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2002 DIGILAW 879 (JHR)

Surendra Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar

2002-08-14

HARI SHANKAR PRASAD, M.Y.EQBAL

body2002
Judgment M. Y. Eqbal, J.- This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.11.1998 passed in CWJC No. 2303 of 1997 (R), whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay. The judgment reads as under : "Heard. The petitioner retired as Sr. District Prosecutor in the year 1986. He has filed the present application making following claims "(i) to give necessary fitment in the time scale of pay for the period 1.4.81 to 8.5.1985 by taking into consideration the actual pay of the petitioner till 31.3.1984 vis-a-vis the revised pay payable on promotion to junior selection grade in the time scale of Rs. 1350-501700-50-2000; (ii) likewise to give necessary fitment of the time scale of pay for the period 9.5.1985 to 1.11.1986 by taking into consideration the actual pay which the petitioner would have been entitled on the implementation (i) hereof vis-avis the revised pay scale 1575-50-177575-2300 on his promotion to senior selection grade w.e.f. 9.5.1985; (iii) to make necessary correction in the date 31.12.1985 in Annexure-3 (with 12) to read 1 .11.1986, the date when the petitioner had superannuated;" (iv) to give all retirement benefits to the petitioner payable to all those persons who retired after 1.1.1986;" This Court is meant for those who are vigilant and not for those who are lazy, sleepy and indolent. The petitioner having retired in 1986 should have approached this Court within reasonable time for the prayer made in the writ application. The long delay in approaching this Court is itself a ground to refuse the relief to the petitioner and accordingly, on this ground alone I am not inclined to exercise my discretion in favour of the petitioner. This application is dismissed accordingly: 2. The petitioner in the writ petition pleaded inter alia that in December, 1971 he was promoted from the cadre of Assistant District Prosecutor to the Cadre of District Prosecutor and in 1977 he was given promotion to the next higher cadre of Senior District Prosecutor and while serving as such he superannuated from services of Senior District Prosecutor on 1.11.86. It was contended that while in service his promotion became due to be promoted to Junior Selection Grade District Prosecutor as well as Senior Selection Grade District Prosecutor, the next two higher cadres of the Bihar Prosecution of the Home (Police) Department, Govt. It was contended that while in service his promotion became due to be promoted to Junior Selection Grade District Prosecutor as well as Senior Selection Grade District Prosecutor, the next two higher cadres of the Bihar Prosecution of the Home (Police) Department, Govt. of Bihar. It appears that after four years from his retirement, the Police Department, Govt. of Bihar issued Notification dated 10.9.1990 giving promotion to the petitioner to next higher cadre with retrospective effect i.e. from 1.4.1981 to 31.12.1986. Petitioner thereafter claimed necessary fitment in the time scale of pay and for payment of revised pay. Petitioner accordingly submitted representation in 1991 before the respondents which was followed by successive representations till 1995. It is therefore, clear that the petitioner/ appellant became entitled to revised pay scale after necessary fitment in the time scale of pay only after the notification issued by the respondents in 1990 and 1991. If the petitioner filed successive representations till 1995 and when his representations were not considered by the respondents then certainly he has right to approach the Court by filing writ petition. Moreover, the writ petition was filed on 12.11.98 and on the first date when the writ petition was listed for admission, the impugned judgment was passed without knowing the stand of the respondents as to whether the petitioner had persuaded his claim till 1995 or not. In our opinion therefore learned Single Judge was not correct in holding that although petitioner retired in 1986, he approached this Court after inordinate delay. It is well settled that High Court may refuse to exercise extra ordinary power where the petitioner is guilty of laches or undue delay, for which there is no satisfactory explanation. The reasonableness of delay in filing writ petition is to be assessed by the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, if it is found that delay has been sufficiently explained and it is not fatal then the High Court should not refuse to exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and also remit the matter back to the learned Single Judge for hearing and for disposal of the writ petition in accordance with law. H.S. Prasad, J.-I agree.