Judgment :- A contract for handling and transport of food grains pertaining to Sub Depot, Vellayil run by the Civil Supplies Corporation had been awarded in favour of the petitioner by Ext.P1 on 16-04-1997. The Sub Depot commenced function around that time and the petitioner had been continuing with the contract work without interruption for the succeeding years. One of the work was cleaning of grains, and yet another work was of filling gunnies with loose grains collected. The major of course was transport of grains to the Sub Depot from the Food Corporation of India Godown at West Hill, Kozhikode and unloading thereof. Connected work of destacking, weighing, standardisation, reconditiong etc., also are covered by the contract. 2. It has come out that in the matter of cleaning/filling work, there were discrepancies noticed by the audit section. The petitioner was involved for the first time by issuing a memo to him on 23-03-2002. He had been directed to remit an amount of Rs. 2,57,361.55, which amount was assessed as paid to the petitioner on bogus claims and not payable as per the terms and conditions of the tender. The notice referred to a detailed audit on the accounts of cleaning and rebagging work done by the petitioner during the period from May, 1997 to December, 2000. The Special Audit party found that the claims were not sustainable. The petitioner had on the very same day, objected to the proposal by Ext. P4. He claimed that work had been done by him, and workers had been engaged and their statutory payments were ensured and statements from time to time had been submitted about the work. He also referred to the circumstance that cleaning works were certified by the officers attached to the sub depot and the bills were claimed as per the certificate endorsing the quantum of work conducted and payments were made only after regular inspection by the officers of the Regional office. This stand is reiterated, as seen from his letter dated 27-03-2002, addressed to the Regional Manger (produced as Ext.P5) and requesting for release of the pending bills. 3.Perhaps taking notice of the objection as above, the Regional Manager on 12-07-2002 by Ext.P6 had ordered for recovery of the excess amount paid to the petitioner and the amounts were directed to be recovered from the bills that are payable. 3.Perhaps taking notice of the objection as above, the Regional Manager on 12-07-2002 by Ext.P6 had ordered for recovery of the excess amount paid to the petitioner and the amounts were directed to be recovered from the bills that are payable. A few weeks later, the petitioner had been issued with an order dated 06-08-2002, passed by the Chairman and Managing Director (produced as Ext.P8), which was received by the petitioner on 12-08-2002, and the operative portion of the order is extracted herein below: “In the above circumstances I find that the Handling and Transporting Contractor M/S. Expertlines Enterprises, 5/2848, Thiruthiyad, Puthiyara P.O. Kozhikode has cheated the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation for an amount of Rs. 2,57,361.55 (Rupees Two lakhs fifty seven thousand three hundred sixty one and paise fifty five). Therefore I hereby order to blacklist M/S.Expertline Enterprises from undertaking any type of work in Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation.” It has been ordered that the firm is blacklisted and thereby prohibited from undertaking any type of work in the Kerala State Civil supplies Corporation. This order is under challenge. Mr. Chandrasekhran, senior counsel attacked Ext.P8 pointing out that such an extreme step should have been resorted to after going through all essential formalities. 4. A counter affidavit has been filled by the Corporation and they have additionally relied on Ext.R1(a), which is a letter written by the petitioner addressed to the Managing Director requesting that if there are move for blacklisting him, the matter may be reconsidered. The Managing Director, in the affidavit, has also referred to the circumstance that led to the passing of Ext. P8 order and claims that it was in the better interest of the organization, and it was not a case where the petitioner had been taken by surprise. 5. Shri. K.Chandrasekhran relies on the legal contention that the blacklisting as done by Ext.P8 was totally in violation of the principles of natural justice. The matter involves serious civil consequences for the petitioner and not only there is loss of money, but also his reputation. According to him, the Corporation ought to have been more careful in the matter and should have ensured about ascertaining his stand when such drastic steps are taken. A full opportunity for the petitioner to state his defence and to record his submissions were to be provided. According to him, the Corporation ought to have been more careful in the matter and should have ensured about ascertaining his stand when such drastic steps are taken. A full opportunity for the petitioner to state his defence and to record his submissions were to be provided. He also referred to a number of judicial pronouncements in support of his submissions, that in the matter of blacklisting due care had to be invested and a hasty decision should not have been arrived at without adequate opportunity for the affected person to state his stand. 6. Therefore, the only question to be considered is as to whether was violation of principles of natural justice while issuing Ext.P8 and whether interference of this Court is necessary or warranted. 7. Shri.George Poonthottom, standing counsel for the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation submitted that Ext.P8 was a bona fide decision taken for the best interest of the institution. Perhaps the criticism that notice about the proposed balcklisting as such might not have been issued to the petitioner might be true, but this was only a formality and the larger issue was whether the respondents are justified in adopting a stand that it will have no dealings with the petitioner hereafter in the matter of arranging its work. He submits that Ext.P8 could be understood as a decision of this nature and the Corporation was within its rights to pass such an order, taking into account the totality of the circumstances that were involved. Thus the contentions lie in a narrow compass. 8. The learned senior counsel referred to the minority judgment of Justice K.K.Mathew reported in Thomas v. State of Kerala (AIR 1969 Kerala 81). He points out that the minority judgment has been upheld in the decision reported in (AIR 1975 SC 266 Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. V. State of West Bengal). Adverting to the said decision, the senior counsel urged that prior notice about the proposal for blacklisting was a necessary precondition. He had also referred to the later decision of the Supreme Court in Raghunath Thakur V. State of Bihar (AIR 1989 SC 620) which heavily relied on Erusion Equipments case and quoted with approval the passage as following: “Black-listing has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purpose of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacking indicates that the relevant authority to have an objective satisfaction. Fundaments of fair-play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the black-list.” In the reported case in M/S. Southern Painters v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (AIR 1974 SC 1277), cited by the senior counsel, the facts were slightly different. The appellant’s name from the list of approved contractors had been deleted on the ground that there was some vigilance report against it. Therefore, tender forms were withheld. Though the High Court had justified the action, the Supreme Court had held the decision could not have been upheld as the petitioner was entitled to a notice before such steps were taken, as the proceedings in effect had interfered with his opportunity to compete for the contract. Again in Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation ((1990) 3 SCC 752), the observation was that “fairness in such action should be perceptible, if not transparent”. The respondents were directed to consider the representation of the appellant afresh and it will be sufficient for the respondent-authority to consider the matter after taking the appellant firm into confidence on this aspect. Thus the legal position, as highlighted, fairly leads one to conclude that the approach about a blacklisting should be fair and not one arbitrary. 9. Shri. George Poonthottom relied on the observations made by Justice Jagannadha Rao, reported in M.C.Mehtra v. Union of India ((1999) 6 SCC 237). The decision proceeded on the assumption that adherence on the principles of natural justice not always mean that this could have led to a situation of an empty formality. In other words, if the facts were clear, and the parties knew where they were situated, even if a formal notice might not have been issued, nothing turned on that, if the conclusion was one, which is already forgone. In other words, if the facts were clear, and the parties knew where they were situated, even if a formal notice might not have been issued, nothing turned on that, if the conclusion was one, which is already forgone. The learned Judge had went into a detailed discussion on the principles and held in para 16 as following: “Courts are not infrequently faced with a dilemma between breach of the rules of natural justice and the Court’s discretion to refuse relief even though the rules of natural justice have been breached, on the ground that no real prejudice is caused to the affected party.” Later on it was held in para 21 as following: “It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or disputable factual position, only the conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of natural justice.” Bearing in mind these aspects, we have to see whether the facts presented justify the order passed as Ext.P8. 10. One thing, that may be relevant at this juncture, is that the petitioner had been given notice of the proposal for recovering the amounts that were paid in excess. Reasons have been given by the Managing Director in Ext.P8 to show that there could not have been any other conclusion possible than to hold that the petitioner was at fault of course, with the connivance of officers of the organization. Mr. Chandrasekharan submitted that the petitioner was intending to challenge the order of recovery, and it will be appropriate that this court, at this juncture, does not enter into a finding as to the nature of the claim, the transactions and the justifiability of the decision that has already been arrived at. I think it will be also proper for me not to enter into a findings as to whether the Corporation has been able to effectively substantiate its claims. The scope of this original petition does not permit such an examination and since especially I have been requested not to dwell upon those matters, I take them as they are existing at present. But, it has however been observed that the orders that have been issued to the petitioner proposing recovery has not so far been subjected to challenge by any process known to law. As far as the Corporation is concerned, it is a bona fide and final decision. But, it has however been observed that the orders that have been issued to the petitioner proposing recovery has not so far been subjected to challenge by any process known to law. As far as the Corporation is concerned, it is a bona fide and final decision. Therefore, the issue is whether the petitioner will be entitled to contend that notwithstanding the order now suffered by him the respondent has a legal duty to continue to entertain him as a contractor who is entitled to deal with them. 11. Even though the respondent is a statutory Corporation, it is not as they have no right to deal in the matters of business as a prudent businessman. By a process of audit and attendant enquiries, it has come to a conclusion that the petitioner was not honest with it in the matter of transactions, referred to in Ext.P1. It is pointed by Shri. George Poonthottom that in addition to Ext.P1, there are a host of other tender conditions which are to be observed in the execution of work. For example, with reference to the files produced, he submits that in the matter of works it is not as if the contractor can arrange the job by himself and claim the price for the work so done. The relevant clause is clause 13, which is extracted herein below: “13. CLEANING: The contractor shall, ‘as and when required’ arrange to clean the sub-standard good grains either loose or in the bags from stacks by carrying them to the Places assigned for cleaning, by carrying them to the places assigned for cleaning, by passing through sieves and subject to such process like ‘winnowing, sifting etc., removing the cleaned grains, filling the same in bags, weighing them to standard weight stitching the bag firmly with atleast 16 stitches and stacking them up to the prescribed height/loading them into trucks. Similarly the refractions and dusts removed after cleaning should also be collected in bags stitched, stakced/delivered. The remuneration for this operation shall be for the weight of uncleaned food grains taken up for cleaning.” It is also stated that disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against a number of officers, who had been helping the petitioner to put up claims against the interest of their employer. The remuneration for this operation shall be for the weight of uncleaned food grains taken up for cleaning.” It is also stated that disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against a number of officers, who had been helping the petitioner to put up claims against the interest of their employer. The files show that a number of officers had been suspended during February and March, 2002 in connection with the above transactions. It is not as if the petitioner was unaware of these happenings and there was even a ‘Dharna’ conducted by the employees at the sub-depot against the suspension of the employees of the organization. The circumstances show at least that this was never a bolt from the blue, as has been characterized by the senior counsel. The correspondence engaged between the parties are sufficient to indicate as to what were the allegations, and on what basis the demand for repayment was arrived at. Viewed from this light, Ext.P8 is unexceptionable. To accept the contention of the petitioner would be to permit him to participate in other contract works. In view of the relations of the parties, as presently existing, this may not be conducive to the interests of either. The order of blacklisting can therefore be understood as one made in the aforesaid context and the circumstances dealt with by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra are not at all available here. 12. An over emphasis on the principles of justice may, at times, lead to drastic results and which may also be not I public interest. I had occasion to deal with such an issue, where there was an allegation that on inspection of a petrol pump there was adulteration found in the motor spirit. Promptly there was an order for suspension of activities of the outlet. It was challenged. The allegation was that the order involves civil consequences to the dealer and the respondents should have convinced him of the nature and extent of the adulteration before such suspension was brought into effect. I had rejected the claims as urged there. (See the decision in Pratheesh V. I.O.C. Ltd. – 2002 (2) KLT 296). Accepting his case would have the effect of injuries interests of general public. I had rejected the claims as urged there. (See the decision in Pratheesh V. I.O.C. Ltd. – 2002 (2) KLT 296). Accepting his case would have the effect of injuries interests of general public. Likewise to uphold the claims of the petitioner would have meant that though the petitioner is found by the Corporation as prima facie guilty of serious lapses nevertheless he should have, have been given opportunity to participate in the contract works with them. This would not have been in public interest. In this context, I may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gangadhar Behera V. State of Orissa (2002 (B) SCC 381) and especially paragraph 17 thereof, which reads as following: “Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nature fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law.[Gurbachan Singh v. Satpalsingh AIR 1990 SC 209]. Prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused (See –State of U.P. V. Ashok Kumar Srivastava – AIR 1992 SC 840). A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rate innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) – AIR 1978 SC 1091]. Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation.” 13. In the totality of circumstances, I have to hold that Ext.P8 cannot be characterized as arbitrary. Facts may arise, as in this case, where it may not be necessary that a proposal for blacklisting has to be separately and specifically advised and an explanation has to be sought for on such n proposal. In the totality of circumstances, I have to hold that Ext.P8 cannot be characterized as arbitrary. Facts may arise, as in this case, where it may not be necessary that a proposal for blacklisting has to be separately and specifically advised and an explanation has to be sought for on such n proposal. Evaluation of attendant circumstances can led to such a decision, which is mostly in the realms of administration. The petitioner cannot have any justification for complaining that he had been taken by surprise. Till he is cleared of the blemishes, therefore he has to be contented with the position that he is not to be recognized as a person with whom the respondent-Corporation is bound to enter into business relations. The Original Petition will stand, dismissed.