ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. None appeared for the respondents despite service of notice. 2. In this appeal filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 the contemnor has assailed the judgment/order of the Allahabad High Court holding him guilty of contempt and sentenced him to fine of Rs. 1000/-. 3. The factual backdrop of the case necessary for appreciating the contentions raised may be stated thus: The appellant who was the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Moradabad during the relevant period received a notice issued by the District Magistrate for convening a meeting of the Board on 4.6.1990 to discuss no-confidence motion against the appellant. He filed Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 seeking quashing of the notice of the meeting. Therein he prayed for an interim order directing the respondents not to hold the meeting on the scheduled date. The matter relating to interim order was heard on 1st June, 1990 and order was reserved. Thereafter the meeting of the Board was held on 4.6.1990 as scheduled and no-confidence motion was carried and Resolution was passed removing the appellant from the office of the chairmanship. Thereafter, he filed another Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 15962/90 challenging the proceeding and the no-confidence motion passed in the meeting held on 4.6.1990. By an interim order passed on 6.6.1990 the Resolution carrying no-confidence motion was ordered to be suspended. On 8.6.1990 an interim order was passed in the writ petition No. 15963/90 filed earlier, on following terms: “After having considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that until further orders of the Court, in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed against the petitioner, the same shall not be given effect to. However, it is ordered that the petitioner may continue to function as Chairman in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed but he shall not sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000/-.” 4. On a bare perusal of the order it was clearly stated that the appellant may continue to function as Chairman in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed but he shall not sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000/-. 5. 1,000/-.” 4. On a bare perusal of the order it was clearly stated that the appellant may continue to function as Chairman in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed but he shall not sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000/-. 5. This order remained operative till 18.7.1990 when on application filed by the appellant that the stay order has been rendered infructuous and the same may be vacated. The Court passed the order dismissing the stay petition as infructuous and vacated the stay order. Between the dates 9.6.1990 and 17.7.1990 when the aforementioned order directing the appellant not to sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000/- remained operative the appellant signed/countersigned several cheques each for sums more than one thousand for the total amount of more than 34 lakhs. 6. Stating the facts above, an application was filed in the High Court for initiating a proceeding for civil contempt against the appellant alleging that he had wilfully and deliberately challenged the order passed by the court on 8.6.1990 in CMWP No. 15963/90. 7. The appellant in his reply has taken the stand, inter-alia, that he was misguided by legal advice given to him and that in view of the blanket stay order obtained in the other Writ Petition No. 15962/90, it was open to him not only function as the Chairman of the Board but also to sign cheques for sums more than 1,000/-. It was the plea of the appellant that being guided by such legal advice, he had signed/countersigned cheques as aforementioned. He also raised the contention that since the conditional order of stay passed on 8.6.1990 had become infructuous in view of the fresh cause of action arising after the no-confidence motion was passed in the meeting held on 4.6.1990, the order was non-obstante in the eye of law and, therefore, he could not be held guilty of contempt for the conduct alleged. 8. The High Court, on a detailed discussion of the facts and circumstances placed on record and the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, held that the plea taken by him that under bona fide and genuine impression that the interim order dated 8.6.1990 had become infructuous he had signed the cheques was not acceptable. 8. The High Court, on a detailed discussion of the facts and circumstances placed on record and the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, held that the plea taken by him that under bona fide and genuine impression that the interim order dated 8.6.1990 had become infructuous he had signed the cheques was not acceptable. For the simple reason that even after coming to know of the order he had not taken steps for withdrawal of the writ petition or even for vacating the interim order till 18 July, 1990; the High Court also observed that the plea of bona fide impression on the part of the contemnor was not even stated in his reply to the show cause notice. The High Court also dealt with the further contention raised on behalf of the appellant that by signing/countersigning the cheques he had not signed the amount stated therein but had only approved the sanction order passed by the Executive Officer of the court. The High Court also rejected and, in our view, very correctly the said contention. It is relevant to state here that in a proceeding when an order is passed by the court where the question of compliance or non-compliance of the same arises not merely the letter of the order but also its spirit is to be understood and the plea of bona-fide or genuine belief taken on the part of the contemnor is to be adjudicated on that basis. 9. Thus, the High Court having rejected the contentions raised on behalf of the contemnor did not feel persuaded to accept the unconditional apology tendered by him as an alternative in the show cause notice. 10. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, we are not satisfied that on the fact situation of the case the judgment/order passed by the High Court calls for any interference by this court. We have no hesitation to hold that the High Court was right in recording the finding that the appellant was guilty of wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order passed on 8.6.1990. 11. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.