Judgment Satish Kumar Mittal, J. 1. This petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as `the Code), has been filed by Kuljit Singh petitioner for quashing of the complaint dated May 18, 1996 (Annexure P-2), filed by Jasbir Singh respondent No. 1, under Sections 406/498-A/34 IPC against the petitioner and his parents Gurmail Singh and Manjit Kaur; and for quashing of the summoning order dated July 5, 1997 (Annexure P-1), passed by Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Fazilka on the aforesaid complaint. 2. Marriage between Kuljit Singh petitioner and Jakirat Kaur, who was sister of Jasbir Singh respondent No. 1 took place on March 1, 1991. Out of this wed-lock, a son was born. Unfortunately, Jaskirat Kaur died on October 24, 1995 due to consumption of choloro compound, a group of insecticides. On that, her brother Jasbir Singh respondent No. 1 lodged FIR No. 103 dated October 24, 1995 against the petitioner and his parents under Sections 302/304-A/34 IPC, by alleging that his sister Jaskirat Kaur was married to Kuljit Singh petitioner. She was having a son, aged about two and half years. He had given customary gifts and other dowry articles to the accused at the time of marriage. He had also given customary gifts according to his capacity, at the time of birth of the son, to his sister but the accused persons were not satisfied and they used to maltreat his sister by saying that she had brought insufficient dowry in the marriage as well as at the time of birth of the child. Thereupon, respondent No. 1 gave Rs. 10,000/- to his sister. In spite of that, the accused did not stop to maltreat her. They demanded Rs. 50,000/- for laying a pacca floor to their house. It was told to him by his sister when he visited her on October 20, 1995 to inform her about the Bhog ceremony of his cousin brother Jagdev Singh. On October 23, 1995, when respondent No. 1 went to the village of his sister to know as to why she did not attend the Bhog ceremony of Jagdev Singh, he found that his sister was crying with pain. On enquiry, she told him that her husband Kuljit Singh and father-in-law Gurmail Singh had caught hold of her by arms and her mother-in- law Manjit Kaur had poured insecticide in her mouth. On enquiry, she told him that her husband Kuljit Singh and father-in-law Gurmail Singh had caught hold of her by arms and her mother-in- law Manjit Kaur had poured insecticide in her mouth. Thereafter, his sister died. At the time of lodging the aforesaid FIR, he further alleged that his sister was murdered by the accused on account of demand of dowry. In the aforesaid FIR, all the three accused were charge-sheeted under Sections 302/304-B/34 IPC. After the conclusion of trial, only petitioner Kuljit Singh was convicted under Section 304-B IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- vide judgment dated August 6, 1998 by Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur. The other two accused, namely Gurmail Singh and Manjit Kaur were acquitted of the charges framed against them. 3. During the pendency of the aforesaid trial, Jasbir Singh respondent No. 1 filed a complaint against the aforesaid three accused under Sections 406/498- A/34 IPC in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Fazilka. This complaint was filed on the same allegations and facts, as mentioned in the aforesaid FIR. It has been alleged in this complaint that at the time of marriage of his sister Jaskirat Kaur, certain gifts were given to her, which constitute her Istri Dhan. Certain gifts were also given to the accused as per custom. Some ornaments were also given by the in-laws of his sister Jaskirat Kaur to her at the time of marriage, and certain household articles as mentioned in the complaint were also given to his sister. It has further been alleged in the complaint that all these articles and Istri Dhan, mentioned in the complaint, were handed over to Kuljit Singh petitioner, as trustee in the presence of Sohan Singh, Balwant Singh, Jagjit Singh and other relations of both the sides, before the departure of the doli. It has also been alleged that after the marriage, these articles, which were given to Jaskirat Kaur as Istri Dhan, were never given to her by the accused in spite of the demand made by her. In the complaint, it has been further alleged by respondent No. 1 that at the time when the son was born to his sister, he spent Rs. 10,000/-, but the accused were not satisfied and continued to harass his sister because of bringing less dowry and other gift items. In the complaint, it has been further alleged by respondent No. 1 that at the time when the son was born to his sister, he spent Rs. 10,000/-, but the accused were not satisfied and continued to harass his sister because of bringing less dowry and other gift items. They again demanded Rs. 50,000/- for the flooring of their house and on that account harassed his sister. Thereafter, the facts relating to the death of his sister, as alleged in the FIR, have been mentioned in the complaint and it has been alleged that his sister was murdered by the accused because of bringing less dowry. It was further alleged that when the accused were under arrest and were brought to the Sessions Court to attend the trial, respondent No. 1 demanded the return of Istri Dhan items from them on April 16, 1996, in the presence of Chuhar Singh, Mohinder Singh and Balwant Singh but they refused to return those articles. Hence, the complaint was filed. 4. In support of the allegations made in the complaint, the complainant Jasbir Singh examined himself and four other witnesses. On the basis of that evidence, the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Fazilka summoned the petitioner and his parents to face trial under Sections 406/498-A/34 IPC vide his order dated July 5, 1997 (Annexure P-1). 5. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the aforesaid complaint dated May 18, 1996 (Annexure P-2) as well as the summoning order dated July 5, 1997 (Annexure P-1). Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the present complaint filed by respondent No. 1 is not maintainable in view of the fact that on the same allegations and facts, the accused have been tried in FIR No. 103 dated October 24, 1995, under Sections 302/304-A/34 IPC, registered at Police Station Khuiyan Sarwar, in which parents of the petitioner have been acquitted and only he has been convicted under Section 304-B IPC vide judgment dated August 6, 1998, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur. He further contends that the appeal filed by the State, i.e. Crl. Misc. No. 61-MA of 1999, and Criminal Revision No. 52 of 1999, filed by respondent No. 1 against the acquittal of the parents of the petitioner, have been dismissed by this court on February 22, 1999. He further contends that the appeal filed by the State, i.e. Crl. Misc. No. 61-MA of 1999, and Criminal Revision No. 52 of 1999, filed by respondent No. 1 against the acquittal of the parents of the petitioner, have been dismissed by this court on February 22, 1999. The appeal filed by the petitioner against his conviction is still pending in this Court, in which he has been released on bail. Learned counsel, thus argued that in view of Section 300 of the Code, the petitioner and his parents cannot be tried again on the same allegations and facts under Sections 406/498-A IPC, for which they could have been charged at the time of previous trial. It is further submitted by him that the allegations made in the FIR and in the complaint are exactly the same. The only difference is that in the complaint, it has been alleged that before her death, sister of respondent No. 1 demanded items of Istri Dhan but the accused refused to return the same to her and that after her death, respondent No. 1 demanded those articles from the accused, which they again refused. Counsel further contends that even a bare perusal of the complaint does not disclose any offence. There is no specific allegation with specific time and place when the articles of Istri Dhan were entrusted to the accused or his parents. There is no specific averment with regard to the time and place when the same were demanded by the deceased wife. It is submitted that the allegations made in the complaint are vague and do not constitute any offence. It has been further submitted that after the death of the wife, her Istri Dhan articles were inherited by her husband and son and respondent No. 1, who is her brother, has no legal right to make a demand for the return of the same from the petitioner. With these submissions, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the aforesaid complaint and the summoning order are liable to be quashed. 6. Ms. Gagangeet Kaur, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, opposed this petition by contending that the complaint as well as the summoning order are not liable to be quashed. With these submissions, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the aforesaid complaint and the summoning order are liable to be quashed. 6. Ms. Gagangeet Kaur, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, opposed this petition by contending that the complaint as well as the summoning order are not liable to be quashed. She submitted that the complainant is entitled to maintain the present complaint in view of the fact that his sister was murdered by the petitioner, therefore, in view of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 he cannot inherit the dowry articles being legal heir of the deceased. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, and have perused the record. 8. Section 300 of the Code, which provides that the persons once convicted or acquitted need not to be tried for the same offence again, is re-produced below :- "300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for the same offence :- (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of Section 220. (3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last- mentioned offence; if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged. (5) A person discharged under Section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first-mentioned Court is subordinate. (6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of section 188 of the Code." 9. This Section embodies the ancient maxim "nemo debet bis vexani pro eadem causa" (no person should be twice disturbed for the same cause). One of the principle of this Section is that where an accused can be held at one trial for several offences and has not been so tried for all the offences but only for a few he should not be put again in jeopardy for the offences for which he could have been tried at the time but had not been tried. From the bare reading of the aforesaid Section, it is clear that if a person, who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and he has been convicted or acquitted for such an offence, shall not be tried again for the same offence or for any other offences, for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under Section 221(1) of the Code or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. Sub- section (1) of Section 300 of the Code consists of two limbs. The first limb deals with the case of a person, who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence. Such person shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence while such conviction or acquittal remains in force. The first limb deals with the case of a person, who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence. Such person shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence while such conviction or acquittal remains in force. The second limb of the sub-section deals with the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221 or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. The case of the petitioner is covered under second limb of this sub-section. Though in the police case, the petitioner and his parents were charged for offences punishable under Sections 302/304-B/34 IPC and they were not charged for offences punishable under Sections 406/498-A IPC, but on the basis of the facts alleged in the FIR, the challan and the evidence came before the Court during the trial, they could have been charged under these offences in exercise of power given under Section 221(1) of the Code. But neither the complainant/prosecution nor the Court called upon the petitioner and his parents to face trial for offences under Sections 406/498-A IPC though the allegations constituting these offences were very much available. The petitioner has been convicted and his parents have been acquitted in the earlier trial vide judgment dated August 6, 1998. In view of this fact, the petitioner and his parents cannot be tried again on the basis of the present complaint. This view of mine is supported by a decision of this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1985(2) Recent Criminal Reports 152 where an accused tried and acquitted of offences under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act then such accused could not be retried for offences under Sections 147/158/224/225 IPC. Thus, in view of Section 300(1) of the Code, the present complaint filed by respondent No. 1, brother of the deceased, is liable to be quashed, as the petitioner and his parents cannot be tried again for an offence under Sections 406/498-A IPC on the allegations made therein. 10. I have also considered the other submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner and find force in the same. I have carefully perused the contents of the complaint. 10. I have also considered the other submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner and find force in the same. I have carefully perused the contents of the complaint. The only allegation made against the petitioner is that the dowry articles and the articles of Istri Dhan were entrusted to him at the time of marriage. There is no allegation that these articles were entrusted to the parents of the petitioner. No specific date and time has been mentioned in the complaint as to when these articles were demanded by Jaskirat Kaur. The allegations of entrustment as well as of demand of dowry articles, which are material facts to constitute an offence under Section 406 IPC, are missing in the complaint. Even otherwise, it is not clear as to how and in which capacity and under which authority respondent No. 1, who is brother of the deceased wife, can make demand of the articles of Istri Dhan. After the death of a wife, her estate is inherited by her children, but the same cannot be inherited by her brother as per the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. In view of this fact also, the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 is not maintainable for offences under Sections 406/498-A IPC and the same is liable to be quashed. 11. In view of the above, I allow this petition and quash the complaint dated May 18, 1996 (Annexure P-2) and the summoning order dated July 5, 1997 (Annexure P-1).