JUDGMENT S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. 1. The appellant-Abhay Kumar Sinha, an employee of Allahabad Bank, was proceeded departmentally and on the basis of enquiry report, he was dismissed from service on 20th January, 1990. The appeal preferred by him was also rejected on 14th September, 1990. The learned single Judge having not interferred with the order of dismissal and appeal and having merely allowed the appellant to prefer a review application, vide judgment dated 31st January, 1997 in CWJC No. 690 of 1995 (R), the present appeal has been preferred. 2. The manner in which the appellant was proceeded departmentally by Allahabad Bank and was punished will speak in itself the legality and propriety of the proceeding and punishment imposed on him. The appellant was an employee of the United Industrial Bank Ltd., a private Bank which merged with the Allahabad Bank, w.e.f. 31st October, 1989. The proceeding seems to have been initiated while the appellant was in the United Industrial Bank Ltd. After merger, on 18th December, 1989, the disciplinary authority decided to hold enquiry himself. The next day, i.e. on 19th December, 1989, he decided and appointed one R.D. Upadhaya as Enquiry Officer. On 21st December, 1989, notice was issued to appellant to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 27th December, 1989. The disciplinary authority having no knowledge where the appellant was posted, issued three notices on 21st December, 1989; one to his defence lawyer at Calcutta; the second to the appellant with address at Nagpur and the third to the appellant showing address at Hazaribagh. Nothing on the record to suggest service of any of the notice on the appellant. The enquiry held for three days, i.e. on 27th, 28th and 29th December, 1989, enquiry report submitted on the 4th day and the appellant was punished on 20th January, 1990. Everything completed within a week to ten days. 3. The counsel for the Allahabad Bank submitted that the aforesaid facts or violation of any rule or rules of natural justice should not be taken into account in this appeal as the appellant is not permitted to raise those issues, being barred by the principle of res judicata. It was submitted that violation of any and every procedural provision cannot automatically vitiate the enquiry or the order unless it occasions prejudice to the delinquent. It was submitted that violation of any and every procedural provision cannot automatically vitiate the enquiry or the order unless it occasions prejudice to the delinquent. Reliance, in this regard, was placed on Patna High Court decision in Arvind Kumar Ranjan v. Nalanda Gramin Bank, reported in 2001 (1) BBCJ 355 . Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, reported in AIR 1996 SC 1669 . In that case, the Supreme Court held that in a case of procedural provision which is not a mandatory character, the complain of violation has to be examined in case it prejudiced to the delinquent employee. The learned counsel also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Managing Director, E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakar, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1074 , to suggest that there was no necessity to furnish the copy of enquiry report to the charged employee, the order of punishment having issued prior to cut-off date, i.e. prior to the decision of Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramjan Khans case, reported in AIR 1991 SC 471 . 4. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that the appellant initially challenged the order of dismissal in CWJC No. 792 of 1992 (R), which was disposed of by learned single Judge on 15th February, 1993. The punishment order was held illegal, the copy of enquiry report having not furnished. Against the said order dated 15th February, 1993, the Allahabad Bank filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 7/93 (R), which was disposed of on 5th August, 1994. The first part of order of learned single Judge in CWJC No. 792/92 (R) regarding non-supply of copy of enquiry report was set aside by the appellate Court, vide order dated 5th August, 1994 in the light of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 , wherein it was held that the decision of Mohd. Ramjans case will apply prospectively and not retrospectively. The second ground as held by the learned single Judge in CWJC No. 792/92 (R) was upheld in LPA No. 7/93 (R) to the extent that the appellate authority ought to have given hearing to the petitioner-appellant in the departmental appeal and as such, the matter was referred back to the appellate authority for further hearing. The second ground as held by the learned single Judge in CWJC No. 792/92 (R) was upheld in LPA No. 7/93 (R) to the extent that the appellate authority ought to have given hearing to the petitioner-appellant in the departmental appeal and as such, the matter was referred back to the appellate authority for further hearing. The appellate authority having again rejected the appeal, vide order dated 19th March, 1994, the second writ petition, CWJC No. 890/95 (R) was preferred by the appellant. In view of order passed in earlier writ petition and letters patent appeal, the counsel for the Allahabad Bank raised the question of res judicata and referred the decision of Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Prasad v. Smt. Deorajin Devi, AIR 1960 SC 941 , and the decisions of Patna High Court in Dinbandhu Ghosh v. Taswar Hus-sain, reported in 1977 BBCJ 253, and Prabhu Halwai v. Phoolchand, reported in AIR 1969 Pat 16 . 5. It is a settled law that the principle of res judicata applies between two stages in the same litigation to the extent that a Court whether the trial Court or a higher Court having in earlier stage decided a matter in one way or the other, in such case, it is not open to the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the proceeding. The departmental proceeding was concluded hurriedly in violation of the rules framed by Allahabad Bank, namely, "Allahabad Bank Officer Employees" (Conduct) Regulations and Discipline & Appeal Regulations, 1976, was the stand taken by the appellant in his appeal and in the writ petition. This issue was not decided by the learned single Judge in CWJC No. 792/94 (R), disposed of on 15th February, 1993. The learned single Judge merely held that the copy of the enquiry report was not supplied and the appellant was not given hearing in appeal. The LPA No. 7/93 (R) was preferred by the Allahabad Bank and the Division Bench, vide its order dated 5th August, 1994 while set aside the first part of the order of the learned single Judge relating to supply of the copy of the enquiry report, upheld the other part that the appellate authority ought to have given hearing to the appellant in the departmental appeal and remitted the matter to the appellate authority. Thus, it would be evident that the issue, in question, was neither decided by the learned single Judge, nor by the Division Bench, rather it was kept open for decision by the appellate authority where the appellant-raised the issue. In this background, the submission of counsel for the Bank that the issue raised is barred by principle of res judicata is rejected. 6. For determination of issue raised by the appellant in departmental appeal and as argued by the counsel for the appellant is (a) whether the appellant was given proper opportunity in the departmental enquiry, the Discipline and Appeal Regulations of Allahabad Bank was follows or not; and (b) whether the punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of charge levelled. 7. For determination of aforesaid issue, this Court called for the original record for perusal, which was produced by the Allahabad Bank. The following fact emerges from the pleading and original record. 2nd December, 1985 ; The appellant was charge-sheeted by the erstwhile United Industrial Bank Ltd. 10th January, 1986 : The appellant submitted show cause reply. 20th November, 1987 : One Shantanu Ghosh was appointed as Enquiry Officer by the erstwhile Bank, According to the appellant, he was punished with stoppage of increment, but there is nothing on the record to suggest it related to the proceeding aforesaid, as held by the learned single Judge. 31st October, 1989 : United Industrial Bank Ltd. amalgamated with the Allahabad Bank. Service of the appellant was taken over in the Allahabad Bank. 8th December, 1989 : Allahabad Bank notified the Officers designated as disciplinary authority/appellate authority/reviewing authority for Officer Employees of erstwhile United Industrial Bank Ltd. (See original record). 18th December, 1989 : One B.N. Sharma, Assistant General Manager and Disciplinary Authority, Allahabad Bank ordered that he will hence forth act as the disciplinary authority in the matter of charge-sheet dated 9th December, 1985 issued against the appellant. (See original record). 19th December, 1989 : Mr. B.N. Sharma, A.G.M. and Disciplinary Authority, Allahabad Bank appointed one Shri R.D. Upadhaya, as Enquiry Officer. Shri P.K. Roy Choudhury was appointed as Presenting Officer. (See original record). 21st December, 1989 : Mr. (See original record). 19th December, 1989 : Mr. B.N. Sharma, A.G.M. and Disciplinary Authority, Allahabad Bank appointed one Shri R.D. Upadhaya, as Enquiry Officer. Shri P.K. Roy Choudhury was appointed as Presenting Officer. (See original record). 21st December, 1989 : Mr. R.D. Upadhaya, Enquiry Officer issued three notices; one to the appellant, c/o an Advocate, defence counsel at Calcutta, second in the name of the appellant with address at Nagpur and the third in the name of the appellant with address of Hazari-bagh, fixing 27th December, 1989 as the date of enquiry. 27th December, 1989 : Appellant could come to know that the date of enquiry was fixed at Calcutta on the same date. (See appeal petition). 28th December, 1989 : The appellant appeared before the Enquiry Officer and informed that the notice was served on his defence counsel and proceeding took place on 27th December, 1989, behind his back. (See appeal petition). 29th December, 1989 : Disciplinary proceeding continued. 30th December, 1989 : Disciplinary proceeding concluded. (See enquiry report). 2nd January, 1990 : Presenting Officer submitted his written brief. 4th January, 1990 : Appellant submitted his written brief. 8th January, 1990 : The Enquiry Officer submitted his report. 22nd January, 1990 : The appellant dismissed from service. 8. From the facts aforesaid, it is evident that the Enquiry Officer had no knowledge as to where the appellant was posted, i.e. at Nagpur or Hazaribagh. As such, three notices were issued; one care of the defence counsel at Calcutta and the other two to the appellant at Nagpur and Hazaribagh. There is nothing on the record to suggest that any of the notices were served. Admittedly, an ex parte enquiry commenced on 27th December, 1989 behind the back of the appellant and hurriedly closed on 30th December, 1989, i.e. within four days. 9. The appellant after his absorption was being governed by the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations and Discipline & Appeal Regulations, 1976 and the procedure for imposing major penalty stipulated under Regulation 6 thereof. After take over of the service of the appellant in the Bank, the disciplinary authority started from the stage of Sub-regulation (6) to Regulation 6 by appointing Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer, but many of the sub-regulations to Regulation 6 were not followed. After take over of the service of the appellant in the Bank, the disciplinary authority started from the stage of Sub-regulation (6) to Regulation 6 by appointing Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer, but many of the sub-regulations to Regulation 6 were not followed. For example, under Sub-regulation (9) of Regulation 6, if an Officer employee does not plead guilty, the inquiring authority shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding 30 days or within such extended time as may be granted by the inquiring authority, whereinafter, as per Sub-regulation 10(b) of Regulation 6, the inquiring authority is required to record an order that the Officer employee may for the purpose of preparing his defence inspect within five days or within such further time not exceeding five days the documents listed. In the aforesaid manner, if the procedure laid down under Regulation 6 is followed, after appointment of Enquiry Officer, from the first date of enquiry, to follow the" procedure, it cannot be concluded prior to 15 to 30 days from the first date fixed by the Enquiry Officer. 10. The aforesaid issue was raised by the appellant in his appeal that he was not given proper hearing, the date of enquiry was not informed and it was hurriedly closed, but the appellate authority failed to decide the issue nor the Bank is in a position to explain as to why the enquiry was hurriedly concluded. 11. The charge against the appellant was that he allowed unauthorised, clean over drawings in 15 Current Accounts; excess over drawings in five Current Accounts, more than the credit limit than the power as was vested on him. Similar were the other charges. The appellant took defence that in the interest of business of Bank and on the direction of the higher authority, he did so. He further took plea that the amounts were deposited by the parties and thus there was no loss of Banks exchequer. 12. In view of aforesaid stand, not disputed by the Bank that there was no loss of Banks exchequer, the appellant has also raised the question relating to quantum of punishment, vis-a-vis charges. This has also drawn the attention of the learned single Judge who by impugned judgment dated 31st January, 1997 held that the issue in respect of award of punishment should be reconsidered. 13. This has also drawn the attention of the learned single Judge who by impugned judgment dated 31st January, 1997 held that the issue in respect of award of punishment should be reconsidered. 13. In the circumstances, as, according to me, the departmental enquiry was conducted hurriedly in violation of Statutory Regulation of 1976, at least one day (27th December, 1989) behind the back of the appellant, the enquiry having vitiated, the punishment order based on such report, is fit to be set aside. 14. Accordingly, I set aside the order of dismissal dated 22nd January, 1990 with liberty to Bank to hold further enquiry giving proper opportunity to the appellant. The appellant stands reinstated. 15. So far as arrears of salary is concerned, there being no intentional laches on the part of the respondents, I allow 25% of the arrears, however, the intervening period will be counted for all other practical purposes. 16. The judgment passed by the learned single Judge is thus set aside. The appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order, as to costs. Lakshman Uraon, J. 17. I agree.