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2002 DIGILAW 88 (KAR)

RATNAWA v. STATE BY BETAGERI POLICE

2002-02-01

H.N.NARAYAN

body2002
H. N. NARAYAN, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions are directed against the order dated 19-9-2000 passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Dharwad, discharging A-3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 302, 201, 202 read with 34 of the IPC and proceeding to frame charges against A-1, A-2 and a-4 for the said offences. While the State has filed Cri. R. P. No. 1077 of 2000 against the order of discharge of A-3, A-1, A-2 and A-4 have filed cri. R. P. No. 520 of 2001 for framing charges against them. ( 2 ) CERTAIN-UNDISPUTED facts are that A-1 is the mother-in-law of the deceased-Surekha while A-2 and A-3 are her sister-in-laws and A-4 is her husband. The father of the deceased is an Advocate at Huvina- hadagli and she was given in marriage to A-4 while A-3, Uma was married to the cousin of the victim. Since differences arose between the accused family and the uncle of the victim, A-3 came to reside with her mother and brother and it appears that trouble started to the victim thereafter. It is alleged that A-1 to A-3 insisted the deceased to settle some property in the name of the husband of A-3 and to advice her father who was the joint family member consisting of himself and his elder brother, the father-in-law of A-3. It appears that the victim once informed the same to her father. It is this circumstance which made A-l to A-3 in particular to harass the deceased. It is alleged that on 12-4- 1996 when the deceased was washing her face in the bathroom, A-l, the mother-in-law of the deceased appears to have splashed kerosene on her and the victim who smelt kerosene, turned back and found her mother- in-law standing behind her with a matchstick and told her that she would not allow her to live and therefore threw a lighted matchstick. Thus, she sustained 30% burn injuries according to the doctor of Shirol at Gadag who examined her for the first time. It is also the case of the prosecution that at that time A-2 to A-4 were sitting in the drawing room viewing television. Thus, she sustained 30% burn injuries according to the doctor of Shirol at Gadag who examined her for the first time. It is also the case of the prosecution that at that time A-2 to A-4 were sitting in the drawing room viewing television. The fact that she sustained burn injuries was communicated to the complainant, the victim's father by her husband over phone and all of them took her to Gadag hospital from where the victim was taken to her native place Huvinahadagli where the doctor informed the complainant that she sustained 60% burn injuries. Thereafter, the complainant shifted her to City Hospital, Davanagere. She died on 3-5-1996. The prosecution mainly relies on the dying declaration of the deceased-Surekha. According to the prosecution she made a statement to the police officer and the hospital authorities when she was brought to the hospital and again made a second statement at Davanagere on 24-4-1996 and the Tahsildar was also summoned when she gave a statement. It is contended that she made a statement at the earliest possible time stating that it is a case of stove burst while on 24-4-1996 she implicated A-l for the commission of murder. It is alleged in her statement made on 24-4-1996 recorded by the Sub-Inspector of police, Gadag in the presence of the doctor at Davanagere that her sister-in-laws viz. , A-2 and A-3 also harassed her stating that no dowry was given to A-4 at the time of marriage and that her father and her senior uncle refused to give share to the husband of A-3. She has directly involved A-1 as the person who poured kerosene on her. The Trial Court while considering the arguments canvassed on behalf of the accused found no sufficient material against A-3 for framing charges and therefore, passed an order of discharge and proceeded to frame charges against the other accused. ( 3 ) THE State has questioned the order of discharge while the other accused persons are aggrieved by the order of learned Sessions Judge who proceeded to frame charges against them. The learned Sessions judge has relied on certain pronouncements of this Court and the Supreme court on this question. ( 3 ) THE State has questioned the order of discharge while the other accused persons are aggrieved by the order of learned Sessions Judge who proceeded to frame charges against them. The learned Sessions judge has relied on certain pronouncements of this Court and the Supreme court on this question. Law on this question is settled in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v anil Kumar Bhunja and Others, wherein the Supreme Court has laid down as follows:"while considering whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or not the provision of Sections 227 and 228 had to be read together in juxtaposition. The standard test, proof and judgment which is needed for finding of a guilt or otherwise is not necessary for framing of charge at this stage and even a strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate may justify framing of charge". It is also settled law that the Judge can sift and weigh evidence for the purpose of finding out whether prima facie case against the accused has been made out. If two views are equally possible and the evidence gives rise to a grave suspicion, charge may be framed. In R. S. Nayak v A. R. Antulay2, the Supreme Court relating to discharge in a trial observed that in spite of the difference in the language of the three sections viz. . Sections 227, 239 and 245 of the Cr. P. C. , the legal position is that if the trial is justified that a prima facie case is made out, the charge has to be framed. It is true that Section 227 of the code is a beneficient provision to save the accused from prolonged harassment which is a necessary concomitant of a protracted criminal trial. Nevertheless, the Court has to find out whether there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed offences triable by court of Sessions. ( 4 ) THERE is sufficient material insofar as A-l is concerned to frame charges under Sections 498-A and 302 of the IPC. However, I find no such material against A-2 to A-4 for framing charges under Sections 302, 201 and 202 read with 34 of the IPC. There is no circumstance brought out on record to frame charges against A-2 to A-4 under Sections 302 and 201 read with 34 of the IPC. However, I find no such material against A-2 to A-4 for framing charges under Sections 302, 201 and 202 read with 34 of the IPC. There is no circumstance brought out on record to frame charges against A-2 to A-4 under Sections 302 and 201 read with 34 of the IPC. A careful perusal of dying declaration made by the deceased does not disclose such a fact. The Trial court has committed an error in proceeding to frame charges against a-2 to A-4 under Sections 302 and 201 read with 34 of the IPC. However, it is argued on behalf of the State that there is no material to support the theory of stove burst. Learned Counsel for the accused contended that sufficient ground is not made out to frame charges against a-2 to A-4 in particular. ( 5 ) A charge-sheet is filed against the accused under Section 498-A of the IPC which deals with cruelty by the husband or relative of the husband. Section 498-A reads as follows:"husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation. For the purposes of this section ''cruelty" means (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman". ( 6 ) THE question whether the statement of the victim made before the sub-Inspector and the Tahsildar can be relied on and whether it could be considered as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian evidence Act are the questions which can only be considered at the trial. Suffice it to say that the victim has specifically alleged that she is harassed by A-2 and A-4 insisting upon her to request her father and uncle to give property to the husband of A-3, They being the relatives of her husband, prima facie there is material to frame charge under Section 498-A of the IPC against A-1 to A-3. However, no such allegation was made against A-4. However, no such allegation was made against A-4. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge is not right in holding that there is sufficient ground for framing charge against A-4 also under Sections 498-A, 302 and 201 of the IPC. The learned Sessions Judge is also not justified in discharging A-3 on the ground that there are no grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is liable to be set aside. In the result, Cri. R. P. No. 1077 of 2000 filed by the State is allowed while Cri. R. P. No. 520 of 2001 is dismissed. The Trial Judge shall frame charges against A-1 under Sections 498-A, 302, 201 of the IPC and charges against A-2 and A-3 under Section 498-A only and under Section 202 against A-4. --- *** --- .