S. K. MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS is to consider an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ('writ petition' in short) filed by the writ petitioners alleging, inter alia, that although they have been discharging the functions of Lower Grade Clerks ('lgcs' in short), they are paid in the grade of Daily Rated Majdoors ('drms' in short ). ( 2 ) THE writ petitioners, namely, Sajappan and Karma Runda, were appointed as DRMs, by the Municipal Council, Port Blair and it has been alleged by them that from the date of their appointments they have been discharging the duties of LGCs. The writ petitioners in support of their allegations annexed certain documents as annexures-C and F to the writ petition indicating that they have actually discharged the functions of LGCs inasmuch as they were engaged for preparing Salary Bills, Over-Time OTA Bills, Leave Salary Bills and other allied works assigned by the Head Clerk concerned. From the Note-Sheet, annexed as annexure-C, it appears that the writ petitioner No. 2, namely, Karma Runda was entrusted with all despatch works and was directed to maintain the accounts of postal stamps. ( 3 ) TO enforce their right of "equal pay for equal work" the writ petitioners earlier moved a writ petition before this Court and by order dated September 21, 2001 Lala, J. directed the authority concerned to consider the issue within a period of one month from the date of communication of the said order upon giving fullest opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners and by passing a reasoned order, ( 4 ) THE Secretary, Municipal Council by order No. 2927 dated October 18, 2001 rejected the claim of the writ petitioners holding, inter alia, that there were no written order given to the writ petitioners for performing the duties of LGCs. It was, further, observed that they were at liberty to appear for the recruitment process of LGCs, as and when recruitment would be conducted. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed. ( 6 ) THE Municipal Council filed affidavit-in-opposition, but they have vaguely stated that no written order has ever been issued by any authority of the Municipal Council authorising the petitioners to perform and/or discharge duties of LGCs. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed. ( 6 ) THE Municipal Council filed affidavit-in-opposition, but they have vaguely stated that no written order has ever been issued by any authority of the Municipal Council authorising the petitioners to perform and/or discharge duties of LGCs. ( 7 ) "equal pay for equal work" applies to cases of unequal pay scales based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay, do identical work under same employer. The principles of "equal pay for equal work" is, however, inapplicable where distinction is based on quantitative difference in functions and responsibilities. ( 8 ) THE apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Another v. Pramod Bhartiya and Others, reported in (1993)1 Supreme Court Cases 539, observed as under:"equal pay for equal work, it is self evident, is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14, it flows from it. Because clause (d) of Article 39 spoke of "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" it did not cease to be a part of Article 14. To say that the said rule having been stated as a Directive Principle of State Policy is not enforceable in a Court of law is to indulge in sophistry. Parts IV and III of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each other. They are complementary to each other. The rule is as much a part of Article 14 as it is of Clause (1) of Article 16. Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16 (1) necessarily means and involves equal pay for equal work. It means equally that it is neither a mechanical rule nor does it mean geometrical equality. The concept of reasonable classification and all other rules evolved with respect of Articles 14 and 16 (1) come into play wherever complaint of infraction of this rule falls for consideration". ( 9 ) EMPLOYEES doing similar work cannot be denied equal pay on the ground that the mode of recruitment was different. Appointment under the temporary scheme is not a ground to deny equal pay, once it is shown the nature of duties and functions discharged and works done is similar. ( 10 ) BURDEN of proving similarity in nature of work is on the aggrieved temporary appointees, that is, the writ petitioners herein. Appointment under the temporary scheme is not a ground to deny equal pay, once it is shown the nature of duties and functions discharged and works done is similar. ( 10 ) BURDEN of proving similarity in nature of work is on the aggrieved temporary appointees, that is, the writ petitioners herein. In my view, they have successfully discharged the initial burden and, therefore, onus shifted to the Municipal Council to prove otherwise, which, in my view, the Municipal Council failed to discharge. The Municipal Council vaguely suggested that no written order has at all been issued asking the writ petitioners to discharge the function of LGCs. In my view, in the facts and in the peculiar circumstances of the case the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is attracted and the writ petitioners are entitled to be paid on the basis of same pay scale of LGCs, and it would be great injustice to continue the writ petitioners on the scale of pay of DRMs, when it has been established beyond doubt that they are discharging the works of LGCs. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, the order dated October 10, 2001 passed by the Secretary, Municipal Council is set aside and I direct the Municipal Council to fix the scale of pay of the writ petitioners at par with the LGCs. The writ petition is, thus, allowed. There will be no order as to cost. Petition allowed