International Best Foods Limited v. State Of Punjab
2002-09-17
VINEY MITTAL
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. The petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the complaint filed by the District Food Inspector, Ferozepur under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the summoning order dated January 18, 1999. A further prayer has been made for quashing the report of the Public Analyst, Punjab, Bathinda dated November 3, 1997. Certain facts may be noticed. 2. Petitioner No. 1-M/s. International Best Foods Limited is the manufacturing company, whereas petitioner No. 2 Murli Rao is the Regional Sales Manager of the aforesaid manufacturing company. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioner company manufactured a product Glucovita- Glucose D, which is stated to be a special formulation of an energy drink/health food consisting of various ingredients mentioned on the label of the product. The aforesaid formulation is stated to be duly approved by the Health Department of the State of Maharashtra. On April 25, 1997 a Food Inspector visited two shops at Abohar namely, Parhlad Kumar, Ram Kishan and Sanjay General Food. The aforesaid product manufactured by the petitioner company was taken as a sample for testing by the Public Analyst, Punjab, Bathinda, who reported that the content of Glucose was found to be 97.4% on dry basis and opined that this was against the minimum requirement of 99%. On that basis, since the aforesaid sample was taken to be not as per the prescribed standards provided under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the complaint was filed under the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. A copy of the aforesaid complaint has been appended as Annexure P-5 with the petition. Upon the aforesaid complaint, the learned trial Magistrate passed an order dated January 18, 1999 summoning the petitioners. 3. The petitioners are aggrieved against the aforesaid summoning order and have filed the present petition challenging the complaint, the summoning order and even the report given by the Public Analyst. 4. I have heard Sh. Inderjit Kaushal, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sh. Sandeep Jain, learned Assistant Advocate General, for the State of Punjab. 5. Sh.
3. The petitioners are aggrieved against the aforesaid summoning order and have filed the present petition challenging the complaint, the summoning order and even the report given by the Public Analyst. 4. I have heard Sh. Inderjit Kaushal, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sh. Sandeep Jain, learned Assistant Advocate General, for the State of Punjab. 5. Sh. Kaushal, learned counsel for the petitioners primarily has raised the contention that the aforesaid manufactured product namely Glucovita-Glucose D is a proprietary food and is not the same thing as the dextrose/Glucose. Sh. Kaushal on that basis submitted that in fact since the manufactured product was a proprietary product manufactured by the petitioner company, therefore, the standard prescribed for dextrose could not be taken to be applicable to the aforesaid product. For this contention Sh. Kaushal has relied upon a judgment dated December 11, 1992 passed by the Madras High Court in Crl.M.No. 2028 of 1990 in case of M/s. Corn Products Company, Bombay and others v. State. It has been brought to my notice that the aforesaid M/s. Corn Products Company, Bombay was none other the present petitioner International Best Foods Limited, which was previously known as Corn Products Company. On that basis, Sh. Kaushal has submitted that in fact as per the judgment of the Madras High Court (which has been appended as Annexure P-6 with the petition), the controversy stands concluded since the Madras High Court has held that the aforesaid product Glucovita-Glucose D is a proprietary food and under the circumstances it cannot be said that the standards prescribed for the dextrose would be attracted for judging the standards of the aforesaid product. 6. A Crl.M. No. 37743 of 1999 was also filed by the petitioner company, praying therein for placing on record a copy of the orders dated September 14, 1999 passed by the trial Magistrate, Abohar in the case State v. Surinder Singh and others and the petitioner company and its three dealers were discharged for violation of the same offence as is in the present case. The learned Trial Magistrate relied upon the aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court and held that no case is made out against the accused and therefore, vide order dated September 14, 1999, discharged the accused. A copy of the aforesaid order has been placed as Annexure A-1 on the record of this case. 7.
The learned Trial Magistrate relied upon the aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court and held that no case is made out against the accused and therefore, vide order dated September 14, 1999, discharged the accused. A copy of the aforesaid order has been placed as Annexure A-1 on the record of this case. 7. On the other hand, Sh. Sandeep Jain, learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab has submitted that even if the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Madras High Court for showing that no offence is made out against him, still as in the earlier case, which culminated in the passing of the order Annexure A-1, he should be asked to approach the trial Court for raising all such defences. 8. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter. I find that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the agony of the petitioners any further. The matter in question is fully covered by the judgment of the Madras High Court aforesaid (Annexure P-6). Further the aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court has been relied upon by the learned trial Magistrate also in another case, which was stated to be pending and have even discharged the petitioners in that case. 9. Keeping in view the entire circumstances, I allow the present petition and quash the complaint Annexure P-5 and the summoning order dated January 19, 1999. All proceedings taken upon the aforesaid complaint would also stand quashed automatically.