JUDGMENT : The plaintiff is in appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned First Additional District Judge, Chhindwara dismissing his suit for partition, separate possession and rendition of accounts. 2. The case of the plaintiff in the Court below was that the parties are governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu Law. Dwarkanath Verma, the father of the plaintiff, expired on 1-5-1963. Plaintiff's mother, Smt. Ramdulari, breathed her last on 12-11-1971. They had two sons, namely, Dharmendra Kumar and Virendra Kumar and a daughter, namely, Gyanwati. Gyanwati expired in the year 1975 issueless. Dharmendra Kumar expired on 29-1-1981 living behind his legal heirs Ravindra (defendant No.1), Jyoti (defendant No. 2), Kiran (defendant No. 3) and Rashmi (defendant No. 4). The wife of Dharmendra Kumar, Smt. Deokumari, was arrayed as defendant No. 5. After the death of Gyanwati for the purpose of the movable and immovable properties belonging to Dwarkanath, the plaintiff and Dharmendra Kumar became the legal heirs. The immovable property, a house situated at Narsinghpur Road, Chhindwara has been described in Schedule A to the plaint. The movable property has been mentioned in Schedule B to the plaint. It was pleaded that after the death of Dharmendra Kumar the property became the joint family property. The plaintiff, a government servant, being unable to lookafter the property, requested the defendants to have a partition, but his request went heedless. He served a notice on the defendants for partition but the same was not replied to. It has been alleged that after the death of Dharmendra Kumar his wife and children collected the rent from the tenanted premises and, therefore, they are liable for rendition of accounts. The plaintiff had claimed Rs. 6000/- towards his share but the same was subject to final adjudication, as pleaded in the plaint. In this factual backdrop the plaintiff claimed for the reliefs, as has been indicated hereinabove. 3. The defendants entered the contest and disputed the claim putforth by the plaintiff. It was the case of the defendants that on 22-8-1976 the plaintiff and the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants voluntarily nominated G. P. Shrivastava, Rajaram Tiwari, J. P. Pandey, P. Mahajan, Sukhram Mistri and Somnath Gupta as arbitrators for partition of immovable properties. The said arbitrators had passed an award partitioning the immovable property between all the co-parceners of the joint family. The said arbitrators had passed an award partitioning the immovable property between all the co-parceners of the joint family. The plaintiff as well as Late Dharmendra Kumar accepted the award and in token thereof put their signatures on its and accordingly remained in possession of their respective shares. It was the further case of defendants that after passing of the award i.e. on 30-10-1976 the plaintiff has been collecting rent in respect of the premises which had fallen into his share and has remained in possession. Similarly, the defendants also acquired possession of their allotted shares. It was the further case of the defendants that the arbitrators filed the award in the Court of learned District Judge, Chhindwara for making the award a rule of Court, but the same could not be made the rule of Court on the ground that it was not properly stamped and was also not registered. The order passed by the learned District Judge, Chhindwara was assailed in an appeal before this Court in Misc. First Appeal No. 15/80 which did not meet with success. The defendants further took the stand that the arbitrators had sought the award to be made the rule of Court to put the controversy that has arisen between Shri D. K. Shrivastava and the plaintiff to rest. A technical objection was taken by the defendants that the award having been passed a further suit under sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was barred inasmuch as the plaintiff had himself accepted the award and the award been acted upon. The defendants further set forth that the plaintiff had deliberately suppressed these aspects and had not approached the Court with clean hands and, therefore, he is not entitled to any relief as the foundation is based on a false one attracting the maxim "suppressio veri suggestio falsi". The defendants further pleaded that the plaintiff was in possession of one Gramophone, a harmonium and 25 records whose cash value would be Rs. 25,000/-. The claim for rendition of accounts was also disputed on the ground that the plaintiff is collecting rent from the premises as per the apportionment of the property in the award. 4. Several issues were framed by the learned trial Judge. The award dated 20-8-1976 was brought on record as Exhibit-D-2. 25,000/-. The claim for rendition of accounts was also disputed on the ground that the plaintiff is collecting rent from the premises as per the apportionment of the property in the award. 4. Several issues were framed by the learned trial Judge. The award dated 20-8-1976 was brought on record as Exhibit-D-2. On behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examined himself as PW.1. On behalf of the defendants two witnesses, namely, Ravindra Kumar (defendant No. 1) and Rajaram Tiwari were examined. The learned trial Judge considered the effect of Exhibit-D-2 and came to hold that the award was passed by the arbitrators allotting the shares, and the parties had accepted their shares and remained in possession. The learned trial Judge referred to the Map-Exhibit-D-1 to indicate the separate possession. With regard to the movable properties the learned trial Judge came to hold that the same had already been partitioned and is perceptible from the documents brought on record. Being of this view the Court below dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 5. Assailing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge, it is contended by Mr. A. G. Dhande, learned senior counsel for the appellant, that when the award was not made the rule of Court the same had become extinct in the eye of law and hence, could not have been placed reliance upon by the learned trial Judge. It is further submitted by him that assuming the award could be taken aid of, yet there was no evidence on record that the same had been acted upon. It is also argued by Mr. Dhande that the learned trial Judge has grossly erred in coming to hold that the suit was barred by sections 32 and 33 of the Act. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Orient Transport Co. Gualabra and anr. vs. M/s Jaya Bharat Credit and Investment Co. Ltd. and anr., AIR 1987 SC 2289 . 6. Resisting the aforesaid submissions it is contended by Mr. Shashank Verma, learned counsel for the respondents, that though the award passed by the arbitrators was not made the rule of Court but the said document does not lose its legal significance and the learned trial Judge has correctly placed reliance upon it. Mr. 6. Resisting the aforesaid submissions it is contended by Mr. Shashank Verma, learned counsel for the respondents, that though the award passed by the arbitrators was not made the rule of Court but the said document does not lose its legal significance and the learned trial Judge has correctly placed reliance upon it. Mr. Verma has also canvassed that the plaintiff-appellant had accepted the document contained in Exhibit-D-2 and if the oral evidence is appreciated in juxtaposition with Exhibits-D-1 and D-2 it would go a long way to show that the plaintiff as well as the defendants have remained in separate possession and in enjoyment of the properties allotted in their favour. It is also urged by him that the learned trial Judge is also sound in accepting the partition with regard to the movable properties. The learned counsel also proponed that the learned trial Judge has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the bar under sections 32 and 33 of the Act attracted in the obtaining factual matrix. To bolster his submissions he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Govinda Gouda vs. Kalu Hauda and another, AIR 1966 Orissa 228, Satish Kumar and others vs. Surinder Kumar and others, AIR 1970 SC 833 , Bhagirathi vs. Kriparam, 1976 MP.L.J. Short Note 73, and Gadadhar Panda and another vs. Gangadhar Panda and another, AIR 1972 Orissa 24. 7. To appreciate the rival contentions raised at the Bar I have carefully perused the judgment of the learned trial Judge and the documents brought on record and the oral evidence. Two questions that arises for consideration are that whether the award passed by the arbitrators has become extinct inasmuch as it was not made the rule of Court under the provisions of the Act, and secondly whether the same was never accepted by the parties to it and not acted upon. I may hasten to add here that in the first compartment the applicability of sections 32 and 33 would be covered. 8. The main plank of submission of Mr. Dhande is that the award passed by the arbitrators did not effect a valid partition as it had never been made the rule of Court. In this connection I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Satish Kumar and others (supra). 8. The main plank of submission of Mr. Dhande is that the award passed by the arbitrators did not effect a valid partition as it had never been made the rule of Court. In this connection I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Satish Kumar and others (supra). In the said case their Lordships referred to the decision rendered in the case of M/s Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. vs. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 162/1962 decided on 11-10-1962) wherein it was stated as under :- "The true legal position in regard to the effect of an award is not in dispute. It is well settled that as a general rule, all claims which are the subject-matter of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which is pronounced in the proceedings before the arbitrator and that after an award has been pronounced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of the said claims can be determined only on the basis of the said award. After an award is pronounced, no action can be started on the original claim which had been the subject-matter of the reference. As has been observed by Mookerjee, J. in the case of Bhajahari Saha Banikya vs. Behary Lal Basak, (1909) ILR 33 Cal 881 at pp.898, 'the award is, in fact, a final adjudication of a Court of the parties' own choice, and until impeached upon sufficient founds in an appropriate proceeding, an award, which is on the face of it regular, is conclusive upon the merits of the controversy submitted, unless possibly the parties have intended that the award shall not be final and conclusive. . in reality, an award possesses all the elements of vitality even though it has not been formally enforced and it may be relied upon in a litigation between the parties relating to the same subject-matter. This conclusion, according to the learned Judge, is based upon the elementary principle, that as between the parties and their privies, an award is entitled to that respect which is due to judgment of a Court of last resort. Therefore, if the award which has been pronounced between the parties has in fact, or can, in law, be deemed to have dealt with the present dispute, the second reference would be incompetent. This position also has not been and cannot be seriously disputed." 9. Therefore, if the award which has been pronounced between the parties has in fact, or can, in law, be deemed to have dealt with the present dispute, the second reference would be incompetent. This position also has not been and cannot be seriously disputed." 9. S. M. Sikri, J. speaking for himself and for Bachwat, J. clearly stated that the said judgment is a binding precedent. Thereafter, their Lordships referred to the para 7 of the Schedule I to the Act which stipulates that the award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively. In that backdrop their Lordships observed that if the award is final and binding on the parties it can hardly be said that it is waste paper unless it is made a rule of the Court. Hedge, J. writing a separate judgment expressed the view as under :- "The award does create rights in property but those rights cannot be enforced until the award is made a decree of the Court. It is one thing to say that a right is not created, it is an entirely different thing to say that the right created cannot be enforced without further steps. For the purpose of section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, all that is necessary is whether the award purports or operates to create or declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or future any gith, title or interest whether vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property. If it does, it is compulsorily registrable. Section 17 does not concern itself with the enforcement of rights." (Quoted from the placitum) 10. In the case of Gadadhar Panda (supra) the learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court relying on the decision rendered in the case of Satish Kuamr and others (supra) held that the award partitioning family property even if not made the rule of Court would be effective. 11. In the case of Gadadhar Panda (supra) the learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court relying on the decision rendered in the case of Satish Kuamr and others (supra) held that the award partitioning family property even if not made the rule of Court would be effective. 11. In the case of Bhagirathi (supra) J. S. Verma, J. (as his Lordship then was) held as under :- "It is equally settled that where after the making of the award no steps are taken for making it effective or having it set aside, a suit on the same cause of action in respect of the same subject-matter would be barred by virtue of sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. Thus, where the subject-matter of the suit and its cause of action are the same, as that of the award, because of the prohibition contained in sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, the suit is not maintainable. It is incorrect to say that an award which is not made "rule of the Court has no existence in law." 12. In this regard I may usefully refer to a decision rendered in the case of Govinda Gouda (supra) wherein G. K. Mishra, J. (as his Lordship then was) placing reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Kashinathsa vs. Narsingasa, AIR 1961 SC 1077 came to hold that when the award passed by the arbitrators divides properties by metes and bounds the parties enjoying properties allotted to them separately and exclusively can enforce their rights on the basis of consent and the fact that the award is not made the rule of Court under section 14 of the Act does not debar them to do so. 13. In view of the aforesaid it is apposite to refer to section 32 of the Act. It reads as under :- "32. Bar to suits contesting arbitration agreement or award.- Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be enforced, set aside, amend, modified, or in any way effected otherwise than as provided in this Act." 14. If the aforesaid pronouncements of law are read conjointly with the provisions enshrined in section 32 of the Act it becomes graphically clear that the award can be placed reliance upon even if that has not been made the rule of Court. Non-making of it the rule of Court does not create an impedement on the part of the parties to place reliance upon it. In the case at hand the plaintiff was a signatory to the award. The map which was brought on record as an exhibit the plaintiff was also signatory to it. In paragraph 7 of his evidence he has clearly admitted that they had appointed the arbitrators to effect partition. He has also admitted that the rooms which were allotted to his share he was collecting rent from it. In paragraph 10 he has admitted that he has been allotted a plot of 37'x 37' sq.ft. He has stated in clear cut terms with regard to allotment as well as to the fact that a wall has been constructed. In the documents relating to partition of movable properties he has put his signature and acknowledged the same. If the entire evidence brought on record is read in proper perspective there remains no scintilla of doubt that the arbitrators were appointed and on consent the award was passed to which the plaintiff is a signatory and the same had been worked out. Thus, in the obtaining factual matrix, I am of the considered opinion, the bar under sections 32 and 33 would have full play and the learned trial Judge has rightly dismissed the suit holding that the suit was not maintainable. I do not see any compelling reason to differ with the same. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable and the learned trial Judge has taken the correct view. 15. Resultantly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, I think it appropriate to direct that both the parties to bear their own costs throughout.