( 1 ) M/s. Hyderabad Cooperative Central Trading Society Limited, the petitioner in this batch of writ petitions, challenges the Awards passed in various Industrial Disputes by the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, filed by the respective employees. Inasmuch as common question of fact as well as law arises in these matters, they are disposed of through common order. ( 2 ) PETITIONER is a Society established in the year 1948. It has also undertaken commercial activities. In the year 1974, it has established "laxmi Super Bazar" at Basheer Bagh, Hyderabad, and employed 34 workers of different categories. Inasmuch as it has gone into losses, it closed the said establishment in July 1998. The petitioner did not find it feasible to resume the business. Accordingly, it had issued orders dated 30-6-1999 retrenching its employees duly paying the retrenchment compensation as well as one month s salary in lieu of notice. The respective workers who were retrenched figure as respondent No. 2 in the individual writ petitions. For the sake of convenience, they are referred to as the respondents. ( 3 ) THE respondents raised Industrial Disputes by filing individual cases before the Labour Court. Their main contention was that the retrenchment compensation was not properly arrived at, in that; DA at the rate of 11. 55 % was paid as against their entitlement for 79. 75%. The other objection was that the petitioner was financially viable and the retrenchment was not called for. A further plea was raised that under the guise of restructuring, the petitioner cannot dispense with the services of the respondents. ( 4 ) THE petitioner resisted the Industrial Disputes and pleaded that retrenchment compensation was paid duly calculating it on the basis of the last pay drawn by the respective workers and that there was adequate compliance with the provisions of Section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the ID Act ). The petitioner has also pleaded that it was no longer possible for it to resume the business and that the Society was in financial difficulties. ( 5 ) THE petitioner and the respondents adduced oral and documentary evidence before the Labour Court in support of their respective pleas. The Labour Court passed Awards dated 22-10-2001 holding that the respondents were entitled to be paid DA at 79. ( 5 ) THE petitioner and the respondents adduced oral and documentary evidence before the Labour Court in support of their respective pleas. The Labour Court passed Awards dated 22-10-2001 holding that the respondents were entitled to be paid DA at 79. 75%, there was non compliance with Sections 9-A as well as 25f of the ID Act and accordingly had set aside the orders of retrenchment dated30-6-1999. Consequently, it ordered reinstatement of the respondents with full back wages and continuity of service. Hence, these writ petitions. ( 6 ) SRI A. K. Jayaprakash Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner had closed the Laxmi Super Bazar in which the respondents were employed way back in the year 1998 and since there was no possibility of resuming the business, it has decided to retrench the respondents. He submits that the provisions of Section 25f were strictly complied with. As regards the plea of non compliance with Section 9-A of the ID Act, he submits that it was not specifically raised by the respondents in their respective applications before the Labour Court and, at any rate, the same does not apply to the cases of retrenchment. ( 7 ) SRI S. Ravindernath, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the respondents were entitled to be paid DA at 79. 75%, whereas the retrenchment compensation was calculated at 11. 55% only and in that view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was compliance with Section 25f of the ID Act. He submits that the petitioner was financially viable and only with a view to get rid of the respondents, they have resorted to retrenchment. He further submits that any restructuring that results in retrenchment automatically attracts the provisions of Section 9-A of the ID Act and inasmuch as the petitioner did not issue any notice as contemplated under that Section, the termination was illegal. ( 8 ) THE following two principal questions arise for consideration in this batch of writ petitions: (1) Whether the provisions of Section 25f of the ID Act have been complied with; and (2) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of Section 9-A of the ID Act get attracted. Compliance with Section 25f of the ID Act. Compliance with Section 25f of the ID Act. ( 9 ) THE respondents were employed at various points of time in the Laxmi Super Bazar, which was established by the petitioner in the year 1974. It is not in dispute that the said establishment was closed in the year 1998. In fact the respondents have consistently stated in their respective petitions before the Labour Court that the Laxmi Super Bazar was closed in July 1998. They alleged mismanagement as the reason for the closure. The petitioner has issued orders of retrenchment dated 30-6-1999 to the respective respondents. Along with the order of retrenchment, the petitioner paid one month s salary in lieu of notice, gratuity benefits and retrenchment compensation, through cheques drawn in favour of the respective respondents. ( 10 ) THE 1st ground of attack on the retrenchment is that the petitioner was financially viable and that there was no justification for the petitioner in resorting to retrenchment of the respondents. It is not in dispute that the establishment in which the respondents were employed was closed one year before they came to be retrenched. Even in a case where an industrial establishment is carrying on its activities, the right of an employer to retrench an employee is circumscribed only with the requirements as to issuance of one month notice or payment of one month salary in lieu thereof, retrenchment compensation and the like. The other restriction on such a right is to follow the rule of last come go first . As long as these requirements are followed, the courts will be very slow to look into the intention of the employer in resorting to the retrenchment. The liberty of the employer to plan his business activity is left untouched as long as the compliance with these requirements is ensured. Section 25f (a) requires indication of reasons for retrenchment in the notice to be served on the employee. However, such a notice can be dispensed with if the employer pays the wages for one month. This factor diminishes the importance of reasons. As long as the discharge of employee is not by way of punishment, the reasons for retrenchment even where they are stated in the notices are not justiciable. However, such a notice can be dispensed with if the employer pays the wages for one month. This factor diminishes the importance of reasons. As long as the discharge of employee is not by way of punishment, the reasons for retrenchment even where they are stated in the notices are not justiciable. When law concedes that much freedom of an employer to plan his activity, subject of course to following the conditions stipulated therein, it is not open to the retrenched employee to plead that there was no justification for the employer in resorting to the retrenchment. ( 11 ) THE 2nd aspect is about the adequacy of retrenchment compensation. The respondents alleged that the retrenchment compensation ought to have been arrived at by calculating the DA at 79. 75%. It is not in dispute that the petitioner paid retrenchment compensation calculating the DA at 11. 55%. The contention of the respondents is that the DA payable to the Government Servants is at 79. 75% and that the same rate was applicable to the employees of the petitioner also. According to them, as per Rule 6 of the Services Rules of the petitioner, DA permissible to Governments Servants was payable to the employees of the petitioner. The petitioner, however, contends that the rates of DA application to Government Servants is not applicable to its employees unless specifically adopted and that they have been following the rates of DA prevailing in the year 1993. The Labour Court recorded a finding that the respondents were entitled to be paid DA at 75% and observed that at least at the time of settlement of the terminal benefits, the DA at 79. 75% ought to have been paid. ( 12 ) IN this context, reference needs to be made to the requirement under Section 25f of the ID Act. Under Section 25f, what is payable is "compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months". Therefore, the compensation has to be calculated on the basis of average pay. From the record, it is evident that the respondents were being paid salary at a particulate rate. It is not in dispute that the retrenchment compensation was calculated by taking into account the average pay. Therefore, the compensation has to be calculated on the basis of average pay. From the record, it is evident that the respondents were being paid salary at a particulate rate. It is not in dispute that the retrenchment compensation was calculated by taking into account the average pay. Things would have been different altogether had the respondents been paid the salary with DA at 79. 75 %, but the retrenchment compensation was calculated by allowing the DA at 11. 55%. When the salary was being paid consistently with 11. 55% DA and the retrenchment compensation was paid on that basis, a further enquiry into the entitlement of the respondents to receive additional DA cannot constitute the subject matter of discussion or enquiry in the proceedings where the order of retrenchment is in question. The Labour Court did record a finding that the petitioner has calculated the retrenchment compensation on the last drawn salary shown in the pay slip. That being so, any further enquiry into the question of permissible DA was outside the scope of the enquiry by the Labour Court. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Labour Court in this regard cannot be sustained. Inasmuch, admittedly, the respondents were paid the retrenchment compensation on the basis of the pay last drawn by them and were also paid one month s salary in lieu of notice, it is to be held that there was compliance with the provisions of Section 25f of the ID Act. ( 13 ) WHETHER provisions of Section 9-A get attracted:-"section 9-A of the ID Act provides for issuance of notice by the employer whenever it proposes to effect changes in conditions of service applicable to the workmen in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule. The matters occurring in the Fourth Schedule range from variation of wages, hours of work and intervals, classification by grades to introduction of new rules of discipline. The relevant provision is item 10, which reads as under: rationalisation, standardisation or improvement of plant of technique which is likely to lead to retrenchment of workmen. " ( 14 ) IN the order of retrenchment, the petitioner stated that in view of the financial difficulties faced by them, it is resolved to "restructure the Society by reducing the establishment charges through retrenchment of staff". " ( 14 ) IN the order of retrenchment, the petitioner stated that in view of the financial difficulties faced by them, it is resolved to "restructure the Society by reducing the establishment charges through retrenchment of staff". The Labour Court recorded a finding that the order of retrenchment is violative of Section 9-A of the ID Act, inasmuch as no notice as contemplated therein was issued. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents did not raise any specific plea in this regard and that the provisions of Section 9-A are not applicable to cases where the employer passed the order of retrenchment simpliciter. He relies upon the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in L. ROBERT D souza VS. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relies upon the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court M/s. LOKMAT NEWSPAPERS PVT. LTD. VS. SHANKARPRASAD and certain other decisions and submits that even where the order is one of retrenchment simpliciter, if the retrenchment is resorted to as a measure of restructuring of the Organisation, Section 9-A gets attracted. ( 15 ) IN ROBERT D souza (supra), the Hon ble Supreme Court took the view that Section 9-A is not at all attracted in the matters of retrenchment simpliciter. It was even held that retrenchment as such does not constitute change of service conditions referred to in the Fourth Schedule. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:-"when a workman is retrenched it cannot be said that change in his conditions of service is effected. The conditions of service are set out in Fourth Schedule. No item in Fourth Schedule covers the case of retrenchment. In fact, retrenchment is specifically covered by Item 10 of the Third Schedule. Now, if retrenchment, which connotes termination of service, cannot constitute change in conditions of service in respect of any item mentioned in Fourth Schedule, S. 9-A would not be attracted. In order to attract S. 9-A, the employer must be desirous of effecting a change in conditions of service in respect of any matter specified in Fourth Schedule. If the change proposed does not cover any matter in Fourth Schedule S. 9-A is not attracted and no notice is necessary. In order to attract S. 9-A, the employer must be desirous of effecting a change in conditions of service in respect of any matter specified in Fourth Schedule. If the change proposed does not cover any matter in Fourth Schedule S. 9-A is not attracted and no notice is necessary. " ( 16 ) THE judgment in ROBERT D souza (1 supra) would certainly support the contention forwarded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, in a later judgment, the Hon ble Supreme Court in LOKMAT NEWSPAPERS (2 supra), took the view that if retrenchment is the result of any re-organisation in the industry, Section 9-A of the ID Act gets attracted and failure to issue notice referred to therein would vitiate the order of retrenchment. Elaborate discussion was under taken in this judgment. It has specifically referred to each and every item of Fourth Schedule vis--vis the provisions of Sections 9-A and 25f. Such a pointed discussion is evident from the following passage:--So far as item Nos. 1 - 9 and 11 are concerned, it becomes obvious that before any such change in conditions of service of the workmen is to be effected, as a pre-condition for such proposed change, notice under Section 9-A has to be issued, without complying with such a pre-condition of notice, proposed change would not legally come into operation. We are directly concerned with Item No. 10 of this Schedule. It, therefore, becomes obvious that before any rationalisation, standardisation or improvement of plant or technique is to be resorted to by any management if by such an exercise retrenchment of workmen is likely to result, then before introducing such rationalisation, standardisation or improvement of plant or technique, as the case may be, a prior notice under Section 9-A is to be issued to the workmen who can get an opportunity to show that they may not be retrenched because of the new scheme of rationalisation etc. , which is in the offing and can suggest ways and means available to the management to avoid such proposed retrenchment of the workmen despite such introduction of a new scheme. , which is in the offing and can suggest ways and means available to the management to avoid such proposed retrenchment of the workmen despite such introduction of a new scheme. Consequently, it must be held on the very wordings of Section 9-A read with Item No. 10 of Fourth Schedule "that any management which seeks to introduce a new working pattern for its existing work force by any future scheme of rationalisation, standardisation or improvement of plant or technique which has a tendency to lead to future retrenchment of workmen" has to give prior notice of proposed change. " ( 17 ) HAVING referred to its judgment in HINDUSTAN LIVER LIMITED vs. RAM MOHAN RAY ( AIR 1973 SC 1156 ), the Supreme Court further held that:in view of the aforesaid decision, it becomes obvious that if the proposed scheme of rationalisation has a likelihood of rendering existing workmen surplus and liable to retrenchment, then item No. 10 of Schedule 1v would squarely get attracted and would require as a condition precedent to introduction of such a scheme a notice to be issued under Section 9-A by the management proposing such an introduction of the scheme of rationalisation but if the proposed scheme is not likely to displace any existing workmen then mere rationalisation which has no nexus with the possibility future retrenchment of workmen would not attract item No. 10 of Schedule IV and would remain a benign scheme of rationalisation having no pernicious effect on the existing working staff. " ( 18 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the judgment in ROBERT D souza (1 supra) was not referred to in this decision. However, having regard to the fact that it is subsequent in time and direct on the issue, the ratio laid down in LOKMAT NEWSPAPERS (2 supra) applies to the facts of the present case. As observed earlier, the order of retrenchment itself states that since the petitioner has undertaken restructuring of the Society, the retrenchment became inevitable. The situation squarely falls within the ambit of Item No. 10 of the Fourth Schedule. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the provisions of Section 9-A of the ID Act get attracted. As observed earlier, the order of retrenchment itself states that since the petitioner has undertaken restructuring of the Society, the retrenchment became inevitable. The situation squarely falls within the ambit of Item No. 10 of the Fourth Schedule. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the provisions of Section 9-A of the ID Act get attracted. In view of the fact that, admittedly, the petitioner did not issue any notice as contemplated under Section 9-A, the retrenchment undertaken by them cannot be sustained and the orders of retrenchment are liable to be set aside on this ground. ( 19 ) IT is true that the plea on this issue was not taken by the respondents so pointedly. A reading of the petition discloses that the respondents pleaded in Para 13 as under:it is further submitted that in the guise of restructuring, the respondent cannot retrench the services of the petitioner. "having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the ID Act, such a plea taken is adequate to enable the Labour Court to undertake the examination with reference to the relevant provision. Therefore, the finding of the Labour Court deserves to be accepted. ( 20 ) IN view of the findings recorded above, the question remains as to the grant of relief. Strictly speaking, once an order of retrenchment is found to be not sustainable, the workmen concerned shall be entitled to be reinstated and extended the benefit of back wages, etc. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon several judgments to drive home this aspect. Inasmuch as it is settled proposition of law, reference to the citations in this regard would only add to the length of the judgment. One important aspect which however needs to be considered is that admittedly the establishment in which the respondents were employed was closed way back in July 1998. It was not case of the respondents that they were assigned any work or have undertaken any activity before they came to be retrenched. The petitioner was paying salaries for about one year while working out the feasibility of resuming the business. Obviously, when they were convinced that it is no longer feasible to resume the business, they have resorted to retrenchment of the respondents. The object underlying the ID Act is to make provisions for settlement of industrial disputes and related purposes. The petitioner was paying salaries for about one year while working out the feasibility of resuming the business. Obviously, when they were convinced that it is no longer feasible to resume the business, they have resorted to retrenchment of the respondents. The object underlying the ID Act is to make provisions for settlement of industrial disputes and related purposes. Any direction as a result of adjudication of the matter should be realistic and should not confound or complicate the situation. The facts of these cases, as borne out by the record, would only indicate that any order or series thereof directing reinstatement of the respondents would at the most postpone the mischief, when there is no possibility of the respondents being provided with the employment. Enabling the employees to receive the emoluments without doing any work was never the object of an Industrial Law. In E. VEERA RAJU vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, this Court, even where it was found that the order of retrenchment was violative of Section 25f of the ID Act, moulded the relief in the form of monetary compensation, after taking into account the attendant circumstances. I am of the view that this case certainly calls for a similar approach. ( 21 ) THE respondents, at the time of retrenchment, were paid each an amount representing about 14-15 months salary, inclusive of the retrenchment compensation, notice pay, gratuity, etc. It is felt that the ends of justice will be met if the petitioner is directed to pay emoluments representing salary of another 24 months in full and final settlement of their claims. This extraordinary measure is resorted to in view of the fact that the establishment in which the respondents were employed remained closed since last 4 years and there is no possibility of its resuming its activities. The awards of the Labour Court in the respective cases shall be modified to the extent indicated above. The petitioner shall calculate and pay the said amounts in three monthly instalments commencing from 10th August 2002. The writ petitions are ordered to the extent indicated above. No costs.