RAJENDRA MENON, J. ( 1 ) BY this common order all the three petitions are being decided. As the question of law involved are common and facts are also similar. The basic question that requires determination in all the three petitions are as to whether the respondent Corporation is justified in terminating the services of the petitioners without conducting any Departmental enquiry and by invoking the special procedure contemplated for terminating the services of an employee under Regulation 41 of the madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation employees (Conduct Discipline and appeal) Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations ). By invoking the special procedure as contained in Regulation 41, services of the petitioners in all the three cases have been terminated without conducting any enquiry and without following the normal procedure contemplated for taking disciplinary action under Regulation 36 of 40. ( 2 ) THE brief facts which are necessary for disposal of the aforesaid petitions are, one laxman Singh, a retired employee of the Corporation filed W. P. No. 1305/2000 inter-alia contending that he has retired from service, the Corporation has not paid or settled his post retiral benefits. By order dated 16-2-2001, the aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by this court vide Annexure P-3 and the respondent corporation was directed to pay the entire retiral dues of the said Laxman Singh in six instalments within a period of six months along with interest @ 15% p. a. ( 3 ) WHEN the benefits in pursuance to the aforesaid order Annexure P-3 were not paid, the said Laxman Singh filed petition for taking action against the Managing Director, Chairman and chief Works Manager of the Corporation for the Contempt of the Court. Notices were issued and vide order dated 22-3-2002, passed in Contempt Petition No. 6/02, annexure P-12, the Court observed that inspite of show cause notice, no reply has been filed by the Contemnor. It was therefore held that the Contemnor have committed Contempt of court. They were convicted for disobeying the orders of the court and were sentenced to one month Simple Irnprisionment and fine of Rs. 100/- each. The aforesaid order has been challenged in Contempt Appeal M. A. (Contempt)226/02. The appeal has been admitted and vide order Annexure P-14, the operation of the order of conviction dated 22-3-2002 passed by the learned Single Judge has been stayed. 100/- each. The aforesaid order has been challenged in Contempt Appeal M. A. (Contempt)226/02. The appeal has been admitted and vide order Annexure P-14, the operation of the order of conviction dated 22-3-2002 passed by the learned Single Judge has been stayed. ( 4 ) AFTER the order of conviction was passed in the Contempt Petition show cause notices were issued to all the three petitioners asking them to show cause as to why their services should not be terminated as it was found on preliminary enquiry that the petitioners have failed to discharge their duties properly, they were not deligent in performing their duties as a result of which the Managing Director and the Chairman have been convicted by the Court. In the notice they were asked to show cause as to why action be not taken for terminating their services under Regulation 41 (8 ). The petitioners submitted their reply and by the impugned orders dated 15-4-2002 in all the cases the Competent authority by exercising powers under Section 41 (4) and 41 (8)of the Regulation, orders of dismissal from their services without enquiry has been issued against the petitioners. The orders impugned in the present petition are the aforesaid orders of dismissal from services. ( 5 ) AS far as W. P. No. 712/02 is concerned, the petitioner in that case is Divisional manager in the Divisional Office of the Corporation at Gwalior. In his case show cause notice Annexure P-1 dated 6-4-2002 was issued. He submitted reply to the same on 10-4-2002 vide Annexure P-25. In reply to show cause notice it is submitted by him that copy of the preliminary enquiry report on the basis of which the show cause notice was issued has not been supplied. That apart, it was contended that he has not committed any dereliction in duty. He is not responsible for not filing reply in the Contempt Petition. He has taken steps to intimate the competent authorities about the pendency of the contempt cases and requested for taking action for complying with the court's order. In fact a reply explaining the position has been filed which runs to more than 8 pages and specific averments have been made explaining his position. He has taken steps to intimate the competent authorities about the pendency of the contempt cases and requested for taking action for complying with the court's order. In fact a reply explaining the position has been filed which runs to more than 8 pages and specific averments have been made explaining his position. However, inspite of the aforesaid the order of punishment was passed vide Annexure R-l dated 15-4-2002 and in para 4 of the said order it has been held that on perusing the reply filed by the petitioner and on consideration of the order passed by this Court in the contempt petition vide annexure P-l2, it is clear that the petitioner has not taken action for filing the reply in time and in view of the order of the High Court it is not found reasonable practicable to hold an enquiry into the matter and therefore invoking powers under Regulation 41 (4) and 41 (8)services have been terminated. Similarly in W. P. No. 714 also the petitioner who is working as chief Legal Officer in the Gwalior Division have been proceeded against in his case also, identical show cause notice Annexure P-l dated 6-4-2002 has been issued. He submitted his reply vide Annexure P-8 on 9th April 2002 refuting the allegations made out in the show cause notice and also narrated the action taken by him for intimating the authorities concerned with regard to the order passed in W. P. No. 1305/2000, action taken by him for settlement of the pensionary dues and subsequent action taken by him after receipt of notice for contempt of Court. In all, the petitioner in the present case also has explained his stand and it is his case that he is not responsible for delay in payment or filing reply. However, in his case also vide order dated 15-4-2002 annexure R-l by holding that in view of the order passed by this Court in the Contempt petition and in view of the admitted fact it is not reasonably practicable nor is it necessary to conduct enquiry and therefore services have been dispensed with by the impugned order annexure R-l dated 15-4-2002. ( 6 ) THE petitioner in W. P. No. 713/02 was working as the Incharge Chief Works Manager at Central Workshop, Gwalior and it is his case that he was one of the Contemnor in the Contempt proceedings and he has also been punished along with the Chariman and the Managing Director. However in his case also, the show cause notice Annexure P-l dated 6-4-2002 indicates that he has been held responsible for not taking action and therefore identical show cause notice proposing to dismiss him from service under Regulation 41 (8) was issued. The petitioner in this case also submitted a detailed reply vide Annexure P-12 dated 10-4-2002 and contended that he is not responsible for committing any default or disobeying the order passed by this Court in W. P. No. 1305/2000. That apart, it has been contended by him that requisite amount were not made available for the purpose of disbursement of salary and pensionary benefits to retired employees. However, in this" case also by exercising powers under Regulation 41, services have been terminated vide order Annexure R-1 dated 15-4-2002 on the ground that no enquiry is necessary. ( 7 ) AS indicated hereinabove except W. P. No. 713/02, in the other two cases the facts are identical and therefore W. P. No. 712/02 and 714/q2 are considered separately before dealing with the petitions in W. P. No. 713/02. ( 8 ) AS far as the petitions W. P. No. 712/02 and 714/02 are concerned, Shri R. ,k. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W. P. No. 712/02 submitted that order impugned is unsustainable as exercise of powers under Regulation 41 was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is submitted by him that no reasons have been recorded for dispensing with the departmental enquiry and whatever reason is indicated in the impugned order Annexure R-l dated 15-4-2002 the same is unsustainable and on those reasons action under Regulation 41 cannot be taken. That apart, Shri Gupta, during the course of hearing referring to various documents brought on record, namely the report of the preliminary enquiry and the finding recorded threin, the reply to the show cause and the correspondence between the parties, emphasised that in fact the petitioners are not guilty of misconduct. That apart, Shri Gupta, during the course of hearing referring to various documents brought on record, namely the report of the preliminary enquiry and the finding recorded threin, the reply to the show cause and the correspondence between the parties, emphasised that in fact the petitioners are not guilty of misconduct. The financial position of the Corporation was such that they were unable to discharge the liability towards the employees. Shri Gupta also referred to various documents and correspondence to demonstrate that the petitioners have not committed any dereliction of duty, misconduct or their action is in no way detrimental to the interest of the Corporation. It is argued by him that on merits also the petitioners cannot be held responsible for the allegations levelled against them. By referring to various documents Shri gupta tried to demonstrate that the circumstances are such that the petitioners cannot be held responsible. In all it is submitted by shri Gupta that the action taken against the petitioners are unsustainable. Shri N. K. Mody learned counsel appearing along with Shri R. K. Gupta in W. P. No. 714/02 also argued in the same line and by referring to various documents which are brought on record, it is emphasised by him that action in the present case is unsustainable. In the case of the petitioner in w. P. No. 714/02 it is argued by Shri Mody that the petitioner in that case took over as chief Legal Advisor on 21-9-2001 whereas the order in the writ petition was passed on 16-2-2001 and he is not responsible for committing any misconduct. It is submitted by Shri mody that the petitioner has been arbitrarily dealt with. ( 9 ) SHRI R. K. Gupta and Shri N. K. Mody learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both these cases relying upon various judgments emphasised that in the facts and circumstances of the case, action of the respondents are not only unreasonable, unjust and contrary to the provisions of law but arbitrary and illegal, power under Regulation 41 has been exercised which is unsustainable. Reliance is placed on the following judgments by the learned counsel in support of their contentions. Union of India and another v. Tulsiram patel, Ex. Constable Chhote Lal v. Union of India and others, Rauindra Ishwardas sethna and another v. Official Liquidator, high Court, Bombay and another. Reliance is placed on the following judgments by the learned counsel in support of their contentions. Union of India and another v. Tulsiram patel, Ex. Constable Chhote Lal v. Union of India and others, Rauindra Ishwardas sethna and another v. Official Liquidator, high Court, Bombay and another. Major singh v. State of Punjab and others, Mool chandra Agrawal v. Jiwaji University. ( 10 ) THE aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are refuted by Shri A. K: Shrivastava learned counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation. As a preliminary objection it is submitted by Shri shrivastava that under the Regulations an Appeal is provided for against such an order, vide regulation 43 and the present petition filed without exhausting the remedy of appeal is not sustainable. It is submitted by him that the petitioners ought to have resorted to the remedy available to them by filing an appeal. It is submitted by him that the appeal lies to the Board and the petition without filing an appeal is unsustainable. In support of the aforesaid contention he places reliance on a judgment in the case of State of Goa and others v. Leukoptast (India) Ltd. It is further argued by him that keeping in view that facts and circumstances, the interest of the Corporation and the manner in which the petitioners have acted action was rightly taken under the provisions of regulation 41 (4) and 41 (8) in the interest of the Corporation. It is emphasised by him that the petitioners are trying to place the facts in a twisted manner, it was within the knowledge of the petitioners that Contempt petition has been filed. They had received the vakalatnama and other papers on behalf of chairman and Managing Director on 1-3-2002 and inspite of the fact that they were directed to make payment. They have failed to discharge their duties properly and because of their carelessness in due discharge of their duties. The corporation had to suffer and responsible Officer of the Corporation have been convicted by this Court. In all it is submitted that the action taken against the petitioners are fully jutified. They have failed to discharge their duties properly and because of their carelessness in due discharge of their duties. The corporation had to suffer and responsible Officer of the Corporation have been convicted by this Court. In all it is submitted that the action taken against the petitioners are fully jutified. ( 11 ) AS far as the petitioner in W. P. No. 713/02 is concerned, as already indicated hereinabove, Shri N. K. Mody learned counsel appearing for the petitioner apart from the common ground taken, has submitted that in this case the petitioner himself being a contemnor, the allegation that he had not taken action for filing reply cannot be sustained. When the petitioner himself is party to the contempt, it cannot be said that he has not taken action for filing the reply. That apart, it is submitted by Shri Mody that action against the petitioner in the present case is not taken because of his conviction but action has been taken under Regulation 41 (8) on the ground that the petitioner has not taken action for implementing the order of the High Court and in view of the order passed by this Court in the Contempt Petition, it is not reasonable or practicable to hold enquiry and there is no evidence which can be offered by the petitioner. In this case Shri R. D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Corporation submitted that in fact action against the petitioner in this case has been taken under Sub-clause 6 of regulation 41 and Clause 8 of Regulation 41 had been wrongly mentioned in the impugned order. It is argued by him that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is obvious evidence of misconduct as far as the petitioneris concerned and therefore no enquiry is necessary. That apart, it is submitted by him that by merely mentioning wrong provision, the order of dismissal will not become illegal. It is argued by him that the High Court having held the petitioner guilty in the contempt proceedings question of the negligence on his part does not require any further evidence or enquiry and he cannot argue that he has not been negligent because he has been punished by the Contempt Court. That being so, thre is obvious evidence of misconduct on his part. That being so, thre is obvious evidence of misconduct on his part. Placing reliance on a judgment of the supreme Court reported in the case of The vice Chancellor, Jammu University and another v. Dushinant Kumar Rampal, it is argued by the learned Sr. counsel that mentioning of wrong provision will not make any difference. That apart, it is argued by him that no further opportunity is necessary as far as the petitioner in this case is concerned as this court has found him guilty of the charges levelled and placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of R. Thiruuirkolam v. Presiding Officer and another and Aligarh muslim University and others v. Mansoorali khan it is argued by the learned Sr. Counsel that termination in this case is fully justified and non-compliance with the provisions of natural justice will have no effect and bearing in the present case as no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. That apart, it is submitted by him that exercise of powers having been done reasonably in the facts and circumstances no case warranting interference is made out. ( 12 ) 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the record. The question that reuires determination in all the three cases are as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case exercise of powers under Regulation 41 is justified. If not, was it necessary on the part of the corporation to conduct Departmental Enquiry as per the normal procedure contemplated under Regulations 36 to 40. The question requiring determination of this Court is with regard to justification of the corporation in invoking special procedure contemplated under regulation 41 in the light of the facts and the law laid down in this regard. ( 13 ) HOWEVER, before adverting to the aforesaid question, it would be appropriate to deal with the preliminary objection raised by shri A. K. Shrivastava learned counsel appearing for the respondents with regard to the availability of alternative remedy of filing an appeal. Even though the provision for appeal is provided for under Regulation 43, the question is can the present petitions be dismissed only on the ground of availability of alternative remedy when the petitioners have raised question of jurisdiction with regard to exercise of powers under Regulation 41. Even though the provision for appeal is provided for under Regulation 43, the question is can the present petitions be dismissed only on the ground of availability of alternative remedy when the petitioners have raised question of jurisdiction with regard to exercise of powers under Regulation 41. Normally when efficacious alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved person, this Court would refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Exercise of writ jurisdiction is discriminatory in nature but in cases where the impugned action lacks complete jurisdiction or when the impugned action is in total disregard to and in violation of the principles of natural justice, exception have been carved out and only on the ground of existence of alternative remedy, petitions have not been dismissed. There are series of judgments wherein it has been held that existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. In cases where the authorities have acted wholly or without jurisdiction and when the basic principles of law have been violated, High Courts should not refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Non entertaining of a writ petition because of failure to avail the alternative remedy is not a statutory requirement but is a matter of self imposed restriction by way of prudence and propriety. In fact this is a self imposed restriction based on a rule of policy and discipline rather than rule or law. Whenever the impugned action is found to be without jurisdiction and in gross violation of basic principles of law, petitions have been entertained and power under Article 226 have been exercised. That apart, if it is felt that recourse of the alternative remedy would be an empty formality this court can always exercise jurisdiction. ( 14 ) EVEN though there are series of judgments on this point. I may refer to a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Life insurance Corporation of India v. Ramji kewat and others. In the aforesaid case after considering the question of availability of alternative remedy it has been held by the learned single Judge that in the following four cases petitions can be entertained and existence of alternative remedy is not a bar. In the aforesaid case after considering the question of availability of alternative remedy it has been held by the learned single Judge that in the following four cases petitions can be entertained and existence of alternative remedy is not a bar. The cases have been classified as (1) order passed without jurisdiction or (2) order violative of principles of natural justice (3) order where vires of rules are under challenge or (4) order where fundamental rules are infringed. The learned Judge in the aforesaid case in para 19 has observed as under:-"frdm the aforesaid enunciations of law it becomes crystal clear that there is no bar for entertaining a writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India where an alternative remedy has not been taken resort to. It is a self imposed restraint and restriction by the Court itself. While exercising such power under the Constitution the Court is required to keep in view certain factors. As has been noticed when an order is passed without jurisdiciton or when principles of natural justice are violated, or when the vires of an act is challenged, where enforcement of any of the fundamental right is sought or where a pure question of law arises or where a strong case has been made out, the Court may exercise the discretion. It is to be further noted here the Apex court has also observed that the grounds are not exhaustive. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down. It will depend upon the facts of each case. " ( 15 ) IN the present case aprart from the fact that the question of exercise of jurisdiciton in exercise of principles of natural justice are involved, Shri R. K. Gupta and Shri Mody learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that relegating the petitioners to exhaust the remedy of appeal would be an empty formality because the allegations against the petitioners are that they did not take action for protecting the interest of the Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation in the pending Contempt case. The appeal will go to the board, it will be presided by the Chairman and managing Director who has passed the impugned order and take action will be a member of the Board. In view of this, it is submitted by them that appeal in these facts will not be an efficacious remdey. The appeal will go to the board, it will be presided by the Chairman and managing Director who has passed the impugned order and take action will be a member of the Board. In view of this, it is submitted by them that appeal in these facts will not be an efficacious remdey. Even though remedy of appeal is available in view of the fact that question raised in this petition is with regard to the jurisdiciton to be exercised by the corporation under Regulation 41 and the fact that the Chairman and the Managing Director are collectively interested in the lis and in the light of the observations made by this Court in the case of L. /. C. (supra), and the legal position which has been referred to hereinabove, I am not inclined to relegate the petitioner to resort to the remedy of appeal. It is the considered view of this Court that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, no useful purpose will be served by dismissing the petition on this ground. The question involved being those of jurisdiciton and violation of the principles of natural justice, this Court can very will decide the same on the basis of the settled legal principles and the admitted facts. No enquiry into the disputed question of facts are involved. That apart, as the allegation against the petitioners are with regard to inaction and negligence in defending the interest of the chariman and the Managing Director of the corporation, the Appellate Forum being presided by the said Chariman and the Managing director being a member of the Appellate board, interest of justice requires that the matter be assessed independently. In view of this and the discussions made hereinabove, I am of the considered view that preliminary objection raised by Shri A. K. Shrivastava does not have any force and is accordingly rejected. ( 16 ) THE question that requires determination now is as to whether exercise of powers under Regulation 41 was justified or not. For the sake of convenience Regulation 45 is reproduced herein under:-"41. Special procedure in certain cases. ( 16 ) THE question that requires determination now is as to whether exercise of powers under Regulation 41 was justified or not. For the sake of convenience Regulation 45 is reproduced herein under:-"41. Special procedure in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in regulation 36 to 40- (i) where the employees charged is temporary employees or a probationary; (ii) where the employees admits the articles of charges; (iii) where any penality is sought to be imposed on any employee on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (iv) where the competent authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in these regualations; or (v) where the misconduct amounts to minor lapse and/or delinquencies. and the penalties proposed to be awarded are and/or A. Reprimand and/or B. Fine not exceeding Rs. 5/-and/or C. Recovery from pay of the whose or part of the pecuniary loss coused to the Corporation not exceeding Rs. 50/- (vi) where there is obvious evidence of misconduct. (vii) where the employee is caught red handed in the act of committing any misconduct. (viii) where the competent authority is satisfied that in the interest of the corporation it is not expedient to hold the enquiry in accordance with these rules; the competent authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. " ( 17 ) A perusal of the aforesaid regualtion makes it clear that it is a special procedure which has to be followed in certain cases only. The normal procedure is contained in regulation 36 to 40, according to which for taking action, charge-sheet has to be issued, opportunity of hearing by way of Departmental enquiry is provided and it is only after a finding of guilty is recorded in the departmental enquiry that punishment is imposed. However, in certain cases, special procedure under regulation 41 can be resorted to. However, in certain cases, special procedure under regulation 41 can be resorted to. A persual of the order impugned as far as W. P. No. 712 and 714 are concerned indicates that action has been taken under Regulation 41 (4) and 41 (8), under Sub-clause 4 the competent authority has to record reasons based on his satisfaction in writing as to why it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in the Regulation whereas under sub-clause 8 the Competent authority has to be satisfied that in the interest of Corporation it is not expedient to hold enquiry in accordance with these regulations. In both these petitions in para 4 of the impugned order annexure R-1 dated 15-4-2002 it has been recorded by the Competent authority that in the order passed by this Court in the Contempt petition it has been held that reply has not been filed, no time was sought for filing the reply and amount directed to be paid has not been paid within the time stipulated in the order. In that view of the matter, it is held by the competent authority that no enquiry is reasonably practicable or necessary after such a finding and the peitioners have not given any justification in their reply to the show cause notice with regard to the aforesaid averments. That apart it has been held that in the circumstances of the case, no enquiry is necessary. It is on these reasons that power under Regulation 41 has been exercised in the case of both these petitioners, i. e. Shri K. S. Shrivastava in w. P. No. 712/02 and Shri K. R. Pawar in w. P. No. 714/02. The question is can it be said that the reasons given in para 4 of the impugned order is in confirmity with the requirement of Clause 4 and 8 of Regulation 41. Only allegation against the petitioners are that they did not take action for making payment within the time stipulated by this Court, they did not file reply in the Contempt Petiton and they did not take time to file the reply. A perusal of the show cause notice indicates that action was taken on the basis of some enquiry conducted and the finding recorded threin. A perusal of the show cause notice indicates that action was taken on the basis of some enquiry conducted and the finding recorded threin. The report has been filed as Annexure R-4 and a perusal of the aforesaidreport indicates that it has been held in para 5 thereof that it has to be taken as a admitted fact that the financial condition of the Corporation is very poor as such is unable to make payment of penal dues of the employees. The report refers to various orders passed by the High Court for making payment and the incapacity of the Corporation to discharge these liabilities because of financial constraint. The petitioners in their reply have categorically stated that they have informed the competent authorities from time to time with regard to making payment of the amount, action to be taken for filing the reply and other details. A persual of the reply filed by both these petitioners indicate that they have categorically stated that they are not responsible for making the payment, funds have not been made available, that apart it is their case that they have informed the competent authorities from time to time for taking action in the Contempt proceedings. As the petitioners have seriously disputed the allegations levelled against them, it was necessary for the Corporation to conduct a proper enquiry into the matter and fix the responsibility. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that it has been passed without considering the reply submitted by the petitioners only on the ground that in the light of the order passed by the High Court no enquiry is necessary. The provisions of Regulation 41 is a Special Procedure and for exercising powers under these regualtions special and extraordinary circumstances should be in existence because of which it is not reasonable and practicable to hold enquiry or it is inexpedient to hold enquiry in the interest of the corporation. Prima facie it seems that the competent authority while exercising powers has not considered this aspect of the matter. It is the fundamental right of an employee to have adequate opportunity of hearing before action is taken for dismissing him from service. Dismissing an employee from service has the effect of depriving him of his livelihood as gauranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is the fundamental right of an employee to have adequate opportunity of hearing before action is taken for dismissing him from service. Dismissing an employee from service has the effect of depriving him of his livelihood as gauranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. That being so, before an employee is deprived of his livelihood, employer has to be very cautious in taking action and principles of natural justice should be followed, opportunity of hearing should be accorded and when regulations having the force of law governed the terms and conditions of service and when such regulation contemplates and particular procedure to be followed for taking action, action has to be taken in accordance with these regulations. Deviation from normal procedure contemplated under the regulation and resorting to the Special Procedure as contemplated under Regulation 41 can be resorted to in exceptional cases. ( 18 ) WHEN powers for taking action is vested in an authority and such powers includes power to act without giving opportunity of hearing, the intention of the rule making authority while granting such powers would have been that the power would be exercised legtimately, sparingly in cases where situation would have occasioned in resorting tothe special procedure. Regulation 41 is so designed that it excludes the principles of natural justice by way of an exception and therefore it cannot be used as a general rule. For exercising this extraordinary rule, situation should be such which demands exclusion of the rule of natural justice because of various factors like non availability of witnesses or impracticability to hold enquiry. The original rules which regulate all procedure contemplates that the person likely to be affected by the action must be accorded opportunity as per the regulation before taking the action. However, a departure from this fundamental rule of natural justice as provided in Regulation 36 to 40 should be resorted to only in circumstances which is extraordinary and warranted. Such circumstances must be shown to exist and when action is impugned, the burden is upon those who have exercised the power to confirm its existence. This is the principles which will have to be examined in the present case. The only reason given for resorting to the extraordinary procedure is the finding of the High Court and no enquiry is necessary. In fact noextraordinary circumstances has been indicated in the impugned order. This is the principles which will have to be examined in the present case. The only reason given for resorting to the extraordinary procedure is the finding of the High Court and no enquiry is necessary. In fact noextraordinary circumstances has been indicated in the impugned order. That apart, the reply to the show cause submitted by the petitioners indicate that they were not responsible for the delay in making the payment or non-filing of the reply in the contempt proceedings. It is not known as to on what basis from th6 orders of the high Court it can be assessed that the allegations are proved. Considering the nature of allegations made and the reply filed by the petitioners, can it be concluded that the same are proved on the basis of findings recorded in the orders passed by this court in the petition of Shri Laxman Singh and the contempt proceedings. In fact the reasons given for exercising powers under Regulation 41 as contained in para 4 of the impugned order is totally extraneous, irrelevant and unsustainable and based on material which are not at all relevant for resorting to the Special Procedure under Clause 4 and Clause 8 of Regulation 41. The aforesaid view taken by this Court is confirmed if the action is judged in the light of law as held by various courts including the supreme Court in the cases referred to by Shri r. K. Gupta and Shri N. K. Mody. The leading cases from Tulsiram (supra) to all other cases indicate that resort to the extraordinary procedure has to be done in extraordinary cases. Even though learned counsel's have referred to various judgments on this point but it would be relevant to reproduce the observations of the Supreme Court made in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, where the Supreme Court in para 5 has observed as under :-"the decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot be rested solely-on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the instant case it was alleged that the delinquent Police Officer instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It was also alleged that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental enquiry was held against him. No particulars were given. It was not shown on what material the concerned authority came to the conclusion that the delinquent had thrown threats. The satisfaction of the concerned authority was found to be based on the ground that the delinquent was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dissatisfaction towards his superiors. It was not shown that the concerned authority had verified the correctness of the information leading to the said allegation. Therefore, it could not be said that the subjective satisfaction of concerned authority as to dispensation of departmental enquiry against the delinquent was fortified by independent material. Thus, the order of dismissal passed against the delinquent would not be sustainable. ( 19 ) SIMILARLY, in the case of Chief Security Officer and others v. Smgasan Rabi das, the Supreme Court has observed in para 5 as under :-"in our view it is not necessary to go into the submissions made by Dr. Anand prakash because we find that in this case the reaons given for dispensing with the enquiry is totally irrelevant and totally insufficient in law. It is common ground that under Rules 44 to 46 of the said rules normal procedure for removal is that before any order for removal from service can be passed the employee concerned must be given notice and an enquiry must be held on charges supplied to the employees concerned. In the present case the only reason given for dispensing with that enquiry was that it was considered not feasible or desirable to procure witnessess of the security/other Railway employees since this will expose these witnesses and make them ineffective in the future. In the present case the only reason given for dispensing with that enquiry was that it was considered not feasible or desirable to procure witnessess of the security/other Railway employees since this will expose these witnesses and make them ineffective in the future. It was stated further that if these witnesses were aked to appear at a confronted enquiry they were likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults and even their familymembers might become targets of acts of violences. In our view these reasons are totally insufficient in law. We fail to understand how if these witnesses appeared at a confronted enquiry, they are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults. These are normal witnesses and they could not be said to be placed in any delicate or special position in which asking them to appear at a confronted enquiry would render them subject to any danger to which witnessess are not normally subjected and hence these grounds constitute no justification for dispensing with the enquiry. There is total absence of sufficient material or good grounds for dispensing with the enquiry. In this view it is not necessary for us. to consider whether any fresh opportunity was required to be given before imposing an order of punishment. " ( 20 ) CONSIDERED in the light of the aforesaid well settled legal principles I have no doubt in my mind that in the facts and circumstances of the present case recourse to the Special procedure provided under Regulation 41 is not warranted. ( 21 ) IT may be relevant to mention that the provisions of Regulation 41 is akin to the provisions of Article 31 l (2) (c) of the Constitution and it is well settled principle of law that when the order passed under these provisions are assailed in a court of law. the court can always examine the circumstances and if it finds that the satisfaction for dispensing with the enquiry is arrived at on extraneous or irrelevant circumstances the action can be quashed as the same is vitiated. As already indicated hereinabove, the reasons given in para 4 of the impugned order Annexure R-1 when examined in the light of the allegations made in the show cause notice and the reply submitted by the petitioners, it would be clear that the satisfaction arrived at for dispensing with the enquiry is wholly unsustainable. As already indicated hereinabove, the reasons given in para 4 of the impugned order Annexure R-1 when examined in the light of the allegations made in the show cause notice and the reply submitted by the petitioners, it would be clear that the satisfaction arrived at for dispensing with the enquiry is wholly unsustainable. In fact while assessing the requirement of dispensing with the enquiry, the competent authority has taken into consideration extraneous material and irrelevant consideration, there, was no circumstances existing which warranted exercise of extraordinary power when the matter requires detailed enquiry. In the light of the reply and justification given by the petitioners, merely rejecting the same on the ground that enquiry is not necessary, only because orders have been passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. In my opinion, reasons given in para 4 are not proper and the competent authorities have acted arbitrarily without application of mind in doing so. In fact present is a case where proper departmental enquiry should have been held and after considering the averments made by the respondents and giving them opportunity of hearing a finding has to be recorded. Holding the petitioners guilty of the allegations punishing them merely on the ground that orders have been passed by the High Court is clearly unsustainable and the competent authority in doing so has acted in a very casual manner and has not followed the basic principles of law. That being so, as far as impugned orders in W. P. No. 712/02 and W. P. No. 714/02 are considered, it cannot be sustained and it is to be held that invoking the Special procedure contemplated under Regulation 41 was not warranted in these two cases. ( 22 ) AS far as W. P. No. 713/02 is considered, the petitioner in that case has been pun-ished in the contempt proceedings. That being so, it has been argued by Shri R. D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel that his case is covered under Sub-clause 6 of Regulation 41. Sub-clause 6 contemplates that enquiry can be dispensed with only if there is obvious evidence of misconduct. Even though the orders impugned referes to the action being taken, under Sub-clause 4 and Sub-clause 8. The arguments of Shri Jain can be considered and the matter canbe examined in the light of all provisions as referred to. hereinabove. Sub-clause 6 contemplates that enquiry can be dispensed with only if there is obvious evidence of misconduct. Even though the orders impugned referes to the action being taken, under Sub-clause 4 and Sub-clause 8. The arguments of Shri Jain can be considered and the matter canbe examined in the light of all provisions as referred to. hereinabove. The petitioner in this case has not being punished because of his conviction in the contempt case. The show cause notice issued to him and the punishment imposed in this case is that he is being punished for non-filing reply in the contempt proceedings, in taking time in filing the reply and not complying with the order of payment made by the High Court. The reasons given in para 4 in this case also is exactly similar to the one given in the earlier two petitions, i. e. W. P. No. 712 and 714 of 2002. However, merely because the petitioner in the present petition has also been convicted in the contempt proceedings, I do not see any difference between the earlier cases and this case. In this case also, it is to be held that the reasons given for dispensing with the enquiry is extraneous and unsustainable. It cannot be said the obvious evidence is available on record with regard to the misconduct committed by the petitioner. If the allegation made in the show cause notice are considered in the light of the reply submitted by the petitioner, it would be seen that the petitioner has disputed the allegation levelled against him and has given various reasons and explanations justifying his stand. Until and unless the aforesaid reasons are held to be incorrect or false, it cannot be said that the evidence are available to hold him guilty. The evidence would be available only if he is punished on the basis of the finding recorded by the High Court. In his case he is not being punished because of his conviction by the High Court. The evidence would be available only if he is punished on the basis of the finding recorded by the High Court. In his case he is not being punished because of his conviction by the High Court. As far as the other two orders of the High Court are concerned with regard to delay in making the payment of pensionary amount and non-filing of reply and not asking for time to file reply in the contempt proceedings are concerned, the petitioner himself was a party in the contempt procedure and the order indicates that reply was not filed and no application for extension of time to comply with the orders of the Court were made. From the orders of the High Court, it cannot be said that obvious evidence are available to held the petitioner guilty of the allegations levelled against him in the show cause notice. The reasons for dispensing with the enquiry in the present case is also unsustainable in view of the discussions made by me in the preceding paragraphs. ( 23 ) DURING the course of hearing, Shri r. D. Jain, Learned Senior Counsel placing reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor All Khan (supra) contended that omission to follow the principles of natural justice has not caused any prejudice and the matter can be decided by this court on the basis of admitted facts as available on record. I am unable to accept the aforesaid argument. The law laid down in the case with regard to the prejudice will not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case where on admitted facts the allegations can be considered and decided. For the purpose of assessment as to whether the petitioners are guilty of the allegations levelled against them, they have to be given opportunity of hearing. It cannot be said that denial of opportunity has not resulted in any prejudice to them. For the purpose of assessment as to whether the petitioners are guilty of the allegations levelled against them, they have to be given opportunity of hearing. It cannot be said that denial of opportunity has not resulted in any prejudice to them. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the principle laid down in the case of Aligarh Muslim University will not apply because various factors require determination such as (1) are the petitioners responsible for complying with the orders passed by this court for making payment of retiral benefits to the employee Laxman Singh, (2)whether it was within the powers of the petitioners to disburse the amount, (3) whether the funds were made available for the purpose of making payment, (4) what action was taken for complying with the orders within 6 months for making payment, (5) whether the petitioners were negligent'in discharging their duties, was any action taken by the petitioners or any action was required to be taken by them, were the authorities deligent enough to comply with the orders or was it only Because of the negligence of the petitioners that orders could not be complied with. All these questions can be answered only if proper enquiry is conducted. Without conducting properenquiry and without recording a finding on all the questions referred to hereinabove, no action can be taken against the petitioners. That being so, it is not correct to say that no prejudice is caused to the petitioners because of dispensing with the departmental enquiry. As answers to the aforesaid questions cannot be determined on the basis of the material available on record and as the same has to be ascertained by holding an enquiry and giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, to put up their defence to show that they are not responsible for making delay in payment or disbursing the amount or non-filing of reply. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that the present is not a case where enquiry can be dispensed with and the matter can be decided by this court on the admitted facts. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that the present is not a case where enquiry can be dispensed with and the matter can be decided by this court on the admitted facts. ( 24 ) CONSIDERING the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, question of law as discussed hereinabove and keeping in view the requirement of principles of natural justice and the fact that punishment of dismissal from service have been imposed on the petitioners without conducting Departmental Enquiry, I am of the considered view that the present was not a case where exercise of powers under regulation 41 was warranted. On the contrary, present is a case where the normal procedure contemplated under Regulation 36 and 40 should have been resorted to, action could be taken only after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. That being so, the orders of punishment imposed on the petitioners vide annexure R-l dated 15-4-2002, all the three orders are unsustainable and accordingly, they are quashed. ( 25 ) WHILE concluding Shri R. D. Jain, learned Senior Counsel has argued that relief of payment of back wages should not be ordered in the facts and circumstances of the present case and for this purpose he has relied on the following judgments :-state of Haryana and another v. Jagdish chander, State of Orissa and others v. Dinabandhu Beheta and others and State bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Ajay Kumar gulati. However Shri N. K. Mody. learned counsel appearing for the petitioner employee submitted that these judgments are not applicable because these were the cases where allegations of fraud misappropriation were involved and the matters were pending in various courts for long periods. According to Shri Mody, in the present case impugned orders were passed only four months back, relief of back wages should be granted. ( 26 ) I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel in this regard. Question of grant of back wages has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. Cases referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation are clearly distinguishable on facts as well as on the legal question involved and will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Question of grant of back wages has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. Cases referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation are clearly distinguishable on facts as well as on the legal question involved and will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the case in hand this court having held the impugned orders to be wholly without jurisdiction and unsustainable, the consequential benefits are liable to be made. ( 27 ) IN view of the discussions and finding recorded hereinabove, the action of the respondents in passing the impugned orders cannot be sustained as dismissal from service without enquiry was not proper. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The orders impugned annexure R-1 dated 15-4-2002 passed in the cases of the petitions are hereby quashed and the petitioners are directed to be reinstated with consequential benefits. The petitions are accordingly allowed. Cost on parties. Petitions allowed. .