Judgment S.L.Jain, J. ( 1. ) Being aggrieved by the order dated 23-7-2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 2821 of 2002, appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 10 of Letters Patent. ( 2. ) Facts shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that an election of Gram Panchayat Harrabhat was held on 28-1- 2002. The appellant Dukkhu Singh and respondent No. 1 Rai Singh also contested for the post of Sarpanch. The counting of votes took place on 30-1-2002 and the Election Officer declared the respondent No. 1 a successful candidate by announcing that respondent Rai Singh had secured 358 votes and appellant Dukkhu Singh had secured only 353 votes. The election was notified on 11-2-2002. ( 3. ) It is alleged by the appellant that his election agent Budhram found certain irregularities in the counting. Certain votes which ought to have been accepted were rejected and certain votes which ought to have been rejected were accepted. Agent Budhram moved an application before the Returning Officer for a recount but the Returning Officer refused to entertain the request. ( 4. ) The appellant filed an election petition under Section 122 of Madhya Pradesh Gram Panchayat Adhiniyam (hereinafter referred to as Adhiniyam) before the competent authority, in which the appellant examined his agent Budhram and other five witnesses. The respondent No. 1 also adduced his evidence. The competent authority, after considering the entire evidence, concluded that Budhram submitted an application for recount but the Returning Officer refused to take the same and on the basis of this finding directed recounting of votes. On recounting, the appellant secured 349 votes while respondent Rai Singh secured only 333 votes. The competent authority allowed the petition and consequently respondent No. 1 had to vacate the office of Sarpanch. Gram Panchayat Harrabhat and the appellant assumed charge of Sarpanch on 23-5-2002. ( 5. ) Respondent No. 1 questioned the correctness of the order passed by the competent authority by filing a writ petition in this Court. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order allowed the petition filed by respondent No. 1 with a finding that no application for recounting was filed before the Returning Officer, therefore, in the absence of such an application recount could not have been ordered in the election petition. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order allowed the petition filed by respondent No. 1 with a finding that no application for recounting was filed before the Returning Officer, therefore, in the absence of such an application recount could not have been ordered in the election petition. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the condition precedent for a recount is that an application in writing is made, therefore, the competent authority com- mitted manifest error in directing recount. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge that the appellant has filed this letters patent appeal. ( 6. ) We have heard Shri S.L. Saxena, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant at the motion stage and perused the record and also the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. ( 7. ) The contention of Shri Saxena is that an application for recounting was filed by Budhram, the counting agent of the appellant but the Returning Officer refused to accept the same, therefore, the appellant had no choice but to file the election petition. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge that no application was filed for recounting is not sustainable. ( 8. ) The sole question which arises for determination in this appeal is:-Whether an application for recounting was filed by the appellant before the Returning Officer immediately after announcement of the total number of votes secured by each candidate ? ( 9. ) Admittedly, the application for recount was not filed by appellant. It is alleged that it was filed by Budhram, the counting agent of the appellant who was examined before the competent authority as Witness No. 6. The witness stated that he moved an application for recount before the competent authority. There is no satisfactory material to support the statement of Budhram that such an application was indeed made. The competent authority has also not recorded a finding that such an application was filed by Budhram. Budhram could not file a copy of the application. There was no reason for the Returning Officer not to accept the application for recount. There is a presumption that official acts are regularly performed, though this presumption is optional and one of facts and it may be displaced by circumstances indicating that the power vested with the authority or official has not been exercised in accordance with law. There was no reason for the Returning Officer not to accept the application for recount. There is a presumption that official acts are regularly performed, though this presumption is optional and one of facts and it may be displaced by circumstances indicating that the power vested with the authority or official has not been exercised in accordance with law. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, we have no hesitation in presuming that since application is not on record, it was not filed. If the Returning Officer would have refused to accept the application, the normal conduct of the appellant would have been to make complaint against him to his superior officers but no such complaint was made. It is difficult to give credence to the contention that the appellant had made an application to the Returning Officer. The fact that the officer had not passed any order in writing also indicates that appellant had not made any application. The fact that the original or copy of such an application was not produced before the competent authority does indicate that no such application had been made on the date of the declaration of the result. The allegation of the appellant that the application was filed but was not accepted by the Returning Officer is an after-thought and nothing but a figment of imagination. ( 10. ) The provision regarding recount of votes is contained in sub-rule (1) of Rule 80 of the Nirvachan Niyam. This sub-rule has been reproduced by the learned Single Judge in his order. On a fair reading of this sub-rule it becomes quite clear that the candidate or the election agent or the counting agent has authority to apply in writing to the Returning Officer or some other officer authorised by him for recount of all or any of the votes already counted. ( 11. ) Since the appellant or someone on his behalf had not filed any application under Rule 80 of the Nirvachan Niyam, the recounting could not have been ordered. It is well settled in law that unless an application is filed before the Returning Officer the subsequent application for recounting is not tenable. Recount can be directed by the Election Tribunal only on a satisfaction reached on the basis of the evidence that such recount is necessary. It is well settled in law that unless an application is filed before the Returning Officer the subsequent application for recounting is not tenable. Recount can be directed by the Election Tribunal only on a satisfaction reached on the basis of the evidence that such recount is necessary. When the condition precedent for recounting was not fulfilled, the learned Single Judge committed no error in allowing the writ petition. The appellant has not adduced evidence of such a compulsive persuation as could have led the Tribunal to reach a primary satisfaction that there was adequate justification for the breach of secrecy by examining the ballots. Secrecy of the ballot papers can not be permitted to be tinkered lightly. An order of recount can not be granted as a matter of routine. In rare cases Election Tribunal or Court is required to order recount, that too on providing satisfactory ground for recounting. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the order of the competent authority. ( 12. ) Where a rule for conduct of election provides for making of an application for recount to the Returning Officer and no such application was made, it is a good ground to refuse the prayer for recounting in the election trial. Obviously some subsequent manipulations have taken place as a result of which the application was filed and the prayer was made for recounting. ( 13. ) Shri Saxena, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant also contends that as the ballot papers were duly inspected wrongly or rightly and appellant had secured more votes than the elected candidate, this Court should uphold the same. The erroneous order of recount can not be supported on the basis of the result of recount. The following observation of the Supreme Court in P.K.K. Shamsudeen Vs. K.A.M. Mappillai Mohideen end others ( AIR 1989 SC 640 ) may profitably be referred :- "The settled position of law is that the justification for an order for examination of ballot papers and recount of votes is not to be derived from hind sight and by the result of the recount of votes. On the contrary, the justification for an order of recount of votes should be provided by the material placed by an election petitioner on the threshold before an order for recount of votes is actually made. On the contrary, the justification for an order of recount of votes should be provided by the material placed by an election petitioner on the threshold before an order for recount of votes is actually made. The reason for this salutary rule is that the preservation of secrecy of the ballot is a sacrosanct principle which can not be lightly or hastily broken unless there is prima facie genuine need for it. The right of a defeated candidate to assail the validity of an election result and seek recounting of votes has to be subject to be basic principle that the secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct in a democracy and hence the affected candidate is able to allege and substantiate in acceptable probability existed for the recount of votes being ordered by the Election Tribunal in the interest of justice, a Tribunal or Court should not order the recount of votes." 13. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and consequently the same is dismissed in limine. L.P.A. dismissed.MOHAMMAD