G. ROHINI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 22-3-2000 made in i. A. No. 1630 of 1996 in O. S. No. 1503 of 1994 on the file of the court of the 10th Junior civil Judge, City Civil court at Hyderabad, whereunder the delay of 70 days in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC to set aside the ex parte decree has been condoned. Aggrieved by the said order the plaintiff has come up with the present Civil Revision petition. ( 2 ) O. S. NO. 1503 of 1994 has been filed by the revision petitioner seeking a decree against the respondents herein for recovery of Rs. 23,600. 00 with interest. The said suit has been decreed ex parte by judgment dated 12-7-1996. The defendants-respondents herein filed an application under Order 9 rule 13 of CPC to set aside the said ex parte decree and also filed I. A. No. 1630 of 1996 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 70 days in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application it has been stated that initially the defendants were set ex parte on 7-4-1994 for their failure to file written statement within the time. In order to set aside the said order dated 7-4-1994, the defendants filed i. A. No. 1151 of 1995 under Order 9 Rule 7 of cpc along with their written statement on 24-7-1995. In the said application notice was ordered to the other side and in the meanwhile on 15-11-1995, the suit itself was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was called absent. Subsequently, i. A. No. 1151 of 1995 filed by the defendants was also dismissed on the ground that the main suit itself was dismissed for default. It has been further pleaded that they were not aware of any further proceedings in the suit and only on receipt of the summons in e. P. No. 156 of 1996 they came to know that o. S. No. 1503 of 1994 has been restored to file and an ex parte decree has been passed on 2-7-1996. It has been further pleaded that they were not aware of any further proceedings in the suit and only on receipt of the summons in e. P. No. 156 of 1996 they came to know that o. S. No. 1503 of 1994 has been restored to file and an ex parte decree has been passed on 2-7-1996. On examining the record relating to the case the defendants came to know that i. A. No. 1356 of 1995 moved by the plaintiff under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC was ordered on 11-7-1995 restoring the suit. The defendants contended that though notice on the opposite party is mandatory in a petition filed under Order 9, Rule 9 of CPC, on such notice was served on them and consequently they were not aware of the restoration of the suit. They were under the impression that since the main suit was already dismissed for default on 15-11-1995 no case was pending against them but they came to know about the ex parte decree passed in the suit only on 3-10-1996 on receipt of the summons in the execution petition. Immediately they filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of CPC seeking to set aside the ex parte decree and the delay of 70 days in filing the petition is neither wilful nor wanton and accordingly pleaded to condone the delay. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff/ revision petitioner herein filed a counter contesting the said application. Though he admitted that the suit was dismissed for default on 15-11-1995 the averments of the defendants that they are not aware of the proceedings in the suit are denied. It is also stated that since the defendants were already set ex parte, no notice was necessary in the petition filed by them under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed to explain each day s delay as required under Section 5 of the Limitation act and the petition filed at the stage of execution of the decree to attach the moveable properties of the defendants is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. ( 4 ) THE Court below after hearing both the parties by order dated 22-3-2000 allowed the said application. Challenging the same, the present revision petition has been filed. ( 4 ) THE Court below after hearing both the parties by order dated 22-3-2000 allowed the said application. Challenging the same, the present revision petition has been filed. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner sri Vilas V. Afzulpurkar submits that the impugned order is not sustainable since the court below has failed to assign any reasons nor recorded satisfaction as to sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 70 days. The learned counsel also submitted that i. A. No. 1639 of 1996 was allowed earlier on 6-10-1998 without assigning any reasons, and therefore, the same was set aside by this court by order dated 8-2-1999 in c. R. P. No. 4812 of 1998 and the matter was remitted back for fresh disposal, however the court below has again allowed the petition without assigning any reasons and without recording the satisfaction as to the existence of the sufficient cause. Therefore, the learned counsel contends that the order under revision cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents submits that the impugned order made by the court below condoning the delay in exercise of the discretionary power conferred on it under Section 5 of the limitation Act does not warrant any interference by this court. ( 7 ) ON a perusal of the order under revision, it is noted that the court below after extracting the pleadings on either side and after referring to the decisions of the supreme Court, wherein it has been held that the court should adopt a liberal approach in exercising the discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, made the following order. "considering the facts and circumstances of the case of the petitioner and in view of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the petitioner s plea is considered. Accordingly the petition is allowed without costs. " ( 8 ) BEFORE examining the correctness of the above order which is now in question, it is necessary to mention that the application filed by the revision petitioner under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was earlier ordered by the court below by order dated 6-10-1998. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff carried the matter to this court by way of a revision. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff carried the matter to this court by way of a revision. This court by order dated 8-2-1999 while allowing the said C. R. P. No. 4812 of 1998 set aside the order dated 6-10-1998 made by the court below and remanded the matter for disposal afresh. It is appropriate to extract the order made in C. R. P. No. 4812 of 1998 which runs as follows:"the impugned order is bald and perfunctory. Though the application for condonation of delay was contested, no reasons are given in the impugned order. The learned Judge merely observed: "i believe that the delay in filing the petition can be condoned. However, I believe that the respondent has to be compensated with costs. " the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial court for fresh disposal for hearing the counsel. The revision petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. " ( 9 ) IT is unfortunate that in spite of the said order of this court, the court below has again chosen to allow the petition by a cryptic order, which is extracted above in paragraph-7. The order is not only not in conformity with the order of this court in c. R. P. No. 4812 of 1998, but also not in consonance with the requirements prescribed under Section 5 of the Limitation act, 1963. ( 10 ) IN this context it is necessary to have a look at Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 extracted hereunder:"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases: any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. " ( 11 ) IT can be seen that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 discretion is conferred on the court for condonation of the delay, if sufficient cause is shown. It is well settled principle of law that whenever a court is vested with the discretionary power, such discretion must be exercised keeping in view the principles of law and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. It is well settled principle of law that whenever a court is vested with the discretionary power, such discretion must be exercised keeping in view the principles of law and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. One of the requirements prescribed under Section 5 of the Limitation act is that the court should be satisfied that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not making the appeal or application within the prescribed period. Whether the court has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and whether any sufficient cause is made out to the satisfaction of the court has to be gathered from the reasons assigned in the order. Whether the cause for delay is sufficient or not is essentially a question of fact and therefore, it is the duty of the court, on appreciation of the material on record, to express its satisfaction as to the sufficiency of the explanation offered by the petitioner. Therefore an order made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act condoning the delay without assigning any reasons and particularly without recording the satisfaction of the court as to the "sufficient cause" cannot be said to be in accordance with law. ( 12 ) IT may be pointed out that once the court accepts the reason for delay and records a finding that the explanation offered is sufficient to condone the delay, normally the Revisional Court would not interfere except where the finding recorded is perverse or the order is vitiated by any manifest error in application of law. A non speaking order which does not reflect the satisfaction of the court as to the existence of "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay shall be liable to be declared as one passed illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction conferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act. ( 13 ) IN the instant case it can be seen that the court below except referring to two decisions of the Supreme Court, did not consider the facts of the case and did not record any finding whether the explanation offered by the petitioner therein is sufficient to condone the delay. The court has not even expressed its satisfaction as to the sufficiency of the cause for the delay. The court has not even expressed its satisfaction as to the sufficiency of the cause for the delay. ( 14 ) AS held by the courts repeatedly, in exercise of the discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the courts shall adopt a pragmatic approach to advance substantial justice to the parties. However the court cannot arrive at a conclusion without application of its mind to the facts of the case on hand and without expressing its satisfaction as to the sufficient cause. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons stated supra the irresistible conclusion would be to declare that the order under revision is vitiated by material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction vested under Section 5 of the limitation Act. Accordingly the said order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the court below with a direction to consider the matter afresh in the light of the observations made above and pass appropriate orders after hearing both the parties. ( 16 ) THE Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.