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2002 DIGILAW 87 (CHH)

HARBANS SINGH TUTEJA v. VINOD NIRMALKAR

2002-09-16

FAKHRUDDIN

body2002
ORDER 1. The applicant preferred a claim w1der section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act on the ground that while he was returning from Raipur on his own vehicle Kinetic Honda No. M.P. 26 I.B. 3221, non applicant/respondent no. 1 who was driving Kinetic Safari No. M.P. 26-K C 2266 dashed him as a result of which the applicant suffered injuries. He was admitted in Govt. District Hospital from 30-12-1999 to 24-12-2000 where his left leg was operated and as per the Annexure A-4, the Doctor opined that the permanent disability of the present applicant is 40%. Thereafter, because of complication the applicant was again admitted in another private hospital where his left leg was re-operated and was again constrained to remain there from 16-5-2001 to 28-5-2001. The Police registered an offence punishable under sections 279 and 338 IPC against respondent no. 1. Thereafter, charge sheet was filed. Respondent no. 1 owned his responsibility and pleaded guilty and the court imposed a fine of Rs. 1,400/- on him, in default of payment of fine, he is to undergo additional R.I. for 40 days. 2. During the accident, respondent no. 1 had also sustained injuries and he preferred counter-claim. The present applicant filed Claim alongwith the documents and also filed application u/s 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act. This was opposed and respondent no. 1 filed an application (I.A. No.4) praying that no fault liability should not be granted and the award of compensation be deferred. Respondent no. 1 also filed application stating that in the same accident, he had also sustained certain injuries and filed claim which was registered as Claim Case No. 41/2001. So far as the claim of the present applicant is concerned he filed copies of the charge sheet, FIR, Dehati Nalishi, injury report and certified copies of impugned order and other documents regarding the criminal case pending in the court of JMFC. On the basis of the said documents, it is manifestly clear that respondent no. 1 was charged for the offence and it is therefore not disputed that the accident had occurred out of the use of vehicle by respondent no. 1. Respondent no. 1 himself had owned his responsibility and admitted to his guilt. On the basis of the said documents, it is manifestly clear that respondent no. 1 was charged for the offence and it is therefore not disputed that the accident had occurred out of the use of vehicle by respondent no. 1. Respondent no. 1 himself had owned his responsibility and admitted to his guilt. So far as the case against the present applicant is concerned, a criminal case has been registered as 257/2002, but the present applicant has not admitted to his guilt and the said case is still pending. 3. By the impugned order the Tribunal instead of granting no fault liability, deferred the healing to determine as to who is at fault without considering the documents filed by the applicant is support of his claim. This approach of the learned Tribunal is totally wrong. The no fault liability is the benevolent provision for which the Legislature has made certain enactments. So far as the no fault liability is concerned, new Act came into force w.e.f. 14-11-1994 and 'by way of amendment the liability of compensation has been raised to Rs. 50,000/- in case of fatal accident and Rs. 25,000/- for permanent injury. Thus, it is very clear that the object underlying the enactment of Section 140 of the Act as amended in 1994 is to make available to the claimants compensation amount to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 25,000/- in case of permanent disablement, as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudicating the claim under section 166 of the Act. 4. It is pertinent to note that the State of M.P. has framed rules which are known as M.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994. Chapter IX relates to the Claims Tribunal. Rule 226, 227 and 228 contained in Chapter IX are relevant and quoted hereinbelow : 226. Obtaining of information and documents necessary for awarding compensation under section 40 - The Claims Tribunal shall obtain whatever information and documents which may be found necessary from the police, medical and other authorities and proceed to award the claim whether the parties who were given notice, appear or not, on the appointed date. Rule 227 deals with Judgment and award of compensation under section 140 which reads as under: 227. Rule 227 deals with Judgment and award of compensation under section 140 which reads as under: 227. Judgment and award of compensation under section 140(1) The claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim of compensation U/S 140 on the basis of- (a) Application and Statement of the parties; (b) Accident information Report in Form 54 of the Central Rules or Certificate regarding ownership and insurance particulars of the vehicle involved in the accident, obtained from the Registering Authority. (c) First Information Report; (d) Post Mortem Report or Death Certificate or Injury Report in Form M.P.M.V.E 76 (Comp. B) by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim. (e) Any other information or documents obtained by the Tribunal under rule 226. (2) The claims Tribunal in passing orders shall make an award of compensation in respect of the death or permanent disablement to be paid by the insure or owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, within a period of thirty days. (3) The Claims Tribunal shall as far as possible, dispose of the application for compensation within forty five days from the date of receipt of such application. Section 228 prescribed the procedure of disbursement of compensation under section 140 which reads as under: 228. Procedure of disbursement of compensation under section 140 Legal heirs in case of death - Where the Claims Tribunal feels that the disbursement of actual amount due to the claimant is likely to take time because of the identification and the fixation of legal heirs of the deceased, the Claims Tribunal may call for the amount of compensation awarded, to be deposited with the claims Tribunal and then proceed with the identification of the legal heirs for deciding the payment of compensation to each of the legal heir. A reading of rules 226, 227 and 228 go to show that 140 proceedings are the proceedings which have to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible within 45 days from the date of receipt of application. While passing the orders the claims Tribunal is obliged to make an award of compensation regarding death or permanent disablement to be paid by the insurer or the insured/owner of the vehicle within one month.. The object underlying the said provision is to enable expeditious disposal of the claim u/s 140. While passing the orders the claims Tribunal is obliged to make an award of compensation regarding death or permanent disablement to be paid by the insurer or the insured/owner of the vehicle within one month.. The object underlying the said provision is to enable expeditious disposal of the claim u/s 140. The said object would be deviated if the claim u/s 140 is deferred till decision of the fault or otherwise. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant in support of his contention placed reliance on a judgment of Supreme Court reported in case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil and another Vs. Vatschala Uttam More where the Apex Court while • interpreting the scope of Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 939 (corresponding to Section 140 of the Act) quoted with approval the law enunciated by it in an earlier decision in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, observed in paras 11 and 12 as under :- 11. ***** It is thus seen that to a limited extent relief has been granted U/S 92A of the Act to the legal representatives of the victims' who have died on account of motor vehicles accidents. Now they can claim Rs. 15,000/ - without proof of any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified. 12. It is thus evident that Section 92A in the nature o/beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising of the use of motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation approach of the Courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. The same approach has been adopted by this Court while construing the provisions of the Act. (See Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation approach of the Courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. The same approach has been adopted by this Court while construing the provisions of the Act. (See Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Judavji Keshavji Modi and Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kokilabe11 Chandravadan4)". (Emphasis supplied) In Shivaji Davanu Patil (supra) the Supreme Court has enunciated the principle of law that no fault provision, as is propounded in section 92-A of the Act of 1939, corresponding to section 140 of the Act, is in the nature as of a measure of social justice a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious statutory payment of fixed amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. The underlying object ofthe provision would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under section 110A of the Act of 1939 corresponding section 166 of the Act, but before ordering compensation under this provision the Tribunal has to satisfy itself that the requirements of section are satisfied. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance on a decision in case of Shamina Begum and others Vs. Rajendra Waghmare and another where the High Court of Madhya Pradesh while dealing with section 140 of the Act held in para 7 that for awarding compensation under section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to satisfy itself where an accident has arisen out of the use of motor vehicle. It has been further held that: "The documents referred to in the relevant Motor Vehicles Rules enable the Tribunal to ascertain the necessary facts in regard to these matters. For example the 'Panchnama' and the first information report will sh9w whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle in question. The post-mortem report or the injury report will show the cause of death and the nature of the injuries. For example the 'Panchnama' and the first information report will sh9w whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle in question. The post-mortem report or the injury report will show the cause of death and the nature of the injuries. In case the Tribunal feels any doubt about the correctness or genuineness of any of these documents or if it considers it necessary to obtain further information or documents the relevant Motor Vehicle Rules empower the Tribunal to obtain such further information or documents from the Police, medical or other authorities, as the case may be. This would enable the Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under section 140 of the Act." 7. Learned counsel for the applicant further placed reliance on a decision Saurabh Kumar Shukla Vs. Hukum Chand and others where the division bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that if the Court is prima-facie satisfied on the material produced by the claimant that the fracture has resulted in any permanent disablement, certainly the compensation U/S 140 of the Act will be granted. But from prima facie satisfaction if simple fracture does not show any permanent disability as defined in section 142 of the Act the claimant would not be entitled to the relief. In such a case he would be entitled to relief on proving the disability at the final adjudication. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the claims Tribunal is obliged to note that the provisions contained in section 140 of the Act are benevolent provisions and in the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the Court is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat the purpose. Claims Tribunals are presided by the higher judicial service holders holding the rank of Additional District Judge to the Court of District Judge and they should consider the matter in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter IX which relates to the claims Tribunal. Here in the present case, the Court below, in fact, found in its impugned order that although the applicant has produced documents regarding permanent disability but the liability cannot be fixed until the evidence is recorded as such deferred the hearing for determining the question as to who is at fault. Here in the present case, the Court below, in fact, found in its impugned order that although the applicant has produced documents regarding permanent disability but the liability cannot be fixed until the evidence is recorded as such deferred the hearing for determining the question as to who is at fault. This approach of the court below is wholly illegal as it has acted against the provisions of law and committed grave error. It rather defeated the very purpose of benevolent provision. The applicant has filed medical certificate (Annexure A-4) regarding his injury which has resulted in permanent disability and has also filed other documents in support of his claim as required under section 140 of the Act and in such a case the question as to who is at fault has not to be adjudicated. It is not required at the stage of grant or refusal of no fault liability. In the instant case, the Tribunal itself has noted and recorded a finding of permanent disability and further that the same has arisen out of use of motor vehicle. In such circumstances, the tribunal ought to have awarded the interim compensation of Rs. 25,000/-. 9. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the impugned order is set aside. The appellant is entitled for grant of no fault liability. The amount be paid within 30 days from today; failing which it will carry interest @ Rs. 9% per annum. 10. The appeal is allowed with costs of Rs. 1,000/- payable within 15 days. 11. Registry shall forward a copy of this order to the Claims Tribunal through the District Judges for drawing the attention of the claims tribunal to the provisions of section 140 of Motor Vehicle Act and the rules 226, 227 and 228 contained in Chapter IX which are the matters of claims tribunal as quoted in the foregoing paragraphs. Appeal Allowed.