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2002 DIGILAW 812 (PAT)

Shrimati Kishori Devi v. Nabendra Prasad

2002-07-29

NAGENDRA RAI

body2002
Judgment 1. The tenants are the petitioners against the judgment and decree dated 31.8.2001 decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-opposite party for eviction on the ground of personal necessity in terms of section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (for short the Act) by following the special procedure as provided under section 14 of the Act. 2. The plaintiff-opposite party filed a suit for eviction of the tenant-petitioners on the assertion that the house in question belonged to his mother Kunti Kuar, who died on 3.9.1982. Thereafter, there was a partition between her two sons, namely, the plaintiff and Mahendra Prasad. The suit premises consisting of one storeyed Khaparpose building, comprising three rooms, one verandah, a courtyard, bathroom and latrine, fell into his share. The suit house bears municipal holding no. 345 (old), new 182, R.S.P. 226, under Khata no. 33, Ward No. 17, Muhalla Brahmantoli, town Muzaffarpur. After allotment of the said house in his share, his name has been mutated in the municipal record as well as in the record of the Anchal Office. 3. Biltu Thakur, husband of petitioner no. 1 and father of petitioners no. 2 to 7, was inducted as a tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 40/-. Said Biltu Thakur died on 30.11.1996 and, thereafter, the defendant- petitioners are living as tenants in the suit house and have been paying rent regularly to him. The plaintiffs family consists of himself, his wife, two sons and one married daughter and they are living in the house fallen in the share of his brother Mahendra Prasad, who is insisting him to vacate the house. He has no other house in the town. He requires the premises reasonably and bona fide and as such he requested the defendant-petitioners to vacate the same but they did not vacate. Hence, the suit. 4. The tenant-petitioners admitted that Biltu Thakur, husband of petitioner no. 1 and father of petitioners no. 2 to 7, was tenant of the suit house on a monthly rental of Rs. 40/- and after his death, they are living as tenants. The premises belonged to Kunti Kuar, who died on 3.9.1982. They haye disputed the factum of partition between the plaintiff and his brother Mahendra Prasad after the death of their mother. The suit house also belongs to the brother of the plaintiff. 40/- and after his death, they are living as tenants. The premises belonged to Kunti Kuar, who died on 3.9.1982. They haye disputed the factum of partition between the plaintiff and his brother Mahendra Prasad after the death of their mother. The suit house also belongs to the brother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff wanted to increase the rent of the suit house, for which he had already filed a case before the Rent Controller and to pressurise them, the present suit has been filed. They further stated that the plaintiff has two other houses, where he can accommodate his family. 5. As the suit was filed on the ground of personal necessity under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, the special procedure under section 14 of the Act was followed. Both the parties were given opportunity to adduce oral and documentary evidence. They led evidence and, thereafter, the court below, after having found that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith required the premises and that partial eviction will not substantially satisfy the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the plaintiff-opposite party, decreed the suit. 6. The facts, which are not in dispute, are that the mother of the plaintiff, namely, Kunti Kuar, inducted Biltu Thakur, husband of petitioner no. 1 and father of the remaining petitioners, as a tenant on the monthly rental of Rs. 40/- since long. It is also an admitted position that the aforesaid mother of the plaintiff died in 1982 and, thereafter, the tenant-petitioners have been paying rent to the plaintiff. It is also an admitted position that the plaintiffs family consists of himself, his wife, two sons and one married daughter. 7. The question for consideration is as to whether the requirement of the plaintiff is reasonable and bona fide. The landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction on the ground of personal necessity in terms of section 11(1)(c) of the Act, which runs as follows : "11. 7. The question for consideration is as to whether the requirement of the plaintiff is reasonable and bona fide. The landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction on the ground of personal necessity in terms of section 11(1)(c) of the Act, which runs as follows : "11. Eviction of tenants.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the following grounds : (a) xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx (c) Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the land lord : Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5; Explanation l.ln this clause the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of section 2. Explanation II.Where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference." 8. It is well-settled that mere desire or wish of the landlord is not sufficient to entitle him to a decree of eviction under the aforesaid provision. He has to prove that his need is reasonable and bona fide one. In other words, his need is not dishonest or a device to get the tenant evicted. However, that does not mean that the land-lord has to prove his dire need. He has to prove that his need is reasonable and bona fide one. In other words, his need is not dishonest or a device to get the tenant evicted. However, that does not mean that the land-lord has to prove his dire need. It is for the landlord to decide about his residential requirement. ,While deciding the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the house, the approach of the court should be neither liberal, nor conservative nor pedantic. There is no requirement in law that the landlord should not be allowed to live with comfort in the premises, which belongs to him and be forced to live in inadequate or lesser premises, not meeting his reasonable and bona fide requirement. Once it is found that the plaintiff requires the premises reasonably and in good faith then under the aforesaid provision the Court has to consider such requirement of the landlord in terms of the proviso to the said section, which mandates the Court to consider the question of partial eviction, irrespective of the fact whether such plea has been taken by the tenant or not. It requires, inter-alia, that the Court has to find out as to whether reasonable requirement of the landlord will be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant only from part of the building and allowing the tenant to continue in occupation of the rest, provided the tenant agrees to such partial eviction and fulfils other requirements as mentioned in the proviso. When the case comes within the purview of proviso to the said section, the Court has to determine first the dimension of the premises and then the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff. This finding has to be arrived at on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties and then it has to be seen whether such requirement will be substantially satisfied, and not fully satisfied, by ordering partial eviction of the tenant. 9. Coming to the facts of the present case, l find that the plaintiff examined himself, his brother and others on the question of ownership of the premises. He also produced the documentary evidence to show that after partition, the suit house has been allotted to him. 9. Coming to the facts of the present case, l find that the plaintiff examined himself, his brother and others on the question of ownership of the premises. He also produced the documentary evidence to show that after partition, the suit house has been allotted to him. The defendant petitioners, though asserted that the suit house belongs to both the brothers but they did not bring any evidence on the record to show that the same belongs to both the brothers. Even if the defendants would have proved that the suit house belonged to both the brothers then the matter would not have been different. However, it is not necessary to dwell upon this matter in view of cogent evidence on the record that there was partition between both the brothers. There is also no dispute about the number of the rooms in the suit house. There are three bed-rooms and the plaintiff family consists of himself, his wife, two sons apart from one married daughter, who after marriage is living with her husband. Taking into consideration the said aspect of the matter, the court below found that the requirement of the plaintiff is reasonable and bona fide. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners did not point out anything to show that the said finding arrived at by the court below is not according to law in the sense that the court below has either omitted to consider the relevant evidence or relied upon irrelevant evidence or has adopted a wrong approach in considering the evidence on record. 11. Coming to the question of partial eviction, l find that the court below, having considered the rooms available in the suit house, found that there are three bedrooms only and the plaintiff requires the same for himself and his two sons who are going to be married and as such the requirement of the plaintiff would not be satisfied substantially by partial eviction. The defendant-petitioners failed to prove that the plaintiff has any other house. 12. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the court below do not suffer from any legal infirmity justifying interference under the revisional power under section 14 (8) of the Act. 13. In the result, I find no merit in this Civil Revision and it is, accordingly, dismissed.