respondent affixed her signature to Ex. A-1 under the impression that it was a lease deed. ( 11 ) THE evidence of PW. 7 shows that the contents of Ex. A-1 were read over to the executant, and that the executants admitted the contents as true and correct. As per Section 34 of the Registration Act, the Registering Officer has to enquire whether or not the document presented for registration was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed, and has to satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him and that they have executed the document and then only register the document. In view of the counter filed by the 2nd respondent in I. P. No. 18 of 1971 and the averments in Ex. A-5 reply notice given by her to Ex. A-3 notice of demand issued by the appellant, it is clear that 2nd respondent admitted her having executed the Ex. A-1 and her being present at the Office Registrar, and the time of registration, because it is not the case of respondents 1 and 2 that they were not present at the time of registration of Ex. A1 or that somebody impersonated them. Since both respondents 1 and 2 admitted execution of Ex. A-1, and their being present in the Sub-Registrar s Office at the time of Registration of Ex. A-1, in view of the evidence of PW. 7 read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Registration Act, the only inference that can be drawn is that PW7 in fact had read over the document to respondents 1 and 2 and registered it only after being satisfied that they admitted their having executed Ex. A1, knowing the contents thereof. The only suggestion put to PW. 7 during cross-examination, which was denied by him, is that when a document is presented for registration, the concerned Officer would only ask whether the document was executed by the executants and whether the consideration passed thereunder or not, and that no other questions would be put. The said suggestion impliedly shows that the respondents 1 and 2 admitted their having executed Ex. A-1 and also their receiving consideration thereunder. PW. 7 would not have registered Ex. A1, or would have made a specific endorsement on Ex. The said suggestion impliedly shows that the respondents 1 and 2 admitted their having executed Ex. A-1 and also their receiving consideration thereunder. PW. 7 would not have registered Ex. A1, or would have made a specific endorsement on Ex. A1 that the executants have denied their having received consideration mentioned in Ex. A1, had respondents 1 and 2 stated before him that they did not receive the amount mentioned therein. Therefore, it is clear that both respondents 1 and 2 knew that Ex. A-1 presented for registration was a mortgage bond, and that it recited that an amount of Rs. 17,000/- was lent there under to them. ( 12 ) SINCE execution of Ex. A1 is admitted, proof of its attestation pales into insignificance in view of the proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence Act, which reads"it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of execution of any document not being a Will which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of Indian Registration Act, 1908 unless its execution by the person for whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied". So the fact that the attestors of Ex. A-1, which is a registered mortgage bond, did not entirely support the case of the appellant is of no consequence, because its execution is admitted by respondents 1and 2. ( 13 ) SINCE the recitals in Ex. A1 show that appellant paid Rs. 17,000/- to the respondents. It is for respondents 1 and 2 to establish that Ex. A-1 is not supported by consideration. The fact that the evidence of PWs. 2, 5 and 6 does not show the passing of consideration under Ex. A-1 is of no consequence, because respondents 1 and 2 admitted the recitals in Ex. A-1 at the time of registration. It is for respondents 1 and 2 to establish that no consideration passed under Ex. A-1 to them. It is not necessary for appellant to establish that he paid consideration under Ex. A-1. Except the interested testimony of 2nd respondent, there is no other evidence on record to show that Ex. A-1 is not supported by consideration. On the other hand, the evidence of PW. 3 shows that 1st respondent had on 29-10-1972 executed Ex. X1 agreement in his favour as per which he [pw3] agreed to pay Rs. A-1. Except the interested testimony of 2nd respondent, there is no other evidence on record to show that Ex. A-1 is not supported by consideration. On the other hand, the evidence of PW. 3 shows that 1st respondent had on 29-10-1972 executed Ex. X1 agreement in his favour as per which he [pw3] agreed to pay Rs. 5,000/- towards part payment of the amount due under Ex. A1. For reasons best known to him, 1st respondent did not go into the witness box to deny the execution of Ex. X1. So an inference has to be drawn against 1st respondent. In view thereof and the evidence of PW. 3, Ex. X1 has to be accepted. If Ex. A-1 is nominal and is not supported by consideration there was no need to make a payment of Rs. 5,000/- under Ex. A-1. So, the contention of respondents 1 and 2, that Ex. A-1 is not supported by consideration cannot be believed or accepted. So, I hold that Ex. A-1 is true and is supported by consideration. The point is answered accordingly. ( 14 ) THE finding of the trial Court that the respondents are not entitled to the benefits of Act 7 of 1977 and that interest claimed by the appellant is neither unfair nor unconscionable is not challenged by the respondents by filing cross objections. On merits also I find no grounds to interfere with the said finding. ( 15 ) FOR the above reasons, in view of my finding on the point for consideration appellant is entitled to a decree as prayed for. ( 16 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The Judgment of the trial Court is set aside and a preliminary decree is passed for the suit amount in favour of the appellant. Time for redemption two (02) months.