C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff in OS no. 128 of 1982 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Vizianagaram filed this appeal. The suit is for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 5-12-1979 executed by the respondents in favour of the plaintiff in respect of plaint schedule property for a sum of Rs. 61,000/ -. Respondents having admitted execution of the agreement took a plea that plaintiff is not entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement since she did not perform her part of the contract within the stipulated time. The trial Court dismissed the suit after trial. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the appeal the sole appellant died and so her lega representatives were brought on record. For the sake of convenience I would refer to the deceased 1 st appellant as plaintiff in this judgment. ( 3 ) THE point for consideration is : whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 5-12-1979. ( 4 ) POINT : The admitted facts are, respondents having agreed to sell the plaint schedule property for Rs. 61,000/- to the plaintiff received Rs. 6,500/- as advance from her and executed Ex. Al agreement on 5-12-1979 in her favour. As per the terms of the agreement, plaintiff has to pay the balance sale consideration before the end of march, 1980 and take a sale deed and get it registered at her expense. Since, plaintiff did not pay the balance amount payable before the end of March, 1980, respondents got issued Ex. A4 Notice dated 12-6-1980 to the plaintiff calling upon her to pay the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 54,500/- within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice and further intimating her that if she were to fail to do so, the agreement would stand cancelled and the amount paid by her as advance would stand forfeited. Plaintiff sent Ex. A5 reply calling upon the respondents to show their documents of title and get the tenant in the plaint schedule land vacated so that she can obtain the sale deed from them after paying the balance due and payable as per the ex. Al agreement, asserting that she is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. Respondents sent ex. Al agreement, asserting that she is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. Respondents sent ex. A7 notice to the plaintiff on 27-8-1980 informing her since she failed to pay the amount payable under Ex. Al within the time stipulated in Ex. A4 making time the essence of the contract the agreement stood cancelled and the amount of Rs. 6,500/- paid by her as advance stood forfeited. ( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since Ex. A1 is in respect of immovable property time is not the essence of the contract, and since the evidence on record clearly shows that plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform her part of the contract, she is entitled to a decree for a specific performance of Ex. Al and in any event she is entitled to seek recovery of Rs. 6,500/- paid as advance and Rs. 1,000/- paid under ex. A2 endorsement; relying on Mekala narsimha v. Gunnalal Raghunandan Rao, air 1977 All. 374. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that though time is not specifically made the essence of the contract under Ex. A1, since respondents by Ex. A4 Notice specifically made time the essence of the contract, time became the essence of contract and since plaintiff failed to pay the amount due and payable under Ex. Al within the time stipulated in Ex. A4 respondents have a right to cancel Ex. A1. His further contention is that merely because time is not made the essence of the contract in respect of immovable property the purchaser cannot indefinitely delay payment of the amount due under the agreement, and seek relief of specific performance at any time of his choice and contended that in this case since the plaint schedule property was agreed to be sold to discharge the debts and pressing necessities of respondents, time should be deemed to be the essence of the contract and since the plaintiff did not seek refund of the amount paid under Ex. A1, as view of Section 22 of Specific Relief act plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. He relied on Maula Bux v. Union of India, air 1970 SC 1955 . ( 6 ) PW1, the son of the plaintiff, is the only witness examined on behalf of plaintiff. A1, as view of Section 22 of Specific Relief act plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. He relied on Maula Bux v. Union of India, air 1970 SC 1955 . ( 6 ) PW1, the son of the plaintiff, is the only witness examined on behalf of plaintiff. His evidence is that plaintiff at the time of Ex. Al paid Rs. 6,500/- as advance and subsequently paid Rs. 1,000/- under ex. A2 and that respondents did not show their document of title and evaded to receive balance amount due and payable under ex. Al and that plaintiff kept an amount of rs. 53,500/- ready as seen from Ex. A3, ex. Al 1 etc. During cross-examination, he stated that subsequent to the agreement, when he visited the plaint schedule land in january, 1980 and asked the respondents to show their title deeds they informed him that they would show their documents of title at the time of registration, and that by the date of Ex. A1 respondents were not in actual possession of the plaint schedule property and that he came to know that plaintiff was not aware that the plaint schedule property was in possession of tenants prior to Ex. Al and that he did not try to know the names of the tenants and admitted that OS No. 50 of 1980 filed by the respondents against the plaintiff and others was decreed. Hence it is necessary to state that the case of the respondents is that when plaintiff high-handlyed tried to occupy the plaint schedule property with the help of PW1, her brother-in-law and brother of her son-in-law setting up their henchman, D. Satyanarayana Murthy raju, as her tenant in respect of the plaint schedule property, they filed OS No. 50 of 1980 against all of them and obtained an injunction restrainingthem from interfering with their possession over the plaint schedule property. ( 7 ) NO ordinary prudent man would have entered into an agreement to purchase land for a huge amount of Rs. 61,000/- during late seventies, even without verifying the title of the vendor. Therefore, the evidence of PW1 that even without verifying the title of the respondents to the suit property, plaintiff entered into Ex. ( 7 ) NO ordinary prudent man would have entered into an agreement to purchase land for a huge amount of Rs. 61,000/- during late seventies, even without verifying the title of the vendor. Therefore, the evidence of PW1 that even without verifying the title of the respondents to the suit property, plaintiff entered into Ex. Al agreement thinking that title of the respondents to the plaint schedule property can be verified at the time of registration of the sale deed cannot be believed or accepted, because no useful purpose would be served in verifying the document of title of the property purchased at the time of registration of the sale deed, which means that the sale deed should have been engrossed on the stamp paper. If at that stage, the proposed vendee is not satisfied with the title of the vendor he would have to seek refund of the value of the stamp purchased by him, because in the case of sale the vendee has to bear the expenses for purchasing stamp and registration. Therefore, in all transactions of sale after satisfying himself with the title of the vendor only would get a sale deed be got engrossed on stamp paper. Similarly, no ordinary prudent man would purchase land in the occupation of a tenant in view of section 15 of A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy act, 1956 which confers on the tenant the first right to purchase the land under his cultivation, since sub-section (6) of the said section 15 lays down that sale of land in contravention of the section is voidable at the option of the tenant. So, the plaintiff would not have taken the risk of entering into an agreement to purchase the plaint schedule land if really it was in possession of a tenant. Therefore, the plea stand taken by the plaintiff that delay in payment was only due to the respondents not showing the documents of title, and their inability to get the plaint schedule land vacated by the tenant, appears to be a lame excuse, for not performing her part of contract within the time stipulated. ( 8 ) EX. AL does not specifically say that time is the essence of the contract, but the specific stipulation therein is that the plaintiff has to pay the balance of sale consideration before the end of March, 1980. ( 8 ) EX. AL does not specifically say that time is the essence of the contract, but the specific stipulation therein is that the plaintiff has to pay the balance of sale consideration before the end of March, 1980. Since the plaintiff failed to pay the balance amount due as per the terms in Ex. Al respondents got issued Ex. A4 notice demanding her to pay the balance within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice, and if she were to fail to do so ex. Al would stand cancelled. Plaintiff sent a reply under Ex. A5 taking a stand that she has been demanding the defendants to get the tenant vacated from the plaint schedule land so that she can take the sale deed from the respondents. Apart from section 15 of A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy act, 1956, referred to above if there was a tenant on the plaint schedule land at the time of Ex. A1 a recital that possession at the time of registration would be delivered would not have been made as found in ex. Al. In view of the recital in Ex. Al that possession was agreed to be delivered at the time of registration, shows that there was no tenant over the plaint schedule property. ( 9 ) AS stated earlier, the specific case of the respondents is that the plaintiff, with the help of others, tried to trespass into the plaint schedule property and so she was constrained to file OS No. 50 of 1980. The evidence of PW1 shows that the said suit was decreed. So, it is clear that there was no tenant over the plaint schedule property. Therefore, it is clear that plaintiff set up a false case in her reply Ex. A5 that a non-existent tenant has to be got vacated by the defendants. It is well known that a person seeking a specific relief has to come to Court with clean hands, and a person who came to court with a false case is not entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance. Plaintiff setting up a false case of tenancy in respect of plaint schedule property and her fasely alleging that she did not verify the title of the respondent to the plaint schedule property prior to Ex. Al disentitles her to the equitable relief of specific performance. Plaintiff setting up a false case of tenancy in respect of plaint schedule property and her fasely alleging that she did not verify the title of the respondent to the plaint schedule property prior to Ex. Al disentitles her to the equitable relief of specific performance. ( 10 ) ADMITTEDLY, the 2nd respondent took Rs. 1,000/- on 3-5-1980 and so the balance due under Ex. Al is Rs. 53,500/- but not Rs. 54,500/- as claimed in Ex. A4. The fact that the plaintiff paid Rs. 1,000/- on 3-5-1980 is also admitted by the respondents. So, the figure Rs. 54,500/- mentioned in ex. A4 should be taken is a mistake for rs. 53,500/ -. ( 11 ) I am not able to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the principle that in contracts relating to immovable property time is not the essence of the contract has to be applied to the facts of this case. As per the terms of Ex. Al plaintiff has to pay the balance due before March, 1980. Since plaintiff failed to pay the amount due under ex. Al agreement on or before end of march, 1980, respondents, by Ex. A4 notice dated 12-6-1980 gave 15 days time from the date of receipt of Ex. A4 notice to the plaintiff to pay the balance due. Plaintiff instead of paying the amount due issued a reply taking an untenable stand that she has to verify the title of the plaint schedule property and that respondent have to get vacated the tenant on the plaint schedule property; and did not even make an effort to pay the amount due to respondents and filed this suit on 13-12-1982, i. e. , almost three years from the date of execution of ex. A1 and few months prior to the expiry of the period of limitation for seeking specific performance. ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court in K. S. Vidyanadam and others v. Vairavan, air 1977 SC 1751, referring to a judgment of Constitution Bench of the Supreme court in Official Trustee of Taminadu v. Udavumkarankal, AIR 1993 SC 1472 , where it is held:". . . . . . . IN the case of sale of immovable property, there is no presumption as to time being essence of contract. . . . . . . IN the case of sale of immovable property, there is no presumption as to time being essence of contract. Even if it not the essence of contract, the Court may interfere that it is to be performed in the reasonable time if the conditions are (1) from the express terms of the contract, (2) from the nature of the property and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of the contract. "held in para 10 as under:"it has been consistently held by the Courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in that case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not following that agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one, or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time limit (s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? it would also mean denying the discretion vested in the Court by both Sections 10 and 20. . . . . . . . . . . "and in Para 11 held :"the said time-limit may not amount to making time the essence of the contract but it must yet have some meaning. Not for nothing could such time-limit would have been prescribed. Gan it be stated as a rule of law or rule of prudence that where time is not made the essence of the contract, all stipulations of time provided in the contract have no significance or meaning or that they are as good as non-existent? Not for nothing could such time-limit would have been prescribed. Gan it be stated as a rule of law or rule of prudence that where time is not made the essence of the contract, all stipulations of time provided in the contract have no significance or meaning or that they are as good as non-existent? All this only means that while exercising its discretion, the Court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limit (s) cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract (relating to immovable properties ). "since the plaintiff failed to perform her part of the contract within the time stipulated or within a reasonable time, and came to court with false case she is not entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance. The point is answered accordingly. ( 13 ) THE next question is whether the appellant is entitled to seek refund of rs. 6,500/- paid under Ex. A1 and Rs. 1,000/- paid under Ex. A2. It is well known that amount paid as earnest money only can be forfeited, if the terms of the agreement provide for such forfeiture. The recital Ex. Al reads thus" llofo #33oo 6> n 61,0007- (eso sa SS^ooo tfj,;> ctfoej) go#j3jjt> e)ooa oj So^oo 3 (ojoooeoand JOgoojoao andm. andand> [c3b and> oes> 33 -8* 6v3 logo 6n 6500/- (escose) SDand 3o3e o> ;> candao) og^fr) qandfrando. andrand 3jj^ss. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, it is clear that Rs. 6,500/- was paid towards part payment of the sale consideration, but not as earnest money. The terms of Ex. A1 do not provide for forfeiture of the said amount. So, respondents have no right to forfeit the said amount of rs. 6,500/- or Rs. 1000/- paid under Ex. A2, which, in any event, is not earnest money. In Mekkala Narsimulu s case (supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, it is held that in case where the agreements makes a provision for the compensation to be paid in case of breach, the Court has power to award either the amount so fixed or a reasonable portion thereof, whether or not the actual loss is proved. In that case rs. 4,000/- was paid as earnest money. But, the Court awarded Rs. 2,000/- as damages though there was no proof of actual loss. In that case rs. 4,000/- was paid as earnest money. But, the Court awarded Rs. 2,000/- as damages though there was no proof of actual loss. In Maula Bux case (supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents, it is held that in every case of breach of contract the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree and the Court is competent towards reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. Since respondent have been enjoying the plaint schedule property and had the benefit of Rs. 7,500 paid by the plaintiff also they need not be awarded any compensation for the breach committed by the plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff sought for refund of Rs. 7,500/- paid under Ex. A1 an order for refund could be passed. In view of the embargo imposed by Section 22 (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 without specific prayer for refund plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for refund of Rs. 7,500/ -. I am not able to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the prayer portion in the plaint reading "grant such other relief or reliefs which the Hon ble court deems fit under the circumstances of the case" includes the relief of refund also, as the same does not amount to a "specific prayer for refund" as contemplated by section 22 of Specific Relief Act. For reasons best known to the plaintiff she did not seek amendment of the plaint incorporating the specific prayer for refund of the amount paid under Ex. Al as an alternative relief, though the appeal is pending from several years. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in the suit and hence the appeal is dismissed.