ANJANI KUMAR, J, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. ( 2 ) THE petitioner claims to have been appointed by the letter of appointment dated february 13, 1987 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) as Nalkoop Operator at Tube-well No. 165 in the district of Mainpuri, ( 3 ) A perusal of the letter of appointment clearly demonstrates that the appointment of the petitioner is purely provisional and temporary with a further rider that it can be terminated at any time without any notice. The letter of appointment further says that in any case, the term of appointment will not be extended beyond three years. It is on the strength of this letter of appointment the petitioner was functioning as Tube-well operator. ( 4 ) BY the order dated November 25, 1991 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition), the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground that Tube-well No. 165 on which the petitioner was employed has since been abandoned and is no more functioning. Therefore, the petitioners services were not required. The termination order also says that the petitioner is being given notice for one month, according to his term of appointment, and thereafter his services will automatically come to an end. This order was also communicated to the petitioner by the Ziledar of the area concerned. ( 5 ) IT is these orders which are challenged by the petitioner firstly on the ground that the services of the petitioner have not been terminated in accordance with law, inasmuch as the termination of the services of the petitioner is arbitrary and discriminatory and while terminating the services of the petitioner, the principle of last come and first go has not been complied with. It has also been submitted that many other tube-wells in the same district are still functioning and instead of terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondents should accommodate the petitioner in one of those tube-wells. It has also been submitted that many other tube-wells in the same district are still functioning and instead of terminating the services of the petitioner, the respondents should accommodate the petitioner in one of those tube-wells. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner had relied upon a decision of the learned single judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 26466 of 1992 decided on July 8, 1994 wherein the learned single Judge has held as under: "even if these wells do not exist in the village of the petitioner he could not have been denied his posting on the vacant post on the failure of the Tube-well No. 106. The tube-well Nos, 106, 136, 57 or 59 are all there in one group. " ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied upon this very decision for the ground as stated above. It has not been asserted that the tube-well, which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, are operative and situated in the same area nor the number thereof has been given in the writ petition. It has also not been stated as to whether any of the aforesaid Tube-wells is functioning without any tube-well Operator. In the absence of these materials, in my opinion, the decision relied. upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable because that depends upon the facts of that case. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon three other judgments of the learned single Judge of this Court passed in writ Petition No. 35425 of 1995, decided on may 15, 1998, Writ Petition No. 3051 of 1996, decided on May 6, 1997 and Writ Petition No. 9044 of 1996 decided on May 30, 1997, wherein the judgment referred above has been relied upon. A perusal of those judgments demonstrate that the facts as that of the present case were not in existence or this is not clear from the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the termination of the services of the petitioner in terms of the letter of appointment (Annexure-I to the writ petition)cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. ( 9 ) NO other point has been raised or argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the termination of the services of the petitioner in terms of the letter of appointment (Annexure-I to the writ petition)cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. ( 9 ) NO other point has been raised or argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 10 ) THIS writ petition is, therefore, devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated december 10, 1991 stands vacated. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. . .