C. R. PAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS Jail Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 3-4-1993 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bargarh in Sessions Trial Case No. 4/93 (No. 122 of 1992 of the Court of Sessions Judge, Sambalpur) convicting the appellant under Section 304, Part I, IPC and sentencing him thereunder to undergo R. I. for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000. 00 and in default to undergo R. I. for a further period of one year. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follows :- in the morning of 30-3-1992 Rajendra Dharua, the deceased along with co-labourer Kanduru Dharua, the appellant, Shyamsundar Dharua, the PW 4 and Khyamanidhi Sahu, the PW 5 being equipped with spades and baskets went to work as labourers in connection with the connection of a culvert. While returning from the work site to their village Saipali at about noon they took alcoholic drinks and went to the village tank at Saipali for taking bath. Near the tank altercation ensued between the appellant and the deceased relating to castism and soon it took the shape of a dual between the two in course of which the deceased fell down. At that moment the appellant picked up the spade which was nearby and dealt a blow by the sharp side of its blade on the head of the deceased which resulted in his instantaneous death. PW 4 who was present at the spot ran to the village and informed about the incident to PW 3, the brother, of the deceased who rushed to the spot and found his brother lying dead in pool of blood. He immediately went to Brijapur Police Station and lodged the F. I. R. Ext. 6 on the basis of which a case was registered and incourse of investigation the accused was arrested. While in custody be made a statement leading to discovery and produced the spade (M. D. II), a towel (M. D. III) and a lungi (M. D. IV ). After investigation police submitted charge-sheet against the appellant for an offence under Section 302, I. P. C. The case was committed to the Court of Session where the appellant stood charged for the offence under Section 302, I. P. C. to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
After investigation police submitted charge-sheet against the appellant for an offence under Section 302, I. P. C. The case was committed to the Court of Session where the appellant stood charged for the offence under Section 302, I. P. C. to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. ( 3 ) IN course of hearing, the prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses out of whom PWs 4 and 5 are the two eye witnesses to the occurrence. PW 3 is the informant, PW 2 is a witness to the inquest over the deadbody of the deceased, seizure of the spade (M. D. 11) and the wearing apparels of the accused consisting of a towel and a lungi the M. Ds. III and IV respectively. PW 1 is a witness to the seizure of blood stained earth and the basket (MD. I) and PW 7 is the S. D. M. D. through whom the Medical Officer who conducted the autospy over the deadbody submitted the post portem report (Ext. 12) and PW 6 is the Investigating Officer. The accused, however , neither cited any witness in his defence nor adduced any documentary evidence in his support. ( 4 ) THE learned Addl. Sessions Judge replying mainly on the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 the two eye-witnesses to the occurrence and the evidence of PW 2, the Investigating Officer relating to the seizure of the spade and blood stained clothes on production by the accused while in custody has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence the accused-appellant has preferred this appeal. ( 5 ) THERE is no dispute that the death of the deceased is homicidal. In this context, the evidence available on record is the evidence of PWs 4 and 5, the two co-workers of the accused and the medical evidence.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence the accused-appellant has preferred this appeal. ( 5 ) THERE is no dispute that the death of the deceased is homicidal. In this context, the evidence available on record is the evidence of PWs 4 and 5, the two co-workers of the accused and the medical evidence. PWs 4 and 5 have deposed in unequivocal terms that while they were on the embankment of the village tank there ensued an altercation between the appellant and the deceased relating to castism which soon took the shape of a duel between them in course of which the deceased fell down at which the appellant picked up the spade which was nearby and dealt a blow by the sharp side of the spade on the head of the deceased and caused a bleeding injury which resulted in his death. PWs 4 and 5 in the above aspect have corroborated each other. In their cross-examination , nothing has been elicited from them to disbelieve their version. Ext. 12, the post-portem report shows that the deceased had one elongated abrasion extending from left sterno clevicular joint to the right angle of mandible 6" x 41/4" long with haemorrhage in the margin and underlying tissue. There was also a lacerated injury on the vertex 41/2" long with comminuted fracture of the underlying skull and laceration of membrane of brain causing heavy bleeding and oozing of brain matter. Ext. 11, the opinion of the Doctor shows that the injuries found on the person of the deceased were possible by the sharp side of the spade. The doctor has also opined that the death of the deceased is due to injury to brain and compression of vital centres at the base of brain. The learned counsel of the appellant, however, contended that in absence of examination of the Medical Officer who conducted the autospy and prepared the report of which the Ext. 12, is a carbon copy the same should not have been admitted in evidence. In the above context, it may be stated here that such questions came up for consideration in Prithi Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR 1989 SC 702 . In the case cited above Dr.
12, is a carbon copy the same should not have been admitted in evidence. In the above context, it may be stated here that such questions came up for consideration in Prithi Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR 1989 SC 702 . In the case cited above Dr. C. S. Vedwa, the lady doctor who examined the prosecutrix, a victim of rape, and issued the certificate was not available for giving evidence as she had proceeded on long leave. The learned Sessions Judge felt that it would not be possible to secure her presence without undue delay and therefore permitted the prosecution to prove the certificate through PW 2 who was conversant with her handwriting and signature, he (PW 2) having worked with her for about two years. He stated that the corbon copy of the certificate tendered as an evidence in that case was prepared by Dr. Vedwa by one process and bears her signature. It was contended that the certificate was inadmissible in evidence since the prosecution has failed to prove that the original certificate was lost and not available. It was laid down by the Apex Court that Section 32 of the Evidence Act provides that when a statement written or verbal, is made by a person in the discharge of professional duty, whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay, the same is relevant and admissible in evidence. Besides, since the carbon copy was made by one uniform process the same was primary evidence within the meaning of Explanation 2 of Section 62 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the medical certificate was clearly admissible in evidence. ( 6 ) IN the instant case, the doctor who conducted the P. M. examination over the deadbody was not available to give evidence in the case as she proceeded on maternity leave. The P. M. examination report, Ext. 12 has been proved by PW 7 the S. D. M. D. with whom she was working and through whom she submitted the same to the Investigating Officer. In the above context, the PW 7 has deposed that Dr. Chulabati Sahu was working as L. T. R. , M. O. , Padmapur Sub-Divisional Hospital as his colleague for sometime and he is acquitted with her handwriting.
In the above context, the PW 7 has deposed that Dr. Chulabati Sahu was working as L. T. R. , M. O. , Padmapur Sub-Divisional Hospital as his colleague for sometime and he is acquitted with her handwriting. From his evidence , it also appears that on 30-3-1992 and 31-3-1992 she was working in the said hospital as L. T. R. , M. O. He has also deposed that after performing autospy on the deadbody of Rajendra Dharua, the deceased, she prepared the postmortem report and submitted the same through him. He has also stated that the report, Ext. 12 was prepared in the same carbon process and the same was forwarded by him under the forwarding memo Ext. 21/1 which also bears his signature. Therefore, under the circumstances, keeping in view the position of law laid down in the case cited above, it cannot be said that the P. M. report , Ext. 12 is not admissible in evidence. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has rightly admitted the P. M. report, Ext. 12 in evidence and has taken it into consideration while coming to the conclusion about the cause of death. As has been stated earlier, there is also the eye witnesses' account about the alleged assault by the appellant on the deceased by means of a spade. Both of them have stated that the appellant dealt a blow on the head of the deceased by the sharp side of the spade and caused a bleeding injury. They have also identified the spade (M. O. II) and the towel and lungi marked as M. O. III and M. O. IV which were seized on production by the accused-appellant. Those articles were sent for chemical examination and human blood were detected on the spade and the towel. There is no explanation how the M. Os. II and III contained human blood. Thus, the evidence on record not only show that the deceased died a homicidal death but also show that the accused-appellant is the author of the same.
Those articles were sent for chemical examination and human blood were detected on the spade and the towel. There is no explanation how the M. Os. II and III contained human blood. Thus, the evidence on record not only show that the deceased died a homicidal death but also show that the accused-appellant is the author of the same. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that since it appears from the evidence on record that the appellant in course of the quarrel which turned into a duel gave only one blow when the deceased caught hold of him, the same will amount to an offence under Section 304, Part II, I. P. C. and not under Part I, as there is no evidence to show that the appellant intended to cause death. The learned Additional Standing Counsel, however, argued in support of the impugned, order. In the above context, it is noticed from the evidence of the eye witnesses, viz. , PWs 4 and 5 that there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased relating to costs dispute. In course of that quarrel which turned into a duel, the deceased tried to assault the appellant. The PW 4 tried to restrained him. But, ignoring the same he caught hold of the appellant at which the appellant pushed him and the deceased fell down. At that moment, the appellant picked up the spade which was nearby and gave the blow. The medical opinion shows that the death of the deceased is due to the injury sustained by him. The evidence on record do not indicate that the assault was with the intention to cause death or such bodily injury which was likely or sufficient to cause death. But from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear that the appellant struck the blow by means of a spade on the head of the deceased and as such he has to be imputed with the knowledge that the head injury was likely to cause death though death might not have been intended.
But from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear that the appellant struck the blow by means of a spade on the head of the deceased and as such he has to be imputed with the knowledge that the head injury was likely to cause death though death might not have been intended. Therefore, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Part II of Section 304, I. P. C. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence passed under Section 304, Part I, I. P. C. is modified and the appellant is held guilty under Section 304, Part II, I. P. C. and is convicted thereunder. Considering the fact that the appellant has already suffered imprisonment for more than nine years, he is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the period already undergone. He be set at liberty forthwith, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. With the above modification in sentence, the appeal is dismissed. Order accordingly.