Judgment V.M.Jain, J. 1. This regular second appeal has been filed by the defendants against the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, whereby the suit for possession by way of ejectment of the defendants, filed by the plaintiffs, was decreed by the learned trial Court and the appeal filed by the defendants was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge. 2. The facts in brief are that the plaintiffs filed a suit for possession by way of ejectment of the defendants from the first floor of SCO No.463-64, Sector 35-C, Chandigarh and for the recovery of Rs.50,000/- towards rent and damages etc. It was alleged that the plaintiffs were owners and landlords of the aforesaid SCO and that the defendants had taken the same on lease through rent deed dated 2.1.1998 at a monthly rent of Rs.6000/-. It was alleged that the defendants were irregular in paying the rent and thereupon the plaintiffs requested the defendants to vacate the premises but of no avail and finally the plaintiffs got issued notice dated 15,3.1990, which was duly received by the defendants and in spite of the notice, the defendants failed to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of (he demised premises. It was alleged that the sewerage connection to the demised premises was sanctioned and granted, vide letter dated 14.5.1986 and as such the building was exempt from the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) as applicable to Chandigarh. 3. The said suit was contested by the defendants by filing the joint written statement. It was alleged that 9 companies had taken the premises in question on lease through lease deed dated 2.1.1998 for a period of six years expiring on 31.12.1993 and as such the suit was premature and liable to be dismissed. On merits, the ownership of the plaintiffs was admitted and taking of the premises on rent was also admitted. It was denied that the defendants had violated the terms and conditions of the agreement or were irregular in making the payments. It was alleged that the premises were not exempted from the provisions of the Rent Act. 4. On merits, the ownership of the plaintiffs was admitted and taking of the premises on rent was also admitted. It was denied that the defendants had violated the terms and conditions of the agreement or were irregular in making the payments. It was alleged that the premises were not exempted from the provisions of the Rent Act. 4. After hearing both sides, the learned trial Court found that the building in question was exempted from the provisions of the Rent Act, inasmuch as the sewerage connection was sanctioned only on 15,5.1986 and the present suit was filed on 20.8.1990 within the exemption period of five years and as such the provisions of Rent Act were not applicable. It was further found that the lease had been terminated by a valid notice. Resultantly, the suit for possession by ejectment was decreed. Aggrieved against the same, the defendants filed the appeal before the learned District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge, after hearing both sides, up-held the findings of the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the defendants. Aggrieved against the same, the defendants have filed the present regular second appeal in this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, has submitted before me that the provisions of the Rent Act were applicable to the present case, inasmuch as the plaintiffs had failed to show that the sewerage connection was sanctioned within five years of the filing of suit. It was submitted that the sanction order produced on the record was issued by the Estate Officer whereas under the Rules, the Chief Administrator was required to issue the sewerage connection. However, I find no force in this submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. The plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence on the record to show that the sewerage connection was granted by the Estate Officer, Chandigarh on 15.5.1986 and as such the date of completion of the building shall be recorded from 15.5.1986 and the suit having been filed on 20.8.1990, the same was well within the prescribed period of exemption of five years. The plaintiffs had examined PW2 Bodh Raj, Works Munshi of the Public Health, Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh and PW3 Thakur Dass Sharma, Junior Assistant, who produced the official record to show that the sewerage connection was granted to the plaintiffs on 14/15.5.1986. The plaintiffs had examined PW2 Bodh Raj, Works Munshi of the Public Health, Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh and PW3 Thakur Dass Sharma, Junior Assistant, who produced the official record to show that the sewerage connection was granted to the plaintiffs on 14/15.5.1986. The question as to whether the sewerage connection could be sanctioned by the Estate Officer or was required to be sanctioned by the Chief Administrator, in my opinion, would not be relevant for the purposes of deciding the present appeal. As per the official records, the sewerage connection was released/sanctioned to the plaintiffs on 14/15.5.1986. There is nothing on the record to show that the sewerage connection was released to the petitioner by the Chief Administrator at any earlier point of time or at any other time. If only the sewerage connection issued/sanctioned by the Chief Administrator is to be considered, then it can be said that in fact no sewerage connection has so far been issued to the plaintiffs. However, as referred to above, as per the official record the sewerage connection was issued/sanctioned to the plaintiffs on 14/15.5.1986, may be by the Estate Officer. In the present appeal, we are concerned as to on which date the sewerage connection was issued, for the purposes of considering, the date of completion of the building so as to consider whether the exemption of five years was applicable to the building in question at the time when the suit for possession was filed by the plaintiffs. In the present proceedings, the legality of the order passed by the Estate Officer releasing/sanctioning the sewerage connection is not an issue. As referred to above, if it is held that the order passed by the Estate Officer sanctioning/releasing the sewerage connection is no order in the eyes of law, even then the defendants cannot lake any benefit inasmuch as by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the building was not exempted from the operation of the Rent Act, at the time of filing of the suit, inasmuch as nothing has come on the record to show that prior to 14/15.5.1986 the sewerage connection had been sanctioned/released in respect of the said building by the Chief Administrator or any other competent authority. 6. 6. In view of the my detailed discussion above, I hold that the building in question was exempted from the operation of the Rent Act at the time of filing of the suit. 7. It was further submitted before me by the learned counsel for the appellants that notice of termination of the tenancy was defective, inasmuch as it had been issued to the defendants through Shri V.K.Sood. It was submitted that Shri V.K. Sood had ceased to have any connection with the appellant companies at the relevant tune. However, I find no force in this submission as well of the learned counsel for the appellants. After considering the entire evidence led by the parties, the learned Additional District Judge had found that a persual of the rent deed would show that the demised premises were taken on rent by 9 companies through . Shri V.K.Sood. It was found that the rent deed was accepted by Shri V.K.Sood on behalf of the said companies in various capacities, as Chairman, Managing Director, Proprietor and/or partner etc. It was also found by the learned Additional District Judge that it was not a case where Shri V.K.Sood had denied the receipt of the notice, copy of which is Ex.P2 and it was sent to all the 9 companies. It was found by the learned Additional District Judge that in other words, all the 9 companies were joint tenants. The learned Additional District Judge, after placing reliance on the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, in the case reported as "Kanji Manji v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay", A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 468, had found that where there was joint tenancy, notice to terminate the lease to one of the joint tenants was sufficient. I agree with the reasoning given by the learned Additional District Judge in this regard. In my opinion, the notice served upon the defendant-companies through Shri V.K.Sood would be sufficient notice to all the defendant-companies especially when said Shri V.K.Sood had admittedly received the said notice and in fact said Shri V.K.Sood had accepted the lease agreement on behalf of all the companies in various capacities. Thus, in my opinion, the plaintiffs had rightly cancelled the tenancy of the defendants by serving notice for determining the lease of the defendants. 8. Thus, in my opinion, the plaintiffs had rightly cancelled the tenancy of the defendants by serving notice for determining the lease of the defendants. 8. It has then been submitted before me by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants were protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer Property Act. However, I find, no force in this submission as well as of the learned counsel for the appellants. Admittedly it was a case of lease and not a case of transfer of immovable property by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants. The question of the defendants having taken possession of the demised premises in part performance of the agreement, in my opinion, would not arise on the facts and circumstances of the present case. In my opinion, the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to the present case, which pertains to the lease by virtue of which the plaintiffs had leased out the premises to the defendants. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge had rightly held that the ingredients of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, were not proved and that Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. No other point has been urged before me in this appeal. 10. I find no illegality in the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, which may require interference by this Court in the present regular second appeal. Even otherwise, no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. 11. In view of the above, finding no merit in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.