JUDGMENT Tapen Sen, J.-Heard the parties. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur have challenged the award dated 26.9.1996 (pronounced on 7.11.1996) as contained at Annexure 1 and passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 18 of 1987, by reason whereof the dismissal of the concerned workman (respondent No.2) was set aside and he was reinstated with full back wages with all intervening increments, continuity in service and all other benefits that he would have earned, had he continued in service of the Company. The order of reinstatement and payment of entire back wages was directed to be given effect to together with increments stated above within six weeks from the date of the award. Over and above the aforesaid, the petitioners were directed to pay an amount of Rs. 10,0001- as costs of litigation to the respondent No.2. In the event the award was not implemented within the period indicated above, the Presiding Officer further ordered that the workman shall be entitled to realize the emoluments with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the order dated 14.3.1990 delivered on a preliminary issue, by reason whereof it was held that the domestic enquiry had not been conducted fairly, properly and according to the principles of natural justice. 3. In the backdrop of the reliefs sought for in the instant writ application, it would be necessary to look into the facts of this case, which, incidentally, appears to have had a chequered history. 4. The facts of the case is that on or about 30.3.1984 a memorandum was issued upon the Respondent No.2, describing the same to be the chargesheet, bearing No. AOP/1390/5, by which the respondent No. 2 was asked to show cause as to why disciplinary action be not taken against him for an act amounting to misconduct within the meaning of Standing Order No. 23. The misconduct alleged was that Holding No. 219, Block 'A' Sonari bastee, measuring 308 square feet had been unauthorisedly purchased by the Respondent No.2, although this holding was meant purely for residential purposes. He unauthorisedly converted the same into a commercial holding by opening five shops after encroaching the company's vacant land and did acts of addition and alteration to the building without obtaining any permission for the same. He unauthorisedly converted the same into a commercial holding by opening five shops after encroaching the company's vacant land and did acts of addition and alteration to the building without obtaining any permission for the same. The charge further alleged that the present area under occupation was 500 square feet approximately whereas the alleged area was only 308 square feet. A further charge was levelled to the extent that the Respondent No. 2 had encroached upon an area measuring 50' x 10' on the year and had built a compound wall enclosing the aforementioned encroached land. 5. The facts as narrated in the writ petition, further discloses that on receipt of reply from the Respondent No.2, the same was found to be unsatisfactory and accordingly a departmental proceeding was initiated and an enquiry was held in which Respondent No. 2 participated and finally on 30.8.1994 the Enquiry Officer submitted his report, finding the Respondent No. 2 guilty of the charges leveled against him. 6. It appears that subsequently the management passed an order discharging the Respondent No. 2 from service with effect from 30.11.1994 vide Annexure 6 to the writ application. 7. This apparently gave rise to a dispute which ultimately culminated in a reference being made by the appropriate government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur vide Reference Case No. 18 of 1987. By an award dated 18.6.1991, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur delivered his award holding inter alia that the management had failed to establish the charge of misconduct against the work and had also failed to establish that the land on holding No. 219 of Block 'A', Sonari Bastee was purchased or encroached or used by the Respondent No.2. The Presiding Officer, however, after having given the aforesaid finding, observed that the relationship between the parties was strained and the workman being a technical (electrician) would have lost his skill within the period of more than six years of his dismissal and so the award of reinstatement did not appear proper. The Labour Court further observed that in lieu of reinstatement the workman concerned should be compensated monetarily by awarding a sum of Rs. 75,000/- for the past and Rs. 25,000/- for future, thereby totaling the amount of compensation to be Rs.1,00,000/-. 8. The Labour Court further observed that in lieu of reinstatement the workman concerned should be compensated monetarily by awarding a sum of Rs. 75,000/- for the past and Rs. 25,000/- for future, thereby totaling the amount of compensation to be Rs.1,00,000/-. 8. It appears that due to some reason or other, although the award had been dictated on 18.6.1991, the same had not been pronounced and therefore, Respondent No.2 filed a writ petition being 6860 of 1991 before the Patna High Court for a direction that the award should be published but since the award, in the meantime, had already been published, the writ petition consequentially became infructuous. 9. The petitioner, in the meantime, also deposited the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in the High Court at Patna. It appears and as has been stated at paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Writ Petition that on 5.10.1994, the High Court passed an order in C.W.J.C. No. 6860 of 1991 that the writ petition had become infructuous but at the same time ordered that this should, however, not prevent the right of the petitioner to challenge the same by filing a separate writ application. Consequently the Respondent NO.2 filed a separate writ petition before the Patna High Court being C.W.J.C. No. 9169 of 1994 and after hearing the parties, by an order dated 2.12.1994 as contained at Annexure 9, the High Court held that the determination of the compensation by the Labour Court was totally without any consideration of the material factors and therefore, unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the award was set aside only in so far as it related to the fixation of the amount of compensation and the matter was remanded with a limited extent directing the Labour Court to redetermine the amount of compensation which should be paid to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement. 10. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned order of the High Court, the respondent No. 2 then preferred S.L.P. No. 26788 of 1995 and by an order dated 15.12.1995 the Supreme Court observed as follows : "The High Court has remanded the case back to the Labour Court for redetermining the question of reinstatement. It will be open to the petitioner to also raise the question once again before the Labour Court that he is entitled to reinstatement. The High Court order shall stand modified to the above extent. It will be open to the petitioner to also raise the question once again before the Labour Court that he is entitled to reinstatement. The High Court order shall stand modified to the above extent. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of." 11. By a subsequent order passed on 5.1.1996, the Supreme Court modified the abovementioned order dated 15.12.1995 by clarifying that the word 'reinstatement' appearing in the second line of the order dated 15.12.1995 should be read as 'compensation'. 12. After the aforesaid orders were passed and upon remand, the petitioner filed an application before the Labour Court stating that they had surplus man power and if the Respondent No. 2 was reinstated, he too would become surplus and in that view of the matter they stated that instead of normal relief of reinstatement, compensation be allowed to the concerned workman. The aforementioned application is Annexure 13 appended to the writ application. Paragraph 5 of that application is perhaps necessary to be considered in as much as the management while filing the said petition, have stated that when the order of termination was found to be unjustified and invalid, the normal relief to be allowed to the workman is reinstatement, but in exceptional circumstances, it was entirely within the discretion of the Lahbour Court to decline the relief of reinstatement and instead, allow the workman money compensation. At paragraph 4, the management also stated that the only limited question that was before the Labour Court was whether the workman was entitled to reinstatement or whether he was entitled to money compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Having made the aforesaid statements in the aforesaid application, the management stated at various paragraphs that there was surplus man power for whom there was no employment or job in the Company and if reinstatement was ordered, the Company would not be in a position to find a job for the concerned workman. However, in Annexure 12 which is the deposition of Management Witness No.1, namely, Dhananjay Kumar, it is apparent that he made a statement before the Labour Court at paragraph 5 that the surplus employees, some of whom who were in the same department where the Respondent No. 2 was working, the management had placed them as Electricians, fitters etc. in other departments. This statement of the management witness, therefore, attains a lot of significance in this case. 13. in other departments. This statement of the management witness, therefore, attains a lot of significance in this case. 13. What is extremely important to note in this case, is that by reason of his earlier award dated 18.6.1991, the Labour Court on the basis of evidences came to a definite conclusion that the management had failed to establish that the land in question had been purchased or encroached or used by the concerned workman and consequently had failed to establish the charge of misconduct levelled against him. In that award, he passed an order of money compensation in lieu of reinstatement but on remand in the manner stated above, the Labour Court passed the impugned award which is subject matter of this writ application. The impugned award, at paragraph 12, records a finding to the effect that, the workman had been held innocent, and his dismissal from the company unjustified and in that view of the matter, the normal relief to be allowed was reinstatement and only in exceptional circumstances it was within the discretion of the Labour Court to decline the relief of reinstatement and instead allow money compensation. In fact, this was what the management also said in Annexure 13 referred to above. This discretion has now been exercised and the normal rule as admitted by the management in the aforementioned application at paragraph 13 has been applied. The Labour Court has also taken into consideration the evidence of the aforementioned management witness, who apart from paragraph 5 in his deposition had also stated at paragraph 6 therein that the respondent No.2 could be placed Dr. deployed in some other department. The Labour Court, therefore, correctly held that the relief of compensation was an alternative relief and after having applied his considered mind, the Labour Court correctly therefore gave his award that the order of dismissal be set aside and the workman be reinstated with all back wages together with all intervening increments, continuity of service and all benefits that he would have earned had he continued in service of the Company. 14. While concluding, this Court would like to refer to the case of Jitendra Singh vs. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 976. 14. While concluding, this Court would like to refer to the case of Jitendra Singh vs. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 976. The Supreme Court has held at paragraph 4 that under Section 11 (A) of the Industrial Disputes Act wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in matters relating to awarding of relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not enjoy such power though as a superior court it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinize the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well expected limitation and, therefore, it can in an appropriate case quash the award of the tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and direction, if any. The Supreme Court has also held that the High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal. 15. In yet another judgment, in the case of Calcutta Port Shramik Union vs. Calcutta River transport Association and others, reported in AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2168 the Supreme Court at paragraph 10 of the said judgment has held that: "The object of enacting the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and of making provision therein to refer disputes to tribunals for settlement is to bring about industrial peace. Whenever a reference is made by a Government to an industrial tribunal it has to be presumed ordinarily that there is a genuine industrial dispute between the parties which requires to be resolved by adjudication. In all such cases an attempt should be made by Courts exercising powers of judicial review to sustain as far as possible the awards made by industrial tribunals instead of picking holes here and there in the awards on trivial points and ultimately frustrating the entire adjudication process before the tribunals by striking down awards on hypertechnical grounds. Unfortunately the order of the single judge and of the Division Bench have resulted in such frustration and have made the award fruitless on an untenable basis." 16. Unfortunately the order of the single judge and of the Division Bench have resulted in such frustration and have made the award fruitless on an untenable basis." 16. Be it recorded that the aforementioned judgments which were cited by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.2 were given notice of during the course of arguments to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the aforementioned judgments are not applicable in the present facts and circumstances of this case. However, this Court does not accept the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court have laid down the broad parameters of the scope of judicial reivew in so far as interference in awards given by Tribunals are concerned and in that view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the award in question. 17. Taking into consideration the, history of the litigation, the management shall now proceed to implement the judgment, regard especially being had to the fact that almost eighteen years have passed from the date when the Respondent No.2 stood dismissed from service. At this stage Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a judgment of this Court passed in the case of Management of West Bokaro Collieries of M/s. TISCO Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, reported in 1997 (2) P.L.J.R. 275 . Placing reliance on paras 9 to 11 thereof, Mr. K.B. Sinha submitted that apparently in the instant case the workman had been dismissed from service on 13.11.1984 and he raised the industrial dispute on 18.2.1985 and the Central Government referred the dispute for adjudication for the first time on 28.7.1987 and after almost four years, i.e., on 18.6.1991 the first award was pronounced whereafter the Respondent No.2 moved the High Court, filed two writ petitions and also moved the Supreme Court whereafter the second award was pronounced in 1996. The submission of Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner was that almost eleven years were lost for no fault on the part of the management and, therefore, for the intervening period the management should not be saddled with the payment of full back wages. The aforementioned submission of Mr. The submission of Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner was that almost eleven years were lost for no fault on the part of the management and, therefore, for the intervening period the management should not be saddled with the payment of full back wages. The aforementioned submission of Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner is not convincing, because in paragraph 11 of the aforementioned judgment reported in 1997 (2) P.L.J.R. 275 , the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein was that no demand had been submitted to the management for raising the dispute and therefore, it shall be treated as if no demand had been raised. In that case, the learned counsel had submitted that had the workman submitted a demand before raising the industrial dispute, the management would have taken appropriate decision and in that case there would not have been payment of back wages as awarded by the Tribunal. In the instant case, from the own showing of the writ petitioner at paragraph 35, the demand had been raised before the management on 18.2.1985. 18. Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that on account of the delay that has taken place during the intervening period, the management should not be saddled for payment of back wages. 19. This argument of Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner would have been of much force had it been a case where they had been able to establish beyond doubt that the concerned workman had actually committed the misconduct. From the pleadings made and from the records which are available it is apparent that the management had miserably failed to prove the misconduct. In fact, the management has totally failed to establish the charges against the concerned workman. In that view of the matter, there is no reason why the concerned workman should suffer. This Court does not accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was because of the fault on the part of the concerned workman that this delay had occurred. Approaching a Court of law cannot be said to be a fault on the part of a person. This Court does not accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was because of the fault on the part of the concerned workman that this delay had occurred. Approaching a Court of law cannot be said to be a fault on the part of a person. The concerned workman has been very vigilant and if by efflux of time, the dispute was finally concluded after a number of years by an Award, then for that the concerned workman cannot be blamed. This Court, therefore, rejects the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. At this stage, Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner informs the Court that during the pendency of the proceedings before one Court or the other, a substantial amount of money has either been deposited or paid to the concerned workman. If this be so, then it goes without saying that whatever amount is found to be payable to the respondent No.2 upon reinstatement, the amounts which have already been paid shall be accordingly deducted from the final calculations. 21. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.