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2002 DIGILAW 88 (GUJ)

DESAIBHAI SOMABHAI v. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER

2002-02-01

AKSHAY H.MEHTA, J.N.BHATT

body2002
J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) RULE. Service of rule is waived by Mr. A. D. Oza for the respondents. The applicants have approached this Court seeking clarification of the judgment rendered in group of aforesaid First Appeals, dated 22/7/1997 by this Court [coram : J. N. Bhatt and H. R. Shelat, JJ. ]. The applicants have prayed that this Court may clarify that all the claimants in the aforesaid First Appeals are entitled to receive and the opponents are liable to pay to them the amount of solatium u/s. 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short the Act) on the enhanced amount of market value which has been fixed at the rate of Rs. 53. 00 per sq. mtr. and further that the claimants are also entitled to receive the statutory benefits available to them by virtue of operation of Section 23 (1-A) of the Act. ( 2 ) SOME relevant facts which are absolutely essential for deciding this application can be stated in brief as follows :-2. 1. THE applicants are the original owners of different agricultural lands situated at village Limbadiya and Karai in Taluka and Dist. Gandhinagar. Necessity to acquire these lands for the purpose of constructing main canal of Narmada Project was felt and hence proposal for the same moved from opponent no. 1 i. e. The Executive Engineer, Narmada Project, Main Canal Divn. , Ahmedabad with a request to the Special Land Acquisition Officer to initiate proceedings for acquisition of the said lands under the Land Acquisition Act. The proposal came to be accepted and the Special Land Acquisition Officer issued necessary notifications which were published in the Gazette on different dates, i. e. For lands situated at village Limbadiya, notification u/s. 4 (1) of the Act was issued on 11/12/1985 and it was again issued after due modifications on 13/1/1987. Notification u/s. 6 published in Government Gazette on 29/1/1987 and the modified notification was issued on 3/2/1987. Whereas for the lands situated at village Karai the notification u/s. 4 (1) was published on 3/12/1985 and the modified notification was issued on 12/11/1986. Notification u/s. 6 was issued on 3/12/1986. The Land Acquisition Officer after completion of necessary formalities under the Act, made an offer of Rs. 2=00 to Rs. 3=50 per sq. mtr. for different parcels of land covered under the aforesaid notifications against the demand of Rs. 100. Notification u/s. 6 was issued on 3/12/1986. The Land Acquisition Officer after completion of necessary formalities under the Act, made an offer of Rs. 2=00 to Rs. 3=50 per sq. mtr. for different parcels of land covered under the aforesaid notifications against the demand of Rs. 100. 00 per sq. mtr. by the applicants and subsequently he passed awards u/s. 11 of the Act dated 2/12/1989, 2/2/1989 and 9/2/1989. 2. 2. SINCE the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer fell hopelessly short of the amount demanded by the applicants, they made necessary request to the Collector to make reference u/s. 18 of the Act for claiming total amount of Rs. 100. 00 per sq. mtr. for their lands. Pursuant to the said request, References came to be made in the Court of 3rd Joint District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Mirzapur. The References came to be filed in different groups. The first group comprised Land Acquisition Case No. 500 of 1991 and its 10 allied matters. The second group comprised Land Acquisition Case No. 506 of 1991 and its allied matters and the third group comprised Land Acquisition Case No. 250 of 1991 and its allied matters. The Reference Court after considering the evidence led before it and the contentions raised by the rival parties, came to the conclusion that the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer ranging between Rs. 2=00 to Rs. 3=50 per sq. mtr. for the land acquired was not adequate and in the opinion of the Reference Court the correct market price of the lands under acquisition was Rs. 70. 00 per sq. mtr. inall. The Reference Court, therefore, enhanced the compensation upto Rs. 70/inclusive of the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and directed the opponents to pay to the applicants compensation accordingly. Over and above that, the Reference Court also directed the opponents to pay to the applicants solatium at the rate of 30% and running interest at the rate of 9% p. a. for the period of one year from the date of taking over possession of the acquired lands and thereafter at the rate of 15% p. a. till the entire amount was fully paid. 2. 3. THE opponents having been dissatisfied with the award passed by the Reference Court, approached this Court by filing aforesaid groups of First Appeals u/s. 54 of the Act. 2. 3. THE opponents having been dissatisfied with the award passed by the Reference Court, approached this Court by filing aforesaid groups of First Appeals u/s. 54 of the Act. All the aforesaid appeals came to be decided by this Court [coram : J. N. Bhatt and H. R. Shelat, JJ. ] vide common judgment dated 22/07/1997. This Court having gone through the entire record of the case and having appreciated the evidence on record afresh and after considering the rival contentions came to the conclusion that the market value of the land in question determined by the Reference Court was on a higher side and in the opinion of this Court the correct market price ought to be Rs. 57. 00 per sq. mtr. and hence this Court modified the awards passed by the Reference Court reducing the total market price of the lands in question from Rs. 70. 00 per sq. mtr. to Rs. 57. 00 per sq. mtr. This Court, therefore, directed that amount of Rs. 70/per sq. mtr. as market rate under Sec. 23 (1) of the Act awarded to the claimants would stand modified by and substituted with an amount of Rs. 57. 00 per sq. mtr. only towards the market price u/s. 23 (1) inall, as total compensation to the claimants for their acquired lands. While modifying the award this Court, also, observed that the claimants would not be entitled to the amount of an interest on solatium and solatium on additional amount and rest of the benefits available u/s. 23 (1-A) of the Act would be available to them. Thus, vide aforesaid common judgment of this Court, the appeals of opponents came to be partly allowed and the awards under consideration came to be modified to the aforesaid extent. 2. 4. THE opponents on being aggrieved by the judgment of this Court, approached the Honble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 1928-1972 of 1998 seeking leave to file appeals. The Apex Court vide order dated 1 3/02/1998 granted leave and disposed of the Civil Appeals Nos. 923-967 of 1998 of the opponents redetermining and modifying the market value upon the concession made by the learned counsel for the present applicants who were the respondents of the appeals before the Apex Court and reducing it to Rs. 53/per sq. mtr. The Apex Court allowed the rest of the judgments to stand. 923-967 of 1998 of the opponents redetermining and modifying the market value upon the concession made by the learned counsel for the present applicants who were the respondents of the appeals before the Apex Court and reducing it to Rs. 53/per sq. mtr. The Apex Court allowed the rest of the judgments to stand. 2. 5. THE applicants thereafter approached this Court by filing a note for speaking to minutes on 27th February, 1998 on the ground that the opponents had interpreted the judgment of this Court to say that the applicants were not entitled to receive solatium and other statutory benefits on the enhanced amount of compensation and the applicants came to know about this only when the opponents deposited the amount in the Reference Court after the order was passed by the Apex Court dated 13/02/1998. Vide said note for speaking to minutes, the applicants by specifically quoting para. 8 of the judgment of this Court dated 22nd July, 1997 required this Court to clarify that the applicants were entitled u/s. 23 (2) of the Act to receive solatium on the enhanced amount of the market value, together with other statutory benefits as envisaged u/s. 23 (1-A) of the Act. This Court [coram : J. N. Bhatt and H. R. Shelat, JJ. ], however, by order dated 14/07/1998 dismissed the note for speaking to minutes filed by the applicants on the ground that the judgment of this Court had merged with the judgment of the Apex Court and while holding so, this Court placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Shri N. B. Trust v. Swami Prakashnand (1997) 6 S. C. C. at page 78. 2. 6. The applicants challenged the said decision of this Court by filing Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 1695-1739 of 1999 and also submitted to the Apex Court Review Petition Nos. 227-272 of 1999 in Civil Appeal Nos. 923-967 of 1998 alongwith the applications for condonation of delay. 2. 6. The applicants challenged the said decision of this Court by filing Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 1695-1739 of 1999 and also submitted to the Apex Court Review Petition Nos. 227-272 of 1999 in Civil Appeal Nos. 923-967 of 1998 alongwith the applications for condonation of delay. The Apex Court vide order dated 24/07/1999 disposed of the Review Petitions as well as Special Leave Petitions observing that in the order of 1 3/02/1998 the Apex Court had merely changed only the figure of market value which was arrived at by the High Court and the rest of the judgment of the High Court was affirmed by it and, therefore, there was no clarification required by the Apex Court. However, the Apex Court also observed that it would be open for the petitioners to approach the High Court, if they so desired. ( 3 ) IN view of the aforesaid observation made by the Apex Court i. e. "it would be open for the petitioners to approach the High Court, if they so desire," this Misc. Civil Application has come to be filed before this Court seeking clarification of the judgment of this Court dated 22/07/1997. In the Review Application the applicants have contended that under the statute the applicants are required to have the solatium and other statutory benefits by virtue of provisions of section 23 and 23 (1-A) of the Act and the same cannot be denied to them by the Court. With regard to the observations made by this Court, particularly in para. 8 of its judgment, the applicants have contended that it was merely a slip of pen and the Court could not have really intended to deny the benefits which were otherwise available to the applicants under the Act. Upon issuance of Rule, the otherside has appeared and has contested the application vehemently. ( 4 ) AT the hearing Mr. A. J. Patel, learned counsel for the applicants has contended before us that by virtue of the aforesaid observation made by the Honble Supreme Court while disposing of their S. L. Ps. Upon issuance of Rule, the otherside has appeared and has contested the application vehemently. ( 4 ) AT the hearing Mr. A. J. Patel, learned counsel for the applicants has contended before us that by virtue of the aforesaid observation made by the Honble Supreme Court while disposing of their S. L. Ps. and Review Petitions it has granted permission to the applicants to approach this Court for seeking necessary clarification of the judgment dated 2 2/07/1997 and hence this Review Application can be entertained on its merits by this Court and this Court is not precluded from doing so despite the earlier orders made by this Court as well as Honble Supreme Court. Mr. Patel has further contended that when the Supreme Court has made such observation, it has not been made for the sake of making it only, but it certainly carries some meaning and it has some definite purpose. According to him, the observation has been made to enable the applicants to approach this Court to seek certain clarification on the directions given by this Court in its judgment dated 2 2/07/1997. He has further contended that so far the observation made by this Court in para. 8 of the aforesaid judgment is concerned, it is merely a slip of pen and this Court would not have really meant to deprive the applicants of their statutory rights to have solatium on increased amount of the market value of the lands in question and all other statutory benefits made available to them by virtue of provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of the Act. In other words, according to him, this Court would not have meant to deny the rights available to the applicants u/s. 23 (2) and 23 (1-A) of the Act. He has further contended that when there are two views possible of the judgment or order passed by the Court, one which advances the cause of the justice should be accepted. According to Mr. Patel, the Court should not go by technicalities to deny a citizen his lawful statutory right and it should see that proper justice is made. He has further contended that when there are two views possible of the judgment or order passed by the Court, one which advances the cause of the justice should be accepted. According to Mr. Patel, the Court should not go by technicalities to deny a citizen his lawful statutory right and it should see that proper justice is made. He has also contended that the State Government should not try to take disadvantage of an unintentionally employed words total while determining market price made by the Court while rendering the judgment and should not deprive the applicants of the amount to which they are legally entitled to have under the Act, especially when their lands have already been acquired and they have become landless long back. 4. 1. AS against that, Mr. A. D. Oza, Ld. Government Pleader, has contended that the judgment of this Court dated 22/07/1997 makes it very clear that this Court never intended to award solatium to the applicants on the enhanced amount of market value. Mr. Oza has placed heavy reliance on the contents of para. 8 of the judgment and has tried to assert that it is not an unintentional error on the part of the Court, but this Court after having considered all the aspects of the case, has denied solatium to the applicants on the enhanced amount of the market value. In support of his submission Mr. Oza has put heavy emphasis on the words "rs. 57/- per sq. mtr. only in all" appearing in para. 8 of the judgment. He has further contended that the present Review Application itself is not maintainable in as much as the judgment of this Court dated 22nd July, 1997 has already merged into the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 13/02/1998 and, therefore, this Court has now become functus officio. According to Mr. Oza, no permission has been granted to the applicants by the Honble Supreme Court by making aforesaid observation while disposing of the Special Leave Petitions and Review Petitions filed by the applicants and applicants now cannot play another inning by taking shelter under the said observation. According to Mr. Oza, this is only a passing remark made by the Honble SupremeCourt which has no meaning at all and it has not given any right to the applicants to again approach this Court by way of this Misc. Civil Application. According to Mr. Oza, this is only a passing remark made by the Honble SupremeCourt which has no meaning at all and it has not given any right to the applicants to again approach this Court by way of this Misc. Civil Application. ( 5 ) THE counsels appearing for both the sides have also cited before us several decisions to which we will refer to, during the course of this judgment. ( 6 ) AT first instance, we would deal with the contentions raised by the parties with regard to the maintainability of this Misc. Civil Application. As stated above, the decision rendered by this Court dated 22/07/1997 came to be challenged before the Supreme Court by the opponents by filing Civil Appeals Nos. 923-967 of 1998 and the said appeals came to be partly allowed. Ultimately when the applicants came to know about the stand taken by the opponents with regard to payment of solatium on enhanced amount of compensation, they approached this Court by way of filing note for speaking to minutes, which was dismissed by this Court on the ground that its judgment had merged into the judgment of the Supreme Court. However, the decision of this Court on this very note came to be challenged by the applicants by filing Special Leave Petitions and at the same time the applicants also preferred Review Petitions in the appeals disposed of by the Supreme Court vide its judgment dated 13/07/1998 and the Supreme Court after hearing the parties, disposed of both, the Review Application as well as the Special Leave Petitions observing that vide order dated 13/02/1998 it had merely changed the figure of market value which was arrived at by this Court and that it had affirmed the rest of the judgment of this Court and, therefore, no further clarification was required by that Court. Further the Apex Court also observed that it will be open for the petitioners to approach the High Court, if they so desire. 6. 1. IT is therefore, very clear that despite having disposed of the Special Leave Petitions and Review Petitions without issuing any further clarification, the Supreme Court consciously made this observation. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the Apex Court had made this observation wantonly and in reality it had no meaning at all. 6. 1. IT is therefore, very clear that despite having disposed of the Special Leave Petitions and Review Petitions without issuing any further clarification, the Supreme Court consciously made this observation. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the Apex Court had made this observation wantonly and in reality it had no meaning at all. In our opinion the meaning can be culled out from the surrounding circumstances i. e. the background of litigation and what was sought to be achieved by the applicants by filing note for speaking to minutes before this Court and subsequently challenging the order of this Court dated 14/07/1998 on the said note before the Apex Court. This will show that at some stage of the litigation confusion regarding payment of solatium on enhanced amount of market value has arisen and at a later stage the applicants have endeavored to get it clarified; and it is at a later stage this observation is made by the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the case of A. D. M. Jabalpur v. S. Shukla reported in AIR 1976 S. C. at page 1207 while deciding the legality and validity of detention order issued under the provisions of Maintenance of Internal Security Act, has made the following observations :-"moreover, it must be remembered that when we are considering the observations of a high judicial authority like this Court, the greatest possible care must be taken to relate the observations of a judge to the precise issues before him and to confine such observations, even though expressed in broad terms, in the general compass of the question before him, unless he makes it clear that he intended his remarks to have a wider ambit. "similarly, in the case of Greater Bombay Municipal Corpn. v. Thukral Anjali reported in AIR 1989 S. C. 1194 the Apex Court has held "any observation in a judgment has to be read and understood in context of facts of that particular case in respect of which the observation is made". "similarly, in the case of Greater Bombay Municipal Corpn. v. Thukral Anjali reported in AIR 1989 S. C. 1194 the Apex Court has held "any observation in a judgment has to be read and understood in context of facts of that particular case in respect of which the observation is made". In several other decisions i. e. in the cases of I. T. Commissioner v. Vazir Sultan and Sons reported in AIR 1959 S. C. at page 814, I. T. Officer, Tuticorin v. T. S. D. Nadar reported in AIR 1968 S. C. at page 623 and Sarwan Singh Lamba v. Union of India reported in AIR 1995 S. C. at page 1729 the Apex Court has laid down in no uncertain terms that obiter or observation made in the judgment is worthy of respect and is of considerable weight and normally it is expected to be obeyed and followed. It is, therefore, a well settled principle of law that any observation made by the Apex Court should be given highest weightage and while considering the same, greatest possible care must be taken to relate it to the precise issues before the Court making it. As already stated above if this observation is viewed in the light or in the background of entire litigation it can safely be said that despite completion of all different proceedings at different stages with regard to the subject matter, at the stage of seeking clarification the Apex Court had specifically made this observation and hence the same cannot be termed as meaningless and it cannot be disregarded in any manner. According to us, it has only one meaning viz. that it is open for the applicants to approach this Court to get the confusion resolved and they cannot be prevented from doing so either on any technical ground or otherwise. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept Mr. Ozas contention on this count. It may also be noted that the otherside was very much present before the Supreme Court and no objection seems to have been raised by it to such liberty having been reserved to the petitioners or if at all it has been raised, the same has been overruled. Now the opponents cannot object to applicants having access to this Court through the opening given to them by the Apex Court. 6. 2. MR. Now the opponents cannot object to applicants having access to this Court through the opening given to them by the Apex Court. 6. 2. MR. Oza has tried to persuade us by contending that the judgment of this Court has merged into the order of the Supreme Court passed at the very first instance in the appeals of the Government after granting Special Leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India and the same has become final and this Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for review of its earlier judgment. In support of this contention, Mr. Oza has placed reliance on decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Kunhayammed and ors. v. State of Kerala and anor. reported in 2000 AIR SCW 2608 wherein the logic underlying the doctrine of merger has been explained and while doing so the Apex Court has held that once leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India has been granted and the appellate jurisdiction of Honble Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger and once that happens the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Apex Court has also observed that doctrine of merger is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Mr. Oza has therefore, argued that in the instant case same situation has arisen and this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain this review application and more so when the Apex Court in its judgment dated 1 3/07/1998 had only modified the market value of lands in question and rest of the judgment of this Court was allowed to stand. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court. It may however be noted here that vide order dated 27th July, 1998, this Court had disposed of the note for speaking to minutes by applying doctrine of merger and that order was carried to the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 by the applicants challenging the legality and validity of the dismissal of the note on the ground of merger and in that group of petitions the Apex Court had made observation which we have interpreted to mean granting leave to applicants to approach this Court. It can therefore, safely be said that now the bar of merger does not operate and the Apex Court has made the doors of this Court open for the applicants. Hence, in our opinion, the present Review Application is maintainable and it can be disposed of on its merits. ( 7 ) SO far the merits of the observations made by this Court in its judgment dated 22/07/1997 and particularly the observation made in para. 8 of the judgment to the effect that the claimants will not be entitled to the amount of interest on solatium and solatium on increased amount are concerned, it clearly appears to us that the same has crept in on account of unintentional error on the part of this Court and there are cogent reasons for drawing this conclusion. However, before discussing, it would be desirable to quote here the exact contents of para. 8 of the judgment of this Court :"in the result, the impugned awards shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. An amount of Rs. 70. 00 per sq. mtr. , totally awarded to the claimants will stand modified by and substituted with an amount of Rs. 57. 00 per sq. mtr. only in all as total compensation to the claimants for their acquired lands. The claimants will not be entitled to the amount of interest on solatium and solatium on additional amount. Rest of the benefits available under sec. 23 (1-A) of the Act will be available to the claimants. 57. 00 per sq. mtr. only in all as total compensation to the claimants for their acquired lands. The claimants will not be entitled to the amount of interest on solatium and solatium on additional amount. Rest of the benefits available under sec. 23 (1-A) of the Act will be available to the claimants. "the first reason is, in the appeals before this Court filed by the State Government challenging the awards made by the Reference Court, no challenge has been made to the order of the Reference Court awarding solatium to the claimants in accordance with section 23 (2) of the Act on the enhanced amount. Careful scrutiny of the memorandum of appeal as well as the submissions made at the time of hearing on behalf of the Government during the hearing of appeals, would reveal that at no point of time any contention has been raised to the effect that the applicants were not entitled to receive solatium on the additional amount of compensation u/s. 23 (2) of the Act as well as other statutory benefits u/s. 23 (1-A) of the Act. When no such contention has been raised and no such challenge has been made, there is no reason for this Court to quash the directions given by the Reference Court. In other words, when the party challenging the award does not make any grievance against the directions given by the Reference Court with regard to payment of solatium on enhanced amount and other statutory benefits on the ground that the same were adverse to its interest, this Court has no reason to disturb the said direction. 7. 1. THE second reason is, when the statute itself provides for payment of solatium and other statutory benefits to the persons whose lands have been acquired and possession has been taken away by the acquiring authorities, there is no reason for this Court to deny the same to the claimants. In the entire judgment rendered by this Court, there is no discussion to be found assigning reasons why the claimants/applicants are not entitled to receive the aforesaid statutory benefits including the solatium on enhanced amount. If there were cogent reasons existing for the same, they would have certainly found place in the judgment. In the entire judgment rendered by this Court, there is no discussion to be found assigning reasons why the claimants/applicants are not entitled to receive the aforesaid statutory benefits including the solatium on enhanced amount. If there were cogent reasons existing for the same, they would have certainly found place in the judgment. However, the fact remains that they do not exist and, therefore, also it can safely be inferred that this Court never meant to deprive the applicants of their valuable statutory rights to receive solatium and other statutory benefits under the Act over and above the market price u/s. 23 (1) of the Act. When there is no intention together with its supporting reasons put in black and white by this Court to deny these benefits to the applicants, a passing observations having some such meaning could safely be attributed to an unintentional error. A careful reading of para. 8 makes it clear that while denying the interest on solatium, this error seems to have crept in. The Government, therefore, cannot try to take disadvantage of the same. According to us, this mistake or error apparent on the face of record is capable of being corrected under the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. In many similar cases arising out of same acquisition proceedings the claimants have received statutory benefits over and above market price. ( 8 ) WE may now deal with Mr. Patels contention that applicants cannot be denied their statutory benefits even by this Court. Mr. Patel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Palika reported in (1991) 4 S. C. C. at page 212. In this case the Apex Court has held that claimant is entitled to receive solatium and the High Court has no discretion of not awarding it. We are in complete agreement with Mr. Patel. It is a well settled principle of law that the solatium u/s. 23 (2) of the Act is required to be paid to the land owners because of the compulsory acquisition of their lands. The question regarding payment of solatium has never caused any difficulty to any Court in light of the fact that the statute is very clear on that point. The question regarding payment of solatium has never caused any difficulty to any Court in light of the fact that the statute is very clear on that point. This Court, therefore, could not have meant to pass any direction which could deprive theapplicants of their legitimate right. So far other benefits u/s. 23 (1-A) of the Act are concerned, the direction of this Court is very clear and there cannot be any confusion on that count. The same are made available to the applicants as can be seen from the contents of para. 8 of that judgment. ( 9 ) MOREOVER, we also agree with the submission made by Mr. Patel that when two interpretations of the judgment and order passed by the Court are possible, then one which is in favour of the justice should be accepted. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that depriving a citizen of his lawful right is a matter of justice. The balance would certainly tilt in favour of the applicants when this question is considered by this Court in as much as justice is in their favour by virtue of the clear provision contained in the Act. We also feel that when the justice is in their favour, we should interpret the judgment under review in a manner which would favour the applicants and not the Government, as accepting the Governments stand would mean causing grave injustice to the applicants. Mr. Patel has submitted that even if this is a slip in the judgment this Court can always rectify the same while exercising powers u/ss. 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We may again state that this Court had never any intention to make any observation or give any direction so as to deprive the applicants of their legitimate statutory benefits and rights upon fixity of market price as envisaged under the Act. ( 10 ) LASTLY we are constrained to observe that the State Government which is supposed to look after the welfare and benefits of its citizens has adopted a stand which does not befit it. ( 10 ) LASTLY we are constrained to observe that the State Government which is supposed to look after the welfare and benefits of its citizens has adopted a stand which does not befit it. Having acquired the land of its citizens and having made them landless, it cannot, now, say that it would not pay the requisite statutory benefits to the erstwhile land owners, which they are legally entitled to receive under provisions of the Act over and above the market price and that too on the flimsy and unacceptable interpretation of the judgment of this Court. Time and again the Apex Court as well as different High Courts of the country have even observed that the Government, its agencies, the local authorities, etc. should not take shelter even under technicalities and turn away its face from the real justice. ( 11 ) THE ultimate design and anxiety of the justice process is to see that rightful person gets rightful remedy. Considering the statutory mechanism of payment of compensation under the provisions of the Act and the factual profile of the cases in this group, the determination of market price of the acquired lands by the Reference Court against award of the Land Acquisition Officer enhanced upto Rs. 70. 00 per sq. mtr. towards the compensation. This determination of market price obviously was in view of the clear provisions u/s. 23 (1) of the Act. The statutory benefits and rights available to claimants, whose lands are acquired, cannot be deprived of merely by raising a pedantic interpretation or submission that reduction of the market price from Rs. 70. 00 per sq. mtr. u/s. 23 (1) to Rs. 57. 00 per sq. mtr. reduced by this Court and subsequently consensually reduced to Rs. 53. 00 per sq. mtr. in the Special Leave Petition as stated hereinabove is inclusive of all the benefits and statutory rights. The main function of the Court in such cases is to ascertain and determine market price u/s. 23 (1) in the light of the provisions of section 23 and consequently incidental statutory benefits flowing from other provisions like sections 23 (2) and 23 (1-A), etc. are required to be worked out on the basis of determination of the market price u/s. 23 (1) in the light of the facts of the case. are required to be worked out on the basis of determination of the market price u/s. 23 (1) in the light of the facts of the case. ( 12 ) THE entire mechanism for compensation under the Act, clearly, suggests that the Court has to determine the market price and on the basis of such determination of market price, the statutory benefits available to the erstwhile land-owners has to be calculated. Depending upon the facts, in this group of matters, the Reference Court determined the market price at the rate of Rs. 70. 00 per sq. mtr. Upon appeals before this Court, for the purpose of compensation under Sec. 23 (1) of the Act, the fixity of market price cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be inclusive of all the available statutory benefits and rights like solatium, interest, etc. under the Act which are essentially based on the fixity of the market price and the factum of the delivery of the possession. This proposition is very well explained and expounded by a catena of judicial pronouncements and some of the very important decisions are referred to hereinbefore by us. ( 13 ) THE authority in a welfare State after having made statutory provisions should not make such a narrow pedantic and unwarranted interpretation and approach. There is no dispute about the fact that similarly situated other claimants, whose lands came to be acquired by virtue of same notification and also covered under the same project, have already been paid statutory benefits and given statutory rights over and above the market price determined by this Court. Therefore, factually and legally the interpretation and approach of the respondent authority is quite unreasonable, unjust and misconceived. As a matter of fact, legally and factually no such clarification is required as similarly situated claimants, whose lands have been acquired, have been paid compensation amount as per the statutory benefits and rights under the Act before and after the initiation of these proceedings. However, since we are addressed at a marathon length, we also felt it necessary to place it on record the clarification that the determination of an amount of rs. 57/- per sq. mtr. only in all used and employed in the judgment does not necessarily mean the exclusion of statutory benefits due and payable under the Act like solatium, interest on enhanced amount of compensation. 57/- per sq. mtr. only in all used and employed in the judgment does not necessarily mean the exclusion of statutory benefits due and payable under the Act like solatium, interest on enhanced amount of compensation. We are sorry to say that the stand adopted by the Government in this group of matters in not paying the amount as per the statutory available benefits over and above the market price determined by the Court, despite the fact that in similarly situated cases, such benefits are paid over and above the market price determined by the Court, is, really, unreasonable, unfortunate and unwarranted. ( 14 ) AS a matter of fact, determination and fixation of the market price u/s. 23 (1) of the Act is to be made first and accordingly it has been done in our judgment as rest of the statutory benefits follow since they are based on it. In light of the aforesaid discussions, we, hereby, clarify that this Court had never meant to deny payment of all available permissible statutory benefits, etc. We have fixed market price only. ( 15 ) THEREFORE, the applicants, the erstwhile owners of the lands, are also entitled to receive all the statutorily available permissible benefits and rights in the light of the directions given by the Reference Court and as envisaged under the Act, over and above, the market price fixed by this Court. With above clarifications, the Applications shall stand allowed to that extent. Rule is, therefore, made absolute in all Applications with costs. ( 16 ) THE respondents are directed to deposit the amounts due and payable in terms of the available and permissible statutory provisions and benefits to the claimants and also by virtue of clarification made by us before the Reference Court within a period of four months. As requested by the Ld. Govt. Pleader, the certified copies will be supplied expeditiously after applications are made by the respondents. .