S. P. MEHROTRA, J. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter-alia, challenging the judgment and order dated 8-12-1988 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar (respondent No. 1) (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) and the order dated 12-3-1987 passed by the learned District Supply Officer, Kanpur/rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur Nagar (respondent No. 2) (Annexure 7 to the writ petition ). 2. The dispute relates to an accommodation on the ground floor of House No. 78/274, Latouche Road, Kanpur. The said accommodation has hereinafter been referred to as "the disputed accommodation. " 3. It appears that the disputed accommodation had fallen vacant as a result of ejectment of one Jaggan Nath Prasad. The petitioner filed an allotment application for allotment of the disputed accommodation in his favour. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4, who were the landlords of the disputed accommodation, filed a release application under Section 16 (1) (b) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 4. By the said order dated 12-3-1987, the respondent No. 2 allowed the said release application filed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and released the disputed accommodation in favour of the said respondents. 5. Thereupon, the petitioner who was evidently a prospective allottee filed a revision being Rent Revision No. 58 of 1987. 6. By the said judgment and order dated 8-12-1988, the respondent No. 1 dismissed the said Rent Revision No. 58 of 1987 filed by the petitioner. It was, inter-alia, held that the petitioner being a prospective allotteee had no right to file the revision against the release order passed in favour of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 (landlords ). 7. I have heard Sri L. P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. Sri L. P. Singh, learned counsel submitted that the impugned orders passed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were illegal. 9. Having considered the submissions made by Sri L. P. Singh, I am of the opinion that the submissions are not correct. It is well established that the prospective allottee has got no right to be heard at the stage of consideration of the release application filed by the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act" ). 10. It is well established that the prospective allottee has got no right to be heard at the stage of consideration of the release application filed by the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act" ). 10. In Talib Hasan and another v. Ist Additional District Judge, Nainital and others, 1986 (1) ARC 1 (FB), a Full Bench of this Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the said ARC): " (25) Having regard to the meaning assigned to the term "release" in various Judicial Dictionaries, it seems to us that the true import of the words `release the whole or any part of such building in favour of the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) is that the building is being set free and is being taken out of the purview of allotment under clause (a) of Section 16 (1 ). In our opinion, the term clearly implies that when the rent control authorities decide to release the accommodation in favour of the landlord against whom the right of allotment was enforceable it shall no longer be available for allotment. (26) The right of a prospective allottee is not an absolute right. It is contingent upon, firstly, the accommodation being vacant and, secondly, the building being available for allotment. Rule 13 (4), as it stands, at present reinforces this conclusion. It provides that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16 (1) (b) shall be made unless such application is rejected. The right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered hence arises only after the rejection of the landlords application under Section 16 (1) (b ). A fortiori the prospective allottee comes into the picture only after the disposal of the landlords application for release under Section 16 (1) (b), and, only if the same is rejected. (27) So far, therefore, as the scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder is concerned, the same, in our opinion, clearly points to the conclusion that a prospective allottee has no right of objection against the release application filed under Section 16 (1) (b ). As mentioned above, this right to have this application considered for allotment accrues only after the rejection of the release application. As mentioned above, this right to have this application considered for allotment accrues only after the rejection of the release application. Indeed the consideration of the applications for allotment is taken up only after the rejection of the application under Section 16 (1) (b ). Neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder thus postulate any right in a prospective allottee to file objections against the release application. (28) The prospective allottee has also no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application on general principles or doctrine of audi alteram partem. (29) We have reached the above conclusion on a systematic analysis of the statute even without the aid of the old Rule 13 (4 ). The old Rule 13 (4), in our opinion, which was dropped in 1977, merely recognized the long settled legal position as spelled out by series of decisions rendered on the construction and scope of Rule 5 framed under the 1947 Act. It was purely declaratory in nature and appears to have been inserted by way of reiteration of the existing legal position. Its election hence did not, in our considered view, bring about any change in the legal position, namely, that prospective allottees have no locus standi in the disposal of an application for release under Section 16 (1) (b ). 11. In R. S. Misra and another v. IVth Additional District Judge, Bareilly and another, 1992 (1) ARC 405, it was held as follows (paragraph 11 of the said ARC): "11. Learned Judge further held that in view of the provisions of Tablib Hussains case (supra) the right of prospective allottee is not absolute right and it arises only after the rejection of landlords application for release of the accommodation. The prospective allottee cannot be permitted to participate in consideration of the release application of the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. In my opinion these findings recorded by the learned Fourth Additional District Judge are absolutely in accordance with the law and do not suffer from any illegalilty or infirmity. " 12. In Ravi Prakash Gupta alias Munna v. Ram Lal Khare and others, 1992 (2) ARC 264, it was laid down as follows (Paragraph 7 of the said ARC): "7. In my opinion these findings recorded by the learned Fourth Additional District Judge are absolutely in accordance with the law and do not suffer from any illegalilty or infirmity. " 12. In Ravi Prakash Gupta alias Munna v. Ram Lal Khare and others, 1992 (2) ARC 264, it was laid down as follows (Paragraph 7 of the said ARC): "7. In my opinion, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer disposing both the release application of the landlord and the allotment application of the prospective allottee is not in accordance with law and the order was passed in Utter disregard to the law laid down in the case of Achal Singh v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Fatehpur and others, 1987 (2) ARC 88. In any view of the matter, the case has to be sent back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to decide the applications separately in accordance with law. It is also correct that the prospective allottee cannot file objections against the release application of the landlord and the same cannot be considered. . . . " 13. In Brij Bushan Lal Srivastava v. Xth Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others, 1994 (1) ARC 175, it was held as follows (paragraph 5 of the said ARC): "5. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant of respondent No. 2 and he was in actual possession. He had a right to participate in the proceedings and contest the release application, but respondent No. 1 acted illegally in holding that the petitioner has no right to contest the release application filed by respondent No. 2. Admittedly, there was no allotment order in favour of the petitioner and no valid tenancy rights were existing in his favour. He had himself filed an application for allotment treating the accommodation as a vacant. The allotment order could not have been passed unless the release application was finally rejected by the authority concerned. In Talib Hussain and another v. First Additional District Judge, Nainital and others, 1986 (1) ARC 1 (FB), it has been held that a prospective allottee has no right to file objection and contest release application filed by the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). " 14. " 14. In Swaroop Narain Srivastava v. IVth Additional District Judge and others, 1994 (2) ARC 407 (SC), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraph 8 of the said ARC): "8. When Rule 10 of the Rules which provides for allotment procedure is seen, nowhere it is provided that an application for allotment of a vacant building should be considered in preference to the application made for release of the vacant building by the landlord. On the other hand, Rule 13 which provides the procedure for consideration of the application made for release of a vacant building by the landlord, by its sub-rule (4) requires that landlords application for release under the Rule shall, as far as possible, be decided within one month from the date of its presentation and no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application in that Rule shall be made unless such application has been rejected. Thus, when the sub-rule (4) of Rule 13 expressly states that unless an application made by the landlord for release of a vacant building is rejected, no allotment of the vacant building covered by that application could be made, it in terms requires consideration of the application for release of vacant building at the first instance in preference to other application for allotment. Therefore, it must be held that the Rules requires the consideration of the application for release made by the landlord in respect of the vacant building and decision thereon in preference to consideration of any other application for allotment or re-allotment made in respect of that vacant building. If that be our answer to the question under consideration the orders of the District Court and the High Court appealed against in this appeal become unsustainable and require to be interfered with. " 15. In Vijay Kumar Sonkar v. Incharge District Judge and others, 1995 (2) ARC 1 (SC), their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld the Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Hasan case (supra) and held as follows (paragraph 2 of the said ARC): "2. The distinction between the two orders envisaged in sub- section (1) is well marked. In Vijay Kumar Sonkar v. Incharge District Judge and others, 1995 (2) ARC 1 (SC), their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld the Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Hasan case (supra) and held as follows (paragraph 2 of the said ARC): "2. The distinction between the two orders envisaged in sub- section (1) is well marked. In the case of an allotment order the result is brought about by a dialogue between the prospective tenant and the District Magistrate, thereafter, under whose orders the landlord is required to let any building to the prospective tenant. On the other hand in the case of a release order the dialogue takes place between the District Magistrate an the landlord and the prospective tenant does not figure in it at all. The allotment order and the release order, as the case may be, being mutually exclusive, have separate areas of operation permitting no encroachment of one over the other. The mere fact that the focal point is the District Magistrate from whom flow the respective orders if of no consequence. It is on this understanding of the law that the High Court relying on its Full Bench decision in the case of Talib Husain v. Ist Addl. District Judge, 1986 (1) ARC 1 (SC): 1986 SCFBRC 369 (Alld) (FB): AIR 1986 Alld 196 (FB): 1986 All LJ 845 (FB), rejected the prayer of the prospective tenant that he had a right to be heard in a release application of the landlord based as it was on the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 16 on ground of bona fide requirement. On the allowing of the release application the premises in question ceased to be allotable and since the District Magistrate, thereafter would have no jurisdiction to make an allotment thereof and the prospective tenant consequently has no right to resist the landlord in release proceeding. The view of the High Court seems to us to be correct in the circumstances of the case as also in law because as of today no allotment order subsists in favour of the appellant and yet he continues to be in possession. The appeal, is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant is directed to vacated the premises within one month. The view of the High Court seems to us to be correct in the circumstances of the case as also in law because as of today no allotment order subsists in favour of the appellant and yet he continues to be in possession. The appeal, is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant is directed to vacated the premises within one month. It is made clear that he is not debarred from seeking another allotment order of any other premises if he has any such right in accordance with law. The appellant shall pay costs to the respondents throughout which we quantity at Rs. 5,000. " 16. In Ram Narayan Sharma v. Shakuntala Gaur, 2002 (2) ARC 1 (SC); their Lordships of the Apex Court laid down as follows (paragraph 12 of the ARC): "12. In the writ petition the High Court found the appellant was rightly treated as a prospective allottee and the need of the landlady having been found to be bona fide by the revisional Court, it committed no error in releasing the accommodation in her favour. So far the legal position is concerned, we feel that there is hardly any doubt that a prospective allottee shall have no right to oppose an application for release moved by the landlord. The need of the landlord is bona fide or not is a matter for satisfaction of the District Magistrate and on being so satisfied, an order of release can be passed. The release application is to be disposed of first before passing an order on the application for allotment. " 17. In view of the settled legal position that the prospective allottee has got no right to be heard at the stage of consideration of the release application filed by the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act, it follows that in case, the release order is passed under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act in respect of an accommodation in favour of the landlord, then the prospective allottee has no right to file revision under Section 18 of the Act challenging the release order. Section 18 of the Act lays down as follows: "18. Section 18 of the Act lays down as follows: "18. Appeal against order of allotment or release.- [ (1) No appeal shall lie from any order under Section 16 or Section 19, whether made before or after the commencement of this section, but any person aggrieved by a final order under any of the said section may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer a revision to the District Judge on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (a) that the District Magistrate has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law; (b) that the District Magistrate has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law; (c) that the District Magistrate acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (2) The revising authority may confirm or rescind the final order made under sub-section (1) or may remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and pending the revision, may stay the operation of such order an such terms, if any, as it thinks it. Explanation.- The power to rescind the final order under this sub-section shall not include the power to pass an allotment order or to direct the passing of an allotment order in favour of a person different from the allottee mentioned in the order under revision. (3) Where an order under Section 16 or Section 19 is rescinded, the District Magistrate shall, on an application being made to him on that behalf, place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. " 18. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act thus shows that revision under Section 18 of the Act can be filed by "any person aggrieved by a final order" under Section 16 of the Act. As a prospective allottee has got no right to be heard at the stage of consideration of the release application filed by the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act, there is no question of the prospective allottee being "aggrieved" by the release order. Therefore, the prospective allottee has no right to file revision under Section 18 of the Act challenging the release order. Therefore, the prospective allottee has no right to file revision under Section 18 of the Act challenging the release order. In Bhairab Dutt Nagarkothi v. District Judge, Pithoragarh and others, 1992 (1) ARC 261, it was held as follows: ". . . . . . Further the petitioner is only a prospective allottee and cannot have any grievance against the release of the accommodation in dispute in favour of the landlady. The legal position in this respect is well settled. " It may be added that in the present case, there is no dispute regarding the existence of vacancy in the disputed accommodation. Therefore, the question as to whether the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the question of vacancy in an accommodation can be challenged by the prospective allottee or not, does not arise in the present case and, therefore, the same has not been considered by me in this judgment. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .