Judgment :- COMMON JUDGMENT O.S.No.182 of 1989 was filed by the first respondent against the appellant for declaration and possession. O.S.No.93 of 1990 was filed by the appellant against the respondent for specific performance. The appellant's suit was dismissed. The respondent's suit was decreed. Both the appeals were dismissed and hence, the two second appeals have been filed. 2. According to the appellant, there was an oral agreement in 1977 with the second respondent. The sale consideration was Rs.2000/- out of which Rs.1500/- was paid and compensation was also given. According to the first respondent, however, the oral agreement was untrue, the compensation was not given to the appellant herein. On the other hand, there is a written sale deed executed by the second respondent in favour of the appellant dated 25-11-1987 and he was put in possession. Both the Courts were inclined to believe the respondents' case and therefore, the present second appeals have been filed. 3. The only substantial question raised by the appellant is res judicata. 4. According to the appellant, there was an earlier suit and he succeeded. This was O.S.No.402 of 1987, which was filed by the appellant for bare injunction against the first respondent and therefore, the present suit was barred and the respondents were also estopped from raising the same plea. This was rejected by the Courts below stating that the plea of res judicata was not clearly raised and therefore, he cannot be allowed to raise it and also that in fact, it did not amount to res judicata and since the sale deed in favour of the first respondent was held to be genuine and valid automatically the reliefs claimed by the appellant were rejected. The written statement filed by the appellant in the suit filed by the respondent herein he had stated the findings of this Court passed in the suit O.S.No.402 of 1987 is binding upon him. It was submitted that in as much as the plaintiff has not preferred any appeal against the findings in the earlier suit he was estopped from questioning the oral sale agreement between this defendant and the second defendant and that he was entitled to protection under Section 53(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaint in O.S.NO.93 of 1990 is almost identical to the written statement referred to above. 5. The plaint in O.S.NO.93 of 1990 is almost identical to the written statement referred to above. 5. The crucial averments in the plaint filed by the respondent are as follows: (a) Para (1) deals with his right as the absolute owner under the registered sale deed dated 25-11-1987. (b) Para (2) deals with the lack of right of the appellant herein in the suit property and the fact that the second respondent was assigned this property in 1957. (c) Para (3) deals with his possession pursuant to the purchase and the manipulation of the records by the appellants and the filing of suits in O.S.No.402 of 1987. In this paragraph, the case of the respondent also is as follows: "The plaintiff herein contested the claim of the first defendant herein in O.S.No.402 of 1987 specifically putting forward the plea that the theory of oral agreement of sale is fictitious and imaginary." (d) Para No.4 deals with the respondent being advised to give a quietus to the dispute and not to pursue the prior proceedings in appeal since the finding regarding the oral agreement of sale in the earlier suit would not bind him in the present comprehensive suit. (e) Para No.6 states that on the strength of the permanent injunction in O.S.No.402 of 1987, the first defendant continues in possession after having trespassed into it during the pendency of the suit in O.S.No.402 of 1987. 5. The written statement filed by the respondent herein in the earlier suit was marked in the present suits as Ex-B4. The crucial recitals of the written statement are as follows: Para No.3 deals with the possession of the second respondent as owner, transfer of patta and the transfer under the registered sale deed dated 25-11-1987 and possession of the first respondent thereafter. Para No.4 deals with the oral agreement of sale and that this oral agreement is not correct nor was it correct to state that the appellant was put in possession of the suit property under the oral agreement. Reasons were given as to how the appellant came in possession of the original patta issued to the second respondent. 6. Ex-A4 is the judgment in the earlier suit. Reasons were given as to how the appellant came in possession of the original patta issued to the second respondent. 6. Ex-A4 is the judgment in the earlier suit. In Ex-A4, the appellant claimed that he was in possession pursuant to the oral sale in 1977 and that the patta was handed over to him, he paid a sum of Rs.1200/- out of the agreed sum of Rs.2000/- and since there was a restraint on the earlier same under the patta the second respondent agreed to execute the sale deed ten years after and possession was handed over in 1977 itself. There were references to planting of coconut saplings and assessment of property tax etc. and since there was an attempt to trespass on 05-12-1987 the suit was filed. The first respondent resisted the suit claim by filing the written statement, which has already been referred to above. 7. In Ex-A4, one issue was regarding the possession of the appellant and the second issue was whether he was entitled to relief of injunction. This is what the learned Judge held after referring to the respective claims of the two parties: 8. As regards the alleged sale in favour of the respondent t is said: and further it is held as follows: 9. Ex-A4 judgment had traced the case of the appellant with regard to his acquisition of possession and had referred to the oral agreement in 1977 the consideration of Rs.2000/- and payment of the amount on the very same date, the postponement of registration of sale deed on account of Kudiyiruppu patta and the handing over of Kudiyiruppu patta in evidence of the oral sale, the patta was marked as Ex-A1 in that suit. The factum of putting up a small thatched house in the suit property was shown to be proved by the property tax receipts from 1978 to 79 up to 1982 to 83 and 1984 to 85 and 1985 to 86 on behalf of the respondents it had been urged that the Tamil Nadu Act 40/71 under which the patta was granted did not impose any restraint on alienation for 10 years and therefore, the very fact that this reason is cited would also show that the oral agreement was wrong. This objection was rejected in Ex-A4, on the ground that if this was true then it would affect his title to the suit property but since O.S.No.402 of 1987 was only with regard to possession and enjoyment that objection was not relevant. The handing over of patta was explained by the respondent on that suit by stating that the second respondent has given it to him and as per the oral evidence whereas the second respondent as D.W.2 has conducted this case that he had given it to the appellant to pay the property tax. Therefore, it was held that the patta had been handed over to the appellant as per the oral agreement. As regards the sale deed dated 25-11-1987 which was marked by the respondent to show that it was he who was in possession pursuant to the sale deed was also dealt with by the learned counsel in the earlier suit. After considering the evidence regarding the manner in which the sale deed was executed and the consideration was paid, it was held that the sale deed had been concocted in a hurry and in haste, since even regarding the payment of consideration there is no unanimity among the witnesses who deposed on behalf of the first respondent and finally, it was held that the appellant was in possession of the suit property on the date of suit and therefore, granted a decree for injunction. These are the relevant features to be noted in the judgment in the previous suit, Ex-B4. 10. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, though the words res judicata have not been clearly stated it is evident from the pleadings that they have been said that this is binding on the parties and therefore, no finding contrary to what has been given regarding the oral agreement is permitted in law. 11. The learned counsel relied on Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad Vs. Rachawwa ( AIR 1971 SC 442 ) where it was held that if a final decision in any matter at issue between the parties is based by a Court on more than one point each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision. The decision on which all these points operates as res judicata between the parties. 12. The decision on which all these points operates as res judicata between the parties. 12. The counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that in the earlier suit, the issue was only the possession on the date of suit, so the other findings are only incidental, so they can have no bearing on the subsequent comprehensive suit. It was also submitted that while in the comprehensive suits the suit itself is barred by limitation, and that in the suit filed by the respondent the decree should be granted as prayed for since his title is supported by sale deed whereas the appellant has based his right only on an oral agreement. 13. In the suit for specific performance the finding in favour of the respondent is that if the assignment in favour of Thangasamy has been in 1957 and the restraint for alienation was for 10 years he should have been free to alienate the property after 1967 and therefore, the 1977 oral agreement cannot be true. 14. As regards the custody of patta, it was held that the patta was given to him by the second respondent because he was a relative and had obtained the property tax etc. and on that score, it was not possible to accept that he was in possession. And so the Lower Appellate Court rejects the suit for specific performance. 15. As regards the suit for recovery of possession it was held that in order to operate as res judicata the finding must be one disposing of a matter directly and substantially in issue of the former suit and the issue should have been heard and finally decided, by the Court trying the said suit and therefore, this question was an incidental question in the earlier suit it would not be binding and in any event since he had only said that it operates as estoppel the question of res judicata will not arise. 16. In 2000 (8) SCC 99 , the Supreme Court dealt with the question of res judicata in detail and held that the Doctrine of res judicata has received a statutory sanction in the Code as a matter of prudence and to give due weightage to a finding or a decision so as to reach a finality in the matter of a dispute between the same parties or litigating under the same parties. Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1965 SC 1153 ) was cited: "As a result of the above discussion, we are of opinion that the provisions of Section 11 CPC are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit and that on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. The nature of the former proceeding in immaterial." 17. It was observed that the 1976 amendment to CPC and introduction of Explanation 7 and 8 to Section 11 clarify the dual objective. It matters little whether the earlier suit was one for bare injunction or not because even with regard to a decree by a Court of limited jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed that the expression Court of limited jurisdiction ought not to be given a limited or restrictive interpretation and as noticed above but widest possible amplitude ought to be given onto the expression above. 18. In Rangaraja Nattar Vs. Subramania Chettiyar (1996 I MLJ 258), the question of res judicata was considered. That case is somewhat identical to the present case. The appellant therein filed a suit for declaration and for recovery of possession. The suit was dismissed on the ground it was hit by res judicata by the decision in an earlier suit for injunction. The Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal. It was urged before this Court that the Courts had committed the error in applying the principles of res judicata and for that Smt. Gangabhai Vs. Chhabubhai ( AIR 1982 SC 20 = 1982 SCC 4 = 1982 I APLJ SC) was relied on which has been relied on in this case too. In AIR 1982 SC 20 (cited supra), there was an earlier suit in which a finding was given by the Court of Small Causes. Chhabubhai ( AIR 1982 SC 20 = 1982 SCC 4 = 1982 I APLJ SC) was relied on which has been relied on in this case too. In AIR 1982 SC 20 (cited supra), there was an earlier suit in which a finding was given by the Court of Small Causes. Since the Court of Small Causes has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on questions relating to the immovable property, it was held that a question of title in a Small Cause suit can be regarded as incidental only to the substantial issue in the suit. So the Apex Court held that the said findings cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit in which the question of title is directly raised. Therefore, the learned Judge in 1996 I MLJ 258 (cited supra) distinguished AIR 1982 SC 20 relying on C. Arumughathan Vs. S. Muthusami Naidu (1991 I LW 63) where it was held that where once it is found that the finding in the earlier suit was necessary for the final decision certainly it will operate as res judicata even though the earlier suit is one for bare injunction. 19. In this case, the suit for bare injunction was decreed since the appellant claimed that he was put in possession pursuant to the oral sale. The oral agreement was believed as also the possession. In fact, the appellant had to prove the oral agreement in order to establish his possession. 20. The Courts below appeared to have rejected the claim of res judicata on the ground that it was not raised at the earliest juncture. But how far this objection can be sustained is not clear because the Trial Court had framed an issue, Therefore, the parties were not taken by the surprise they knew that res judicata was put in issue. All the facts and documents necessary for ascertaining the issue were before the Court and marked as exhibits. The parties had admitted the decision in the previous suit. In fact, the respondent claimed that he was advised not to proceed with the appeal against the decree in the previous suit since it was on a limited issue and therefore, he filed the comprehensive suit. 21. The parties had admitted the decision in the previous suit. In fact, the respondent claimed that he was advised not to proceed with the appeal against the decree in the previous suit since it was on a limited issue and therefore, he filed the comprehensive suit. 21. The pleadings indicate the bar of res judicata without using the exact word and the party, who is affected by the bar of res judicata had notice of the likelihood of this issue being decided against him, and the copy of the judgment and decree in the earlier suit were marked in Court. In these circumstances, to reject the issue of the respondent on the ground the word 'res judicata' was not used appears to be too technical. It cannot be said that the matter was not directly or substantially in issue in the previous case. In Ex-A4 suit, the respondent attacked the oral agreement, denied that the appellant was put in possession pursuant to the oral agreement. But the Court after detailed consideration of the oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the appellant was in possession pursuant to the oral agreement of sale and that he had also parted with consideration. In Ex-A4, it was also held that the sale deed set up by the first respondent appears to be hastily concocted, there being no corroboration amongst the witnesses regarding payment of consideration. Therefore, the suit filed by the respondent will have to fail. 22. As regards the suit for specific performance, the Appellate Court's judgment will to be set aside. According to the appellant, the second respondent asked the appellant to defer the execution of the sale deeds for ten years and therefore, he waited patiently and he had also got ready the stamps for registration. It is only when the second respondent had given evidence as D.W.2 denying the agreement that he realise that the second respondent was resiting from the sale agreement he had filed the suit for specific performance. Eventhough the finding of the earlier suit that the oral agreement is true and that he had been put in possession has become final, the question whether he is entitled to a decree for specific performance must be decided by the Appellate Court on the oral and documentary evidence. 23. Eventhough the finding of the earlier suit that the oral agreement is true and that he had been put in possession has become final, the question whether he is entitled to a decree for specific performance must be decided by the Appellate Court on the oral and documentary evidence. 23. The finding in the earlier suit that the sale deed in favour of the first respondent is not a genuine one and the oral agreement in favour of the appellant is true and his possession in the suit property is pursuant to the oral agreement have become final and will operate as res judicata. The claim of the first respondent that the appellant trespassed into the suit property during the pendency of the earlier suit cannot be upheld because in the earlier suit it was found that only the appellant was in possession on the date of suit. For these reasons O.S.No.182 of 1989 stand dismissed. S.A.No.1759 of 1991 is allowed. No costs. 24. As regards, S.A.No.1760 of 1991 though the oral agreement has been upheld, yet the Appellate Court will have to decide as the final Court of fact whether the appellants is entitled to a decree for specific performance on the facts of the case. S.A.1760/91 is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Appellate Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned District Judge, Thanjavur to decide whether the appellant is entitled to specific performance of the oral agreement of the year 1977.