Judgment :- The petitioner prays for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent dated 29.6.1995 and to quash the same. 2. The following facts are sufficient for the disposal of this writ petition:- The petitioner was working as Assistant Engineer with the first respondent/Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. During the year 1982, he applied for leave from 15.9.1982 for 30 days and subsequently he sought for extension of leave from 16.10.1982 to 15.4.1983. This request was however not accepted by the second respondent and the petitioner was directed to join duty forthwith. As he did not rejoin duty, a charge memo dated 8.3.1983 was issued formulating the following two charges:- "Charge-1: Thiru S.Thanikachalam, ADE/Mechl, was unauthorisedly absent from 16.10.1982 to till date. This is a misconduct under Clause 5A (XXVIII) of TNEB-Employees Discipline and appeal Regulation of non-Clerical. Charge-2: The leave applied for by Thiru S.Thanikachalam ADE/M for the period from 16.10.1982 to 15.4.1983 was refused on administrative grounds and he was directed to join duty. But he did not join duty. This accounts to disobedience of orders. This is a misconduct under Clause 5A(1) of TME of employees' Discipline and Appeal Regulations". 3. The petitioner questioned the validity of the charge memo contending that the authority who had issued the charge memo had no jurisdiction to do so. He filed the writ petition in the said context and W.P.No.9843 of 1984 dated 16.12.1994 was allowed in favour of the petitioner with liberty to the respondent to proceed further in accordance with the rules and regulations. On 29.6.1995, the first respondent issued two memos/orders. In the first memo, it was stated that the Board had ordered that without prejudice to the disciplinary proceedings, the order of dismissal dated 29.6.1984 was cancelled and he was reinstated in the Board's service without back wages. By another memo, which is impugned herein it was stated that in pursuance of the judgment of this Court in W.P.No.9843 of 1983, as an enquiry into certain charges against the petitioner was pending, on his reinstatement as Assistant Executive Engineer, he was placed under suspension with immediate effect. 4. The petitioner being aggrieved by the second order of suspension, has come forward with the above writ petition. 4. The petitioner being aggrieved by the second order of suspension, has come forward with the above writ petition. It may be incidentally mentioned here that by virtue of an order of interim stay, the petitioner was given posting with effect from 23.11.1995. He has also been subsequently removed from service consequent upon the disciplinary proceedings and the same has been questioned by him in a separate writ petition. Hence the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service is not the subject matter of this writ petition. 5. In this writ petition, the petitioner is aggrieved by the order of suspension dated 29.6.1995 and considering that he was reinstated in service on 23.11.1995, the scope of this writ petition is actually regarding the entitlement of full salary for the period under suspension. The learned counsel for the petitioner raises the following grounds for consideration:- 1. The order of suspension is purely mala fide as the respondents were aggrieved by the petitioner having approached this Court earlier alleging that the authority who issued the charge memo had no jurisdiction to do so and the petitioner had also succeeded in the said writ petition. 2. Under Regulation 9(a), an employee can be placed under suspension only if there was an eqnuiry into 'grave charges'. Further enquiry into charges could be only after issuing charge memo as envisaged under Regulation (b). 3. Rule 9(d) would come into picture only when the employee concerned is deemed to have been placed under the suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal until further orders and in so far as the petitioner was concerned, the situation did not arise. 4. There was no mention of 'grave charges' being contemplated or pending enquiry. 5.The allegations are of the year 1982 and initiation of the proceedings in the year 1995 was beyond the period of limitation. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, contends that the writ petition itself had become infructuous, considering that the petitioner has been removed from service and he had questioned the same by way of a separate writ petition. He would also contend that the Rules permitted holding further enquiry. As far as the impugned order of suspension was concerned, the said order was passed only in terms of Rule 9(d) and not under Rule 9(a). He would also contend that the Rules permitted holding further enquiry. As far as the impugned order of suspension was concerned, the said order was passed only in terms of Rule 9(d) and not under Rule 9(a). For the same reasons, it is also not necessary to mention 'grave charges' in the order of suspension. 7. Considering the above submissions, the only issue which requires to be decided in this writ petition is the interpretation of Rule 9 in the background of the facts mentioned above. As regards the decision of the respondents in having decided to proceed further by way of a fresh enquiry, apart from the fact that the respondents were given liberty to do so by virtue of the orders of this Court in W.P.No.9843 of 1984, a perusal of Rule 9(d) also makes it clear that the respondent is given power to re-enquire into the charges in the event of the earlier proceedings having been set aside or declared void as a result of the decision of any higher authority or by the Court of Law. Therefore, I am unable to sustain the contention that the proceedings are tainted with mala fides or that the same is barred by limitation. 8. As far as the other points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are concerned, those issues would mainly depend upon the interpretation of Rule-9 and I am inclined to agree that the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents. Rule-9 of Part-1 Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Employee's Discipline and Appeal Regulations are extracted below:- "9. Suspension: (a) A member of a class of service may be placed under suspension from service, where- (i) an enquiry into grave charges against him is contemplated, or is pending, or (ii)a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial and if such suspension is necessary in the public interest. (b) An employee who is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period longer than forty-eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended under this regulation. (b) An employee who is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period longer than forty-eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended under this regulation. (c) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon an employee under suspension is set aside on appeal or on review under these regulations and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (d) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon an employee of the Board is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal/removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. (d) Where a Board employee is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceedings or otherwise) and if any other disciplinary proceedings is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Board employee shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any such proceedings. (e) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this regulation may at any time be revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate". 9. A perusal of the above extract will show that two different situations are contemplated viz., Rule-9(a) would apply for suspending an employee at the stage prior to the commencement of or during the pendency of an enquiry into 'grave charges'. 9. A perusal of the above extract will show that two different situations are contemplated viz., Rule-9(a) would apply for suspending an employee at the stage prior to the commencement of or during the pendency of an enquiry into 'grave charges'. Rule-9(d) deals with the case of an employee who had already been sent out of service by way of either dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and such order had been set aside by higher authorities or by the Court and the authority decides to hold further enquiry on the same allegations/charges. In such circumstances, the appropriate authority is entitled and enabled to decide and hold a further enquiry on the same allegations on which the dismissal/removal was originally ordered and the employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal and the employee shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. 10. The contentions that no charges were pending on the date of the order of suspension and that the non-mentioning of 'grave charges' would be fatal, cannot be sustained in view of the clear language under Rule 9(d). The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty ( AIR 1994 S.C. 2296 ), in support of his contention that an order of suspension cannot be passed in a routine administrative manner or automatically on the framing of charges. The gravity of misconduct sought to be enquired into must be taken into account by the appropriate authority before passing an order of suspension. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the order of suspension in the course of an enquiry and also in the context of the orders passed by the State Administrative Tribunal, Bhuavaneshwar, which required taking prior permission of the Tribunal before suspending the employee. The facts of the present case therefore cannot be compared with the background in which the Supreme Court disposed of the said appeal. That decision can apply to only a case of suspension made in the circumstances as contemplated under Rule 9(a). The facts of the present case therefore cannot be compared with the background in which the Supreme Court disposed of the said appeal. That decision can apply to only a case of suspension made in the circumstances as contemplated under Rule 9(a). To insist that the same charges should be framed or restated again and that it should also be stated that the enquiry related to 'grave charges', would be not only too hypertechnical, but is also an unnecessary exercise having regard to Rule 9(d). When an employee had already been dismissed or removed from service in an earlier enquiry, it goes without saying that the charges are grave enough resulting in major punishment of dismissal. It would be a redundant exercise to insist that charges should be framed again and that it should also be specifically mentioned that enquiry into 'grave charges' were pending. Rule 9(d) is a deeming provision, whereby, when once the authority decides to hold the further enquiry, the earlier charge-memo is automatically revived and the employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal. 11. Therefore, I am unable to find any error in the impugned order of suspension. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected WPMP No.15232 of 1995 is dismissed.