P. C. AGRAWAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a second appeal by the defendant under S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (to be called as "code" only ). ( 2 ) BHOLARAM (R. 1) and late Nanhu were brothers. Jamuna Bai (the appellant), is widow of late Nanhu. Bholaram (R. 1) had filed a civil suit for declaration of his title and that the appellant had no right to get partitioned khasra Nos. 7, 121, 125 and 160 area 44. 25 acres land revenue Rs. 119. 99 paise situate at village Jogla, Tehsil narsurullhaganj, District Sehore (to be called as "suit land" only ). Such a civil suit no. 14-A/83 (Bholaram v. Jamuna Bai and another by the Civil Judge, Class II, narsurgullahganj), was dismissed and both bholaram {r. 1) and Smt. Jamuna Bai (appellant) were found to be joint owners of the suit lands. However, Civil Appeal No. 14-A/93 (Bholaram v. Smt. Jamuna Bai and another) was allowed on 24-3-1995 by the Second addl. District Judge, Sehore Camp narsurullahganj and Bholaram (R. 1) was declared the sole owner of the suit land and smt. Jamuna Bai (the appellant) was held to have no right or title in the suit lands,2. As per plaint, Nanhu had died in June 1947 when Hindu Womens' Right to Property act 1937 was not in force in Bhopal (to be called as "act" only ). Both Bholaram (R. 1) and late Nanhu formed a co-parcenary. As late Nanhu had no male issue. Bholaram succeeded to the whole property by survivership. As per plaint after the death of late Nanhu neither Smt. Jamuna Bal (appellant) his widow nor Geeta Bal (who is not a party to the suit), his daughter did acquire any right or title In the suit lands. It was claimed that as Smt. Jamuna Bai (appellant) had applied for partition in revenue court, a civil suit for declaration of title had to be filed Bholaram (R. 1 ). ( 3 ) ON the other hand appellant disputed that Bholaram (R. I) and his brother late nanhu ever formed a coparcenary. According to her they were co-owners of equal shares. The whole land did not pass to bholaram {r. 1) by survivorship. ( 3 ) ON the other hand appellant disputed that Bholaram (R. I) and his brother late nanhu ever formed a coparcenary. According to her they were co-owners of equal shares. The whole land did not pass to bholaram {r. 1) by survivorship. According to her after death of her husband Smt. Jamuna Bai (appellant) has been in possession of V6 share of the auit land and has been cultivating the same with the help of her son-in-law and servants. Her name continued since 1948 in revenue papers with the knowledge and consent of Bholaram (R, 1 ). Both Smt. Jamuna Bai (appellant) and bholaram (R. 1) had sold some property jointly and had shared the price also jointly. According to her she had acquired right in 1/2 share by long, open and peaceful possession. She claimed her exclusive possession of an area 3. 98 acres out of 7. 88 acres area of khasra No. 7 and on area 18-25 acres out of 33. 90 acres, out of khasra 180. It was claimed that the son-in-law of Smt, Jamuna bai (appellant) was sent to Jail as Bholaram (R. 1) withdrew his surety bond and thus she had applied for division of land. As already seen the stand of Bholaram (R. 1) was negatived by the trial Court while the first appellate court agreed with him. ( 4 ) IN this second appeal the following substantial question of law was framed :"whether the title of the appellant as she was in possession perfected into full ownership after coming into force of the Hindu succession Act"?. ( 5 ) OBVIOUSLY to decide the question, operation of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. has to be decided in the present case. It reads as follows :"properjy of a female Hindu to be her absolute property. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. has to be decided in the present case. It reads as follows :"properjy of a female Hindu to be her absolute property. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation: In this sub-section "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court of under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. "analysis of this provision would show that female Hindu would become a full owner in case (1) she is in possession of property (2) whether the same is acquired before or after the commencement of the Act. The provision has a very wide scope. Under Explanation " property" includes both movable and immovable property and mode of acquisition is also very widely defined including (1) by inheritance, (2) by device, (3) at a partition, (4) in lieu of maintenancer or arrears of mainteriarice. . (5) by gift by any person whether relative or not, before at or after her marriage, (6) by her own skill or exertion, (7) by purchase, (8) by prescription and (9) by any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as 'stridhana' immediately before the commencement of the Act. Obviously, sub-sec. (2) is a proviso to sub-section (l) and is applicable only when any property is acquired under some instrument like gift, Will or other instrument or decree, order or award of the court which prescribes a restriction by its own terms. Obviously, sub-sec. (2) is a proviso to sub-section (l) and is applicable only when any property is acquired under some instrument like gift, Will or other instrument or decree, order or award of the court which prescribes a restriction by its own terms. However, in cases where such a female has 'any_ pre-existing right' to hold the property otherwise than under such an instrument, S. 14 (2) is not applicable. ( 6 ) THE core question in such cases would be whether the widow was in possession of the property on 17-6-1965, the date on which the Act came into force, and she had some vestige of right or some title to hold the property. Possession in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance seems to be enough for the purpose. Of course, the widow should not be a mere trespasser having no right to possess or should not have remarried Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu AIR 2000 SC 434 and Shreelal v. Laltln 1967 MPLJ (SN) 50 or should not have divested her rights to someone before advent of the Act. A limited ownership is sine qua non for application for provision, Bai Vajia v. Thakor Bhai AIR 1979 sc 993 and 1960 JLJ 731 (Sic ). Existence of right on the date on which the Act into force is necessary. Munshi Singh v. Sohan bai AIR 1989 SC 1179 . ( 7 ) AT this juncture it has to be examined as to what is the meaning of 'possession' under S. 14 (1) of the Act. Of course such possession must be as of a right. Some vestige of a claim or a right must exist. The widow should not be a rank trespassers dlndayalv. Rajaram AIR 1970 SC 1019 . She must have possession on the date of advent of the Act. Such possession must be in presenti. Mere right to future possession would not do Mst. Janku v. Kisan AIR 1959 madh-Pra 1 : 1958 MPLJ 756 : 1958 Jab LJ 864. Of course illegal possession of a female cannot be validated by the provisions erammav. Verrupanna AIR 1961 SC 1879. However, actual physical possession is not necessary, Mahesh v. Dhaupal (1974 MPLJ 544) (Sic) Mangal Singh v. Rattno AIR 1967 sc 1786 . Personal occupation need not be proved only limited ownership has to be proved. Of course illegal possession of a female cannot be validated by the provisions erammav. Verrupanna AIR 1961 SC 1879. However, actual physical possession is not necessary, Mahesh v. Dhaupal (1974 MPLJ 544) (Sic) Mangal Singh v. Rattno AIR 1967 sc 1786 . Personal occupation need not be proved only limited ownership has to be proved. It includes right to possession, constructive possession or possession in any form recognised by law. Shobhalaxrni v. Ram laxmi AIR 1959 SC 577 (Sic ). Thus, Joint possession with her brother-in-law is sufficient to attract the provision. Possession of a share of her husband of her husband in joint family property in lieu of maintenance is sufficient to apply the provision. For the applicability of the provision, two conditions must co-exist namely : (1) the concern female Hindu must be in possession of the property and (2) such property must be possessed by her as a limited owner. A mere spes successionis or mere chance to succeed is not enough Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh AIR 2000 SC 1908 at page 1912. ( 8 ) TRUE it is that Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 1937 was applied to the State of Bhopal, a Part "c" State, on 26th December 1949, by virtue of the Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949. In other words, this Act was not applicable to area then within bhopal State in year 1947 when late Nanhu had died and succession had opened. It is true that Hindu Women's Rights to Property act, 1937 gave the widow right of inheritance similar to a son and created a limited interest known as Hindu women's estate with the right to claim partition as a male member has. Obviously, late Nanhu had died on 1947. Thus, succession opened in 1947 and the benefit of the Act is not available to Smt. Jamuna Bai, the appellant. Any how, even then the appellant being widow of late Nanhu, who had a share in coparcenery immovable property clearly had a right of maintenance out of the property of her late husband. Please see Section 559 (1) of the Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla which reads as follows : "559. Any how, even then the appellant being widow of late Nanhu, who had a share in coparcenery immovable property clearly had a right of maintenance out of the property of her late husband. Please see Section 559 (1) of the Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla which reads as follows : "559. Widow's rjght of maintenance, (1) A widow, who does not succeed to the estate of her husband as his heir, is entitled to maintenance (I) out of her husband's separate property ; also (II) out of property in which he was a coparcener at the time of his death. " unvder old Hindu Law the widow had at least a right to maintenance out of her husband's estate whether such estate was in the hands of his male issue or in the hands of his coparceners. The coparcener in possession of such estate was liable to maintain the widow "not because he was under an obligation to maintain her but because he has in his hands her husband's estate". Thus, obviously, even if Smt. Jamuna Bal did not succeed as a heir to her husband, she had a right-to maintenance out of the property of her husband which was in the hands of Bholaram (R, 1 ). ( 9 ) A very expansive and liberal construction was put by the Apex Court in V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977 SC 1944 to Section 14 (1) of the Act. To understand the approach of the Apex Court, it is beneficial to quote Hon'ble Fazal Ali, J. : (1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. To understand the approach of the Apex Court, it is beneficial to quote Hon'ble Fazal Ali, J. : (1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow; (2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i. e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil Court; (3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance; (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 and is, therefore, a pre-existing right; (5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner, in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to property or purchase the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance. " ( 10 ) IN Vijay Pal Singh v. Dy. Director of consolidation, AIR 1996 SC 146 the Apex court held in para 5 at page 147 :"5. IT is settled law that the widow is entitled only to limited estate for maintenance. " ( 10 ) IN Vijay Pal Singh v. Dy. Director of consolidation, AIR 1996 SC 146 the Apex court held in para 5 at page 147 :"5. IT is settled law that the widow is entitled only to limited estate for maintenance. By operation sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, her limited estate enlarged into absolute right as she was in possession when the Act into force. Thereby, she becomes the absolute owner of the property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The entries in the revenue record corroborate the same. Thereby she became the absolute owner. " ( 11 ) OBJECTIVE of the provision is to remove disparity and injustice to which females were subjected under the Hindu law. Section 14 (1) was used as a tool to undo put injustice to elevate her to equal status with the dignity of person at par with man gumpa v. Jai Bai, (1994) 2 SCC 511 at page 514. ( 12 ) SUCH a view of Apex Court has been consistently followed in Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai, AIR 1979 SC 993 wherein a widow's right to maintenance was held to be a pre-existing right. It can amount to a right to property. It is an inherent right conferred by the Hindu Law and any property given to her in lieu of maintenance is merely in recognition of the claim or right which the widow possessed from before. Raghubar singh v. Gulab Singh, AIR 1998 SC 2401 maintained that a Hindu widow has a right of maintenance under the Shastric Hindu law. Actually Hindu Women's Rights to Property act, 1937 and Hindu Married Women's right to Separate Maintenance and Rest-dence act, 1946 (Act No. 19 of 1946) did not create ,a new right of maintenance but merely gave statutory recognition to a pre-existing right. Such a right flows from the social and temporal relationship between husband and wife. Apex Court held that Tulsamma's case, air 1977 SC 1944 (supra) has held the field till date and referred to Ramkali (Smt.) v. Choudhary Ajit Shankar, (1997) 9 SCC 613 and Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli pedda Verrapa (Dead) by L. Rs. (1997) 10 SCC 673 : AIR 1997 SC 2311 ). Recently, balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh. AIR 2000 sc 1908 has also affirmed the same view. (1997) 10 SCC 673 : AIR 1997 SC 2311 ). Recently, balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh. AIR 2000 sc 1908 has also affirmed the same view. ( 13 ) OUR own High Court has also consistently followed the ratio of Tulsamma's case (supra), Nima Bai v. Dulari, (1978) II mpwn 297, Ravi Shanker v, Pethia Amritlal. (1978 Jab LJ (SN) 56; Ramsingh v. Ambaram, 1979 (1) MPWN 39, Nanhibai v. Sahawani, (1981) II MPWN 250, Revabai v. Sitaram, 1984 Jab LJ 486 : 1984 MPLJ 81 : air 1984 M. P. 102, Padmavatibai v. Shyamlal, (1985 MP 474 (sic), Dharamvati baiv. Shiv Singh, AIR 1991 MP 18 18, Prembai v. Hukum Chand, 1992 MPLJ 60 , kanhaiyalal v. Ram Kunwar Bai, 1994 Jab lj 223 : 1995 MPJL 998, Ramthir Bai (Smt.) v. Radha Bai Kumari, 1996 RN 347 and ramesh Prasad v. Bhagwatibai, 2001 (4) mpht 141 . ( 14 ) NOW the question is whether appellant jamuna Bai has become full owner of half share in the property under the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Act. Here in the present case, Bholaram (R. 1) and late nanhu were brothers. Admittedly suit properties were ancestral. After death of father names of both the brothers were entered in the revenue papers. After death of late nanhu name of his widow Smt. Jamuna Bai (the appellant) remained continuously entered in revenue papers since 1948. She remained in possession of the suit land continuously since 1948 to the date of suit. Her name remained continuously entered in revenue papers since 1948. Obviously Smt. Jamuna Bal partook in certain transfer with bholaram, signed the sale deeds as co- executant and shared the price. There is consistent evidence on record to show that smt. Jamuna Bai (appellant) lived jointly with Bholaram (R. 1) her brother-in-law and shared usufruct of the suit land for her maintenance. There has been no evidence that Smt. Jamuna Bai was ever ousted from the suit land or ever abandoned her rights in the same. Thus, obviously Smt. Jamuna bai was neither a rank trespasser nor a mere licensee. She was a limited owner initially whose interest had become absolute on advent of the Act 1956. ( 15 ) THUS, the question has to be answered in affirmative. As such the appeal is allowed and civil suit filed by Bholaram (R. 1) is hereby dismissed with costs throughout. She was a limited owner initially whose interest had become absolute on advent of the Act 1956. ( 15 ) THUS, the question has to be answered in affirmative. As such the appeal is allowed and civil suit filed by Bholaram (R. 1) is hereby dismissed with costs throughout. Advocate's fee as per schedule. Appeal allowed. .