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2002 DIGILAW 936 (JHR)

Jharkhand Truck Owners Association H. E. C. v. State Of Jharkhand

2002-08-29

HARI SHANKAR PRASAD, VINOD KUMAR GUPTA

body2002
ORDER 1. This case involves interpretation of Rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 and also the adjudication of the question as to whether it was open to the State Government to post an officer on a regular appointment during the period that he was under suspension. 2. Respondent No. 4 Shri Chintu Nayak is a member of All India Services being an IAS officer of 1974 batch. After the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar, he has been allocated to the Jharkhand Cadre of IAS. 3. It appears that in connection with his alleged involvement in some criminal case respondent No. 4 was taken in custody on 2nd February, 2001. It is the admitted case of the parties that he remained in custody between 2nd February, 2001 and 28th February, 2001, the date when by a judicial order he was released from custody. During the period that he was in custody, precisely speaking, on 27.2.2001 an order came to be passed by the Government of Jharkhand placing the respondent No. 4 under suspension on the ground of his having been in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. This order even though has been passed in Hindi by the State Government, we reproduce herein below the English translation (as attempted by us) of the substance of this order, which reads thus. "As Shri Chintu Nayak, IAS (74 batch) has been in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours since 02-02-2001 in connection with Vigilance Case No. 12/2000, (Special Case No. 3/2000) under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477A, 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 4(2) of the Bihar Non-Gazatted Physical Training College and Non-Gazatted Primary Education College Act, 1982, therefore, he is placed under suspension with effect from 02-02-2001, until further orders in terms of Rule 3(2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. During the period of suspension the Headquarter of Shri Chintu Nayak shall be at Ranchi. During the period of suspension Shri Chintu Nayak shall be entitled to receive the subsistence allowance as per Rule 4(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969." 4. During the period of suspension the Headquarter of Shri Chintu Nayak shall be at Ranchi. During the period of suspension Shri Chintu Nayak shall be entitled to receive the subsistence allowance as per Rule 4(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969." 4. It is admitted case of the parties that till 3rd January, 2002 the Government of Jharkhand or any other authority had not issued or passed any order whatsoever revoking the aforesaid suspension of respondent No. 4. It is also the admitted case of the parties that it was only on 9th May, 2002 that the Government of Jharkhand passed an order revoking the suspension of respondent No. 4, but this revocation, strangely and curiously enough was made effective from 1.3.2001. This order is also in Hindi but the English translation (as attempted by us) of the substance of this order reads thus: "Shri Chintu Nayak, IAS (74 batch), who was suspended vide order dated 27.2.2001 with effect from 02-02-2001 (the date when he was taken in custody), and who was released from custody on 28.02.2001, his suspension order in terms of Rule 3(7)(a) of 1969 Rules is hereby revoked with effect from 1.3.2001. The decision with respect to the suspension period between 02.02.2001 to 28.2.2001 shall be taken later on." 5. The undisputed facts which thus emerged are that the respondent No. 4 was taken in custody on 02.02.2001, he remained in such custody uptill 28.2.2001 and was placed under suspension on 27.2.2001 (but with effect from 02.02.2001). It was on 9.5.2002 that the suspension order was revoked but retrospectively with effect from 01.03.2001. It also emerges that as on 3.1.2002 respondent No. 4 was continuing to be under suspension. While therefore, respondent No. 4 was under suspension as on 3.1.2002, the Govt. of Jharkhand issued the impugned order whereby he was appointed on the post of Secretary, Deptt. of Transport & Civil Aviation-cum-State Transport Commissioner, Jharkhand. 6. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned Advocate General appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. Amreshwar Sahay, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 have raised two important points for our consideration. Their first argument is that the suspension as contemplated under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of 1969 Rules being a deemed suspension is effective and valid and operates only for the period that a Govt. 1 to 3 and Mr. Amreshwar Sahay, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 have raised two important points for our consideration. Their first argument is that the suspension as contemplated under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of 1969 Rules being a deemed suspension is effective and valid and operates only for the period that a Govt. Servant remains under custody and the moment he is released from such custody, the suspension automatically comes to an end. Their second argument is that if a Govt. Servant is placed under suspension by the aforesaid deeming provision there is no requirement in Law or under Rules, or even otherwise to pass any specific order revoking the suspension and that since the suspension automatically stands revoked the moment the Govt. Servant is released from custody, correspondingly therefore the State Govt. is well within its rights to post such a Govt. Servant on a regular appointment. We find ourselves in total disagreement with both the aforesaid submissions and for the reasons that we hereinafter indicate. 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 reads thus : "(2) A member of the service, who is detained in official custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise for a period longer then forty-eight hours, shall be deemed to have been suspended by the Govt. concerned under this rule." Sub-rule (7)(a) and Sub-rule (8)(a) read thus: "(7)(a) An order of suspensions made or deemed to have been made under this Rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. concerned under this rule." Sub-rule (7)(a) and Sub-rule (8)(a) read thus: "(7)(a) An order of suspensions made or deemed to have been made under this Rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. (8)(a) An order of suspension made under this rule which has not been extended shall be valid for a period not exceeding ninety days and an order of suspension which has been extended shall remain valid for a further period not exceeding one hundred eighty days at a time, unless revoked earlier...." Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 reads thus: "(3) Where the punishing Government is not the Government on whose cadre the member is borne, the latter Government shall be consulted before any penalty specified in Rule 5 is imposed : Provided that in relation to the members of the Service borne on any Joint Cadre, the punishing Government shall consult the Joint Cadre Authority : Provided further that where the Government concerned are the Central Government and the State Government or two State Governments and there is a difference of opinion between the said Government in respect of any matter referred to in this rule, the matter shall be referred to the Central Government for its decisions which shall be passed in consultation with the Commission." 8. Basic, elementary and vital difference between a suspension occurring under Sub-rule (2) and a suspension ordered under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of 1969 Rules is that whereas under Sub-rule (2) a member of the Service, who is detained in official custody for a period exceeding forty eight hours shall be automatically deemed and considered to have been placed under suspension, no such automatic or deeming suspension is contemplated under Sub-rule (3), inasmuch as under Sub-rule (3) it is the discretion of the Government to place a member of the Service under suspension if such a member of Service is facing a trial, or is involved in any inquiry or investigation relating to a criminal charge. Under Sub-rule (3) therefore the suspension order has to be passed by the Government after due application of mind and at its discretion and upon consideration of various aspects, viz. whether to place the member of the Service under suspension or not. There is no automatic or deemed suspension under Sub-rule (3). Under Sub-rule (3) therefore the suspension order has to be passed by the Government after due application of mind and at its discretion and upon consideration of various aspects, viz. whether to place the member of the Service under suspension or not. There is no automatic or deemed suspension under Sub-rule (3). Placing a member of the Service under suspension under Sub- rule (3) is a matter of exercise of discretion, and that too based on grounds mentioned in the sub-rule itself. 9. But so far as Sub-rule (2) is concerned, there is no element of discretion whatsoever. The suspension is automatic; it is deemed to have occurred the moment the custody of a member of the Service exceeds forty-eight hours. It is of course, an altogether different matter that even if a suspension under Sub- rule (2) is automatic, it is deemed, yet an order recording such suspension has to be issued/passed by the appropriate Authority. The purpose of passing a formal order recording the fact of suspension has to place the suspension fact on record so that all concerned in the hierarchy of the Government at various levels, including the office of the Accountant General, are officially communicated the fact that the Government Servant stands placed under suspension. We can not conceive of a situation where even under Sub-rule (2), an automatic or deemed suspension can be effected or brought about without the passing of a formal order to that effect. Actually a bare look at Sub-rule (2) suggests that the suspension even though automatic or deemed, takes effect at a point of time after expiry of forty-eight hours, which means that only if a member of the Service has been in official custody for a period of more than forty-eight hours, he should be deemed to be under suspension. It also, therefore, means that the suspension shall continue to be in force from that moment until further orders. The Government understood Sub-rule (2) in that perspective, in that context and rightly so, and it was, therefore that while issuing the suspension order on 27.2.2001 it itself clearly stated that it shall continue to remain in force until further orders. 10. The Government understood Sub-rule (2) in that perspective, in that context and rightly so, and it was, therefore that while issuing the suspension order on 27.2.2001 it itself clearly stated that it shall continue to remain in force until further orders. 10. If there was any doubt in any ones mind about the continued operation of the suspension order the same can rest by a bare look at Sub-rule (7) (a) and Sub-rule (8)(a) of 1969 Rule, inasmuch as Sub-rule (7)(a) clearly stipulates that an order or suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 3, will continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked. Sub-rule (8)(a) also is clearly suggestive of continued operation of the suspension order inasmuch as it says that the order of suspension made under this Rule which has not been extended shall be valid for a period not exceeding ninety days and that an extended suspension order shall be valid for a further period not exceeding one hundred eighty days at a time, unless revoked earlier. Reading of all the sub-rules of Rule 3 (supra) therefore, clearly suggests that a suspension order either under Sub-rule (2) or Sub-rule (3) has to remain in force until it is revoked. The revocation has to be by the issuance of a specific order, in explicit terms. Therefore, the argument that the suspension is only for the period that the Government servant remains in custody is totally devoid of any merit. Similarly the argument that there was no need to pass any revocation order is also without any merit because the rule itself clearly contemplates the continued operation of the suspension order and its validity and life till it is revoked by the passing of an express and specific revocation order. 11. That takes us to a more vital and important ingredient of the Service Jurisprudence and a basic aspect of public life. What it open for the State Government to have posted a suspended official on a regular appointment. Our answer has to be clearly in the negative. The very concept of placing some one under suspension is that during the period of suspension the Public Servant concerned shall not discharge any duties. What it open for the State Government to have posted a suspended official on a regular appointment. Our answer has to be clearly in the negative. The very concept of placing some one under suspension is that during the period of suspension the Public Servant concerned shall not discharge any duties. The word "suspend" has been defined in the New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edition, as under : "Suspend: temporarily prevent from continuing or being in force or effect; officially prohibit (someone) from holding their usual post or carrying out their usual role for a particular length of time; defer or delay (an action, event, or judgment)...." Similarly, the word "suspension" in the same dictionary has been defined as under : "Suspension; the action of suspending someone or something or the condition of being suspended, in particular, the temporary prevention of something from continuing or being in force or effect; the official prohibition of someone from holding their usual post or carrying out their usual role for a particular length of time...." The Chambers Dictionary, New Edition, 1998 (re-printed in India in 2000-2001) defines the word "suspend", inter alia, as under : "Suspend: to put or hold in a state of suspense or suspension; to make to stop for a time; to defer; to defer or stay; to debar from any privilege, office, emoluments etc. for a time..." 12. The very object and purpose of placing a Public Servant under suspension is to ensure that during the period he remains under suspension he does not hold any official assignment and therefore, is prevented from discharging any official duties. That is why during the period of suspension he is only allowed subsistence allowance i.e., the allowance for sustaining himself during the period he remains under suspension. He is not allowed his full salary during the period of suspension. It is a contradiction in terms therefore to keep a Government Servant under suspension and also at the same time to place him on a regular appointment or a regular post. This is totally contrary to public policy and actually is prejudicial to public interest. Actually we have not come across any other case earlier where a public servant being under suspension was yet posted on a regular appointment. This is totally contrary to public policy and actually is prejudicial to public interest. Actually we have not come across any other case earlier where a public servant being under suspension was yet posted on a regular appointment. We are of the clear view and firm opinion that the Government of Jharkhand very, very inappropriately and in a colourable exercise of power, for motives and reasons not explained to us, took the usual step in placing a suspended public servant on a regular appointment. It was open for the State Government to have revoked the suspension order and then to proceed to post him, but why it did not do so has not at all been explained to us. 13. We now come to the specific question of retrospective revocation of the suspension order. How can a suspension order be revoked retrospectively is not at all understood by us. Let us elaborate. Suppose a Government servant is placed under suspension on 1st January, 2002. Suspension order is passed on that day (1st January, 2002) placing him under suspension effective from that date. On 30th August, 2002, the order revoking his suspension is passed. Admittedly, between 1st January, 2002 and 30th August, 2002, such a Government servant was under suspension. How can the clock be turned back? If he was under suspension, can the Revocation Order issued on 30th August, 2002, revoke the suspension retrospectively? surely not. The Revocation Order can always provide for a particular treatment being given with respect to the suspension period. It can say that the suspension period can be treated as "duty" or "leave" of whatever kind and so on and so forth. But it can not revoke the suspension retrospectively because during the period of subsistence of Suspension Order, the Public Servant was under suspension. We, therefore, find that the retrospective revocation of the suspension was an act of the Government which is contrary to established norms of Service Jurisprudence. Apparently, it appears that to cover up its aforesaid lapse, to rectify its mistake, the label of retrospectivity was given to the order, dated 9th May, 2002, only by way of a ratification. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that respondent No. 4 continued to suffer suspension between 2nd February, 2001 and 9th May, 2002. Apparently, it appears that to cover up its aforesaid lapse, to rectify its mistake, the label of retrospectivity was given to the order, dated 9th May, 2002, only by way of a ratification. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that respondent No. 4 continued to suffer suspension between 2nd February, 2001 and 9th May, 2002. The Order revoking his suspension retrospectively as passed on 9th May, 2002 is hereby declared to be non est in the eyes of law in so far as its retrospective operation is concerned. 14. Even though, the suspension was revoked on 9th May, 2002 (which we have now held to be prospective in operation). Respondent No. 4 was posted on a regular appointment on 3rd January, 2002. We have already held that this act of the Government in posting him on a regular appointment during his suspension period is illegal. We are not interfering at all with either the prospective operation of the Suspension Order or the posting of respondent No. 4 in so far as its validity after 9th May is concerned. But, we declare that the posting of the respondent No. 4 on the appointment of Secretary between 3rd January, 2002 and 9th May, 2002 was illegal. All consequences shall follow. 15. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Principal Accountant General for his information. 16. Based on the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ application is disposed of but without any order as to costs.