JUDGMENT : D. Murugesan, J.—The petitioners were appointed in the second respondent- management as Chemistry Lab Assistant, carpenter and pump operator on February 26, 1986, October 18, 1984, March 18, 1985, respectively. On March 31, 1988, the services of first and fourth petitioners were terminated. On March 17, 1988, the services of second and third petitioners were terminated. Hence, the petitioners filed claim statement before the Labour Court, Coimbatore questioning the non-employment along with 16 other employees on the ground that the same is illegal and unjustified and for an award, directing the second respondent to reinstate the petitioners with full back-wages and continuity of services and other benefits along with compensation, interest and back- wages. The said dispute was adjudicated in I.D.No. 346 of 1989. By an award, dated February 16, 1995, the Labour Court, Salem, directed the second respondent herein to pay only compensation to the petitioners while declining reinstatement. As against the said award, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 2. Sri S. Ayyathurai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would challenge the termination on the ground of non-compliance of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called as the Act), which would vitiate the orders of termination, and consequently the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement with back-wages and other attendant benefits. Learned counsel submitted that Labour Court failed in taking into consideration the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act, in the proper perspective. 3. Secondly, learned counsel would challenge the order of termination on the ground of victimisation of all the workmen, including the petitioners. The orders of termination were passed against the petitioners only for the reason that the petitioners participated in the trade union activities. Further, the orders of termination were passed on two different dates, i. e., on March 7, 1988 and March 31, 1988. 4. Thirdly, the challenge to the award is on the ground that the Labour Court has not considered the order of dismissal by the management, without following the principles of natural justice. Non-consideration of the principles of natural justice, fair play before the orders of termination were issued is fatal to the award and accordingly, the impugned award is unsustained. 5. Thirdly, the challenge to the award is on the ground that the Labour Court has not considered the order of dismissal by the management, without following the principles of natural justice. Non-consideration of the principles of natural justice, fair play before the orders of termination were issued is fatal to the award and accordingly, the impugned award is unsustained. 5. Learned counsel for the second respondent, on the other hand would submit that even if there is non-compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act," the petitioners are entitled to only proper compensation since the second respondent/management is not an industry started for commercial purpose, but it is only an educational institution. The Labour Court, Salem, taking note of the above fact has not ordered reinstatement, but has ordered only adequate compensation. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no victimisation on the part of the second respondent/ management in terminating the services of the petitioners since the petitioners and other 16 employees were appointed only on ad hoc basis till such time the permanent appointments are made, as per the recruitment rules. As the respondent/management is an institution being a State within Article 12 of the Constitution, the employment opportunity available in the institutions should be made available to the public and recruitment should be made only by following the procedures laid by the State Government. Therefore only, the services of the petitioners were terminated. Therefore, the petitioners could not be provided with job. 6. I have considered the submissions of the respective counsel. 7. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were appointed in the second respondent/ management and were allowed to continue to work for more than two years. The services of the petitioners were terminated during March 1988. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners had completed 240 days of service in 12 continuous calendar months, in such event the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Section 25-F of the Act. Admittedly, the second respondent/management has not complied with Section 25-F of "the Act." The Supreme Court in more than one case has held that non-compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act" would result in termination as illegal and consequently the employee is entitled to reinstatement with back-wages. 8. While considering a similar question regarding non-compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act," the Supreme Court in the reported judgment Deep Chandra Vs. 8. While considering a similar question regarding non-compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act," the Supreme Court in the reported judgment Deep Chandra Vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2001) 10 SCC 606 , has held that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and back-wages. In that case, a dispute was raised by the employee on the ground that though he had put in more than 240 days in each year of service from the year 1982 to 1988, he had been retrenched without following the procedure prescribed u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal, after adjudication came to the conclusion that the termination of service of the appellant was bad and awarded reinstatement with back-wages. The High Court set aside the said order of reinstatement. While considering the said judgment, the Supreme Court held that the service of an employee who had put in more than 240 days in a year cannot be put to an end without following the procedure prescribed u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. By holding so, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and directed reinstatement of the employee. 9. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others, (1990) 3 SCC 682 , the question of termination of the workmen without following Sections 2(oo) and 25-F of the Act was considered. In that case, the services of the workmen were terminated on the ground that the Chairman had no power to appoint them. The Labour Court held that services of the workmen were terminated illegally without payment of retrenchment compensation under the Act and that they were entitled to reinstatement. The Supreme Court held that the termination by the employer of the services of the workmen for any reason whatsoever, other than those expressly excluded by the definition in Section 2(oo) of the Act would attract Section 25-F of the Act. The Supreme Court in another judgment reported in Santosh Gupta Vs. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 SC 1219 has considered a similar question and held in para 6, at p. 75 of LLJ as follows: "In interpreting these provisions, i.e., Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF, one must not ignore their object. The Supreme Court in another judgment reported in Santosh Gupta Vs. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 SC 1219 has considered a similar question and held in para 6, at p. 75 of LLJ as follows: "In interpreting these provisions, i.e., Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF, one must not ignore their object. The manifest object or these provisions is to so compensate the workmen for loss of employment as to provide him the wherewithal to subsist until he finds fresh employment. The non-inclusion of voluntary retirement of the workmen, retirement of workmen on reaching the age of superannuation, termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health in the definition of 'retrenchment' clearly indicate and emphasise what we have said about the true object of Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF and the nature of the compensation provided by these provisions...." The Supreme Court in an yet another judgment reported in The Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and Another, AIR 1960 SC 251 , has observed, in Para.6, at p. 833 of LLJ as follows: "......As the expression 'retrenchment compensation' indicates it is compensation paid to a workman on his retrenchment and it is intended to give him some relief and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment inevitably causes. The retrenched workman is, suddenly and without his fault, thrown on the street and has to face the grim problem of unemployment. At the commencement of his employment a workman naturally expects and looks forward to security of service, spread over a long period; but retrenchment destroys his hopes and expectations. The object of retrenchment compensation is to give partial protection to the retrenched employee and his family to enable them to tide over the hard period of unemployment." 10. The Supreme Court, in an earlier judgment reported in Mohan Lal Vs. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1253 , held that the termination of service without compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act" would constitute retrenchment and the same would bring about the termination of service, which is ab initio void. 11. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners had completed 240 days of service in a year and they are entitled to compensation u/s 25-F of the Act. They were terminated without reference to Section 25-F of the Act. 11. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners had completed 240 days of service in a year and they are entitled to compensation u/s 25-F of the Act. They were terminated without reference to Section 25-F of the Act. In view of the above settled position of law, non-compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act" would result in the order of termination ab initio void. In view of the above, the orders of termination are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, it is held that non-employment of the petitioners is bad and the orders of retrenchment is declared as void in view of the non- compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act." 12. The next question to be decided is as to whether what relief the petitioners are entitled to. 13. There were occasions where the Courts, even after holding that the order of termination was ab initio void for non- compliance of Section 25-F of "the Act", declined to order reinstatement, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Hindustan Steels Ltd., Rourkela Vs. A.K. Roy and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1401 , the Supreme Court held that the Court before granting reinstatement must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement or to award compensation. The Supreme Court in a judgment reported in Sain Steel Products Vs. Naipal Singh and Others, (2003) 4 SCC 628 , while considering a case of retrenchment without following Section 25-F of "the Act," but taking into consideration of the letter of the management, informing the employee to go and collect the amount as contemplated u/s 25-F of "the Act," finally directed grant of relief of Rs. 50,000 to be paid to the employee. 14. In the present case, the respondent/management is an educational institution sponsored by an undertaking of the Government of Tamil Nadu. The Educational institution does not run either on profit motive or on commercial basis. Further, the Educational Institute, within Article 12 of the Constitution of India should make the employment opportunities available to the public, as per the rules prescribed for the same by the Government. The petitioners were appointed only on ad hoc basis. It is the bounden-duty of the educational institution to make recruitment to those posts held by the petitioners on permanent basis. The petitioners were appointed only on ad hoc basis. It is the bounden-duty of the educational institution to make recruitment to those posts held by the petitioners on permanent basis. It is further to be seen that such appointments shall be with reference to the eligibility such as age, qualification, suitability on medical grounds and verification of certificates, etc. However, the petitioners were appointed without reference to the above criteria and the eligibility norms. In this context it is relevant to extract the stand of the respondent as recorded in the reply statement, which runs as follows: "4. The Institute of Road and Transport Technology, Erode was established on October 8, 1984. Soon after this it was decided to commence the classes for the academic year 1984-85 and accordingly students selected by the Directorate of Technical Education and those selected by the Institute were admitted into the college on and from October 10, 1984. The decision to admit the first batch of students from the academic year 1984-85, was taken at the instance of the Government of Tamil Nadu in order to ease the rush for admission into the engineering courses. Normally, the academic year for Technical courses commence even in August each year, but having regard to the pressure for admission into technical course, it was decided to commence the courses in October 1984. In view of the short period, emergent steps have to be taken for commencement of the courses. In the first instance the Institute rented certain premises in Chithode and temporary arrangements were made for starting the courses. The Teaching Staff required for the Institute were secured by deputation, ad hoc appointments, transfer from the Institute of Road Transport, Madras and engaging guest lecturers on hour-rate basis. In respect of non-teaching staff, the heads of departments were authorised to make ad hoc appointments on temporary basis pending regular appointments. Candidates who were so appointed on ad hoc basis were clearly told that they have no right for permanency and that their posts will continue only until the appointment of regular candidates. 7. It is further submitted that the persons covered by the reference were recruited and appointed by the respective heads of department in which they were working. These heads of departments did not have any power of appointment. 7. It is further submitted that the persons covered by the reference were recruited and appointed by the respective heads of department in which they were working. These heads of departments did not have any power of appointment. Further no criteria either in relation to age, educational qualifications, medical suitability, verification of antecedents, etc., were laid down or followed in the recruitment of these persons. Even the consideration on which the persons were recruited may not be above the board. Many of the posts in which these persons were working do not find a place in the sanctioned strength of the Institute. Therefore, it would not be in the interest of the institution to take back the petitioners on permanent basis. 15. Applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments referred to above, I think it would be proper to order adequate compensation, instead of directing reinstatement. 16. The Labour Court, awarded a compensation of Rs. 4,500 each to the petitioners 1 and 3 and Rs. 3,600 each to petitioners 2 and 4. No reason was adduced by the Labour Court in arriving at the quantum of compensation. There is also no reason adduced for fixing different amounts of compensation to different employees. In my view, the amount of compensation awarded by the Labour Court cannot be considered as proper and adequate in the facts of the case, more particularly when the orders of termination of the petitioners were found to be invalid. All the petitioners have put in four years of service and were terminated during the year 1988. They raised dispute in the year 1989 and award was passed on February 16, 1995. When the petitioners were terminated, the first petitioner was drawing a sum of Rs. 450, second petitioner Rs. 360, third petitioner Rs. 450, and the fourth petitioner Rs. 360. Considering the above, I am of the view that the back-wages calculated on the basis of last drawn salary from the date of termination till the date of award would be just, proper and reasonable compensation to the petitioners instead of order of reinstatement. 450, second petitioner Rs. 360, third petitioner Rs. 450, and the fourth petitioner Rs. 360. Considering the above, I am of the view that the back-wages calculated on the basis of last drawn salary from the date of termination till the date of award would be just, proper and reasonable compensation to the petitioners instead of order of reinstatement. Accordingly, the award of the Labour Court, is modified to that extent, directing the respondent/ management to pay each of the petitioners the back-wages for the period from the date of termination till the date of award and 25 per cent of the back-wages from the date of the award till the date of the order in this writ petition, i.e., February 11, 2002, calculated on the basis of the last drawn salary. 17. The writ petition is ordered in the above said terms. No costs.