JUDGMENT 1. 1. This special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance is directed against the judgment and order dated 9.11.1995 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition was dismissed. 2. The present appellant was the original petitioner who will be hereinafter referred to as the petitioner. The petitioner came with the case that he was a Commerce Graduate, was appointed as Revenue Inspector Vide order dated 24.9.1973 passed by the Commissioner of Municipal Council, Beawar on purely temporary basis for a period of six months or till the candidates selected by the Rajasthan Municipalities Subordinate and Ministerial Services Selection Commission are available whichever is earlier. He was allowed to continue in service even after the expiry of the six months and his term of appointment was extended upto 31.3.1976 by order dated 16.12.1975. By the office order dated 30.3.1976 wherein his name appear at Serial No. 1, his services were terminated w.e.f. 31.3.1976 on the ground that he had not been selected by the Commission for the post of Revenue Inspector. This order dated 30.3.1976 passed by the Commissioner, Municipal Council, Beawar was earlier subjected to challenge in the writ petition No. 700/76. In that writ petition No. 700/76, the petitioner moved an amendment application after eight years while the petition was pending since 1976. Through this amendment application, the petitioner sought to incorporate new ground of challenge to his termination order dated 30.3.1976 based on violation of Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petition was decided by an order dated 6.2.1985 which is reproduced as under: "Certified copy of order dated 6.2.85 from S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 700/96, Ram Ratan Soni v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR. Date of Order 6.2.85 HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Ajay Rastogi, for the petitioner. Mr. M.I. Khan, Advocate. In my opinion, the petitioner has applied for amendment of the petition after a delay of eight years. This could not be allowed. In the circumstances, therefore, I reject this application for amendment. Mr. Rastogi, however, contended that he will rather move a comprehensive petition and withdraw this petition. I allow the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition with liberty for him to move on the same cause of action, if it is not otherwise barred. This could not be allowed. In the circumstances, therefore, I reject this application for amendment. Mr. Rastogi, however, contended that he will rather move a comprehensive petition and withdraw this petition. I allow the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition with liberty for him to move on the same cause of action, if it is not otherwise barred. The rule is discharged as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. P.K. Banerjee." 3. It is very clear from the reading of this order dated 6.2.1985 that the amendment was not allowed by the Court on the ground of delay of eight years in moving the amendment and the application seeking amendment was rejected and further in face of the rejection of the amendment application, the petitioner chose to withdraw the petition and to file a comprehensive petition. The petition was accordingly allowed to be withdrawn with the liberty to move for the same cause of action if it is not otherwise barred and the rule was discharged. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present petition out of which this appeal has arisen. The petition was filed on 25.2.1985. 4. When this petition came up before the Court on 17.5.1985, the submissions of the petitioner's counsel that he did not press his claim for back-wages till the filing of this petition was noted and notice was issued to the respondents as to why the petition may not be admitted. Later on, the petitioner was admitted on 20.1.1986. In this petition, the order dated 30.3.76 was sought to be quashed and set aside on the grounds that the petitioner was a workman, had completed more than 21/2 years of continuous service on the date of the termination order dated 30.3.76 which amounts to retrenchment within a meaning of Section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the provisions of Section 25F had not been followed while passing this retrenchment order dated 30.3.76 and also that even if the petitioner had not been selected by the Rajasthan Municipal Subordinate and Ministerial Service Selection Commission, had he been allowed in service beyond 31.3.76, had the termination order not been passed on 30.3.1976, his case could have been dealt with under amended Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Municipal (Subordinate and Ministerial Service) Rules, 1963 which provided that the temporary appointees appointed during the period on. and from 24.11.1963 to 1.4.1975 and who were not confirmed on the respective posts but had been working continuously shall be referred to the Commission by the Board concerned along with its recommendation of eligibility and suitability. This petition was contested by the respondents by way of reply to the writ petition filed by the Municipal Council, Beawar on 15.7.1993. A separate reply dated 27.8.1993 has been filed on 22.9.93. The petitioner filed a rejoinder to the reply of the respondent No. 2 on 29.8.95. 5. The learned Single Judge passed the order dated 9.11.95 which is under challenge in this appeal. The learned Single Judge has taken the view that when the amendment application had been rejected on the ground that the same had been filed after eight years. The same ground as were sought to be incorporated through the amendment application could not be raised in the subsequent comprehensive petition and the liberty as was granted by the Court while allowing the petition to the withdrawn and dismiss the same as withdrawn on 6.2.1985, was coupled with the condition that, 'if it is not otherwise barred.' 6. In view of these facts, the learned Single Judge after considering the law, came to the conclusion that petitioner could not be permitted to raise the plea of violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act in these writ proceedings; even otherwise the said grievance could be raised under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Gopi Lal Teli v. State of Raj. & Ors., reported in 1995(2) WLC (Raj.) 1 the writ petition was dismissed. 7. It is, of course true that the liberty was granted by the Single Bench of this Court while dismissing the earlier petition but equally true it is, that the amendment was not allowed on the ground of delay of eight years and while granting the liberty, the Court imposed the condition that if it is otherwise not barred. 7. It is, of course true that the liberty was granted by the Single Bench of this Court while dismissing the earlier petition but equally true it is, that the amendment was not allowed on the ground of delay of eight years and while granting the liberty, the Court imposed the condition that if it is otherwise not barred. Therefore, the question of delay could be considered by the learned Single Judge while passing the present impugned order dated 9.11.95 and we agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that when the amendment application was rejected on the ground of delay and yet the same ground was sought to be agitated through the fresh writ petition filed now. The Court while considering the fresh writ petition can certainly take into consideration the question of delay inasmuch as, in the other dated 6.11.85 itself it was mentioned that, 'if it is not otherwise barred." 8. We are aware of the settled principle that for the purposes of writs under Article 226, there is no lower limit and no upper limit and it would depend upon the facts of each case as to whether the delay stands explained or not. The plea of Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act had been sought to be raised after a long period of eight years in the earlier writ petition through amendment and such prayer was rejected and therefore, even if he reagitates the same plea now in the fresh writ petition, the question of delay could still come in the way of entertaining the petition, if the court finds it to be a case of amendable. 9. Besides this, we find from the pleadings of the parties that the parties are at dispute on the question as to whether the petitioner who was working as a Revenue Inspector, was workman or not. While, the petitioner's claim is that he was a workman, the respondents have traversed this claimed by way of filing the reply. In the reply, it has been submitted that the duties of the Revenue Inspector are of Supervisory nature and did include even the power to impose the penalties in the matter of recovery of octroi while discharging the duties as a Revenue Inspector. 10. In the reply, it has been submitted that the duties of the Revenue Inspector are of Supervisory nature and did include even the power to impose the penalties in the matter of recovery of octroi while discharging the duties as a Revenue Inspector. 10. Section 310 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 provides for the Subordinate Officers, Ministerial establishment and other servants and sub-section (4) of section 310 says that without prejudice to such control and supervision, the persons so appointed shall be directly subject to the orders of the Commissioner or the executive officer and shall perform such functions, exercise such powers and discharge such duties as are laid down in rules or as may be required of them by the commissioner or the executive officer. 11. The case of the respondents is that such duties and functions which were required to be discharged by a person holding the post of Revenue Inspector are of supervisory nature and it also include the power to impose the penalties in the matter of recovery of octroi. The post of Revenue Inspector is included in the Rajasthan Municipal (Subordinate & Ministerial Service) Rules, 1963 under part II Rule 6 with the heading of revenue under subordinate service. Thus, we find that the parties are at dispute on question as to whether the petitioner holding the post of Revenue Inspector was a workman or not. 12. The learned Single Judge has also observed in the judgment that the grievance with regard to the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act that even otherwise, the grievance could be raised under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, in views of the decision rendered by a Bench of five judges of this Court in the case of Gopi Lal Tell v. State of Raj. & Ors., reported in 1995(2) WLC (Raj.) 1 . 13. For the reasons aforesaid that the petitioner had been appointed in 1973 and was terminated by order dated 13.3.1976 because he had not been selected by the Commission and the fact that in earlier writ petition filed by him, the amendment application was rejected and the petitioner was permitted to withdraw his petition with the liberty to file the fresh one coupled with the condition that if it was otherwise not barred, we do not find it a case worth interference in this appeal. 14. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that while admitting the petition on 17.5.1985, he statement was recorded that he would not press his claim for back wages till the filing of the petition. This order was an ex parte order at the stage when the show cause notice was issued as to why it may not be admitted and that by itself is not sufficient, not to consider the question of delay. 15. We find no basis to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the appeal is hereby dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******