Judgment Kirpal, C.J.I.— Civil Appeal Nos. 2330 of 2000, 3572 of 2000, 76 of 2002 and S.L.P. (C) No. 22549 of 2001 : Leave granted. 2. These appeals are against orders passed by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "MRTP Commission") whereby Indonesian manufacturers of float glass had been restrained from exporting the same to India at allegedly predatory prices. 3. Respondent No. 1 is an association of float glass manufacturers in India. During March-April, 1998, complaints were made by the said respondent to the Customs Department, alleging that the Indonesian manufacturers of float glass, in association with Indian importers were allegedly indulging in heavy under-invoicing. The respondents were, however, informed by the Customs Department in Calcutta that if they had any genuine grievance, the same could be made before the Designated Authority, Ministry of Commerce dealing with anti-dumping complaints. On 26th May, 1998, the respondent No.1 presented a complaint before the Designated Authority. This complaint appears to have been filed before the Anti-Dumping Authority and the same was possibly not pursued by the complainant. 4. On 10th September, 1998, the respondent No. 1 filed a complaint before the MRTP Commission under Section 33(1)(j), (ja) and Section 36A read with Section 2(o) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the MRTP Act ) against three Indonesian companies alleging that they were manufacturing float glass and were selling the same at predatory prices in India, and were hence resorting to restrictive and unfair trade practices. In the complaint, it was stated that the float glass of Indonesian origin was being exported into India at the CIF price of US$ 155 to 180 PMT. At this price, some float glass had been shipped into India during the period December, 1997; to June, 1998. It was alleged that these sale prices were predatory prices as they were less than not only the cost of production for the product in Indonesia but also the variable cost of production of the product. The complainant gave figures indicating the estimated cost of float glass ­internationally as well as the cost of pro­duction of float glass in India with a view to ­demonstrate that the Indian manufacturers of float glass would not be able to compete with the price at which the Indonesian manu­facturers were presently selling or intending to sell to Indian consumers. The complainant gave figures indicating the estimated cost of float glass ­internationally as well as the cost of pro­duction of float glass in India with a view to ­demonstrate that the Indian manufacturers of float glass would not be able to compete with the price at which the Indonesian manu­facturers were presently selling or intending to sell to Indian consumers. On this basis, it was contended that the sale of float glass by the ­Indonesian manufacturers at the said price of US$ 155 to 180 PMT will restrict, distort and prevent competition by pricing out Indian ­producers from the market. This would result in lowering the production of the Indian ­industry and the consequent idle capacity and losses would force the industry to become sick which would lead to its closure which would have a direct impact on the employment in the industry. 5. In response to the notice issued to the Indonesian companies, M/s. P.T. Mulia Industries (respondent No. 2 in this appeal) wrote a letter to the MRTP Commission stating that it had never in the past exported float glass to India. The other two respondents did not send any reply to the Commission. The appellant, however, which is the Indian importer of the float glass from Indonesia had filed a caveat before the Commission. It also filed a reply refuting the allegations of the respondent and it was the contention of the appellant that respondent No. 1 was a cartel of Indian manufacturers of float glass which was, in fact, exporting out of India at prices far lower than their own cost of production in India. It was also contended by the appellant herein that the cost of production of float glass was lower in Indonesia than in India and float glass was not being exported to India at predatory prices. 6. The application under Section 12-A for interim injunction was heard by the Chairman of the Commission and a second Member. There was a difference of opinion amongst them. While the Chairman vide order dated 18th January, 1999, allowed the application and restrained the Indonesian companies from exporting to India their float glass production at predatory prices, Dr. S. Chakravarthy, the second Member dismissed the application, inter alia, holding that there was no evidence to substantiate the plea of predatory pricing at this stage. While the Chairman vide order dated 18th January, 1999, allowed the application and restrained the Indonesian companies from exporting to India their float glass production at predatory prices, Dr. S. Chakravarthy, the second Member dismissed the application, inter alia, holding that there was no evidence to substantiate the plea of predatory pricing at this stage. By order dated 9th February, 2000, the third Member who heard the case concurred with the view taken by the Chairman and passed an order of injunction against the Indonesian companies. 7. While Civil Appeal No. 2330 of 2000 is filed by the Indian importer who was the caveator before the Commission, Civil Appeal No. 3572 of 2000 has been filed by P.T. Mulia Glass which is the subsidiary of P.T. Mulia Industrindo. It is the case of P.T. Muliaglass that the holding company does not carry out any manufacturing operations and that is why it had informed the MRTP Commission that it was not engaged in the export of float glass to India and, therefore, it did not appear before the MRTP Commission. P.T. Mulia Glass which, in fact, manufactures the float glass being aggrieved by the order of the MRTP Commission has filed the appeal, inter alia, contending that it is not exporting float glass to India at predatory prices. 8. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the MRTP Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the complaint which was made by the respondents. It was submitted that the essence of the complaint of the respondents before the MRTP Commission was of injury to the domestic industry on account of low prices by the Indonesian manufacturers which is a dispute under Anti-Dumping law and does not fall within the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. It was submitted that the complaint which was made against the Indonesian exporters was one essentially of dumping as it had been contended that the Indonesian exporters were exporting float glass at very low prices which were predatory in nature and the intention was to cause injury to the domestic industry. 9. It was submitted that Article 18.1 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, 1994, provides that "no specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT, 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement". 9. It was submitted that Article 18.1 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, 1994, provides that "no specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT, 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement". The remedy against the practice of "dumping"/export of goods at "predatory prices" has been expressly agreed upon internationally under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to which India is a signatory. The Agreement deals with anti-dumping duties and provides mechanism to implement it. 10. In pursuance of the GATT, 1994, the Parliament for the first time inserted provisions 9A to 9C in the Customs Tariff Act vide the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Act, 1995, No. 6 of 1995 which replaced the provisions of sections 9, 9A and 9B earlier inserted in the Customs Tariff Act under Act No. 52 of 1982. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill clearly states that the Bill seeks to amend the Custom Tariff Act to bring the provisions of the Custom Tariff Act in conformity with the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994, and the agreements on subsidies and countervailing measures. Even the preamble of the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Act, 1995, No. 6 of 1995 also provides that the pro­visions of sections 9, 9A and 9B of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, have been replaced by the new sections 9, 9A and 9B to reflect the changes in the domestic law, consequent upon coming into effect the Agreement on Anti-dumping (i.e. an Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994).... under the Uruguay Round on 1st January 7, 1995. 11. Section 9A, inter alia, provides that where any article is exported from any country or territory to India at less than its normal value, then, upon the importation of such article into India, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, impose an anti-dumping duty not exceeding the margin of dumping in relation to such article. The said section indicates how the normal value and the margin of dumping is to be ascertained. The said section indicates how the normal value and the margin of dumping is to be ascertained. Section 9B contains provisions which provide for exemption from levy under Section 9 or Section 9A in certain cases while Section 9C gives the right of appeal against the order of determination or review thereof regarding the existence, degree and effect of any subsidy or dumping in relation to import of any article. The Act contemplates the Designated Authority, which is appointed under it s provisions, to conduct a detailed investigation into the allegation of dumping of articles before it determines the normal value, export price and the margin of dumping. It is important to note that in undertaking this exercise, the Government or the foreign country exporting the article is required to be informed. By notification dated 1st January, 1995, Anti-Dumping Duty Rules were framed. Rule 14 sets out circumstances under which the designated authority may terminate an investigation. In Rule 14(d), there is a de-minimus requirement that is to say the volume of the dumped imports, actual or ­potential, should account for not less than 3 of the imports of the like product. If the imports are below this level, the authority shall terminate the investigation immediately. It is the case of the appellant that the float glass which was imported from Indonesia was much less than 3 . 12. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the respondents have in the complaint filed by them with the MRTP Commission under the MRTP Act sought redressal of their alleged grievance that certain Indonesian companies are selling float glass at prices much lower than their cost of production and are thereby allegedly indulging in predatory pricing with an alleged intent to eliminate competition and causing material injury to the interest of domestic float glass industry. For redressal of the alleged grievance of the respondents, a specific remedy has been provided under sections 9A to 9C of the Customs Tariff Act and the Anti-dumping Duty Rules. For redressal of the alleged grievance of the respondents, a specific remedy has been provided under sections 9A to 9C of the Customs Tariff Act and the Anti-dumping Duty Rules. The provisions of sections 9A to 9C introduced under the Customs Tariff Act and the Anti-dumping Duty Rules provide for a complete and exhaustive machinery to prevent dumping of goods into India including export of goods into India at predatory price causing injury" to domestic industry, causing threat of injury to domestic industry and material retardation to establishment of domestic industry by way of imposition of anti-dumping duty on import of such goods. The expression "injury" has been defined under Article 3 of the Agreement on Anti-Dumping as under: "Injury shall unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry; threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry, and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article." 13. Thus, it was submitted, the remedy for imposition of anti-dumping duty has been provided so as to prevent distortion, impairment and restriction of competition in domestic industry. A specific authority, i.e., the Designated Authority on Anti-dumping has been constituted under the Anti-dumping Duty Rules framed under the Customs Tariff Act which has the powers to conduct investigation upon receipt of a complaint from the domestic industry or suo motu relating to dumping of goods by a foreign company to identify the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping in relation to import of any article and injury to domestic industry, threat of injury to domestic industry, material retardation to establishment of domestic industry, etc. and to recommend to the Central Government the amount of anti-dumping duty to remove the injury to the domestic industry, based on which the Central Government imposes provisional or final anti-dumping duty upon importation of the concerned goods into India as a result of which the cost for the Indian importer for the imported goods and the articles becomes the same as that of fair value of such goods and articles in the domestic market. The object of the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act and the Anti-dumping Duty Rules is thus to prevent distortion, impairment and restriction of competition caused by export of goods to India at dumped/predatory price. The object of the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act and the Anti-dumping Duty Rules is thus to prevent distortion, impairment and restriction of competition caused by export of goods to India at dumped/predatory price. In view of the aforesaid, the finding of the MRTP Commission that as the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act only provide for imposition of custom duties, they have had no relevance for overriding the provisions of the MRTP Act, is erroneous, was the submission. It is also submitted that the object of the MRTP Act on the other hand generally is to check concentration of economic power to the common detriment, to control monopolies and to prohibit monopolistic and restrictive trade practices and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. In view of the above, the MRTP Act and the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act cover the same subject-matter as the scope and object of both the Acts is same although the MRTP Act is a general Act and the Customs Tariff Act is a special Act for the redressal of grievance of the respondents. 14. It was urged that where a particular subject has received special treatment under specific provisions/statute, it will exclude the applicability of the general provision(s) which might otherwise cover the said topic. Therefore, applying this well-settled law, the general provisions of the MRTP Act will be excluded in relation to any grievance and complaint ­pertaining to dumping/exporting of goods at predatory price from foreign country into India, with an intent to cause injury to the ­domestic industry which is specifically covered under the provisions of Sections 9A, 9B and 9C of the Customs Tariff Act and the Anti-dumping Duty Rules framed there under. ­Therefore, Sections 9A to 9C of the Customs Tariff Act exclude the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission in such matters. The appellants rely on the ­following decisions of the Hon ble Supreme Court which unequivocally lays down and ­reiterates the above mentioned principle: (i) Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and Others (1999) 9 SCC 620 ; at 638 and 639, 641, 648, 649 and 650. (ii) Jogendra Lal Saha vs. State of Bihar and Others 1991 Supp (2) SCC 654; at 657 (iii) Life Insurance Corporation of India­ vs. D.J. Bahadur and Others­ (1981) 1 SCC 315 ; at 349, 350-354. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and Others (1999) 9 SCC 620 ; at 638 and 639, 641, 648, 649 and 650. (ii) Jogendra Lal Saha vs. State of Bihar and Others 1991 Supp (2) SCC 654; at 657 (iii) Life Insurance Corporation of India­ vs. D.J. Bahadur and Others­ (1981) 1 SCC 315 ; at 349, 350-354. (iv) Damji Valji Shah and Another vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India­ and Others (1965) 3 SCR 665 ; at 673. (v) Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 76 ; at 80-82. (vi) Shriram Mandir Sansthan vs. Vatsalabai and Others (1999) 1 SCC 657 ; at 661 and 662. 15. On behalf of the respondents, it was submitted that the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, relating to imposition of anti-dumping duties do not in any way oust the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission over the restrictive trade practice of predatory pricing. It was contended that the two statutes occupied different fields and were distinct in their scope and applicability. There was no overlap or conflict between the statutes and hence the question of repeal, whether implied or express, did not arise. The Customs Tariff Act is concerned with the imposition of duties of customs. Imposition of customs duty is the policy decision of the Government in the realm of taxation. Section 9A read with the Rules provide for the determination of certain objective criteria on the basis of which the decision of the Central Government to levy anti dumping duty can be based. The Customs Tariff Act does not confer any right on any individual or Association and does not provide for any remedy to them. Only the domestic industry can approach the Designated Authority. 16. It was further contended that whereas predatory pricing enquiries are concerned with sales below the cost of production of the predator with the intention to eliminate competition, anti-dumping investigations are triggered when an exporter sells his products in the export market at a price below that of the price at which he sells his product in the country of origin. In anti-dumping investigations, therefore, the focus is on sale price in the country of origin as opposed to the cost of production. 17. According to the respondents, the MRTP Act provides for a judicial remedy for specified practices done individually or collectively. In anti-dumping investigations, therefore, the focus is on sale price in the country of origin as opposed to the cost of production. 17. According to the respondents, the MRTP Act provides for a judicial remedy for specified practices done individually or collectively. An individual consumer or a trade association or a competitor can approach the MRTP Commission. There is a right of appeal to the Supreme Court against the orders passed by the MRTP Commission. Only domestic industry has the right to initiate anti-dumping proceedings. Thus the scope and operation of the Acts mentioned above was different. In particular, the ingredients of transactions which attract operation of the MRTP Act and the Customs Tariff Act are different and the ­question of one superseding the other as a special law does not arise. They operate in different fields and are subject to different considerations. Hence, in the absence of any conflict or overlap between the two statutes, the question of the Customs Tariff Act provisions impliedly repealing the provisions of Section 33(1)(j) of the MRTP Act do not arise, was the submission. 18. While adopting the arguments of the other counsel, Shri Anil B. Divan, Senior Advocate on behalf of the respondent No. 1 referred to Sections 2(e), 2(u), 13 and 14 of the Act. He submitted that Section 2(u)(i) which defines "trade practice" covers a chain of events/series of transactions that affect the price charged or methods of trading. Thus a part of "trade practice" may be outside India but the affectation of prices may have effect in India. Thus, he submitted, the import of goods and the sale in India which is the last link of the trade practice of predatory pricing read with Section 14 clearly gives jurisdiction in an appropriate case to the MRTP Commission. He contended that like the EEC as well as the USA, the law in India was the same, namely, that if the effect of a restrictive trade practice came to be felt in India because of a part of the trade practice being implemented in India, the MRTP Commission would have jurisdiction. He contended that like the EEC as well as the USA, the law in India was the same, namely, that if the effect of a restrictive trade practice came to be felt in India because of a part of the trade practice being implemented in India, the MRTP Commission would have jurisdiction. This "effects doctrine" was, therefore, sought to be invoked with a view to clothe the MRTP with jurisdiction to pass orders even though a transaction which resulted in exporting goods to India at predatory price, which was in effect a restrictive trade practice, had been carried outside the territory of India. He submitted that where the effect of restrictive trade practice carried out outside the territory of EEC or USA is felt within the EEC or USA, the authorities enforcing competition law in the EEC or the USA exercise jurisdiction in regard to such conduct. He relied upon the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Wood Pulp case rendered on 27th September, 1988. There while interpreting Article 85 of the EEC Treaty which prohibited any agreement, decision and concerted practice which have the effect of prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, it was held that where producers established outside the EEC implement a pricing agreement within the common market the community s jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered by the territoriality principle and is not in breach of the principle of international comity. 19. It was submitted by Mr. Divan that even while a regime for imposition of anti-dumping duties has been present in the EEC right from 1968, it was never suggested before the European Commission or the European Court of Justice that it s jurisdiction stood ousted or that the provisions of Article 85 stood impliedly repealed by the anti-dumping code in respect of imports. Mr. Divan also submitted that in the USA, the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations issued by the U.S. Department of Justice enunciated that the State Department will exercise jurisdiction under the Sherman Act over foreign conduct which had direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce. 20. Mr. Divan also submitted that in the USA, the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations issued by the U.S. Department of Justice enunciated that the State Department will exercise jurisdiction under the Sherman Act over foreign conduct which had direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce. 20. While adopting the arguments of the other counsel, Shri Anil Divan on behalf of the respondents, drew the Court s attention to Section 4 of the MRTP Act which reads as follows:- "Application of other laws not barred. —(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2) or elsewhere in this Act, the provisions of this Act, shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3 or elsewhere in this Act, so much of the provisions of this Act, as relate to matters in respect of which specific provisions exist in the— (i) Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934), or the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), or (ii) State Bank of India Act, 1955 (23 of 1955), or the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959), or (iii) Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938), shall not apply to a banking company, the State Bank of India or a subsidiary bank, as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959), or an insurer, as the case may be." 21. He submitted that the provisions of the MRTP Act clearly postulated the continued applicability of other laws. There was no specific provision in the MRTP Act which made any other law inapplicable and there was no reason why by a process of interpretation the Indian MRTP Act should be emasculated and a beneficiant anti-monopoly jurisdiction exercised world-wide should be denied to the Indian MRTP Commission. 22. What is the scheme of the Act, insofar as it is relevant to the present case, relating to allegation of restrictive trade practice and the jurisdiction and power of the Commission in regard thereto. 23. As the preamble indicates the MRTP Act, inter alia, prohibits restrictive trade practices. Section 2(o) defines restrictive trade practice while Section 2(u) defines trade practice. 24. Section 10 gives the jurisdiction to the Commission to inquire into any restrictive trade practice. 23. As the preamble indicates the MRTP Act, inter alia, prohibits restrictive trade practices. Section 2(o) defines restrictive trade practice while Section 2(u) defines trade practice. 24. Section 10 gives the jurisdiction to the Commission to inquire into any restrictive trade practice. This jurisdiction can be exercised either upon receiving of a complaint or upon reference made by the Government or upon an application by the Director General or upon its own knowledge or information. Before a process is issued requiring the attendance upon any person the Commission may require, under Section 11, the Director General to make an investigation and to submit a report. Section 12-A contains the power of the Commission to grant temporary injunctions and the same reads as follows:- "12-A. Power of the Commission to grant temporary injunctions.—(1) Where, during an inquiry before the Commission, it is proved, whether by the complainant, Director General, any trader or class of traders or any other person, by affidavit or otherwise, that any undertaking or any person is carrying on, or is about to carry on, any monopolistic or any restrictive or unfair, trade practice and such monopolistic or restrictive, or unfair, trade practice is likely to affect prejudicially the public interest or the interest of any trader, class of traders or traders generally or of any consumer or consumers generally, the Commission may, for the purposes of staying or preventing the undertaking or, as the case may be, such person from causing such prejudicial effect, by order, grant a temporary injunction restraining such undertaking or person from carrying on any monopolistic or restrictive, or unfair, trade practice until the conclusion of such inquiry or until further orders. (2) The provisions of Rules 2-A to 5 (both inclusive) of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall, as far as may be, apply to a temporary injunction issued by the Commission under this section; as they apply to a temporary injunction issued by a civil court, and any reference in any such rule to a suit shall be construed as a reference to any inquiry before the Commission. 25. Section 14 relates to orders where a party concerned does not carry on business in India. 25. Section 14 relates to orders where a party concerned does not carry on business in India. Section 15 contains the restriction of application of orders in certain cases and reads as follows:- "Restriction of application of orders in certain cases.—No order made under this Act with respect to any monopolistic or restrictive trade practice shall operate so as to restrict— (a) the right of any person to restrain any infringement of a patent granted in India, or (b) any person as to the condition which he attaches to a licence to do anything, the doing of which but for the licence would be an infringement of a patent granted in India, or (c) the right of any person to export goods from India, to the extent to which the monopolistic or restrictive trade practice relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution, or control of goods for such export." 26. Chapter V contains provisions relating to restrictive trade practices and unfair trade practices. In the present case, it was the contention of the respondents that there were agreements between the Indian importers and the foreign parties which were registerable under Section 33 of the Act. So far as the import of float glass is concerned, it was contended that the provisions of Section 33(1)(j) were attracted. In the present case, it was the contention of the respondents that there were agreements between the Indian importers and the foreign parties which were registerable under Section 33 of the Act. So far as the import of float glass is concerned, it was contended that the provisions of Section 33(1)(j) were attracted. The relevant portions of Section 33 are as follows:- "Registerable agreements relating to restrictive trade practices.— (1) Every agreement falling within one or more of the following categories shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an agreement relating to restrictive trade practices and shall be subject to registration in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, namely- (a) xxxxxxx (b) xxxxxxx (c) xxxxxxx (d) any agreement to purchase or sell goods or to tender for the sale or purchase of goods only at prices or on terms or conditions agreed upon between the sellers or purchasers; (e) xxxxxxx (f) xxx xxxx (g) xxxxxxx (h) xxxxxxx (i) xxx xxxx (j) any agreement to sell goods at such prices as would have the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor; (ja) any agreement restricting in any manner, the class or number of wholesalers, producers or suppliers from whom any goods may be bought; (jb) any agreement as to the bids which any of the parties thereto may offer at an auction for the sale of goods or any agreement whereby any party thereto agrees to abstain from bidding at any auction for the sale of goods; (k) xxx xxx (l) xxx xxxx (2) The provisions of this section shall apply, so far as may be, in relation to agreements making provision for services as they apply in relation to agreements connected with the production, storage, supply, distribution or control of goods. (3) No agreement falling within this section shall be subject to registration in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter if it is expressly authorised by or under any law for the time being in force or has the approval of the Central Government or if the Government is a party to such agreement." 27. The registration of agreement is provided for by Section 35. The registration of agreement is provided for by Section 35. The relevant provisions of which are as follows:- "Registration of agreement.—(1) The Central Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify a day (hereinafter referred to as the appointed day) on and from which every agreement falling within Section 33 shall become registerable under this Act: Provided that different days may be ­appointed for different categories of agreements. (2) Within sixty days from the appointed day, in the case of an agreement existing on that day, and in the case of an agreement made after the appointed day within sixty days from the making thereof, there shall be furnished to the Director General in respect of every agreement falling within Section 33, the following particulars, namely- (a) the names of the persons who are parties to the agreement; and (b) the whole of the terms of the agreement. (3) If at any time after the agreement has been registered under this section, the agreement is varied (whether in respect of the parties or in respect of the terms thereof) or determined otherwise than by afflux of time, particulars of the variation or determination shall be furnished to the Director General within one month after the date of the variation or determination. (4) The particulars to be furnished under this section in respect of an agreement shall be furnished- (a) in so far as the agreement or any variation or determination of the agreement is made by an instrument in writing, by the production of the original or a true copy of that agreement; and (b) in so far as the agreement or any variation or determination of the agreement is not so made, by the production of a memorandum in writing signed by the person by whom the particulars are furnished. (5) The particulars to be furnished under this section shall be furnished by or on behalf of any person who is a party to the agreement or, as the case may be, was a party thereto immediately before its determination, and where the particulars are duly furnished by or on behalf of any such person, the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be complied with on the part of all such persons. Explanation I.—Where any agreement subject to registration under this section relates to the production, storage, supply, distribution or control of goods or the performance of any services in India and any party to the agreement carries on business in India, the agreement shall be deemed to be an agreement within the meaning of this section, notwithstanding that any other party to the agreement does not carry on business in India. xxx xxx" 28. The investigation by the Commission and the orders which may be passed by it relating to restrictive trade practices is dealt with by Section 37. 29. We will first consider whether the MRTP Act has extra territorial application. In other words, can the MRTP Commission pass orders against parties who are not in India and who do not carry on business here and where agreements are entered into outside India with no Indian being a party to it. 30. The preamble of the MRTP Act reads as follows . "An Act to provide that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of economic power to the common detriment, for the control of monopolies, for the prohibition of monopolistic and restrictive trade practices and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. " Presumably the economic system to which reference has been made in the preamble of the Act can only be with regard to the Indian economic system and not any other system in the world. The object of the Act was that there should be no exploitation of the people of India, as a result of concentration of economic power or by reason of monopolistic and restrictive trade practices being carried out in India.­ 31. Section 1(2) states that the Act "extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir". Section 2(a) defines "agreement" while Section 2(e) defines "goods" which reads as follows:" "goods" means goods as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (3 of 1930), and includes,— (i) products manufactured, processed or mined in India; (ii) shares and stocks including issue of shares before allotment; (iii) in relation to goods supplied, distributed or controlled in India, goods imported into India;" 32. Section 14 which has relevance on the point in issue reads as follows:— "Orders where party concerned does not carry on business in India.—Where any practice substantially falls within monopolistic, restrictive, or unfair, trade practice, relating to the production, storage, supply, distribution or control of goods of any description or the provision of any services and any party to such practice does not carry on business in India, an order may be made under this Act with respect to that part of the practice which is carried on in India." 33. Reading Sections 1(2), 2(e) and 14 together can leave no manner of doubt that the Act has no extra territorial operation. Section 1(2) specifically provides that the Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, thereby defining the geographical boundary of the operation of the Act. Section 2(e)(iii) defines goods as including those goods which are supplied, distributed or controlled in India or the goods imported into India. The emphasis is on the words "in India" or "into India". Paraphrasing the said sub-section "goods" would mean "those goods supplied in India or goods distributed in India or goods controlled in India or goods imported into India". In the present case, we are concerned with float glass which was sought to be imported into India. For the purpose of the Act, it is only the goods imported into India which will fall within the definition of the word "goods" in Section 2(e). As such for the Commission to exercise any jurisdiction goods must be those which are imported into India. As long as the import has not taken place and the goods are merely intended for export to India the same will not fall within the definition of the word "goods" in Section 2(e). 34. Even if there was any manner of doubt the same would stand dispelled by the plain reading of Section 14. The said section visualizes where, inter alia, restrictive or unfair trade practice is carried on and any party to such practice does not carry on business in India then an order can be passed under the Act only with respect to that part of the practice which is carried on in India. To put it differently, it is only that part of monopolistic, restrictive, or unfair, trade practice, relating to production, supply etc. To put it differently, it is only that part of monopolistic, restrictive, or unfair, trade practice, relating to production, supply etc. of goods in India in respect of which orders can be passed. To put matters beyond any doubt Explanation I to Section 35, which refers to agreements which are subject to registration under the said section, provides that when any party to the agreement for the production, supply, distribution etc. of goods or performance of any services in India carries on business in India then that agreement shall be deemed to be an agreement within the meaning of the section, notwithstanding that any other party to the agreement does not carry on business in India. The meaning of this clearly is that it is only that agreement which would require registration in India if at least one party to the agreement carries on business in India. It may happen that there may be two or more parties which enter into an agreement outside India, relating to supply or distribution of goods to India, the formation of such an agreement would not ipso facto require any registration even if it relates to restrictive trade practice but if one of the parties to an agreement carries on business in India then that agreement shall be deemed to be an agreement within the meaning of the section which would require registration. 35. The next question which would arise for consideration is whether the principle of "effect doctrine" has any application in India. Where, in other words, actions take place and agreements are entered into outside India but the resultant adverse effect is experienced in India then can the MRTP Commission have any jurisdiction. 36. The preamble of the Act indicates that the MRTP Act was enacted, inter alia, for prohibiting any restrictive trade practice. Where, in other words, actions take place and agreements are entered into outside India but the resultant adverse effect is experienced in India then can the MRTP Commission have any jurisdiction. 36. The preamble of the Act indicates that the MRTP Act was enacted, inter alia, for prohibiting any restrictive trade practice. Restrictive trade practice has been defined in Section 2(o) which reads as follows: " restrictive trade practice means a trade practice which has, or may have, the effect of preversing, distorting or restricting competition in any manner and in particular,- (i) which tends to obstruct the flow of capital or resources into the stream of production, or (ii) which tends to bring about manipulation of prices, or conditions of delivery or to effect the flow of supplies in the market relating to goods or services in such manner as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs or restrictions;" 37. The expression "trade practice has been defined under Section 2(u) which reads as under: " trade practice means any practice relating to the carrying on of any trade, and includes— (i) anything done by any person which controls or affects the price charged by, or the method of trading of, any trader or any class of traders, (ii) a single or isolated action of any person in relation to any trade;" 38. Section 33 of the Act deals with certain types of agreements stipulated therein to be an agreement relating to restrictive trade practice and such agreement requires to be registered. Section 37(1) gives the Commission power to inquire whether an agreement is governed by Section 33 and has been registered under Section 35 or not. 25. This decision is not a direct authority for the proposition that a citizen cannot be preferred for employment under the State on the ground that he or she hails from rural area. However, what has been laid down in regard to the first point assumes some relevance in the cases on hand. The criterion for identifying a rural candidate was held to be irrelevant as it had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In the present case, the position is much worse as the impugned circular does not spell out any criteria or indicia to determine whether an applicant is a rural candidate. 26. The criterion for identifying a rural candidate was held to be irrelevant as it had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In the present case, the position is much worse as the impugned circular does not spell out any criteria or indicia to determine whether an applicant is a rural candidate. 26. Realising the difficulty in sustaining the impugned circular of the Government merely on the basis of classification between persons residing in rural areas and towns. Mr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned Senior counsel as well as the learned counsel appearing for the State, sought to draw support from the plea taken by the State in the counter affidavit filed in SLP (C) No. 10780/2001 that the award of bonus marks to the residents of rural areas is a measure of affirmative action or compensatory discrimination to help the disadvantaged sections namely, the rural people. It is trite to say that India lives in villages and inhabited predominantly by poorer sections of people. The people in the rural areas suffer many handicaps especially in the sphere of education. These factors, according to the learned counsel justify the State action to throw up better employment opportunities to the rural citizens and such act of levelling, it is contended, is nothing but an instance of protective discrimination. According to the learned counsel, the State, in the instant case, has resorted to least offensive and least obtrusive method of protecting the interests of the rural citizens instead of going in for wholesale reservation and it does not in any way violate the mandate of Art. 14 or Art. 16. The learned counsel reminds us that giving relaxations and concessions to disadvantaged people are an integral part of the equality clause enshrined in Article 14. 27. This plea proceeds on the supposition that the proportion of employment of rural residents is much less than that of the residents in the towns; in other words, the major chunk of appointments in State services are going to those born in and brought up in towns. The other assumption underlying this argument is that the educated people in the rural areas are economically weaker than those living in towns. None of these assumptions are based upon any data or concrete material. The other assumption underlying this argument is that the educated people in the rural areas are economically weaker than those living in towns. None of these assumptions are based upon any data or concrete material. We must say that the argument built up on this plea falls more in the realm of platitudes rather than affording a solid basis for the classification. In Nidamarti Maheshkumar Vs. State of Maharashtra [ 1986(2) SCC 534 ], when regionwise classification for admissions to medical colleges was sought to be defended on the ground that Vidharbha and Marathwada regions are backward as compared to Pune and Bombay regions, this Court declined to accept such contention. It was observed: "In the first place there is no material to show that the entire region within the jurisdiction of the university in Vidharbha is backward or that the entire region within the jurisdiction of Pune University is advanced. There are quite possibly even in the region within the jurisdiction of Pune University predominantly rural areas which are backward and equally there may be in the region within the jurisdiction of the university in Vidharbha, areas which are not backward. We do not think it is possible to categorise the regions within the jurisdiction of the various universities as backward or advanced as if they were exclusive categories and in any event there is no material placed before us which would persuade us to reach that conclusion.'' 28. Here too, in the absence of any material, we cannot take it for granted that the premise on which the argument is sought to be built up is correct. Similarly, when the reservations of certain percentage of seats in medical colleges in favour of candidates from rural areas was sought to be justified on economic considerations, a three Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Ray, C.J., in State of U.P. vs. Pradip Tandon [ 1975(1) SCC 267 ] emphatically rejected the plea. We quote: "........ A division between the population of our country on the ground of poverty that the people in the urban areas are not poor and that the people in the rural areas are poor is neither supported by facts nor by a division between the urban people on the one hand and the rural people on the other that the rural people are socially and educationally backward class. Some people in the rural areas may be educationally backward, some may be socially backward, there may be few who are both socially and educationally backward, but it cannot be said that all citizens residing in rural areas are socially and educationally backward. The following observations may also be noticed : "The reservation for rural areas cannot be sustained on the ground that the rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. This reservation appears to be made for majority population of the State. Eighty per cent of the population of the State cannot be a homogeneous class. Poverty in rural areas cannot be the basis of classification to support reservation for rural areas .............. The incident of birth in rural areas is made the basic qualification. No reservation can be made on the basis of place of birth as that would offend Art. 15". 29. Though the Court was primarily dealing with an argument based on Article 15(4) and the import of the expression "socially and educationally backward classes of citizens" occurring in that sub-Article, the observations quoted above are quite relevant in testing the plea raised on behalf of the State to save the classification. In the face of what has been laid down in Pradip Tandon's case, the State cannot possibly invoke Article 16(4). 30. Our attention has however been drawn to the following observations in Nidamarti's case (supra) in reiteration of what was said in Pradeep Jain's case (supra): "It is therefore, clear that where the region from which the students of a university are largely drawn is backward either from the point of view of opportunities for medical education or availability of competent and adequate medical services, it would be constitutionally permissible, without violating the mandate of the equality clause, to provide a high percentage of reservation or preference for students coming from that region, because without reservation or preference students from such backward region will hardly be able to compete with those from advanced regions since they would have no adequate opportunity for development so as to be in a position to compete with others. By reason of their socially or economically disadvantaged position they would not have been able to secure education in good schools and they would consequently be at a disadvantage compared to students belonging to the affluent or well-to-do families who have had best of school education. By reason of their socially or economically disadvantaged position they would not have been able to secure education in good schools and they would consequently be at a disadvantage compared to students belonging to the affluent or well-to-do families who have had best of school education. There can, therefore, legitimately be reservation or preference in their favour so far as admissions are concerned in case of a medical college which is set up or intended to cater to the needs of a region which is backward or whose alumni are largely drawn from such backward region." 31. These observations, in our view, cannot be legitimately pressed into service for the purpose of justifying reservation or weightage in favour of rural candidates on the ground of nativity/residence for purposes of public employment. The difference in approach in relation to Articles 15 and 16 was indicated by Bhagwati, J. in Pradeep Jain's case and we have quoted the relevant passage extensively. It was made clear in Pradeep Jain's case that in the matter of admissions to professional colleges the considerations were different. As far as public employment is concerned, the classification on the basis of residence in a region or locality was broadly held to be constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, the preferential treatment of rural candidates in the instant case is not on the ground that they hail from the backward region. All or most of the villages in the district or the State cannot be presumed to be backward educationally or economically. Such a claim was not accepted in Pradip Tandon's case by a three Judge Bench. Even in Nidamarti's case, it was held that in absence of material, certain regions cannot be dubbed as backward. 32. The justifiability of the plea stemming from the premise that uplifting the rural people is an affirmative action to improve their lot can be tested from the concrete situation which confront us in the present cases. We are here concerned with the selections to the posts of teachers of primary schools, the minimum qualification being SSC coupled with basic training course in teaching. Can the Court proceed on the assumption that the candidates residing in the town areas with their education in the schools or colleges located in the towns or its peripheral areas stand on a higher pedestal than the candidates who had studied in the rural area schools or colleges ? Can the Court proceed on the assumption that the candidates residing in the town areas with their education in the schools or colleges located in the towns or its peripheral areas stand on a higher pedestal than the candidates who had studied in the rural area schools or colleges ? Is the latter comparatively a disadvantaged and economically weaker segment when compared to the former? We do not think so. The aspirants for the teachers jobs in primary schools - be they from rural area or town area do not generally belong to affluent class. Apparently they come from lower middle class or poor background. By and large, in the pursuit of education, they suffer and share the same handicaps as their fellow citizens in rural areas. It cannot be said that the applicants from non-rural areas have access to best of the schools and colleges which the well to do class may have. Further, without any data, it is not possible to presume that the schools and colleges located in the towns-small or big and their peripheral areas are much better qualitatively, that is to say, from the point of view of teaching standards or infrastructure facilities so as to give an edge to the town candidates over the rural candidates. 33. We are, therefore, of the view that the first plea raised by the State which is also found in the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court (as soon from the judgment in Deepak Kumar Suthar's case) is untenable. 34. We now turn our attention to two other pleas more vehemently raised by Mr. Rajeev Dhawan as well as the counsel appearing for the State to justify the weightage in favour of District and rural candidates. We may quote the averments in the counter affidavit of the State in one of the cases i.e. SLP 10780/2001: "These teachers were primarily recruited for primary education of the children in backward and rural districts.................. It is bounden duty of the State to provide free and compulsory education to the children upto 14 years irrespective of their place and status. It has been empirically found that the teachers recruited from urban and relatively from forward districts do not wish to go to the rural and relatively backward districts. It is bounden duty of the State to provide free and compulsory education to the children upto 14 years irrespective of their place and status. It has been empirically found that the teachers recruited from urban and relatively from forward districts do not wish to go to the rural and relatively backward districts. The result is that 'teacher absenteeism' is rampant and the teachers are more interested in getting themselves transferred to relatively urban areas and forward districts. The situation is most appalling in the district of Barmer where the literacy rates is only 18.33 . Thus it had ­become imperative that the teachers ­belonging to the rural areas and belonging to certain districts should be preferred by granting certain additional marks so that there is teacher retention in those districts and rural areas and there is no depletion in the teacher strength even in the rural and backward districts. This grant of additional marks is based upon a very noble objective of providing education to all. The other reason for differentia is based upon the vernacular language which the teachers are going to teach at the primary stage. It has been repeatedly stressed by various educational surveys that medium of instruction should be mother tongue as far as possible. The State of Rajasthan is the largest state in the country and has diverse climatic and socio-cultural zones. The dialects/languages vary according to the topography of the region ranging from the Thar Desert of the West to the sub-humid climate of the East. Each zone has its distinct language which is barely similar to that of the other religions. By enacting a policy of granting some additional marks to persons belonging to particular districts shall lead to teachers conversant in local vernacular teaching the children who some times only know the local language. That shall establish easy apport and understanding of the children at the tender age. Thus the objective of granting additional marks shall not only lead to retention of teacher in a rural and backward district but it shall also benefit the student community as they shall have a teacher who shall be able to understand them and converse with them easily." 35. The two grounds pleaded in justification of preferential treatment accorded to rural area candidates found favour with the Division Bench of the High Court in Baljit Kaur's case (1992 WLR Raj. The two grounds pleaded in justification of preferential treatment accorded to rural area candidates found favour with the Division Bench of the High Court in Baljit Kaur's case (1992 WLR Raj. P.83) and Arvind Kumar Gochar's case (decided on 6.4.94). Shri Rajeev Dhawan appearing for the selected candidates who have filed SLP (C) No.10780/2001, did his best to support the impugned circular mainly on the second ground, namely, better familiarity with the local dialect. The learned counsel contends that when the teachers are being recruited to serve in Gram Panchayat area falling within the concerned Panchyat Samiti, those hailing from the particular district and the rural areas of that district are better suited to teach the students within that district and the Panchyat areas comprised therein. He submits that the local candidates can get themselves better assimilated into the local environment and will be in a better position to interact with the students at primary level. Stress is laid on the fact that though the language/mother tongue is the same, the dialect varies from district to district and even within the district. By facilitating selection of local candidates to serve the Panchyat run schools, the State has not introduced any discrimination on the ground of residence but acted in furtherance of the goal to impart education. Such candidates will be more effective as primary school teachers and more suitable for the job. It is therefore contended that the classification is grounded on considerations having nexus with the object sought to be achieved and is not merely related to residence. We find it difficult to accept this contention, though plausible it is. We feel that undue accent is being laid on the dialect theory without factual foundation. The assertion that dialect and nuances of the spoken language varies from district to district is not based upon empirical study or survey conducted by the State. Not even specific particulars are given in this regard. The stand in the counter affidavit (extracted supra) is that "each zone has its distinct language". If that is correct, the Zila Parishad should have mentioned in the notification that the candidates should know particular language to become eligible for consideration We are inclined to think that reference has been made in the counter to 'language' instead of ‘dialect’ rather inadvertently. If that is correct, the Zila Parishad should have mentioned in the notification that the candidates should know particular language to become eligible for consideration We are inclined to think that reference has been made in the counter to 'language' instead of ‘dialect’ rather inadvertently. As seen from the previous sentences the words dialect and language are used as interchangeable expressions, without perhaps understanding the distinction between the two. We therefore take it that what is meant to be conveyed in the counter is that each Zone has a distinct dialect or vernacular and therefore local candidates of the district would be in a better position to teach and interact with the students. In such a case, the State Government should have identified the zones in which vernacular dissimilarities exist and the speech and dialect vary. That could only be done on the basis of scientific study and collection of relevant data. It is nobody's case that such an exercise was done. In any case, if these differences exist zone-wise or region-wise, there could possibly be no justification for giving weightage to the candidates on the basis of residence in a district. The candidates belonging to that zone, irrespective of the fact whether they belong to x, y or z district of the zone could very well be familiar with the allegedly different dialect peculiar to that zone. The argument further breaks down, if tested from the stand point of award of bonus marks to the rural candidates. Can it be said reasonably that candidates who have settled down in the towns will not be familiar with the dialect of that district ? Can we reasonably proceed on the assumption that rural area candidate are more familiar with the dialect of the district rather than the town area candidates of the same district ? The answer to both the questions in our view cannot but be in the negative. To prefer the educated people residing in villages over those residing in towns - big or small of the same district, on the mere supposition that the former (rural candidates ) will be able to teach the rural students better would only amount to creating an artificial distinction having no legitimate connection to the object sought to be achieved. It would then be a case of discrimination based primarily on residence which is prescribed by Art. 16(2). 36. It would then be a case of discrimination based primarily on residence which is prescribed by Art. 16(2). 36. Coming then to the next plea that the residents of towns, if appointed will not be willing to serve the rural areas and they will be more interested in getting themselves transferred to "relatively urban area and forward districts", does not in our view, stand a moment's scrutiny. The apprehension that 'teacher absentecism' will be rampant if non-rural candidates are appointed, to say the least, is based on irrelevant and unwarranted assumptions. First of all, as rightly pointed out by Dr. A.M. Singhvi, postings and transfers are managerial functions. The concerned authorities in-charge cannot be heard to say that there will be undue pressures from the candidates from extraneous sources and they will have to succumb to such pressures. Secondly the question of non rural candidates trying to avoid working in villages and seeking transfer to town or urban areas does not arise for the simple reason that the appointees would have no option but to work in villages coming within the jurisdiction of the concerned Panchayat Samiti. The only other possibility is that they may like to have postings in the villages close to the town. If the non-rural candidates would like to have postings at places close to the town, the rural area candidates may equally have the desire to get postings close to their native villages and many of them may even prefer working at places near the town. Thus desire and aspiration in regard to choosing the place of work need not be on a set pattern. Ultimately, it is a matter of regulation of postings of rural as well as non-rural candidates. As regards the candidates coming from other districts, the question of seeking inter-district transfer does not arise, as they are required to work within the particular district in which they are selected and appointed. The factors which may exist in the context of appointments to State-wide cadre does not exist here. The difficulties sought to be projected by the State appear to be more imaginary rather than real. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this argument. 37. The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that the award of bonus marks to the residents of the district and the residents of the rural areas of the district amounts to impermissible discrimination. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this argument. 37. The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that the award of bonus marks to the residents of the district and the residents of the rural areas of the district amounts to impermissible discrimination. There is no rational basis for such preferential treatment on the material available before us. The ostensible reasons put forward to distinguish the citizens residing in the State are either non-existent or irrelevant and they have no nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, spread of education at primary level. The ­offending part of Circular has the effect of diluting merit, without in any way promoting the objective. The impugned circular dated 10.6.1998 in so far as the award of bonus marks is concerned, has been rightly declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the High Court. 38. One more serious infirmity in the impugned circular is that it does not spell out any criteria or indicia for determining whether the applicant is a resident of rural area. Everything is left bald with the potential of giving rise to varying interpretations thereby defeating the apparent objective of the rule. On matters such as duration of residence, place of schooling etc., there are bound to be controversies. The authorities, who are competent to issue residential certificates, are left to apply the criteria according to their thinking, which can by no means be uniform. The decision in the State of Maharashtra vs. Raj Kumar ( AIR 1982 SC 1301 ) is illustrative of the problem created by vague or irrelevant criteria. In that case a rule was made by the State of Maha­rashtra that a candidate will be considered a rural candidate if he had passed SSC Examination held from a village or a town having only 'C' type municipality. The object of the rule, as noticed by this Court, was to appoint candidates having full knowledge of rural life so that they would be more suitable for working as officers in rural areas. The rule was struck down on the ground that there was no nexus between classification made and the object sought to be achieved because "as the rule stands, any person who may not have lived in a village at all can appear for SSC Examination from a village and yet become eligible for selection". The rule was struck down on the ground that there was no nexus between classification made and the object sought to be achieved because "as the rule stands, any person who may not have lived in a village at all can appear for SSC Examination from a village and yet become eligible for selection". The rule was held to be violative of Article 14 and 16. When no guidance at all is discernible from the impugned circular as to the identification of the residence of the applicants especially having regard to the indefinite nature of the concept of residence, the provision giving the benefit of bonus marks to the rural residents will fall foul of Art. 14. 39. We have now come to the close of discussion on the constitutional issue arising in the case. Now, we shall proceed to consider the question of relief. We have to recapitulate at this juncture, how the High Court in the two impugned judgments before us, addressed itself to the question of relief. 40. There are two judgments under appeal in this batch of cases. The first is the judgment of the Full Bench dated 18.11.1999 in Kailash Chand's case. The second is the judgment of the Divison Bench dated 13.4.2002 in a batch of appeals filed by the State against the decision of the learned single Judge disposing of the Writ Petitions. 41. In Kailash Chand's case, the earlier Full Bench judgment in Deepak Kumar's case rendered a month earlier, the operative part of which has been extracted at para 3 (supra) of this judgment, was implicitly followed. No separate directions or observations are found in the full Bench judgment in Kailash Chand's case which is under appeal now. However, it has been made clear by the full Bench that the cases before it were being disposed of ‘‘in the same terms’’ as those contained in the earlier full Bench decision. The writ petitions were ‘‘ordered accordingly’’. Therefore, the operative part of the judgment in Deepak Kumar's case applies ‘‘mutatis mutandis’’ to the cases disposed of by the full Bench by its judgment dated 18.11.1999. According to those directions, the appointment made earlier to the judgment shall not be affected and the judgment should have prospective application in that sense. The writ petitions were ‘‘ordered accordingly’’. Therefore, the operative part of the judgment in Deepak Kumar's case applies ‘‘mutatis mutandis’’ to the cases disposed of by the full Bench by its judgment dated 18.11.1999. According to those directions, the appointment made earlier to the judgment shall not be affected and the judgment should have prospective application in that sense. The second part to be noticed is that the full Bench (in Deepak Kumar's case) made it clear that no relief can be granted to the petitioners as they will not stand to gain even if the bonus marks are omitted. No separate finding on this aspect has been recorded by the full Bench in the impugned order. 42. Coming to the second batch of cases, the learned Judges of the Division Bench while reiterating the directions given by the full Bench in Deepak Kumar's case, however, dismissed the appeals, though the directions given by the learned single Judge are somewhat at variance with those granted in Deepak Kumar's case. The learned single Judge quashed the merit list prepared or in existence after 21.10.1999 (the date of judgment in Deepak Kumar's case) and directed fresh merit lists to be prepared ignoring the provision for award of bonus marks to the district and rural residents and to regulate appointments based on that fresh list, if necessary, after giving show cause notice to the appointees. The affected appointees (who were not parties before the High Court) have filed the SLPs in view of the consequential action taken by the concerned authorities. 43. Whether the judgment should be given prospective application so as not to affect the appointments made prior to the date of the judgment i.e. 18.11.1999 is one question that has been debated before us in the background of direction given by the High Court. Counsel appearing for the original writ petitioners who succeeded in principle before the High Court contended that there is no warrant to invoke the theory of prospective overruling to validate unconstitutional appointments especially when such appointments were made during the pendency of the writ petitions and some of the appointments were made after the matter was referred to the full Bench. At any rate, it is contended that the appointments orders issued after the first full Bench judgment which was rendered on 21.10.1999 should not be validated. At any rate, it is contended that the appointments orders issued after the first full Bench judgment which was rendered on 21.10.1999 should not be validated. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the successful candidates who have been either appointed or yet to receive appointment orders that there is every justification for the prospective application of the judgment. While so contending, the learned counsel find fault with the direction of the High Court in so far as it impliedly restrains further appointments subsequent to the date of the judgment. In this connection, it is pointed out that the selections were finalized long prior to the judgment - either of the first full Bench or of the second full Bench, and if there was delay in issuing appointment orders either on account of the stay order or administrative delays, the candidates selected should not be placed at a disadvantageous position when compared to the candidates appointed earlier. In other words, these parties contend that the creation of a cut-off date with reference to the appointments already made and yet to be made is unjustified and it would have been in the fitness of things if all the selected candidates are excluded from the rigour of the judgment as a one time measure instead of creating two classes amongst them. 44. Arguments were addressed before us on the contours and limitations of the doctrine of prospective overruling applied in our country for the first time in Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab [ 1967(2) SCR 762 ] in the context of invalidity of certain constitutional amendments and extended gradually to the laws found unconstitutional or even to the interpretation of ordinary statutes. The sum and substance of this innovative principle is that when the Court finds or lays down the correct law in the process of which the prevalent understanding of the law undergoes a change, the Court, on consideration of justice and fair deal, restricts the operation of the new found law to the future so that its impact does not fall on the past transactions. The doctrine recognises the discretion of the Court to prescribe the limits of retroactivity of the law declared by it. It is a great harmonizing principle equipping the Court with the power to mould the relief to meet the ends of justice. The doctrine recognises the discretion of the Court to prescribe the limits of retroactivity of the law declared by it. It is a great harmonizing principle equipping the Court with the power to mould the relief to meet the ends of justice. Justification for invoking the doctrine was also found in Articles 141 and 142 which as pointed out in Golak Nath's case are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. In the aftermath of Golak Nath case, we find quite an illuminating and analytical discussion of the doctrine by Sawant, J. in Managing ­Director Vs. B. Karunakar ( 1993 (4) SCC 727 ). The learned Judge prefaced the discussion with the following enunciation :- "It is now well settled that the courts can make the law laid down by them prospective in operation to prevent unsettlement of the settled positions, to prevent administrative chaos and to meet the end of justice." 45. Law reports are replete with cases where past actions and transactions including appointments and promotions, though made contrary to the law authoritatively laid down by the Court were allowed to remain either on the principle of prospective overruling or in exercise of the inherent power of the Court under Article 142. The learned senior counsel Mr. P.P. Rao reminds us that this power is only available to the Supreme Court by virtue of Article 142 and it is not open to the High Court to neutralize the effect of unconstitutional law by having resort to the principle of prospective overruling or analogous principle. The argument of the learned counsel, though not without force, need not detain us for the simple reason that as this Court is now sized of the matter, can grant or mould the relief, without in any way being fettered by the limitations which the High Court may have had. We are of the view that there is sufficient justification for the prospective application of the law ­declared in the instant cases for more than one reason and if so, the declaration of the High Court to that extent need not be disturbed. 46. For nearly one decade the selections made by applying bonus marks to the residents of the concerned districts and the rural areas therein were upheld by the High Court of Rajasthan. 46. For nearly one decade the selections made by applying bonus marks to the residents of the concerned districts and the rural areas therein were upheld by the High Court of Rajasthan. The first decision is the case of Baljeet Kaur decided in the year 1991 followed by Arvind Kumar Gochar's case decided in 1994. By the time the selection process was initiated and completed, these decisions were holding the field. However, when the writ petitions filed by Kailash Chand and others came up for hearing before a learned single Judge, the correctness of the view taken in those two decisions was doubted and he directed the matters to be placed before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a full Bench. By the time this order was passed on 19.7.1999, we are informed that the select lists of candidates were published in many districts. On account of the stay granted for a period of three months and for other valid reasons, further lists were not published. It should be noted that in a case where the law on the subject was in a state of flux, the principle of prospective overruling was invoked by this Court. The decision in Managing Director ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar (supra) is illustrative of this view- point. In the present case, the legality of the selection process with the addition of bonus marks could not have been seriously doubted either by the appointing authorities or by the candidates in view of the judicial precedents. The cloud was cast on the said decisions only after the selection process was completed and the results were declared or about to be declared. It is, therefore, a fit case to apply the judgment of the full Bench rendered subsequent to the selection prospectively. One more aspect which is to be taken into account is that in almost all the writ petitions the candidates appointed, not to speak of the candidates selected, were not made parties before the High Court. May be, the laborious and long-drawn exercise of serving notices on each and every party likely to be affected need not have been gone through. At least, a general notice by newspaper publication could have been sought for or in the alternative, at least a few of the last candidates ­selected/appointed could have been put on notice; but, that was not done in almost all the cases. At least, a general notice by newspaper publication could have been sought for or in the alternative, at least a few of the last candidates ­selected/appointed could have been put on notice; but, that was not done in almost all the cases. That is the added reason who the judgment treading a new path should not as far as possible result in detriment to the candidates already appointed. We are not so much on the question whether the writ petitioners were legally bound to implead all the candidates selected/appointed during the pendency of the petitions having regard to the fact that they were challenging the notification or the policy decision of general application; but, we are taking this fact into consideration to lean towards the view of the High Court that its judgment ought to be applied prospectively, even if the non-impleadment is not a fatal flaw. 47. Prospectivity to what extent is the next question. Counsel argues that when once it is accepted in principle that past actions should not be unsettled, there is no rationale in prescribing a cut off date with reference to the date of judgment, so as to save the appointments already made and to bar the appointments to be made. It is contended that the entire selection process and the consequential appointments should be out of clutches of the judgment rendered on 18.11.99 and it would be more national and logical to apply it to further selections. The fortuitous circumstance of not being in a position of securing appointment orders for a variety of administrative reasons should not stand in the way of candidates appointed or to be appointed after the date of judgment, otherwise, it would ­result in injustice and hardship to the selected candidates without any tangible benefit to the petitioners who moved the High Court for relief. It is pointed out that in some districts like Chittorgarh, Lok Sabha election programme came in the way of formal appointments orders being issued. It is further pointed out that in any case, if the judgment is to be prospectively applied - as it ought to be, the application of judgment should be from the date of its pronouncement i.e. 18.11.1999 but not from 21.10.99 which is the date of decision in Deepak Kumar's case pertaining to a different selection held five years earlier. 48. 48. The above argument was countered by the learned counsel appearing for the original writ petitioners contending that after the judgment of the High Court in Deepak Kumar's case (21.10.1999 is the date of judgment) in which similar provision in another circular was struck down, there was neither legal nor moral justification for making further appointments, though the impugned judgment in Kailash Chand, was rendered on 18.11.1999. In the first SLP filed by Kailash Chand, the senior counsel Mr. Krishnamani raised a subsidiary contention that the High Court was wrong in proceeding on the assumption that his client and other similarly situated petitioners would not have got selected even if the bonus marks were ignored. In the SLP, the said petitioner furnished the particulars relating to marks secured by him and some other selected candidates. Quite rightly, the learned counsel contended that the High Court apparently could not have looked into the particulars of marks in each and every case and it would have been in the fitness of things if it were left to the concerned authorities to go into the factual details. 49. One more point which need mention. Some of the learned counsel argued that the unsuccessful applicants should not be allowed to challenge the selection process to the extent it goes against their interest, after having participated in the selection and waited for the result. It is contended that the discretionary relief under Article 226 should not be granted to such persons. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Madan Lal vs. State of J & K 1995(3) SCC 486 and other cases in support of this argument. On the other hand, it is contended that in a case of challenge to unconstitutional discrimination, the doctrine of acquiescence, estoppel and the like does not apply and the writ petitioners cannot be expected to know the constitutional implications of the impugned circular well before the selections. We are not inclined to go into this question for the reason that such a plea was not raised nor any argument was advanced before the High Court. 50. We are not inclined to go into this question for the reason that such a plea was not raised nor any argument was advanced before the High Court. 50. Having due regard to the rival contentions adverted to above and keeping in view the factual scenario and the need to balance the competing claims in the light of acceptance of prospective overruling in principle, we consider it just and proper to confine the relief only to the petitioners who moved the High Court and to make appointments made on or after 18.11.1999 in any of the districts subject to the claims of the petitioners. Accordingly, we direct: 1. The claims of the writ petitioners should be considered afresh in the light of this judgment vis a vis the candidates appointed on or after 18.11.99 or those in the select list who are yet to be appointed. On such consideration, if those writ petitioners are found to have superior merit in case the bonus marks of 10 and/or 5 are excluded, they should be offered appointments, if necessary, by displacing the candidates appointed on or after 18.11.1999. 2. The appointments made upto 17.11.1999 need not be reopened and re-considered in the light of the law laid down in this judgment. 3. Writ Petition No. 542/2000 filed in this Court under Article 32 is hereby dismissed as it was filed nearly one year after the judgment of the High Court and no explanation has been tendered for not approaching the High Court under Article 226 at an earlier point of time. 50. Before parting, we must say that we have moulded the relief as above on a consideration of special facts and circumstances of this case acting within the frame-work of ­powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. In so far as the relief has been granted or modified in the manner aforesaid, this judgment may not be treated as a binding precedent in any case that may arise in future. 51. Another parting observation. While we realize the need to generate better employment opportunities to the people of rural backward areas and an affirmative action in this regard is not ruled out, any such action should be within the framework of constitutional provisions relating to equality. 51. Another parting observation. While we realize the need to generate better employment opportunities to the people of rural backward areas and an affirmative action in this regard is not ruled out, any such action should be within the framework of constitutional provisions relating to equality. Equalising unequals by taking note of their handicaps and limitations is not impermissible under the Constitution provided that it seeks to achieve the goal of promoting overall equality. However, measures taken by the State on considerations of localism are not sanctioned by the constitutional mandate of equality. As indicated in the judgment, any attempt at giving weightage to the rural candidates should be backed up by scientific study and considerations germane to constitutional guarantee of equality. 52. The appeals arising out of the SLPs are disposed of accordingly. The impugned judgments of the High Court stand modified to that extent. The writ petition mentioned above is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. (N.K.R.) Order accordingly. 39. Section 37 reads as under: "37. Investigation into restrictive trade practices by Commission.—(1) The Commission may inquire into any restrictive trade practice, whether the agreement, if any, relating thereto has been registered under Section 35 or not, which may come before it for inquiry and, if, after such inquiry it is of opinion that the practice is prejudicial to the public interest, the Commission may, by order, direct that- (a) the practice shall be discontinued or shall not be repealed; (b) the agreement relating thereto shall be void in respect of such restrictive trade practice or shall stand modified in respect thereof in such manner as may be specified in the order. (2) The Commission may, instead of making any order under this section, permit the party to any restrictive trade practice, if he so applies to take such steps within the time specified in this behalf by Commission as may be necessary to ensure that the trade practice is no longer prejudicial to the public interest, and in any such case, if the Commission is satisfied that the necessary steps have been taken within the time specified, it may decide not to make any order under this section in respect of that trade practice. (3) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) in respect of— (a) any agreement between buyers relating to goods which are bought by the buyers for consumption and not for ultimate resale whether in the same or different form, type or specie or as constituent of some other goods; (b) a trade practice which is expressly authorised by any law for the time being in force. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, if the Commission during the course of an inquiry under sub-section (1), finds that the owner of any undertaking is indulging in monopolistic trade practices, it may, after passing such orders under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) with respect to the restrictive trade practices as it may consider necessary, submit the case along with its findings thereon to the Central Government for such action as that Government may take under Section 31." 40. Section 37 thus gives power to the Commission to inquire into any restrictive trade practice and if it is of the opinion that the practice is prejudicial to the public interest, the Commission may, by order, direct that the practice shall be discontinued or shall not be repeated. It appears to us that what is, inter alia, prohibited by the Act will be carrying on restrictive trade practice as defined in Sections 2(o) and 2(u) of the Act. The restrictive trade practice may or may not be directly connected with or be the result of any agreement between the parties in India. Any act which falls under the category of restrictive trade practice can be investigated into and orders passed under Section 37(1). Sections 2(o) and 2(u) do not specifically indicate that the practice should be carried on only by a person or persons in ­India. If the trade practice is such that it becomes a restricted trade practice in India as contemplated by Section 2(o), then action can be taken under Section 37(1) in respect of such a trade practice. 41. Sections 2(o) and 2(u) do not specifically indicate that the practice should be carried on only by a person or persons in ­India. If the trade practice is such that it becomes a restricted trade practice in India as contemplated by Section 2(o), then action can be taken under Section 37(1) in respect of such a trade practice. 41. Section 38 provides that every restrictive trade practice shall be deemed to be prejudicial to the public interest unless the Commission is satisfied of any one or more of the circumstances mentioned in Clauses (a) to (k) of Section 38 exists and it is further satisfied that the restriction is not unreasonable having regard to the balance between those circumstances and any detriment to the public or to persons not parties to the agreement. 42. Section 2(u) does state that ‘trade practice' means any practice relating to the carrying on of any trade but then it adds that such a trade practice would include anything done by any person which controls or affects the price charged by, or the method of trading of, any trader or any class of traders. The Act and the aforesaid section, in particular, is, therefore, concerned specifically with the incidence of the restrictive trade practice within India which in Section 2(o)(i) refers to the obstruction to the flow of capital or resources into the stream of production, while Section 2(o)(ii) talks of manipulation of prices or conditions of delivery or to effect the flow of supplies in the market but which must be such as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs or restrictions. To put it differently, mere manipulation of prices or conditions of delivery would not be a restrictive trade practice under Section 2 (o)(ii) unless it is done in such a manner so as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs or restrictions. Lowering of prices cannot be regarded as imposing on the consumers unjustified costs or restrictions. 43. Under Section 33(1)(j) of the Act, any agreement to sell goods at such prices as would have the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor is regarded as an agreement relating to restrictive trade practice and shall be subject to registration. The Act nowhere states that this agreement should be only in India or between Indian parties. 43. Under Section 33(1)(j) of the Act, any agreement to sell goods at such prices as would have the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor is regarded as an agreement relating to restrictive trade practice and shall be subject to registration. The Act nowhere states that this agreement should be only in India or between Indian parties. In effect, this Section recognizes the 'effects doctrine', namely, where an agreement results in sale of goods at such prices which would have the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor. In the very nature of things, the sale of goods keeping in mind the definition of the word "goods" in Section 2(e) must be of goods imported into India, in the case like the present. But if we replace the word "goods" in Section 33(1)(j) with the definition of "goods" in Section 2(e)(iii), then the Section 33(1)(j) would read as follows: "Any agreement to sell goods imported into India at such prices as would have the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor" 44. Thus, the agreement requiring registration must be in respect of goods after their import into India. 45. In other words, where the goods are already in India, then any agreement which has the effect of eliminating competition or a ­competitor of the sale of those goods existing in India would be a restrictive trade practice and it would be immaterial as to where the agreement takes place in relation to the sale of those goods. The "effects doctrine" would be applicable only in relation to those goods which are within the territory of India before its sale referred to in Section 33(1)(j) of the Act. An agreement, which results, in sale outside India and the export of the goods to India, even if that sale is at predatory prices, would not fall within the ambit of Section 33(1)(j) of the Act. It is a subsequent agreement of sale of the ­imported goods, if it has the effect of elimi­nating competition or a competitor, which would be registerable under Section 33(1)(j) of the Act. 46. It is a subsequent agreement of sale of the ­imported goods, if it has the effect of elimi­nating competition or a competitor, which would be registerable under Section 33(1)(j) of the Act. 46. Even if an agreement is executed outside India or the parties to the agreement are not in India and agreement may not be registerable under Section 33, being an outside India agreement, nevertheless, if any, restrictive trade practice, as a consequence of any such an outside agreement, is carried out in India then the Commission shall have jurisdiction under Section 37(1) in respect of that restrictive trade practice if it comes to the conclusion that the same is prejudicial to the public interest. 47. It is possible that persons outside India indulge in such trade practices, not necessarily restricted to the effectuation of prices within India, which have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition in ­India or gives rise to a restrictive trade practice within India then in respect of that restrictive trade practice, MRTP Commission will have jurisdiction. The counsel for the respondents is right in submitting that if the effect of restrictive trade practices came to be felt in India because of a part of the trade practice being implemented here the MRTP Commission would have jurisdiction. This "effects doctrine" will clothe the MRTP Commission with jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order even though a transaction, for example, which results in exporting goods to India at predatory price, which was in effect a restrictive trade practice, had been carried out outside the territory of India if the effect of that had resulted in a restrictive trade practice in India. If power is not given to the MRTP Commission to have jurisdiction with regard to that part of trade practice in India which is restrictive in nature then it will mean that persons outside India can continue to indulge in such practices whose adverse effect is felt in India with impugnity. A competition law like the MRTP Act, is a mechanism to counter cross border economic terrorism. Therefore, even though such an agreement may enter into outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Commission but if it results in a restrictive trade practice in India then the Commission will have jurisdiction under Section 37 to pass appropriate orders in respect of such restrictive trade practice. 48. Therefore, even though such an agreement may enter into outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Commission but if it results in a restrictive trade practice in India then the Commission will have jurisdiction under Section 37 to pass appropriate orders in respect of such restrictive trade practice. 48. We will now consider whether the Anti-dumping provisions will oust the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission, as has been contended by the appellants. 49. The jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission, in our opinion, is not ousted by the Anti-dumping provisions in the Customs Act. The two Acts operate in different fields and have different purposes. The Import Control Act and the Customs Tariff Act are concerned with import of goods into India and the duty which could be imposed on the imported items. Import may be allowed on the basis of an import license or, depending upon the policy, import may be allowed under OGL - Open General License - where no specific license for import is required. Whether to allow import or not and the terms on which an item may be imported is a matter of policy and regulated by law. 50. There is in this case no challenge to the import policy allowing import of float glass and even if such a challenge was to be there it would hardly succeed. The grievance of the respondents is that import is being made at predatory prices. The challenge is to the actual import. But allowing such a challenge will amount to giving the MRTP Commission jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legal validity of the provisions relating to import, which jurisdiction the Commission does not have. It is not a court with power of judicial review over legislative action. Therefore, it would have no jurisdiction to decide whether the action of the Government in permitting import of float glass even at predatory prices is valid or not. The Commission cannot prohibit import, it's jurisdiction commences after import is completed and any restrictive trade practice takes place. 51. Customs duty on import of any goods is levied under the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act. The rate at which the import duty is to be levied is a matter of policy. The rate of duty is determined by the schedule to the Customs Tariff Act and is subject to such exemption as may be granted under that Act. Customs duty on import of any goods is levied under the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act. The rate at which the import duty is to be levied is a matter of policy. The rate of duty is determined by the schedule to the Customs Tariff Act and is subject to such exemption as may be granted under that Act. Thus the rate of import duty which is imposed is a legislative act and is thus not amenable to the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. A party cannot contend before the MRTP Commission that the rate of duty is too high or too low. In fact, such a challenge is hardly likely to succeed in a Court of law and the question of the MRTP Commission having such a jurisdiction does not arise. 52. Apart from the rate of duty the value of the goods imported has to be determined for the purpose of levy of duty. The customs authorities are required to determine whether the value of the goods imported has been correctly declared. In case of wrong valuation, the customs authorities can determine the correct value and levy duty thereon. Normally the goods are valued at the price at which they are actually purchased. Then that will be the value at which the duty will be imposed. It is not the case of the respondents that the appellants are guilty of under-valuing the goods imported. It is the low price which has been charged by the Indonesian exporter which is really the object of attack. 53. The levy or non-levy of anti-dumping or other duty being a legislative act pursuant to the exercise of powers under the Customs Tariff Act can also not be a subject-matter of judicial review by the MRTP Commission. The two Acts substantially operate in different fields and the following table brings out some of the distinctions between the MRTP Act and the Anti-dumping provisions: COMPETITION LAW ACTIONS ANTI-DUMPING ACTIONS 1 2 3 4 5 Competition law is concerned with the regulation of competition in a particular market within the territory of a country. Thus, it would take within its sweep a whole host of anti-competitive practices including (i) monopolistic trade practices, as defined in Section 2(i) of the MRTP Act, (ii) restrictive trade practices, as defined in Section 2(o), and (iii) unfair trade practices as defined in Section 36A. Thus, it would take within its sweep a whole host of anti-competitive practices including (i) monopolistic trade practices, as defined in Section 2(i) of the MRTP Act, (ii) restrictive trade practices, as defined in Section 2(o), and (iii) unfair trade practices as defined in Section 36A. A Complaint under the MRTP Act can be filed by a Trade Association or any Consumer or a Registered Consumers Association, or a reference can be made by the Central Government or the State Government or even by the Director General upon its own knowledge or information. [Section 10 (1)(A) of the MRTP Act.] Competition law procedures allow and require consideration of interest groups such as manufacturers, importers, exporters, consumers and the general public. Commercial actors can have their interests assessed through the determination of the market, causation or injury. Interests of consumers are taken into account when assessing the impact of a business practice on competition. In predatory pricing enquiries, the complainant has to establish that the predator acted with intent to eliminate competition and competitors. Actual injury is not required. In most countries, com­petition cases are dealt with by a court of law, where parties are entitled to full discovery rights and due process. An anti-dumping law is concerned with ad­dressing just one type of unfair, inter­national trade practice that causes injury to do­mestic industry i.e., "dum­ping" of goods by an exporting ­country. An Anti Dumping Petition can be filed by the Domestic Industry as defined under the Anti Dumping Rules or suo motu by the Designated Authority. [See Rules 2(b), 5(1) and 5(4) of the Anti Dumping Rules.] No interest group other than domestic industry has full legal standing in anti-dumping cases. The predominant interest group is of domestic producers. Industrial users and consumers do not have legal standing to maintain a complaint. In anti-dumping complaints, intent is irrelevant but actual injury has to be shown. Further, a causal link has to be established between the dumping and the injury suffered. Anti-dumping en­quiries are always conducted by government agencies through administrative procedures and law. A perusal of the above chart indicates that the two statutes and regimes operate in different and distinct spheres, and there is no conflict between the two regimes/statutes. Further, a causal link has to be established between the dumping and the injury suffered. Anti-dumping en­quiries are always conducted by government agencies through administrative procedures and law. A perusal of the above chart indicates that the two statutes and regimes operate in different and distinct spheres, and there is no conflict between the two regimes/statutes. Hence, the question of implied repeal of the provisions of section 33(1)(j) of the MRTP Act, 1969 on account of the provisions of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 does not arise. 54. It is thus seen that the provisions relating to anti-dumping contained in the Customs Tariff Act do not in any way affect the power or jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. The Import Control Act and the Customs Tariff Act on the one hand and the MRTP Act on the other operate in different independent fields and the authority under one has no jurisdiction over the other. In other words, their paths do not cross each other. While the provisions of Anti-dumping Act are concerned with the levy of anti-dumping duty, the MRTP Act in the present case would be concerned with the agreements between the parties which relate to the restrictive trade practices. Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that the incorporation of the anti-dumping provisions ousts the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission to inquire and pass orders, inter alia, with regard restrictive trade practice in India. 55. It was submitted that import by the Indian party from Indonesia at predatory prices required the agreement for import to be registered as per Section 33(1)(j) of the Act. On the facts of this case, we are not inclined to agree that such a case is made out. As far as Section 32(1)(j) is concerned, there must be an agreement between the foreign seller and the Indian importer to sell goods at such prices as would have the effect of eliminating competition of a competitor, i.e., here the Indian industry. What seems to have happened here is that the monopolistic Indian undertakings are now having to face competition. The quantum of import in the present case is a small fraction of the total float glass which is manufactured and sold in India. The reduction in prices of the Indian importer is to the benefit of the Indian customer. What seems to have happened here is that the monopolistic Indian undertakings are now having to face competition. The quantum of import in the present case is a small fraction of the total float glass which is manufactured and sold in India. The reduction in prices of the Indian importer is to the benefit of the Indian customer. It is only if there is an agreement between the Indian importer and the foreign seller which has such an effect that the production in India of float glass by efficient Indian industry would have to stop and such stoppage is considered prejudicial to the public interest, can an order under Section 12-A or Section 37 be passed. It is the case of the petitioners that the Indian manufacturers have formed a cartel of their own and are charging high prices because of lack of competition. It is alleged that the Indian manufacturers are making much profits and despite import of float glass having taken place for the last 5-10 years the Indian industry has not suffered. On the other hand, the volume of sales has increased and the profit of the Indian producers not decreased. Under these circumstances, it was contended, the passing of the injunction was wholly uncalled for. 56. Import of material at prices lower than prevailing in India cannot per se be regarded as being prejudicial to the public interest. If the normal or export price of any goods outside India is lower than the selling price of an indigenously produced item then to say that the import is prejudicial to the public interest would not be correct. The availability of goods outside India at prices lower than those which are indigenously produced would encourage competition amongst the Indian industry and would not per se result in eliminating the competitor, as was sought to be submitted by the respondents. 57. It is while dealing with a complaint relating to restrictive trade practice that the MRTP Commission has the jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction under Section 12-A(1). 57. It is while dealing with a complaint relating to restrictive trade practice that the MRTP Commission has the jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction under Section 12-A(1). It is only on the basis of proof, and not mere allegation, and on the basis of an inquiry before the Commission that any trader or class of traders is carrying on a restrictive trade practice which is likely to affect prejudicially the public interest or the interest of any trader, class of traders or traders generally or of consumers that the Commission would have jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction restraining any undertaking or person from carrying on any restrictive trade practice. While the Commission has power to grant ex-parte temporary injunction, but in view of Explanation II to Section 12-A, whereby the provisions of Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are made applicable, for the grant of temporary injunction the Commission normally ought to give notice and hear the respondents before passing an order of injunction. What is, however, important is that the conditions stipulated in Section 12-A(1) have to be satisfied before an order for injunction can be passed. In other words, it has to be proved that the respondents before the Commission is carrying on or about to carry on a restrictive trade practice which will be prejudicial to the public interest or to the interest of traders etc. before an order for injunction can be issued. Merely because an industry will finds itself unable to be able to compete with imports from outside can be of no ground for exercising jurisdiction under Section 12-A(1). It is only if the trade practice which is being impugned is such that would fall within the four corners of Section 2(o), which defines restrictive trade practice, can the Commission grant an injunction. The facts on record do not indicate any justification for any interim order being passed in the present case. Furthermore, the impugned order passed against the foreign manufacturers of float glass, who do not carry on business in India is clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act and, as such, cannot be sustained. 58. In our opinion, the MRTP Commission has no extra territorial jurisdiction. The action of an exporter to India when performed outside India would not be amenable to jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. 58. In our opinion, the MRTP Commission has no extra territorial jurisdiction. The action of an exporter to India when performed outside India would not be amenable to jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. The MRTP Commission cannot pass an order determining the export price of an exporter to India or prohibiting him to export to India at a low or predatory price. 59. The matter may be examined from another angle. In this case, there is a sale of float glass by the exporter in Indonesia. If the float glass was ready and available, then being ascertained goods the sale would be regarded as having taken place where the goods existed at the time of sale, i.e., in Indonesia. If the glass had to be manufactured and not readily identifiable, then the sale would take place outside India when the goods are appropriated to the contract by the foreign exporter. Here the appropriation would take place in Indonesia when the glass is earmarked and exported to India. In either case the MRTP Commission would have no jurisdiction to stop that sale. If the said sale cannot be stopped and the import policy permits the Indian importer to import on payment of duty then we fail to see what jurisdiction the MRTP Commission can possibly have till a restrictive trade practice takes place after float glass is imported into India. 60. It is not as if the Indian industry has no remedy against goods being exported to India at predatory prices. It is because of the need for such a provision that the Customs Act was amended and anti-dumping provisions were incorporated. Recourse to this was taken by the respondents but then that remedy was not pursued. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 11 of the Customs Act. The said Section gives the Central Government a power to prohibit importation or exportation of goods, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for any of the purposes specified in sub-section (2). At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 11 of the Customs Act. The said Section gives the Central Government a power to prohibit importation or exportation of goods, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for any of the purposes specified in sub-section (2). Under sub-section (2), such prohibition can be for the purpose of establishment of any industry (sub-clause (i)); preventing serious injury to domestic production of goods of any description (sub-clause (j)); the compliance of imported goods with any laws which are applicable to similar goods produced or manufactured in India (sub-clause (s)); the prevention of the contravention of any law for the time being in force (sub-clause (u)) and any other purpose conducive to the interest of general public (sub-clause (v)) Inasmuch as, the import into the country is, inter alia, governed by the Customs Act and the power to prohibit or not to prohibit the importation of any goods is with the Government, then unless and until, a law prohibiting import is infringed, it is difficult to perceive as to how the MRTP Commission can prevent the importation of the goods. In this connection, it is also useful to refer to Section 33(3) of the Act which reads as under: "No agreement falling within this section shall be subject to registration in ­accordance with the provisions of this Chapter if it is expressly authorized by or under any law for the time being in force or has the approval of the Central Government or if the Government is a party to such agreement." 61. Inasmuch as the importation of float glass is permitted by law, under the provisions of the Customs Act and the Import Control Act, then an agreement in relation to such an import may not be liable to be registered under the provisions of the Act. It is only in respect of float glass, which is imported and thereafter if in respect to that a restrictive trade practice is indulged can the MRTP Commission have jurisdiction qua post import Indian end of the transaction. Conclusions : 62. From the aforesaid discussion and reasons, we arrive at the following conclusions:- 1. Anti-dumping provisions do not per se oust the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. 2. Conclusions : 62. From the aforesaid discussion and reasons, we arrive at the following conclusions:- 1. Anti-dumping provisions do not per se oust the jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. 2. The MRTP Commission can, inter alia, take action whenever a Restrictive Trade Practice is carried out in India in respect of imported goods or otherwise. 3. It is only in respect of the Indian leg of the restrictive trade practice, can an order under Section 12A and/or Section 37 be passed. 4. Under Section 33 of the Act what can be registered is only an agreement in regard to which any party to an agreement carries on business in India [Section 35 Explanation I]. But this does not mean that if an agreement is entered into outside India and which results in a Restrictive Trade Practice in India, the MRTP Commission has no jurisdiction. The "effects doctrine" will apply and Section 2(o) read with Section 2(u) and Section 37 gives jurisdiction to the MRTP Commission to pass appropriate orders qua the Restrictive Trade Practice in India. The MRTP Commission, in such a case, may not be able to stop import but there can be order imposing post import restrictions such as, for example, not to sell imported goods in India in such a manner which will be regarded as a restrictive trade practice under Section 37. 5. In Explanation I to Section 35 the use of the words ''shall be deemed to be an agreement within the meaning of this section....." and the time-frame for registration clearly indicates that Section 33 and Section 35 apply only to Indian agreements or agreements in India and, therefore, it became necessary to incorporate Explanation I so as to enlarge the ambit and give extra territorial jurisdiction in relation to those agreements which relate to performance of services in India and any party to that agreement carries on business in India. 6. On the facts of this case, the im pugned order passed by the MRTP Commission against the Indonesian exporters cannot be sustained and is set aside 63. Appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Parties to bear their own costs. Civil Appeal No. 3562 of 2000 : 64. Interim order of the MRTP Com­mission restraining the appellant from dis­patching, directly or indirectly, soda ash to ­India is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. 65. Appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Parties to bear their own costs. Civil Appeal No. 3562 of 2000 : 64. Interim order of the MRTP Com­mission restraining the appellant from dis­patching, directly or indirectly, soda ash to ­India is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. 65. The complainant - M/s. Alkali Manufacturers Association of India (AMAI for short) had filed a complaint before the MRTP Commission under Section 33(1)(d), Section 36-A and Section 40 read with Section 2(i) & (o) of the MRTP Act. The Complainant Association had 34 members carrying on the business of Soda Ash in India. In the complaint, it was stated that the Soda Ash was being manufactured by six companies in India and was being sold to the Indian consumers at a net price of Rs.8190 to Rs.8320 PMT net of excise. It was alleged that the appellant M/s American Natural Soda Ash Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ANSAC) consisted of six producers of natural Soda Ash who have joined together to form an Export Cartel by virtue of a Membership Agreement amongst them entered into in America on 8th December, 1983. By this agreement, the six producers had agreed that all export sales by them or by any of their subsidiaries will be made through ANSAC which was set up as a Corporation in accordance with the provisions of the United States Export Trade Act, 1918. It was further alleged in the complaint that ANSAC in an attempt to invade the Indian market and undercut the Indian producers, it sold American Soda Ash to Indian consumers at an unrealistically low price of US $ 132 PMT-CIF. With a view to circumvent the prohibition in Indian law against monopolistic, restrictive and unfair trade practices, a strategy had been adopted by ANSAC by selling American Soda Ash to Indian consumers through the front of one M/s. G. Premjee of Singapore in whose favour the Indian producers had opened letters of credit. According to this complaint, there was a bulk sale of soda ash by ANSAC to the Indian Consumers through the conduit of M/s. G. Premjee of Singapore. According to this complaint, there was a bulk sale of soda ash by ANSAC to the Indian Consumers through the conduit of M/s. G. Premjee of Singapore. On the basis of these averments, namely, that ANSAC was a Cartel of American Soda Ash Producers and was likely to affect maintenance of prices at reasonable and realistic levels in India and with a view to adversely affect the local production and availability of Soda Ash, the MRTP Commission should enquire against this restrictive and unfair trade practice and grant an ex-parte injunction restraining ANSAC from despatching the goods. On the basis of these allegations, the MRTP Commission on 9th September, 1996 passed an ad-interim injunction, which was subsequently confirmed by it, directing ANSAC not to indulge in the practice of cartelisation by exporting soda ash to India in the form of cartel directly or indirectly. The order further stated that it was without prejudice to the final outcome of the said enquiry as well as to the rights of the importers or exporters in the individual capacity to export soda ash to India. This order has been affirmed by the Commission by it’s order of 9th March. 2000. 66. While denying that ANSAC was a cartel or that export of Soda Ash to India was violative of any of the provisions of the MRTP Act, ANSAC has submitted in this appeal that the MRTP had no extra-territorial jurisdiction and furthermore in view of the provisions of the anti-dumping law, the MRTP Commission had no jurisdiction to decide the case. 67. This appeal was heard along with Civil Appeal No. 2330 of 2000 M/s. Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Manufacturers Association. In Haridas Exports case common contentions raised in this appeal regarding jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission and the scope and ambit of the MRTP Act vis-a-vis Anti Dumping Duty have been dealt with. We now propose to deal with the allegation of export by the appellant which is alleged to be a cartel, and whether there was justification for granting the injunction. 68. Some more undisputed facts, which are relevant may first be mentioned. ANSAC was set up under the Webb Powerence Act of U.S.A. as an export agency, the six producers of soda ash in U.S.A. being it's members. Like a canalising agency exports of natural soda ash by these producers cannot be made by the members individually. 68. Some more undisputed facts, which are relevant may first be mentioned. ANSAC was set up under the Webb Powerence Act of U.S.A. as an export agency, the six producers of soda ash in U.S.A. being it's members. Like a canalising agency exports of natural soda ash by these producers cannot be made by the members individually. Exports of soda ash from U.S.A. are made by the canalising agency, namely, the appellant. 69. While the Indian companies manufacture synthetic soda ash, the American companies export natural soda ash which is cheaper to produce than the Indian soda ash. Since its inception in 1983, the appellant had sold for export to India only one consignment equal to 1.44 per cent of the annual production of India, and it is in respect of this consignment that the MRTP Commission issued injunction restraining it's import. Till today, therefore, no soda ash has been exported by the appellant to India. 70. It was submitted by the respondent that the agreement of 1983, formed a cartel and was registrable under Section 33(1)(d) of the MRTP Act. 71. In so far as Section 33(1)(d) is concerned, the scheme appears to be that every agreement falling under Section 33(1)(a) to (1) is presumed to be one relating to restrictive trade practice and is subject to registration. An agreement falling under Section 33 need not necessarily be one in writing inasmuch as Section 2(a) defines an agreement as including any arrangement or understanding as well. Therefore, if apart from written agreement there is an arrangement or understanding amongst the sellers or the purchasers with regard to the purchase or sale of goods to be only at the prices or on terms or conditions agreed upon amongst them then such an agreement would require registration. Section 33(1)(d) regards an agreement to be one relating to restrictive trade practice if such agreement relates to purchase or sale of goods or to tender for sale or purchase of goods only at prices or on terms or conditions agreed upon amongst the sellers or amongst the purchasers. Such an agreement amongst the sellers or amongst the purchasers relating to purchase or sale or to the prices in respect thereof may be regarded as the formation of a cartel. 72. Section 35 specifies the period within which every agreement falling under Section 33 becomes registrable. Such an agreement amongst the sellers or amongst the purchasers relating to purchase or sale or to the prices in respect thereof may be regarded as the formation of a cartel. 72. Section 35 specifies the period within which every agreement falling under Section 33 becomes registrable. As we have already noticed, Explanation I would make such an agreement registrable only when at least one party to the agreement carries on business in India. On an agreement being filed under ­Section 35 particulars are furnished to the ­Director General who is required to maintain a register under Section 36. Section 37 then gives the jurisdiction to the Commission to make an inquiry, whether an agreement is ­registered or not, in order to find out if a ­restrictive trade practice is prejudicial to the public interest. The effect of this is that by not registering an ­agreement falling under Sections 33 and 35 the Commission is not divested of its jurisdiction of exercising its powers under Section 37. The opening words of Section 37 make it quite clear that an inquiry into any ­restrictive trade practice can be made by the Commission even in relation to an agreement which is not ­registered. Therefore, once an agreement comes to the notice of the Commission which is to be regarded as containing a restrictive trade practice then the Commission is under an ­obligation to find out and ­determine whether in its opinion the practice is prejudicial to the public interest. It is only if the Commission is satisfied that there is pre­judice to the public interest then the Com­mission has the juris­diction to direct either that the practice shall be ­discontinued or shall not be repeated or to hold that any such agreement which is prejudicial to the public interest shall be void in ­respect of such restrictive trade practice or that the said agreement shall be modified in such a manner as may be ­specified. If remedial steps have been taken then, as contemplated by Section 37(2), no order need be passed by the Commission. One further restriction on the power of the Com­mission to pass order is also contained in Section 37(3)(b) which provides that if a trade practice is expressly authorised to be carried on by any law for the time being in force then no order shall be passed under Section 37. One further restriction on the power of the Com­mission to pass order is also contained in Section 37(3)(b) which provides that if a trade practice is expressly authorised to be carried on by any law for the time being in force then no order shall be passed under Section 37. This Explanation is in addition to the provisions of Section 38 which deals with cases relating to presumption as to the agreement of the types mentioned there in being in the public interest. 73. The impact of reading of the provisions together is that what is sought to be targeted in relation to restrictive trade practice is not the nature or the factum of the restriction but such restriction should not be prejudicial to the public interest. For example, an agreement may be entered into amongst the purchasers in order to ensure constant supply of goods at a reasonable rate. Such an agreement even though it may fall under Section 33(1)(d) would not be regarded as being prejudicial to the public interest. 74. It is in this context that when we examine the provisions of Section 12-A, we find that the power of the Commission to grant temporary injunction arises only after it is ­satisfied that a restrictive trade practice or­ unfair trade practice is being carried on which is likely to affect prejudicially the public interest or the interest of trader or class of traders etc. It is only with a view to prevent the causing of a prejudicial effect that an interim order can be passed by the Commission under Section 12-A. 75. As we have already seen the Act does not have any extra territorial operation. An agreement which is referred to under Section 33(1)(d) must, therefore, be of a kind in which a person in India is a party. This is clear from the bare reading of Explanation I to Section 35. This means that for an agreement to fall within the ambit of Section 33(1)(d) and in respect of which the Commission can exercise its powers under Section 37 a person in India must be regarded as one of the sellers who is a person to such an agreement. This is clear from the use of the words "any party to the agreement carries on business in India" occurring in Explanation I to Section 35. This is clear from the use of the words "any party to the agreement carries on business in India" occurring in Explanation I to Section 35. A Careful reading of Section 33(1)(d) indicates that it refers to two classes of agreements. One class is an agreement to purchase goods or to tender for the purchase of goods only at prices or on terms or conditions agreed upon between the purchasers. The other class is an agreement to sell goods or to tender for the sale of goods only at prices or on terms or conditions agreed upon between the sellers. In other words, Section 33(1)(d) refers to the agreements which have the effect of forming either a buyers cartel or a sellers cartel. This sub-section does not refer to or deal with agreements of sale and purchase between sellers and purchasers. 76. In the case of import of soda ash, the contention is that the appellant is a cartel in America which was proposing to sell soda ash to India at very low prices with a view to eliminate competition and to adversely affect the Indian industry. Any agreement of sale by the appellant to an Indian purchaser would not attract the provisions of Section 33(1)(d), which refers only to cartelising agreements and not to agreements of sale and purchase. But the MRTP Commission will have jurisdiction under Section 37 to pass orders if such a sale was to amount to being a restrictive trade practice. For the Commission to have jurisdiction to pass such an order, whether interim or final, it must come to the conclusion that it is in public interest to do so. It is to be borne in mind that public interest does not necessarily mean interest only of the industry. Unless and until it can be demonstrated that an efficient Indian industry would be forced to shut down or suffer serious loss resulting in closure or unemployment, the Commission ought not to pass an injunction restraining an Indian party from importing goods from a cartel at predatory prices. Importing goods at a price lower than what is available in India is not per se illegal. We have provisions under the Customs Act which enables the Government to impose anti-dumping duties with a view to protect the Indian industry. Nevertheless, the era of protectionism is now coming to an end. Importing goods at a price lower than what is available in India is not per se illegal. We have provisions under the Customs Act which enables the Government to impose anti-dumping duties with a view to protect the Indian industry. Nevertheless, the era of protectionism is now coming to an end. The Indian industry has to gear up so as to meet the challenges from abroad. If the cartel is selling goods to India and still making profit then it will not be in the interest of the general body of the consumers in India to prevent the import of such goods. The remedy of the Indian industry, in such an event, is to take recourse to the provisions under the Customs Act in relation to the levy of anti-dumping duties. 77. A cartel is formed, inter alia, with a view that members of the cartel do not wage a price war and they sell at an agreed or uniform price. There may perhaps also be a cartel where members divide the territories to which each of them can export. There is lime doubt that the object of an export cartel is to capture a market even if at first, it may result in a loss to the exporter. 78. The competition law in the form of MRTP as it stands today does not contain any provision, which can give it jurisdiction to interfere merely with cartel formation. Formation of cartel which takes place outside India is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the MRTP. The Indian importer obtaining goods at a low price does not contravene any law. He has obtained a good bargain. 79. We need not go into the question whether anti-dumping provisions in the Customs Act can be an effective remedy against such cartelisation. But if the cartel carries out Restrictive Trade Practice in India or it's actions have the effect of a Restrictive Trade Practice being carried out in India, then the MRTP Commission will get jurisdiction to act under Section 37(1) of the MRTP Act. 80. We make it clear that we are expressing no opinion as to whether the appellant is a cartel or on the question of predatory prices for the reason that we are satisfied that here no case had been made out by the respondents for the grant of injunction against the appellant. 80. We make it clear that we are expressing no opinion as to whether the appellant is a cartel or on the question of predatory prices for the reason that we are satisfied that here no case had been made out by the respondents for the grant of injunction against the appellant. The injunction issued against the appellant was not only against the provisions of Section 14 of the Act but even on facts as alleged no case had really been made out for any order under Section 12-A or Section 37 of the Act more so when no import of soda ash into India from the appellant had, in fact, taken place. On the other hand, prima facie the allegation of the appellant that it is the respondents which have formed a cartel and do not welcome any competition does merit consideration, perhaps in another case. 81. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed with costs. (N.K.R.) Appeals disposed of. Order ­accordingly.