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2002 DIGILAW 96 (RAJ)

Laxman Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2002-01-11

ARUN KUMAR, PRAKASH TATIA

body2002
JUDGMENT 1. -A notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was issued on 1-5-1980 expressing the intention to acquire 4 bigha and 2 biswa of land comprised in khasra No. 1013 at Doongarpur. On 27-6-1981, the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1981 came into force whereby sub-section (2) of Section 5 was introduced which provided a period of limitation of two years for issuing a declaration under Section 6 of the principal Act i.e., a declaration under Section 6 had to be made within a period of two years from the commencement of the amending Act. On 24-9-1984, the Central Land Acquisition Act was brought into force in the State of Rajasthan. A notice under Ss. 6 and 17(4) of the Act was issued on 19-3- 1987 dispensing with Section 5 proceedings and expressing the decision of the State Government to acquire the land in question by invoking the emergency provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act. Notice under Section 9 of the Act was issued regarding taking possession of the land on 23-3-1987. In pursuance thereof, possession of the land was taken on 8-4-1987. The petitioners filed writ petition on 21-3-1987 challenging the acquisition of their land. The facts are similar in other connected cases though there is a slight variation in the dates which has no implication on the legal issue being decided. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants raised following points in support of the appeal: (I) Proceedings could not be continued because notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued after a lapse of about 7 years. This was in view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1981. The said provisions provided a limitation of two years from the date of commencement of the Validation Act for issuing the declaration under Section 6. Since the declaration was issued much beyond this period of limitation the same was liable to be quashed. It was further contended that Section 17(4) notification could not be used to validate the proceedings. (II) Notice under Section 127 (4) was void ab initio because the respondents failed to tender payment of 80 per cent of compensation as envisaged under sub-section (3) (a) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was further contended that Section 17(4) notification could not be used to validate the proceedings. (II) Notice under Section 127 (4) was void ab initio because the respondents failed to tender payment of 80 per cent of compensation as envisaged under sub-section (3) (a) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. (III) The action of the respondents is highly arbitrary. By issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Act in the year 1980 the appellants were being pegged down, for purposes of payment of compensation although effectively the acquisition was being made the year 1987. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully considered the above contentions on behalf of the appellants. 4. So far as the first point is concerned a reference to Section 17 of the Act shows that no time limit is provided for issuing a notification under Section 17(4). For ready reference, sub-section (4) of Section 17 is reproduced as under : "(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)." It will be seen from the above that a declaration under Section 6 in respect of the land can be made at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). In view of this specific statutory provision which is admittedly applicable, it cannot be said that a declaration under Section 6 could not have been issued after a lapse of 7 years or more. Learned counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that Section 17 is a Code in itself. It contains complete procedure for acquisition made under the said provision. Section 17 is a provision to be resorted to in cases of urgency. Notification under Section 4 of the Act already stood issued with respect to the land in question as far back as the year 1980. The Government felt the urgency for the acquisition and, therefore, Section 17(4) notification, read with Section 6, was issued on 19-3- 1987. Section 17 is a provision to be resorted to in cases of urgency. Notification under Section 4 of the Act already stood issued with respect to the land in question as far back as the year 1980. The Government felt the urgency for the acquisition and, therefore, Section 17(4) notification, read with Section 6, was issued on 19-3- 1987. We find no illegality in the procedure followed in the facts of the case. 5. Coming to the second contention raised by learned counsel for the appellants a reference has to be made to Section 127, sub-section (1) and (3-A). Under Section 17 (1) the Government is entitled to take possession of the land on expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice under Section 9 (1) and, thereupon, the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. This is what has been done in the present case. Possession of the land was taken on the expiry of 15 days after issuance of the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act. On possession being taken, the land vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. So far as the question of payment of 80 per cent of compensation before taking possession under sub-section (3-A) is concerned, the failure to make this payment will not render the acquisition of the land or vesting of the land in the Government as void ab initio as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants. Of course, the payment of compensation as per sub-section (3-A) is a requirement under the statute which has to be complied with. But non-compliance of this does not render the acquisition void. The Government can be directed to ensure compliance of the said provision. We are fortified in this view by a decision of the Apex Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U. P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 : ( AIR 1993 SC 2517 ) wherein it was observed that failure to pay compensation as envisaged under sub-section (3A) does not mean that possession was taken illegally or that the land did not thereupon vest in the Government. Thus we find no merit in the second contention raised on behalf of the appellants. 6. Lastly, the learned counsel raised an argument suggesting arbitrariness on the part of the respondents. Thus we find no merit in the second contention raised on behalf of the appellants. 6. Lastly, the learned counsel raised an argument suggesting arbitrariness on the part of the respondents. As already noted, Section 17 permits the Government to invoke its provisions at any time, therefore, there is no statutory bar so far as the action is concerned. If the action of the respondents results in some hardship to the land-owners normally the provision regarding payment of interest takes care of the hardship. The power of compulsory acquisition of land is in the nature of a power of eminent domain which the State is entitled to exercise keeping in view the larger public interest as against individual interest.The result of the above discussion is that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.Appeal dismissed. *******