Judgment 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 64 of 1995 by the 1 st Additional District Judge, Patna reversing the judgment and decree passed in Title Eviction Suit No. 19 of 1991 by the Munsif, Patna City. 2. In short, the case of the plaintiffs is that plaintiff no. 1 Dineshwar Nath Verma purchased the suit property in the name of his close relation Satya Narain Lal (Plaintiff no. 2). On 7.1.1972, plaintiffs inducted the father of defendants-appellants as tenant on suit property which is a portion of the holding in question and fully described in Schedule 1 of the plaint at a monthly rental of Rs. 100/- which was finally increased up to Rs. 515/- from 1990. The remaining portion of the holding was in occupation of other tenants. Their further case is that since last one year i.e. from 25.4.1991 the plaintiff no. 1 was posted at Patna as Deputy Secretary, Forest and Environment Department, Government of Bihar and he was going to retire very soon. His children were major and their marriages were being postponed for want of accommodation. 3. According to the plaintiffs case, when their relations come to Patna for examination, interview, medical treatment and court cases etc., they are faced with difficulty in their accommodation and hence the plaintiff no. 1 require the suit premises for his personal use and occupation. Besides this, they also alleged non-payment of rent, electric charges and damage to the building in contravention of the terms of tenancy by the defendants-appellants. On refusal to vacate the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity, the plaintiffs filed the present suit contending that for arrears of rent a separate suit will be filed later on. 4. The defendants-appellants contested the suit and pleaded that plaintiff no. 2 Satya Narain Lal has not joined the plaint and his signature on the Vakalatnama is forged. They denied the relationship of tenant and landlord between them and plaintiff no. 1. Besides this, they also denied the claim regarding personal necessity as, according to them, there were other accommodation available to meet the personal necessity. Thus, they pleaded that there was no necessity of more accommodation and the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief. 5. The trial court held that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Thus, they pleaded that there was no necessity of more accommodation and the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief. 5. The trial court held that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants. However, rest of the issues, such as regarding requirement of the premises in question reasonably and in good faith and can the necessity of plaintiffs be fulfilled from partial eviction, were decided by the trial court against the plaintiffs and the suit was dismissed. 6. The lower appellate court on detailed consideration disagreed with the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff no. 1 does not require the suit premises reasonably and in good faith and held that the suit premises is reasonably and in good faith required by the plaintiffs for their own occupation and for occupation of their family members and relations and, thus, held that the plaintiffs are entitled to decree under section 11 (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (herein after referred to as the B.B.C. Act). 7. The lower appellate court has also considered the question of partial eviction and held that in view of the large number of family members, relations and visitors, eviction of the respondents from a part only of the suit premises will not satisfy the reasonable requirement of the appellants and in view of Explanation II of section 11 of the B.B.C. Act, the plaintiffs cannot be forced to evict the tenants other than the defendants-appellants. Accordingly, the lower appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit by the impugned judgment. 8. The lower appellate court has also considered the defendants allegation that plaintiff no. 2 has not joined the plaint and his signature on Vakalatnama is forged and has come to the conclusion that it is true that the plaint is neither signed nor verified by the plaintiff no. 2 but such plaint was filed with a duly signed Vakalatnama of defendant no. 2 which was duly accepted by his Advocate and that the learned Advocate has signed on the plaint. Thus, in view of Order VI, Rules 14 and 16 of the C.P.C. the lower appellate court has found that there is no defect in the plaint as it is signed by plaintiff no. 1 as well as by a duly authorised Advocate of both the plaintiffs. Thus, in view of Order VI, Rules 14 and 16 of the C.P.C. the lower appellate court has found that there is no defect in the plaint as it is signed by plaintiff no. 1 as well as by a duly authorised Advocate of both the plaintiffs. He has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in AIR 38 Patna 323. He has also considered the objection regarding the maintainability of the suit in view of the bar under section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Benami Act) and disagreed with the finding of the trial court that plaintiff no. 1 cannot be said to be the real owner of the suit holding and, further that the suit is hit by section 4 of the Benami Act. On consideration of evidence it has been held by him that both the plaintiffs are landlord and owner of the suit premises and as plaintiff no. 2 in whose name the suit property is held is co-plaintiff, the suit cannot be dismissed as being hit by the provisions of the Benami Act. 9. Learned counsel for the defendants- appellants has contended that the lower appellate court has grossly erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court on all scores and especially on the question that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is hit by section 4 of the Benami Act. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents has submitted that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court is based on detailed consideration of the evidence and there is no infirmity in the same. On the question as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for eviction by the defendants is hit by section 4 of the Benami Act, learned counsel submitted that in view of the fact that the real owner as well as the benamidar has jointly filed the suit in question and there is no dispute inter se, the suit will not be hit by the said provision. Moreover, in paragraph 3 of the written statement it has been admitted that Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) is the real owner of the property and in that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the suit is hit by section 4 of the Benami Act. Moreover, in paragraph 3 of the written statement it has been admitted that Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) is the real owner of the property and in that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the suit is hit by section 4 of the Benami Act. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that benamidar Satya Narain Lal was acting in fiduciary capacity as the property which was in his name was actually for the benefit of Shri Verma. He referred to the definition of fiduciary capacity given in the Law Lexicon compiled and edited by P. Ramnatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition 1997. It is submitted that sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Benami Act excludes the applicability of section 4 under the circumstances mentioned therein and the expression used in sub-section (1) of section 4 "or against any other person" will not mean only the successor, in any manner, of the benamidar or any person deriving right, title or interest through him. 11. This Court finds substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents. The averments made in the plaint clearly indicate that the title of Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) has been accepted by the benamidar Shri Satya Narain Lal (plaintiff no. 2). The defendants-appellants also in paragraph 3 of the written statement has admitted that Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) is the real owner of the property. The Law Lexicon defines fiduciary capacity in the following manner: "One is said to act in a "fiduciary capacity" or to receive money or contract a debt in a "fiduciary capacity" when the business which he transacts, or the money or property which he handles, is not his own or for his own benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as to whom he stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on the one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part. The term is not restricted to technical or express trusts, but includes also such offices or relations as those of an attorney at law, a guardian, executor, or broker, a director of a Corporation, and a public officer." 12. Sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Benami Act excludes the applicability of section 4 of the Benami Act under certain circumstances. Sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Benami Act excludes the applicability of section 4 of the Benami Act under certain circumstances. Sub-section (3) of section 4 reads as follows: "(3) Nothing in this section shall apply (a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or (b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity." Thus, it has rightly been contended that the expression "or against any other person" used in sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Benami Act will mean only the successor, in any manner, of the benamidar or any person deriving right, title or interest through him. 13. In the instant case, there is no dispute between the real owner and the so- called ostensible owner. Section 4 of the Benami Act prohibits right of the so-called real owner from the ostensible owner and thus in effect might bar a suit for declaration for benami transaction and not where there is no dispute between the real owner and the so-called ostensible owner. 14. In the case of Mubarak Ali vs. Wahid Ali, reported in 1991 (3) Current Civil Cases 339, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, a similar question arose and the Allahabad High Court held that the suit will not be barred by the provisions of the Benami Act. It may be useful to quote paragraph 5 of the said judgment, which runs thus: "The first argument before me in this case is with reference to the provisions of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. It was urged that in view of the decision in the case of Mithilesh Kumari vs. Prem Behari Khare ( AIR 1989 SC 1247 ), the Act was retrospective in nature and, therefore, the plea of Benami could not be entertained. That was a case where nature of the suit was for a declaration that certain properties were held by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff and the Act came into operation during the pendency of the appeal. That is a different situation. That was a case where nature of the suit was for a declaration that certain properties were held by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff and the Act came into operation during the pendency of the appeal. That is a different situation. In fact, the provisions of Benami Transaction Prohibition Act themselves would not be available to the defendant of this case. A perusal of the Act would show that it bars the Banami transaction and section 3 of the Act would naturally for future, and prospective in nature. Section 4 of the Act prohibits right of the so-called real owner from the ostensible owner and thus in effect might bar a suit for declaration for benami transaction. In the instant case, there is no dispute between the real owner and so-called ostensible owner and in the earlier case Wahid Ali and his son Juned Beg had come together with the assertion that the property was owned by Wahid Ali though the document of title was in the name of Juned Beg. This argument, therefore, has no bearing upon the facts of the present case." 15. One of the questions which also arose for consideraton is as to whose personal necessity will be examined by the Court. Learned counsel for the defendants- appellants submitted that as the property stood in the name of Shri Lal, he is the landlord and his personal necessity is only required to be considered in view of the provisions, contained in section 11(1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, it is true that the suit premises stands in the name of Shri Satya Narain Lal (plaintiff no. 2) but in the facts and circumstances and in view of section 11(1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act, the requirement of Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) will have to be considered by the Court because admittedly he is the real owner of the property. 16. I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. 2) but in the facts and circumstances and in view of section 11(1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act, the requirement of Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) will have to be considered by the Court because admittedly he is the real owner of the property. 16. I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. Section 11(1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act reads as follows: "Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord." Section 11(1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act clearly says that the suit can only be filed on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord or the landlord can file the suit for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. 17 In the instant case, admittedly, the building was in the name of the Shri Satya Narain Lal (plaintiff no. 2) for the benefit of Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) and, as such, it is the requirement of Shri Verma, which is to be considered by the Court. Apart from this Ext. 6 and Ext. 10 are indicative of the fact that the respondents have admitted the title of Shri Dineshwar Nath Verma (plaintiff no. 1) and, as such, they are estopped from denying the title necessity of Shri Verma. 18. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants has failed to show any infirmity in the other findings recorded by the lower appellate court relying upon the evidence and, thus, this Court does not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.