Judgment : TAPEN SEN, J. ( 1 ) WHAT were the events that led the respondent No. 1 to conclude that the Petitioner was an encroacher of a public land is an issue which has to be examined in the background of the facts and circumstances of this case. The other question that falls for consideration is as to whether the petitioner unit was a part of the royal Tisra Colliery and in order to ascertain this fihding we have to necessarily advert to the facts of this case. The facts which are necessary to be looked into are as follows and which are being stated hereinafter on the basis of pleadings made in this writ application :1. According to the petitioners, lands measuring 9. 46 acres situated at Plot Nos. 639, 641, 642, 643, 644, 646, 649, 648, 650, 653 and 695 were purchased by them, whereafter some time in the year 1971 the petitioners constructed a Hard Coke Plant and got it registered under the Small Scale industries Scheme of the State of Bihar vide registration No. 3291 of 1971. It was also registered under the Factories Aet. By reason of coming into force of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1973 on 30-1-1973, all Coal Mines specified in the Schedule appended to the said ordinance stood vested in the Central Government on and from 31-1-1973 and a Custodian was appointed to remain in-charge of the management of such Mines. The aforesaid Ordinance was replaced subsequently by an Act, known as the Coal Mines (Taking over of the Management) Act, 1973which was published on 31-3-1973. Again the Central Government enacted the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 which was published on 30-5-1973 and the appointed date was given as 1-5-1973 and on and from said date, i. e 1-5-1973 the Coal Mines specified in the Schedule appended thereto, stood nationalized. The Petitioners have further stated that the Custodian illegally and wrongfully took over the Management of the hard Coke Plant of the Petitioners, treating the same as part of Royal Tisra Colliery by his order dated 1-2-4973 as contained in annexure-1 to the writ application. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioherb, however, the Coke Oven Plant was not a part of Royal tisra Colliery, and, therefore, the Custodian realising his mistake, and being satisfied that the plant, land, machinery etc. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioherb, however, the Coke Oven Plant was not a part of Royal tisra Colliery, and, therefore, the Custodian realising his mistake, and being satisfied that the plant, land, machinery etc. did not form part of the said Coal Mines, had hot vested, accordingly handed back the possession of the same to the Petitioners vide letter dated 28-4-1973 as contained at annexiare-2. Thereafter, the petitioners stated that the respondent No: (3) M/s bharat Coking Coal Limited) attempted to acquire some of the plots belonging to the petitioners on which the Hard (Coke Plant was situated. They issued a Notification dated 16-2-1981 under the Bihar Gazette and a case being Case No. 8-B of 1979-80 under the Land Acquisition Act was initiated against Shri Mahabir Prasad Agarwala, one of the partners of the Petitioner. However, on an objection raised by him, the respondents revoked the said Notification. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the Petitioners, the Respondent No. 3 (Bharat Coking Coal Limited) has always attempted to grab the property under the pretext that it stood vested under the provisions of Nationalisation Act. According to them, in their pursuit to grab this property, the Respondent No. 2 (The administrative Officer, Lodna Area of Bharat coking Coal Limited) submitted a report on 29-8-1985 before the Respondent No. 1 (Estate Officer, Shri Ramesh Prasad) wherein they alleged that 4. 52 acres of land situated at different plots in Mouza Alakdiha of the said Hard Coke Plant had vested. In the said report, according to the Petitioners, it was incorrectly mentioned that the Hard Coke plant was constructed five years after the nationalisation. The Respondentino. 2 requested the Respondent No. 1 to initiate proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The Petitioners have further stated that in the said encroachment report some lands which were not in the possession of the Petitioners were also included. After receiving the aforementioned report, the Respondent No. 1 proceeded under the aforementioned Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the Act) and it was registered as the Case no. 28 of 1978. Notices were issued under section 4 (1) of the said Act. The Petitioners have stated that although aforementioned act was not applicable, yet in good faith they filed their cause and produced their documents and also examined witnesses. 28 of 1978. Notices were issued under section 4 (1) of the said Act. The Petitioners have stated that although aforementioned act was not applicable, yet in good faith they filed their cause and produced their documents and also examined witnesses. In the meantime on 14/18-5-1993 the General manager, Lodna Area of the Respondent No. 3 sent a letter to the Petitioners alleging that they were unauthorized occupants and, therefore, they should vacate the land in question, over which they were in unauthor, ized occupation, as according to the case of bharat Coking Coal Limited, the land, admittedly became a vested property in the central Government, namely, Bharat Coking Coal Limited under the provisions of coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. 1973. ( 4 ) THE Petitioners have also stated that their Hard Coke Plant was not situated on any Coal Mine nor was it a part of the Royal tisra Colliery, and as such stand of the bharat Coking Coal Limited to the effect that it stood vested is totally misconceived. They have also stated that in view of the fact that their property is a private property and the same having been mutated in the records of the State of Bihar and the Petitioners having been recognized as tenants of the said state, the respondents had no right to treat it as a public land and, therefore, they should not have proceeded under the provision of the said Act and that the land should not by any stretch of imagination be said to come within the definition Clause of Section 2 of the said Act. In fact what the Petitioners contend, is that the entire proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction. The Petitioners have further stated that taking into consideration the fact that the land was neither a public land nor a part of the Royal tisra Colliery, they filed an Application for appointment of a Survey Knowing Pleader commissioner before the Respondent No. 1 vide Annexure-7, but that was rejected on the same date vide Annexure-8 by the respondent No. 1. According to the Petitioners they have also filed Title Suit No. 107 of 1993 in the Court of Sub-Judge No. 1 for declaration of the title which was subsequently transferred to the Court of subjudge No. 2 at Dhanbad. ( 5 ) IN this case, a Counter-Affidavit has been filed by the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. According to the Petitioners they have also filed Title Suit No. 107 of 1993 in the Court of Sub-Judge No. 1 for declaration of the title which was subsequently transferred to the Court of subjudge No. 2 at Dhanbad. ( 5 ) IN this case, a Counter-Affidavit has been filed by the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. They have stated that the order dated 4-8-1993 passed under the provisions of Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, a statutory appeal lies before the district Judge under the provisions of Section 9 of the said Act, and therefore, the instant writ is not maintainable in view of the existence of an alternative remedy. This argument is rejected on the ground that this writ Application was admitted for final hear ing by order dated 22-2-1994. Having admitted the Writ Application, it would not at all be fair after so many years to reject this writ Application on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. ( 6 ) THESE respondents have taken various other objections in their Counter-affidavit but some of the most important objections that they have taken are as follows : (A) By reason of coming into force of various enactments relating to nationalization, a property in case where it was under a Coking Coal Mine, stood vested by reason of the coming into force of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972; (b) By reason of coming into force of various enactments relating to nationalization, a property in case where it was under a noncoking coal mine stood vested by reason of the coming into force of Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. (c) Any property used for the purpose of mine, irrespective of ownership of anybody, stood vested absolutely and free from all encumbrances in the Central Government and subsequently in the Bharat Coking Coal limited. Even if the petitioners have filed a title Suit, the same relates to a property which stood vested and, therefore, such suit is specifically barred under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the same. Even if the petitioners have filed a title Suit, the same relates to a property which stood vested and, therefore, such suit is specifically barred under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the same. (d) The property in question and purchases made by the Petitioner-Company were made by the erstwhile Colliery Owners and the Respondent No. 1 had come to a finding, therefore, that this was a Public premise within the meaning of Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, and, therefore, petitioners were proceeded against as they were unauthorized occupants. (e) In reply to the statements made in paragraphs 6, 15 and 16 of the Writ Petition to the effect that the custodian had handed back the possession of Hard Coke Plant on 24-8-1973 and that the Notificatibn of acquisition which was published in the Gazette. had been revoked, these Respondents have stated that the then custodian were managed and that thepetitioners have deliberately suppressed the fact that they had filed a Writ Petition before the Honble Calcutta High Court which may have been dismissed and that the matter relating to the handing back of the possession by the custodian was duly explained by them before the Estate Officer and after taking into consideration all these aspects the Estate Officer passed his final order on 4-8-1993. (f) The contention of the Writ Petitioners in raising issues before;this Court are actually attempts to grab a valuable property belonging to the Central Government and subsequently to the Bharat Coking Coal Limited which has acquired title over the property in question by reason of vesting thereof on account of Parliamentary Legislation. The hard Coke Plant comes within the definition of mines and the property forms part of the mine vested in the Central Government and subsequently in the Respondent No. 3. The Estate Officer has the necessary competence to look into all aspects of the matter and it is a matter of evidence as to whether the property had been used fpr the purposes of Mine or not. (g) The property in question is admittedly purchased by erstwhile Colliery Owners and had been used and occupied by them for mining purposes and, therefore, it is wrong on the part of the Petitioners to assert that there were complicated questions of title involved. (g) The property in question is admittedly purchased by erstwhile Colliery Owners and had been used and occupied by them for mining purposes and, therefore, it is wrong on the part of the Petitioners to assert that there were complicated questions of title involved. (h) The suit filed by the Petitioners is barred under Section 15 of the Public premises, Act as admittedly the property in question is a public premise and that the filing of the suit establishes mala fides on the part of the Petitioners. (i) So far as the allegations relating to the amendment Applicatiqn. for quashing the order dated 4--8-1993 and counterg the allegations of mala fides, the Respondents have filed a Supplemenfarv Counter-Affidavit in which they have stated that the Respondent no. 1 had already signed the final order at 3. 15 P. M. oil 4-8-1993 and before signing the said order neither the Petitioner nor his representative had informed the respondent No. 1 about passing of the order dated 4-8-1993 by this Court itself. It was after 3. 15 P. M i. e. between 4. 15 P. M. and 4. 3 P. M. that the representative of the petitioner came to the Court, but by that time certified copy of the order had already been obtained by these Respondents. It is absolutely incorrect on the part of the Pettioners to allege that within such a short time a hasty order was passed because the order of the Estate Officer runs into seven pages which cannot be said to have been passed in a short time. ( 7 ) THE further case of the Petitioners is that the Hard. Coke Plant cannot be said to be a "mine" and in any event, all Hard Coke plants which were nationalized, had been mentioned in Schedule 2 of the Coking Coal mines Nationalisation Act. They have also stated that none of the partnerof the Hard coke Plant were ever owners of the Colliery. They: have further stated that the Writ Petition filed in the Calcutta High Court was withdrawn by them after possession was given back to them by the Custodian. They have further stated that Royal Tisra Colliery was included in the Schedule appended to the 1973 Act by entry No. 183 and a compenstion of Rs. 50,000/- was paid to the owners of Royal Tisra Colliery. They have further stated that Royal Tisra Colliery was included in the Schedule appended to the 1973 Act by entry No. 183 and a compenstion of Rs. 50,000/- was paid to the owners of Royal Tisra Colliery. They have also stated that none of the partners of the petitioners firm were ever owners of the royal Tisra Colliery and that the findings of the Respondent No. 1 to the effect tat the brother of Shri Mahabir Prasad Agarwala is the owner of the colliery is without any basis. The petitioners have further placed reliance on Annexure-20 Series appended to their Rejoinder and have stated that the lands in question were sought to be acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act in Land Acquisition Case No. 8-B of 1979-80. In that case, several letters were written by these Respondents to the Land Acquisition Officer, specifically mentioning that the lands were urgently required for mining. According to the petitioners, therefore, these letters prove that th lands had not vested in the Coall Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 because if had it sd vested then there was no necessity to issue such letters. ( 8 ) AFTER the Respondent No. 1. rejected the application of the petitioners for appointment of a Pleadercommissioner by his order dated 24-7-1993 and being aggrieved by the action of the respondents in proceeding with Encroachment Case No. 28 of 1986 initiated under the provisions of the Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Apt, Petitioners filed the instant writ application and, on 4-8-1993, a Division bench of this Court restrained the Respondents from passing any order underi Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and, ordered that in the event such an order had already been passed, the Petitioners shall not be ejected and it will be open to the Petitioner, in the event any final order is passed by filing an Amendment Application. ( 9 ) THE Petitionershave stated that ignoring this order, the Respondent No 1 hastily passed the order dated 4-8-1993 on the same date holding that the property is a vested property and that Bharat Coking Coal limited is authorized to get the Petitioners evicted from the premises in question, and accordingly, directed issuance of notice under Section 5 of the P. P. Act. ( 10 ) WE are not impressed by the argument of the petitioner to the effect that this order was passed hastily, because it really runs into number of pages. We have to see as to whether order dated 4-8-1993 which has been brought on record by the Petitioner vide Annexure-13 appended to the Amendment Application, is proper or not. But before we do that, we have to bear in mind that from the rival contention of the parties in this case, it is abundantly clear that there exists serious and bona fide dispute on the question as to whether the subject-matter of the aforementioned Eviction Case, i. e. , the hard Coke Plant was really a part and parcel of the Royal Tisra Colliery or not. In this context it would be relevant to notice that the Petitioners tried to establish and asserted before the Respondent NO. 1 that they were the real owners of the premise in question and that their occupation was lawful and authorized and that the premises had never vested in the Bharat Coking Coal Limited under the provisions of Nationalisation act as it never formed part of any mine as defined in the Nationalisation Act. According to the Petitioners, under the provisions of Section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, on and from the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the Coal Mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to and shall vest absolutely in the Central Government, free from all encumbrances. In other words, what the Petitioners contended before the Estate Officer and what has been argued in the instant case, also is that on a joint reading of Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the aforementioned Coal Mines (Nationalisation)act, 1973, it would be apparent that what vests in the Central Government in terms thereof, is the right, title and interest of the owner of the Coal Mines in question and the right, title and interest of any land of any person who is not the owner of a mine cannot be said to vest in the Central Government. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that its unit was never a part of the Royal Tisra Colliery, and therefore, it is an independent property and same could not be said to have vested in the Central Government, although the Royal Tisra Colliery has been show at Entry No. 183 appended to the Schedule of the aforementioned Act of 1973. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that such a dispute can only be resolved by a Civil Court and a conclusive finding can be reached after taking evidence to come to a conclusion as to whether the land/hard Coke Plant was a part and parcel of the Royal Tisra Colliery and unless such evidence is legally brought on record, it cannot be said that the lands/hard coke Plant was a part of the Royal Tisra colliery, and therefore, it vested in the bharat Coking Coal Limited. ( 11 ) ON the contrary, Mr. Ajit Kumar sinha, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the respondents states that under the provisions of the Nationalisation Act, and with special reference to Section 2{h), read with the various provisions of the Coking Coal mines (Nationalisation) Act, the entire area must be held to be a part and parcel of the mine, and therefore, must be deemed to have vested in the Central Government. Mr. Sinha has also stated that there is no dispute that the Petitioners have title over the property but merely by having title, does not absolve the land from the consequences of vesting, and therefore, even in a case like this, the petitioners claim of right, title and interest becomes irrelevant and the inevitable consequence is that the lands vest in the Central government absolutely and free from all encumbrances. ( 12 ) IN the background of the aforementioned contentions of the respective counsels for the parties, it would be necessary to deal briefly with the various provisions of the Acts in question. ( 13 ) THE provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act relate to the eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises. ( 12 ) IN the background of the aforementioned contentions of the respective counsels for the parties, it would be necessary to deal briefly with the various provisions of the Acts in question. ( 13 ) THE provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act relate to the eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises. The words publicpremises has been defined under Section 2 of the said Act, which reads as follows :"2 (L) (E) : public premises means (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980 under the control of the secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat; (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of (i) any company as defined in Sec. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) in which not less than fifty one per cent, of the paid up share capital is held by the Central government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company, (ii) any corporation not being a company as defined in Sec. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a local authority established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government. (iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act, {iv} any Institute incorporated by the Institute of Technology Act, 1963 (38 of 1963), (v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (38 of 1963 ). Under the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act, the Central: Government has the authority to appoint by notification in the official Gazette such persons being Gazetted officers of Government or of the Government of any Union Territory or Officers of equivalent rank of the statutory authority as it thinks fit to be an Estate Officer. Under the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act, the Central: Government has the authority to appoint by notification in the official Gazette such persons being Gazetted officers of Government or of the Government of any Union Territory or Officers of equivalent rank of the statutory authority as it thinks fit to be an Estate Officer. Statutory authority has been defined in section 2 (fa) which reads as follows : "2 (fa) "statutory authority means (i) in relation to the public premises placed under the control of the Secretariat of either house of Parliament, the Secretariat of the concerned House of Parliament, (ii) in respect of the public premises referred to in item (i) of sub-clause (2) of that clause, the company or the subsidiarycompany as the case may be, referred to therein, (iii) in respect of the public premises referred in item (ii) of sub-clause (2) of that clause, the corporation referred to therein, (iv) in respect of the public premises referred to respectively, in items (111), (iv), (v)and (vi) of sub-clause (2) of that clause, the university, Institute or Board as the case may be referred to therein and (v) in respect of the public premises referred to in sub-clause (3) of that clause, the Corporation, Committee or Authority, as the case may be, referred to in, that subclause;"section 2 (g) defines unauthorised occupation" in the following terms :"unauthorized occupation in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. "sections 4 and 5 of the said Act provide for the procedure as to how an order under the provisions of the Public Premises Act is to be passed. ( 14 ) FROM what has been discussed and quoted above, it is abundantly clear that an authority under the aforementioned Act has a very limited Jurisdiction and it has to determine only a dispute that may arise, visa-vis a public premises. Upon an "application made before it, it has to proceed in a summary disposal thereto. ( 14 ) FROM what has been discussed and quoted above, it is abundantly clear that an authority under the aforementioned Act has a very limited Jurisdiction and it has to determine only a dispute that may arise, visa-vis a public premises. Upon an "application made before it, it has to proceed in a summary disposal thereto. The question, as to whether the area formed part of the Royal tisra Colliery or not, consequently making it a public premise is a question that becomes the focal point of the instant case and it, therefore, obviously involve determination/finding of fact. Undoubtedly, while attempting to come to such finding, the authority may be faced with complicated question of title as is involved in the instant case. The authority in the aforementioned case cannot be said to have the jurisdiction to embark upon the domain of the Civil Court for the purposes of adjudicating on a question of a complicated title, which can only be done by a Civil Court it Would be extremely unreasonable to allow a Court vested with summary procedure to give a finding, which can only be arrived at by a Civil Court having the necessary judicial competence. ( 15 ) IN the background of the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, the Act of 1973 namely, the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 973 has to be read in juxtaposition. The long title of the said. 1973 Act provides that it is an Act to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in respect of the coal mines specified in the schedule with a view to reorganizing and reconstructing such coal mines so as to ensure the rational, coordinated and scientific development and utilization of coal resources consistent with the growing requirements of the country, in order that the ownership and control of such resources are vested in the State and thereby so distributed as best to subserve the common good and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Now Section 2 (b) defines coal mines and it means a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal. Now Section 2 (b) defines coal mines and it means a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal. Section 2 (h) defines mine means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is beingcarried on and includes (I) all borings and bore holes; (ii) all shafts, whether in the course of being sunk or not; (iii) all levels and inclined planes in the course of being driven; (iv) all open cast workings; (v) all conveyors or serial rope-ways provided for bringing into or removal from a mine of minerals or other articles or for the removal of refuse therefrom; (vi) all lands, buildings, works, adits, levels, planes, machinery and equipments, instruments, stores, vehicles, adjacent to, a mine and used for the purposes of the mine; (vii) all workshops (including buildings, machinery, instruments, stores, equipments of such workshops and the lands on which such workshops stand) in or adjacent to, a mine and used substantially for the purposes of the mine or a number of mines under the same management; (viii) all coal belonging to the owner of the mine, whether in stock or in transit, and all coal under production in a mine; (ix) all power stations in a mine are operated primarily for supplying electricity for the purpose of working the mine or a number of mines under the same management; (x) all lands, buildings and equipments belonging to the owners of the mine, and in, adjacent to or situated on the surface of, the mine where the washing of coal obtained from the mine or manufacture, therefrom, of coke is carried on; (xi) all lands and buildings other than those referred to in sub-cl. (x) wherever situated, if solely used for the location of the management, sale or liaison offices, or for the residence of officers and staff, of the mine; (xii) all other fixed assets, movable and immovable, belonging to the owner of a mine, wherever situate and current assets, belonging to a mine, whether within its premises or outside. "section 3 reads as follows : 3. "section 3 reads as follows : 3. Acquisition of rights of owners in respect of coal mines (1) On the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central Government free from all encumbrances. (2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that if, after the appointed day, the existence of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act, 1973, shall, until that mine is nationalized by an appropriate legislation, apply to such mine. (3) On and from the commencement of section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)amendment Act, 1976 (A) no person, other than (i) the Central Government or a Government Company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or (ii) a person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the proviso to cl. (c), has been granted by any such Government Company or corporation, or (iii) a company engaged in the production of iron and steel, shall carry on coal mining operation in India, in any form; (B) excepting the mining leases granted before such commencement in favour of the government Company or corporation, referred to in clause (a), and any sub-lease granted by any such Government company or corporation, all other mining leases and sub-leases in force immediately before such commencement, shall, in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated; (C) no lease for winning or mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government Company or corporation, referred to in clause (a) provided that the Government Company or corporation to whom a lease for winning or mining coal has been granted may grant a sub-lease to any person in any area such terms and conditions as may be specified in the instrument granting the sub-lease, if the Government company or corporation is satisfied that (i) the reserves of coal in the area are in isolated small pockets or are not sufficient for scientific and economical development in a co-ordinated and integrated manner, and (ii) the coal produced by the sub-lessee will not be required to be transported by rail. (4) Where a mining lease stands terminated under sub-section (3), it shall be lawful for the Central Government or a Government company or corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government to obtain, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), or in the proviso to subsection (2) of Section. 3 of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands so terminated. (a) Inserted by Act 67 of 1976, S. 3 (w. r. e. f. 29-1-76 ). 4. Central Government to be the lessee of the State Government (1) Where the rights of an owner under any mining lease granted or deemed to have been granted, in relation to a coal mine, by a State Government or any other person vest in the Central Government under (Section 3, the Central Government shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the lessee of the State Government or such other person, as the case may be, in relation to such coal mine as if a mining lease in relation to such coal mine had been granted to the Central Government and the period of such lease shall be the entire period for which such lease could have been granted by the State Government or such other person under the Mineral Concession Rules, and thereupon all the rights under such mining lease, including surface, underground and other rights granted to the lessee shall be deemed to have been transferred to and vested in, the Central Government. (2) On the expiry of the term of any lease, referred to in sub-section (1), such lease shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed, on the same terms and conditions on which the lease was held immediately before the appointed day, by the lessor for the maximum period for which such lease can be renewed under the Mineral Concession Rules. 5. 5. Power of Central Government to direct vesting of rights in a Government company (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 3 and 4, the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that a Government company is willing to comply, or has complied, with such terms and conditions as that Government may think fit to impose, direct, by an order in writing, that the right, title and interest of an owner in relation to a coal mine referred to in Section 3, shall instead of continuing to vest in the Central Government, vest in the Government Company either on the date of publication of the direction or on such earlier or later date (not being a date earlier than the appointed day), as may be specified in the direction. (2) Where the right, title and interest of an owner in relation to a coal mine vest in a government company under sub-section (1), the Government company shall, on and from the date of such vesting be deemed to have become the lessee in relation to such coal mine as in a mining lease in relation to the coal mine had been granted to the Government company and the period of such lease shall be the entire period for which such lease could have been granted under the mineral Concession Rules; and all the rights and liabilities of the Central Government in relation to such coal mine shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the rights and liabilities, respectively, of the Government company. (3) The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 4 shall apply to a lease which vests in a Government company as they apply to a lease vested in the Central Government and references therein to the "central Government" shall be construed as reference to the Government company. 6. Properties vested in the Central Government to be freed from mortgages etc. (1) All property which vests in the Central government or in a Government company under this Chapter shall, by force of such vesting be freed and discharged from any trust obligation, mortgage, charge, lien and all other encumbrances affecting it and any attachment, injunction or decree or order of any Court restricting the use of such property in any manner shall be deemed to have beeri withdrawn. (2) Every mortgagee of any property which has vested under this Act in the Central government or a Government company, and every person holding any charge, lien or other interest in or in relation to any such property shall give, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, an intimation to the Commissioner of such mortgage, charge, lien or other interest. (3) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the mortgagee of any property referred to in sub-section (i) or any other person holding any charge, lien or other interest claim, in accordance with his rights and interests, payment of the mortgage money or other dues, in whole or in part, out of the amount specified in relation to such property in the Schedule, but no such mortgage, charge, lien or other interest shall be enforceable against any property which has vested in the Central Government or the government company. 7. Central Government or Government company not to be liable for prior liabilities. (1) Every liability of the owner, agent, manager or managing contractor of a coal mine, in respect of any period prior to the appointed day, shall be the liability of such owner, agent, manager or managing contractor, asthe case may be, and shall be enforceable against him and not against the central Government or the Government company. (2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that (a) save as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Act, no claim for wages, bonus, royalty, rate, rent, taxes, provident fund, pension gratuity or any other dues in relation to a coal mine in respect of any period prior to the appointed day, shall be enforceable against the Central Government or the Government company; (b) no award, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority in relation to any coal mine passed after the appointed day, but in relation to any matter, claim or dispute which arose before that day, shall be enforceable against the Central Government or the Government Company; (c) no liability for the contravention, before the appointed day, of any provision of law for the time being in force, shall be enforceable against the Central Government or the Government Company. 8. Payment of amount to owners of coal mines. 8. Payment of amount to owners of coal mines. The owner of every coal mine or group of coal mines specified in the second column of the Schedule shall be given by the Central Government, in cash and in the manner specified in Chapter VI, for the vesting in it, under Section 3, of the right, title and interest of the owner in relation to such coal mine or group of coal mines, an amount equal to the amount specified against it in the corresponding entry, in the fifth column of the Schedule. 9. Payment of further amount. (1) In consideration of the retrospective operation of the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5, there shall be given by the Central government, in cash, to the owner of every coal mine or group of coal mines specified in the the Schedule, an amount equal to the amount which would have been, but for the provisions of the said Sections 3, 4 and 5, payable to such owner under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, for the period commencing on the 1st day of may, 1973, and ending on the date on which this Act receives the assent of the President. (2) In addition to the amount referred to in sub-section (1), there shall be given by the Central Government, in cash, to the owner of every coal mine or group of coal mine specified in the Schedule, simple interest at the rate of four per cent per annum on the amount specified against such owner in the corresponding entry in the fifty column of the Schedule for the period commencing on the date on which payment of such amount is made by the Central Government to the Commissioner. (3) The amounts referred to in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall be in addition to the amount specified in the Schedule. " ( 16 ) NOW before proceeding to answer the question that arise for consideration in this writ application, it has to be taken note of that the Estate Officer, after taking into consideration the documents filed on behalf of the parties, came to the following conclusion which are quoted below : (A) Admittedly all the plots are adjoining and the brother of Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla was a colliery namely North Tisra Colliery. There are possibilities of the purchase of the land in the name of Mahabir Prasad agarwalla during the pre-nationalisation period to be used for the colliery purposes. From the uncertified rent rolls granted by the Circle Officer it appears that plots nos. 639, 658 and 695 have been settled in favour of Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla by the circle Officer, Baliapur of course without jurisdiction. However, Mahabir Prasad agarwalla does not claim possession over the above plots. Rent receipts of the year 1989 have been filed. Admittedly excepting few deeds all the documents filed by Mahabir prasad Agarwalla are of post-nationalization period and therefore, the chances of fabrication of those documents are always there and as the property has been vested in the first party under the provisions of the Nationalisation Act then any documents pertainingto the property relating to the postnationalization period does not give any authority to Shri Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla. (B) The documents filed by the first party and the evidence adduced by the first party clearly establish the fact that the premises in question forms a part of the mine by. virtue of the purchases made for that purpose by erstwhile owner as well as by virtue of the user of the property during the pre-nationalisation days for colliery purposes and thereby is in vested property in the BCCL. The possibility that during the process of taking over the Management of the mine the second partys claim of the colliery structures of their own in the form of hard coke bhatta cannot be ruled out. The possibility that during the process of taking over the Management of the mine the second partys claim of the colliery structures of their own in the form of hard coke bhatta cannot be ruled out. ( 17 ) THUS, from a perusal of the order of the Estate Officer, it will be apparent that, no doubt he has taken note of the evidences and the documents filed before him but considering the fact that the Petitioner asserted that the Hard Coke plant was never a part of the mine, the Estate Officer could not have proceeded to hold that the premises in question forms a part of the mine on the basis of a concluding summing up paragraph which reads as follows : to sum up in consideration of the entire facts as also documentary and oral evidences in the matter I find and hold that the premises in question forms a part of the "mine" and thereby it is vested in the Central Government vis-a-vis BCCL under the provisions of the Coal Mines Nationalisation act, 1973 and the occupation of the second party over the premises in question is clearly unauthorized and that being is the second party is liable to be evicted therefrom under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 as the properly belonging to the first party is "public Premises" within the meaning of the "public Premises" as defined in the P. P. Act. The second party is accordingly directed to quit and vacate the premises in question within 15 days from the date of this order failing which the Estate Officer of Lodna Area no. X under the first party is authorized to get the second party evicted from the premises in question even on application of force as may be necessary. R. O. Area No. X Lodna Area under b. C. C. L. is authorized to evict the Opposite party within a fortnight from the date of passing order. Issue Notice u/s. 5 of the Act (under PP Act ). ( 18 ) THE Petitioners case repeatedly is that the Hard Coke Plant was never a part of the Royal Tisra Colliery. Issue Notice u/s. 5 of the Act (under PP Act ). ( 18 ) THE Petitioners case repeatedly is that the Hard Coke Plant was never a part of the Royal Tisra Colliery. In fact, this Court has also not been able to find out any evidence to prove that the Hard Coke Plant in question was actually a part and parcel of the Royal Tisra Colliery or that the Royal tisra Colliery included all that part and parcel of lands over which the Hard Coke Plant was set up. The jurisdiction of the Estate officer is summary in nature. He cannot deliver a judgment within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure or provisions analogous thereto. By holding on the basis of oral evidences and some documents, he could not have given a finding to the effect that the premises in question forms part and parcel of the mine, especially when at Quotation (a) and (b) of para 15 above, he has held that there were possibilities of the purchase of the land in the name of Mahabir prasad Agarwalla during pre-nationalised period to be used for colliery purpose and that there were chances of fabrication. Similarly, he has also stated that the possibility that during the process of taking over of the management of the mine, the Petitioners claim of the colliery structures in the form of Hard Coke Plant cannot be ruled out. ( 19 ) THE aforesaid reasoning of the Estate Officer are based on presumption. Now under Section 5 of the aforementioned Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) act, 1971 it is clear that a Estate officer after following the procedure required to be followed therein and after reaching to a conclusion that a person is in unauthorized occupation of a public premises, he may make an order of eviction. The catch words that cannot be lost track of in this provision are that, all that the Estate Officer is required to do is that he must come to a conclusion that a person is in occupation of an area which is already confirmed or which has already been declared to be a "public premises". He cannot nor does he have the jurisdiction to identify a particular piece of property and then give a finding that, that piece of property is a public property. He cannot nor does he have the jurisdiction to identify a particular piece of property and then give a finding that, that piece of property is a public property. This power is vested only with a Court of competent civil jurisdiction and not in a statutory authority, such as Estate Officer, who has been conferred only with summary powers. If such Estate Officer are allowed to give such finding, it would amount to conferring them with the powers of adjudication and delivery of judgments within the meaning of section 2 (a) read with provisions of Order xiv of the Code of Civil Procedure and/or principles/provisions analogous thereto. ( 20 ) UNDER the provisions of the Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, it is relevant that the same has very limited application and the object of the terms of the said Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorized occupants from different premises by way of summary procedure so that the premises may be made available to the authorities concerned. Whether the hard Coke Plant was a part and parcel of the Royal Tisra Colliery, required an adjudication by a Court of civil jurisdiction and in the absence of an adjudication or a finding of such a Court of civil jurisdiction, the estate Officer could not have held that "i find and hold that the premises in question forms a part of the mine and thereby it is vested in the Central Government, vis-a-vis b. C. C. L. under the provisions of Coal Mines nationalisation Act, 1973. . . . . . . . . " ( 21 ) NOW a "coal Mine" has been defined under Section 2 (b) of the Act of 1973 above and it means a mine in which there exist one or more seams of coal. Similarly, under section 3 thereof, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to and shall vest absolutely in the central Government, free from all encumbrances. Royal Tisra Colliery, undoubtedly, has been entered at Entry No. 183 but whether the Hard Coke Plant was a part and parcel of the Royal Tisra Colliery is a fact which still lies in a maze of doubt. Royal Tisra Colliery, undoubtedly, has been entered at Entry No. 183 but whether the Hard Coke Plant was a part and parcel of the Royal Tisra Colliery is a fact which still lies in a maze of doubt. In the case of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. The Estate Officer and another, a Division bench of this Court had the occasion to deal very extensively in a similar matter. In that case, taking note of the provisions of the public Premises Act, the Division Bench held that taking into consideration the scope, purport and object of the Act, that there cannot be any doubt that the Courts under the Public Premises Act, merely exercise special jurisdiction in relation to the matters confined within the scope of the said act and cannot be said to have plenary jurisdiction. Their Lordships came to that view, after noticing various judgements in paragraphs 26 thereto. ( 22 ) SECTION 10 and Section 15 of the public Premises Act also needs to be taken note of. Section 10 of the said Act provides that orders passed by the Estate Officer or the Appellate Authority under the said Act shall be final, while Section 15 reads as follows :"bar of jurisdiction : No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain suit or proceeding in respect of (a) the eviction or any person who is in unauthorized occupation any public premises, or (b) the removal of any building, structure of figure, or goods, cattle or other animal from any public premises under Sec. 5, or (c) the demolition of any building or other structure made, or ordered to be made under Section 5b, or (d) the arrears of rent payable under subsection (1) of Sec. 7 or damages payable under sub-section (2) or interest payable under sub-section (2-A) of that section. ( 23 ) IN the aforementioned judgment of the Division Bench, it was held that the finality attached to the orders passed under the Act in terms of Section 10 thereto must be given a restricted meaning as was done in the case of K. S. Venkataraman and Company (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras, reported in air 1966 SC 1089 . The Division Bench observed as follows :"it was held in that case that finality clause must be construed in such a manner that it may mean that the orders passed by the authorities become final when the same are passed within the scope, ambit and purport of the Act and in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. " ( 24 ) THE Division Bench also noted the judgment of R. v. Medical Bill Tribunal Ex. (1957) 1 QB 574 at page 583 and noted the words of Denning, J. who held that the word "final" is not enough and that it means only "without recourse to appeal" and that it does not mean "without recourse to certiorari". It was also held therein that the word final makes decision final on the facts and not final on the law. the Division Bench in that context referred to the case of R. v. Crown court of Knights Bridge Ex. P International sporting Club (London) (1981) 3 All ER 317 at page 324. ( 25 ) IN the said judgment of Division bench another paragraph is necessary which is very important and which must be quoted which is paragraph 30 thereto :"there is no doubt that the bar of jurisdiction is of vide amplitude. However, it is to be remembered that the Courts look down with disfavour the attempt on the part of the Parliament to curtail their jurisdiction. In Lee v. Showmens Guild of Great Britain (1952) 2 QB 329 at page 354, Romer LJ held as follows :"the proper tribunals for the determination of legal disputes in this country are the courts, and they are the only tribunals which, by training and experience and assisted by properly qualified advocates, are fitted for the task. The Courts jealously uphold and safeguard the prima facie privilege of every man to resort to them for the determination and enforcement of his legal rights. " ( 26 ) FINALLY, after considering various other judgments, the Division Bench held that the Civil Courts jurisdiction is not barred in considering the question whether the provisions of an Act are applicable or not applicable to a disputed land. " ( 26 ) FINALLY, after considering various other judgments, the Division Bench held that the Civil Courts jurisdiction is not barred in considering the question whether the provisions of an Act are applicable or not applicable to a disputed land. ( 27 ) WE are also in respectful agreement with the observations of the Division Bench referred to above, which after considering a number of judgments, appearing in paragraphs 30 to 35 of the said judgment, finally came to the conclusion that a suit is maintainable beside a ouster clause. ( 28 ) WHILE referring to a judgment of honble Supreme Court of India, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2361 and after having noted the same and after having also noted the judgment of the said Apex Court reported in AIR 1969 SC 439 , the Division Bench held that the Civil Court can go into the question to decide as to whether the defendant had established that he had statutory right and in doing so can determine whether the defendant was a tenant on the relevant date. Thus, it is amply clear that the general law of the country cannot be altered by special legislation and in the facts and circumstances of this case and especially where no evidence has been led to establish that the Hard Coke Plant was a part and parcel of the Royal Tisra Colliery, it would only be appropriate to hold that this aspect must be decided by a Civil Court on the basis of evidences adduced and led before it, regard, especially being had to the fact that from a bare perusal of the definition of a "mine" as contained under Section 2 (h) read with Sections 3, 5 (2) and 8, it is absolutely clear that in terms of the provisions of the Nationalisation Act, only the right, title and interest of owners in relation to a mine can be taken over and be said to be vested. A land which does not belongs to an owner or a mine as has been repeatedly asserted by the petitioners, cannot be said to come within the purview/ambit of the definition of a mine. A land which does not belongs to an owner or a mine as has been repeatedly asserted by the petitioners, cannot be said to come within the purview/ambit of the definition of a mine. It is also clear that under the provisions of the aforementioned Act, compensation is payable to an owner in relation to a mine but no such provision has been made for compensation to any other person, whose, right, title and interest is sought to be taken over by reason of the aforementioned Act, without recording a finding through evidence that the property in question was a part of the mine. Unless there is a finding that the land in question was a part of the mine or adjacent to the mine or that it was used for the purposes of a mine or that It belonged to the owner of the mine, it cannot be said that a person who has nothing to do with the mining operations can come within the ambit of the acquisition clause contained in Section 3 of the Act of 1973. In the instant case, as has already been stated above, the Estate Officer has no doubt dealt with various documents and evidences filed and led by the parties, but from a perusal thereof, it will be evident that there was no evidence led to establish that this Hard Coke Plant formed a part of the royal Tisra Colliery, and, therefore, in the absence of such a finding, the Estate Officer could not have held that the premises in question formed a part of the mine, and therefore, it stood vested in the Central Government. Some of the factors which may have led the Estate Officer to come to the aforesaid conclusion are : (A) The evidence of Witness No. 2 for the b. C. C. L. , who was a haulage operator and who stated that the premises in questions formed part of the Royal Tisra Colliery and that one of the purchasers of the land was ramautar Agarwala who was also the owner of the Colliery. (b) The evidence of Witness No. 4, an employee of B. C. C. L. , who had stated that the property forms part of the colliery and stood vested in the B. C. C. L. ; (c) Witness No. 1 on behalf of the petitioner who has stated that in and around the premises, there are collieries. (d) Witness No. 3 on behalf of the petitioner, who had stated that about 20 yards away there was the Royal Tisra Colliery and in and around the Bhatta there were collieries. ( 29 ) THE Estate Officer, while dealing with the matter and while dealing with the evidence of P. W, 2, has stated that Ramautar agarwalla was an owner of North Tisra Colliery and the possibility of the area having been purchased for coal mining purposes cannot be ruled out and that there are possibilities of the purchase of the land in the name of Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla during the pre-nationalisatlon period. Merely because there were depositions in the manner stated above, it cannot be said that there were clinching evidence before the Estate officer to come to a conclusion that the area in question formed a part of the mine. ( 30 ) MR. AJit Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the Respondents has stated that in view of the evidences that the area was surrounded by collieries it must be deemed to be a mine within the extended definition of mine under Section 2 (h) of the act and in support thereto he has relied upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme court in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. S. S. Prasad reported in (1998) 5 JT (SC) 615 : ( AIR 1999 SC 560 ). We are not persuaded to agree with the argument of Mr. Sinha on the ground that the said judgment related to the machinery/boilers which were of use in connection with mining operations regard being had to the nature of its user. ( 31 ) MR. We are not persuaded to agree with the argument of Mr. Sinha on the ground that the said judgment related to the machinery/boilers which were of use in connection with mining operations regard being had to the nature of its user. ( 31 ) MR. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the Respondents also relied upon the case of B. C. C. L. v. Madhan Lal Agarwala reported in (1997) 1 SCC 177 : ( AIR 1997 sc 1599 ) and submitted that as per the extended meaning of Section 2 (h), all properties or assets which fall within the definition of a mine and which are used over a period of time, irrespective of whether or not they belong to the owner of the mine would vest in the Central Government. We are again not in agreement with the learned counsel for the Respondents inasmuch as at paragraphs 14, 26 and 27, the scope and applicability of the effect of acquisition has been explained and from a perusal thereof it is apparent that wherever the extended definition has been applied, it includes all lands, buildings and equipments belonging to the owners of a mine and adjacent to or situated on the surface of the mine, where washing of the coal or manufacture of coke was carried on. The key words, therefore, are that these lands should belong to the owners of the mine. How does the Estate officer come to a definite conclusion as to whether the owners of the Hard Coke Plant were also the owners of the mine is not very clear. On the contrary, the Estate Officer has held as follows :"admittedly all the plots are adjoining and the brother of Mahablr Prasad Agarwalla was a colliery namely North Tisra Colliery. There are possibilities of the purchase of the land in the name of Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla during the pre-nationalisation period to be used for the colliery purposes. From the uncertified rent rolls granted by the Circle officer it appears that plot Nos. 639, 658 and 695 have been settled in favour of mahabir Prasad Agarwalla by the Circle Officer, Baliapur of course without jurisdiction. However, Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla does not claim possession over the above plots. Rent receipts of the year 1989 have been filed. From the uncertified rent rolls granted by the Circle officer it appears that plot Nos. 639, 658 and 695 have been settled in favour of mahabir Prasad Agarwalla by the Circle Officer, Baliapur of course without jurisdiction. However, Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla does not claim possession over the above plots. Rent receipts of the year 1989 have been filed. Admittedly excepting few deeds all the documents filed by Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla are of post nationalization period and therefore, the chances of fabrication of those documents are always there and as the property has been vested in the first party under the provisions of the Nationalisation Act then any documents pertaining to the property relating to the post nationalization period does not give any authority to Shri Mahabir prasad Agarwalla. Surprisingly the second party did not file the partnership deed in respect of the hard coke plant in question and as a matter of fact no explanation whatsoever in that rgard has also been submitted. However, from the copy of the letter dated 28-5-81 filed by the second party, addressed to the Circle officer, Baliapur wherein the second party has claimed ownership of plot Nos. 641 to 650 only first time it has been disclosed that partners of the hard coke plant are (1) Amar chand (2) Sita Devi (3) Draupadi Devi and (4) Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla. No documents of transfer have also been produced by the second party to establish the fact that the properties purchased by Ram Ratan agarwalla and Ram Dayal Agarwalla were transferred to the second party. The documents filed by the second party do not establish the ownership of the Second Party over the premises in question. " ( 32 ) FINALLY another aspect which cannot be lost site of, are the letters of Bharat Coking Coal Limited written to the Additional collector, Dhanbad in L. A. Case No. 8b of 1979-80 wherein they had requested the said authority to proceed with the acquisition as the lands were urgently required for the purposes connected with mining operations. This Court does not understand as to how such letters were necessary if the lands in question stood vested? If these lands stood vested as per the case of the Respondents, then where was the question of requesting for acquisition under the provisions of the land Acquisition Act? This Court does not understand as to how such letters were necessary if the lands in question stood vested? If these lands stood vested as per the case of the Respondents, then where was the question of requesting for acquisition under the provisions of the land Acquisition Act? The Respondents have, however, stated that the land acquisition proceedings were initiated for acquisition of 46. 56 Acres for mining purposes out of which 43. 52 acres were acquired and remaining 3. 04 acres were dropped from the proceeding. They have further stated that after initiation of the land acquisition proceeding, it was discovered that the remaining portion, namely, 3. 04 acres were vested properties and therefore, the Respondent No. 3 allowed the proceeding with that portion to be dropped. However, from the Gazette notification dropping the proceeding no such reasons have been given. All that, it says is that, out of 46. 56 Acres which had been acquired for B. C. C. L. , 3. 04 acres were being returned. ( 33 ) IN view of the discussions made, this court comes to a finding that the findings recorded by the Estate Officer were neither adequate nor proper and such complicated questions of title could only have been adjudicated upon by a Court of competent civil jurisdiction. From the pleadings made it is apparent that there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the premises are public premises or not and in that view of the matter and taking all facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that it would be in the fitness of things to direct the parties to get their title decided by a competent court of civil jurisdiction. The impugned order passed by the Estate Officer is, accordingly, set aside. ( 34 ) WE are informed at the Bar that the title Suit No. 107 of 1993, reference whereof has been made at paragraph 32 of the writ application, is still pending before the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad. In that view of the matter the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad is directed to take up the said title suit with all expedition and dispose of the same with a period of six months from today on a "day-to-day" hearing basis without giving any adjournment to any of the parties. ( 35 ) WITH the aforementioned observations, this writ petition is disposed of. Order accordingly. ( 35 ) WITH the aforementioned observations, this writ petition is disposed of. Order accordingly. --- *** --- .

BAJRANG HARD COKE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. RAMESH PRASAD