JUDGMENT : In this appeal preferred under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the defendant No. 2 has called in question the legal propriety of the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 12-A/82 by the learned Additional District Judge, Satna. 2. The respondents No. 1 to 3 as plaintiffs instituted the aforesaid suit against the respondent No. 4 (defendant No. 1) and the present appellant (defendant No. 2) and eleven others claiming the relief for partition, possession, declaration, cancellation of certain sale-deeds and permanent injunction. 3. According to the plaintiffs, Late Raj Bahadur Singh and the original defendant No. 2, Shiv Bahadur Singh, had acquire certain land as members of joint Hindu Family. As per the plaintiffs the land situated in Khasra No. 47, admeasuring an area of 5 Bighas, 18 Biswa was purchased by Late Shri Raj Bahadur Singh in the name of his son Budhendra Pratap Singh, the defendant No. 1 along with some other land. There was an oral partition between the family members in the month of July, 1968 which was later on written on stamp paper of Rs. 30/- on 26-2-1970 and according to the said document the land which originally stood in the name of defendant No. 1 fell to the share of plaintiff No. 3, Dharmendra Singh. The said Budhendra Pratap Singh, the defendant No. 1, had no right, to alienate the property but he executed as many as 11 sale deeds in favour of original defendants Nos. 3 to 13. It was pleaded that the execution of the sale-deeds by the defendant No. 1 was invalid in the eye of law as the said defendant No. 1 had no right, title or interest in the property. With the abovesaid factual backdrop the plaintiffs prayed for cancellation of the sale-deeds executed by the defendant No. 1 against original defendants Nos. 3 to 13 and further prayed for recovery of possession. 4. A joint written statement was filed by number of defendants wherein it was putforth that the suit land was not the joint family property and it was exclusive property of defendant No. 1 inasmuch as in revenue records the property stood recorded in the name of said defendant which conclusively proved that he was the sole owner. 4. A joint written statement was filed by number of defendants wherein it was putforth that the suit land was not the joint family property and it was exclusive property of defendant No. 1 inasmuch as in revenue records the property stood recorded in the name of said defendant which conclusively proved that he was the sole owner. It was also setforth in the written statement that in any case the said defendant was the ostensible owner and, therefore, the defendant No. 2 purchased the land for sufficient consideration in good faith after making full enquiry about the entries in revenue records which describe him as the recorded owner of the land. 5. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiffs entered into a compromise with all the purchasers except the defendant No. 2/appellant. In view of the compromise the suit against the said defendants as well as the defendant No. 2 got dismissed. After that exercise the appellant was described as defendant No. 2. 6. It is apposite to mention here that the contesting defendants had putforth that there was a partition between Shiv Bahadur and Raj Bahadur much earlier than that has been setforth in the plaint and, therefore, the sale deed executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of original defendant No. 2 was totally sustainable in law. It was also putforth that there was no right, title or interest of Raj Bahadur on the property which was acquired by the defendant No. 2 through purchase. A plea of mis-joinder of parties was also pleaded. The defendant also pleaded that the vendor had the right over the property which he had alienated. 7. The learned trial Judge originally had framed as many as 11 issues and thereafter, framed another additional issue. The Court below on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record came to hold that the suit property belonged to Joint Hindu Family of Raj Bahadur, Budhendra Singh and Shiv Bahadur Singh; that partition was effected by Raj Bahadur Singh during his life time in the month of July, 1968 between the plaintiffs and the original defendants Nos. The Court below on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record came to hold that the suit property belonged to Joint Hindu Family of Raj Bahadur, Budhendra Singh and Shiv Bahadur Singh; that partition was effected by Raj Bahadur Singh during his life time in the month of July, 1968 between the plaintiffs and the original defendants Nos. 1 and 2; that the Exhibit-P-1 vide which the acknowledgement was recorded did not require registration; that though there has been demarcation on the basis of Exhibit-P-1, the same did not affect the allocation of share; that the suit property had fallen to the share of Dharmendra Singh, the plaintiff No. 3; that Budhendra Pratap Singh had no right, title or interest over the suit property and the purchaser/defendant No. 2 had not taken adequate precaution to find about the entire fact situation pertaining to the rights of the vendor and hence, he had undertaken the risk on his own; that the defendant No. 1 without the knowledge of plaintiffs had sold the property and handed over the possession and in absence of his own title the transfer is null and void; that the suit has been filed within the period of limitation; that the suit is not to be defeated because of any collusion and it was maintainable to be proceeded against the defendants who were on record; that the partition could have been effected without getting Exhibit-P-1 registered as the said document is the proof of acknowledgement of earlier oral partition; that the plaintiffs were entitled to bring the suit in the present frame/shape; that prayer for recovery of the possession of the suit land was tenable; and that the plaintiffs were entitled to costs. After reaching such findings the learned trial Judge declared that the plaintiff No. 1, Shiv Nandan Kumar was the title holder in respect of certain plots and Dharmendra Singh was the owner of plot situated on Khasra Nos. 532, 533, 534 and 649/1. The Court below declared the sale-deed executed by the vendor Budhendra Singh in favour of the defendant No. 2 as null and void and directed that the concerned defendant should give delivery of possession. The learned trial Judge refused to grant relief of mesne profit. 8. Assailing the aforesaid judgment and decree Mr. 532, 533, 534 and 649/1. The Court below declared the sale-deed executed by the vendor Budhendra Singh in favour of the defendant No. 2 as null and void and directed that the concerned defendant should give delivery of possession. The learned trial Judge refused to grant relief of mesne profit. 8. Assailing the aforesaid judgment and decree Mr. J. P. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant has raised for contentions, namely, (a) after deletion of the names of the defendants-purchasers the value of the suit came down to Rs. 6421.90 P inasmuch as relief of partition was valued at Rs. 3469.50 P, cancellation of sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 2-appellant was valued at Rs. 2500/-, possession of suit land was valued at Rs. 72.40 P and prayer for injunction was valued at Rs. 200/- and, therefore the trial Judge did not have the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit; (b) that after compromise was effected by the plaintiffs with number of defendants the learned Additional District Judge should have returned the plaint for presentation in the appropriate Court as the appropriate Court could have been Civil Judge Class-I; (c) that the document Exhibit-P-1 which has been accepted by the learned trial Judge should not have been accepted as that was not the acknowledgment of earlier partition as an actual fact it gave effect to partition and hence, was compulsorily registerable under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act; and (d) that the scrutiny of Exhibit-P-1 if appreciated with the fact that there was no correction of revenue records goes a long way to show that there was no partition and hence, the defendant No. 2 was entitled to purchase from Budhendra Pratap Singh as that was self-acquired property of Budhendra Pratap Singh. 9. Mr. R. K. Samaiya, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 3, sounding a contra note, has submitted that the effect of compromise did not necessarily decrease the valuation of the suit and, therefore, the learned Additional District Judge did not commit any error by not returning the plaint for file it in the appropriate Court. It is also contended by him that no objection was taken to the pecuniary jurisdiction after the amendments were carried out and no proper issue was framed in that regard. It is also contended by him that no objection was taken to the pecuniary jurisdiction after the amendments were carried out and no proper issue was framed in that regard. It is also submitted by him that the learned trial Judge has correctly arrived at the conclusion that Exhibit-P-1 is the acknowledgement of earlier partition and, therefore, it did not require registration. It is also putforth by him that once Exhibit-P-1 is accepted as valid it is plain as day that Budhendra Pratap Singh had no right, title or interest to alienate the suit land and, therefore, no right as such passed in favour of defendant No. 2 appellant and accordingly the learned trial Judge could declare the sale-deed as null and void. In addition to this it is also contended by Mr. Samaiya that the appellant had not taken proper care to find out about the real status of the vendor and, therefore, he cannot also be regarded as bona fide purchaser of value in absence of any adequate evidence brought on record in that regard. 10. It is appropriate to state here that I.A. No. 2401/98 was filed and this Court by order dated 3-4-1999 had directed that the same shall be considered at the time of final hearing. The said interim application has been filed by one Brijraj Kishore Pathak who had sought leave of this Court to be impleaded as respondent No. 5 on the ground that he has purchased the land situated at Khasra No. 38/1 vide registered sale-deed dated 8-6-1991 from respondent No. 4. I shall deal with this application at a later stage. 11. As far as the first contention of Mr. Pandey is concerned it relates to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. This is not one of those cases where the Court lacked jurisdiction because of high valuation. In the case at hand due to the original valuation the suit could be filed before the learned Additional District Judge and after the valuation decreased, no objection was taken and no issue in that regard was framed. Had that been done possibly the matter would have been different. The Court did have the inherent jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction to adjudicate the suits of high valuation. Had that been done possibly the matter would have been different. The Court did have the inherent jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction to adjudicate the suits of high valuation. In absence of any objection in this regard and in view of the non-lacking of inherent jurisdiction, I am of the considered opinion that determination of the controversy by the learned trial Judge cannot be found fault with on the base of aforesaid irregularity. Hence, I repel the first contention of Mr. Pandey. 12. The second contention of Mr. Pandey relates to the aspect that the document by which the acknowledgment of partition was done required compulsory registration inasmuch as by the said document, Ex. P/1, as such partition was effected and not acknowledged. Per contra, it is submitted by Mr. Samaiya that the document in fact, recognised the earlier arrangement of partition. The learned trial Judge has dwelled upon this aspect while dealing with the issue No. 3. Considering the evidence the learned trial Judge has found that there was a prior partition. The Court below has taken note of the fact that the contents of Ex.P/1 had not been properly controverted by the defendants. The leaned trial Judge has also placed reliance on Exhibits P-8, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 28 wherein this aspect has been mentioned but the defendants chose to maintain total silence in that regard. Oral evidence which has been brought on record clearly proved that there has been a prior partition. On a proper scrutiny of Ex. P/1 it is also perceptible that it is an acknowledgement of prior arrangement. It is not a document by which the partition has been effected by metes and bounds. In this context I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Nani Bai vs. Gita Bai, AIR 1958 SC 706 . In the said case their Lordships in paragraph 11 held as under :- "..The question, therefore, is whether those documents "purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property," within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. No authority has been cited before us in support of this contention. No authority has been cited before us in support of this contention. Partition in the Mitakshara sense may be only a severance of the joint status of the members of the coparcenary, that is to say, what was once a joint title has become a divided title though there has been no division of any properties by metes and bounds. Partition may also mean what ordinarily is understood by partition amongst co-sharers who may not be members of a Hindu coparcenary. For partition in the former sense, it is not necessary that all the members of the joint family should agree, because it is a matter of individual volition. If a coparcener expresses his individual intention in unequivocal language to separate himself from the rest of the family, that effects a partition, so far as he is concerned, from the rest of the family. By this process, what was a joint tenancy has been converted into a tenancy in common. For partition in the latter sense of allotting specific properties or parcels to individual coparceners agreement amongst all the coparceners is absolutely necessary. Such a partition may be effected orally, but if the parties reduce the transaction to a formal document which is intended to be the evidence of the partition, it has the effect of declaring the exclusive title of the coparcener to whom a particular property is allotted by partition, and is, thus, within the mischief of section 17(1)(b), the material portion of which has been quoted above. But partition in the former sense of defining the shares only without specific allotments of property, has no reference to immovable property. Such a transaction only affects the status of the members of the members who have separated themselves from the rest of the coparcenary. The chance of status from a joint member of a coparcenary to a separated member having a defined share in the ancestral property, may be effected orally or it may be brought about by a document. If the document does not evidence any partition by metes and bounds, that is to say, the partition in latter of section 17(1)(b), because so long as there has been no partition in that sense, the interest of the separately member continues to extend over the whole joint property as before. Such a transaction does purport or operate to do any of the things referred to in that section. Such a transaction does purport or operate to do any of the things referred to in that section. Hence, insofar as the documents referred to above are evidence of partition only in the former sense, they are not compulsorily registrable under section 17, and would, therefore, not come within the mischief of section 49 which prohibits the reception into evidence of any document "affecting immovable property." It must, therefore, be held that those documents have rightly been received in evidence for that limited purpose." 13. In this context I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Deochand vs. Shiv Ram, 1970 MPLJ 371 wherein the Apex Court placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Ganpat Gangaji Patil vs. Namdeo and ors., 1941 NLJ 266, Narayan vs. Co-operative Central Bank, Malakpur, 1938 NLJ 82 and Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi etc. vs. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi etc., (1961) 3 SCR 792 and thereafter held in categorical terms : ". However we think that the law is well settled that a memorandum or acknowledgement of a partition already effected orally does not require registration unless it be that by that very documents, will to separate and the matter of the partition is to be deducted..." If the documents and the oral evidence are appreciated in proper perspective there is no iota of doubt that Exhibit P-1 is an acknowledgment of a partition already effected orally. Thus the finding of the learned trial Judge is acceptable and the contention of Mr. Pandey assailing the same is sans substance and accordingly repelled. 14. The next contention which has been putforth by Mr. Pandey is that there no mutation had taken place after the partition effected in the year 1968 and therefore, it cannot be said that Ex. P-1 was a memorandum of previous partition. The learned trial Judge has taken note of that at the time of oral partition Rajendra Singh was hardly 15 years and Dharmendra was aged about 3 years. The court below has also observed that the same cannot be regarded as factor to disbelieve the memorandum of partition. He has also noticed that the defendants had not adduced any evidence to controvert the factum of previous partition. Hence, analysis made by the learned trial Court, I am inclined to think, is correct and no dent can be found in the same. 15. He has also noticed that the defendants had not adduced any evidence to controvert the factum of previous partition. Hence, analysis made by the learned trial Court, I am inclined to think, is correct and no dent can be found in the same. 15. Another aspect which requires to be dealt with is whether the purchaser appellant had performed the real duty of caveat Emptor. The court below in paragraph 19 has discussed the evidence and come to hold that the purchaser had purchased only on the basis of revenue record and has not made proper enquiry. The finding reached by the learned trial Judge cannot be regarded as erroneous. Hence, on this ground also the submission of Mr. Pandey is not acceptable. 16. As I have already held that the vendor Budhendra Pratap Singh did not have right, title and interest, he could not have transferred the suit land and, therefore, the application seeking impleadment by the person who is a lis pendens purchaser is bound to be rejected and accordingly it stands rejected. 17. In view of the foregoing premises, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, I am inclined to direct that the parties shall bear their respective costs throughout.