ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. ( 1 ) SMT. K. Uma Maheswari, who is a graduate in Computer Science and a holder of Post-Graduate Diploma in Computer applications, got married with one sri Y. Raghavardhan, a Software Engineer in atlanta, USA, on 23-10-1999 at VMC kalyana Mandapam, Tirupathi according to hindu rites. It is averred that the elders have arranged the marriage of the petitioner with the said Y. Raghavardhan with a fond hope that since he is well settled in life, he will protect the interest of the petitioner s well being and her future and paid Rs. 4. 00 lakhs in cash as dowry and gave gold and silver articles worth Rs. 3. 00 lakhs and household articles worth Rs. 1. 00 lakh at the time of marriage. Thereafter a house that was registered in the name of the petitioner was demanded by Y. Raghavardhan and his father to be transferred in the joint names of the petitioner and Y. Raghavardhan, and it was threatened that unless such transfer takes place, she will not be taken to USA. After transfer of the said house in the joint names of petitioner and the said raghavardhan, on 13-11-1999 the petitioner left for USA along with the said y. Raghavardhan where she came to know that the respondent was already married to one Geethika, who also attended the marriage, and they were living together and when she questioned the said y. Raghavardhan with regard to his earlier marriage with Geethika, he informed her that to satisfy his parents he married the petitioner. He further demanded an amount of Rs. 3. 00 lakhs from the parents of the petitioner to take her back and with the said demand, on 18-1-2000 she was sent back from USA. After return to India, she narrated the story to her parents, who tried to negotiate the matter and as all the negotiations failed, she lodged complaint before the II Addl. Munsif Magistrate, tirupathi on 21-3-2000, which was forwarded to Central Crime Station, tirupathi, which was registered as Crime no. 129 of 2000 for the offences under secs. 420, 498-A and Sec. 506 (2) of Indian penal Code (for brevity Penal Code ). After completion of investigation, the police filed charge-sheet which was registered as CC no. 489 of 2000. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the said CC, the Addl. 129 of 2000 for the offences under secs. 420, 498-A and Sec. 506 (2) of Indian penal Code (for brevity Penal Code ). After completion of investigation, the police filed charge-sheet which was registered as CC no. 489 of 2000. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the said CC, the Addl. Director General of Police, CID hyderabad, the first respondent herein, in his memo dated 29-4-2000 directed Inspector of Police, CID, Cuddapah, second respondent herein, to take over the C. D. file in Cr. No. 129 of 2000 filed under Secs. 420, 498-A and 506 IPC referred under Sec. 156 (3) of the Code from CCS, Tirupathi, for further investigation immediately and submit PER within 15 days. In consequence of which he filed a memo stating that on certain allegations the first respondent Addl. Director General of Police, CID, Hyderabad, in his Memo dated 14-8-2000 directed him to take over the C. D. file in the above case and conduct further investigation. In obedience of the said orders, he obtained the C. D. file in the above case, on 19-8-2000 from the inspector of Police, CCS, Tirupathi, and took up further investigation. Therefore, prayed the court to stop further proceedings in the above case until further report is filed by the cid. It is this order which is assailed in this writ petition on the ground that the respondent has no jurisdiction or authority to issue such directions once the offence was already investigated, a final report was filed and the court has taken cognizance of the offence. It is further contended that when there is no further evidence oral or documentary, there is no necessity to further investigate into the matter. Therefore, the order passed by the first respondent on certain allegations dated 14-8-2000 directing the 2nd respondent to take C. D. file in cr. No. 129 of 2000 for further investigation and submit a fresh report within 15 days is liable to be set aside on the ground of lack of. power and contrary to Sec. 173 (8) of the code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity the procedure Code ). No. 129 of 2000 for further investigation and submit a fresh report within 15 days is liable to be set aside on the ground of lack of. power and contrary to Sec. 173 (8) of the code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity the procedure Code ). ( 3 ) IN response to the rule nisi issued by this Court, respondents 1 and 2 filed counter-affidavit trying to support the impugned action initiated by the first respondent in pursuance of which the second respondent filed Memo dated 22-8-2000 before the Court, as legal and sustainable in law. The counter is conspicuously silent as to under what circumstances tine respondents have ordered for further investigation into the matter. What all paragraph 3 of the counter shows is that on the basis of the preliminary inquiry report submitted by the Inspector, CID, cuddapah, the first respondent directed the second respondent to take over the C. D. file and to conduct further investigation. The counter further shows that the petitioner in her complaint lodged before the learned magistrate prayed to forward the complaint to the SHO, CCS, Tirupathi, where one sambasivaiah, Inspector of Police who is related to the petitioner was working, that the said Inspector of Police has not properly conducted the investigation and he has not examined the witnesses, that though the matter was tried before the elders, as per the desire of the parents of the Y. Raghavardhan husband, the said Inspector, Sambasivaiah, has not referred the matter to the Family counselling so as to make efforts for the reunion of the separated married couples, even though there were instructions given to the Investigating Officer on 4-5-2000 i. e. , before filing of charge-sheet on 10-6-2000, for the reasons best known to him. Therefore, all these acts and deeds warranted the first respondent topass the impugned order directing the 2nd respondent to investigate into the matter. Therefore, all these acts and deeds warranted the first respondent topass the impugned order directing the 2nd respondent to investigate into the matter. It is further stated that the petitioner arrived india on 20-1-2000 and she never lodged complaint with the police either at Kodur or tirupathi, that the Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Rajampet is the jurisdictional court for Kodur and she has not approached the court at Rajampet, that the matter was settled before the elders and an undertaking was given by the father of the petitioner on 9-3-2000 before Town elders and contrary to the said undertaking given by her father, she filed the above said complaint against her husband, father-in- law and mother-in-law ( 4 ) DURING the course of investigation, the 2nd respondent brought some new facts into light, with regard to the alleged marriage of the said Raghavardhan with one Geethika prior to the marriage of the petitioner with raghavardhan. It is stated that the said geethika Ramani who is the daughter of one k. Basaveswara Rao, Deputy Central intelligence Officer, Hyderabad" and he performed her marriage with Sri P. Sekhar, son of P. Uma Maheswara Rao, vivekanandanagar Colony, Hyderabad on 9-11-1995 at Bozai Kalyana Mandapam, near shobhana Theatre, Balanagar, Hyderabad. The said Sekhar is a Civil Engineering graduate, got trained up in Computers and smt. P. Geethika Ramani did her B. Sc. , computers and underwent training in aptech, both of them got married and registered before the Registrar of Marriages, kukatpalli, Rangareddy District on 11-3-1997 and went to USA during April, 1998 and are presently working there and living together in America along with their son Akshay, 4 years. In token of his investigation, the Investigating Officer has collected the wedding card of smt. P. Geethika Ramani and Sri P. Sekhar, evidencing their marriage on 9-11-1995 and the marriage certificate date 11-3-97. ( 5 ) HAVING regard to these pleadings of the parties, without going into the merits or otherwise of the surmises, the only question that arises for consideration and decision is whether the power exercised by the first respondent, purported to be under sec. l73 (8) of the Code, in ordering further investigation when once the offence has already been investigated into and the court has taken cognizance of the same, is valid in the eye of law or not. l73 (8) of the Code, in ordering further investigation when once the offence has already been investigated into and the court has taken cognizance of the same, is valid in the eye of law or not. ( 6 ) ON the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner herein alleging that the said y. Raghavardhan married her suppressing the fact of his earlier marriage with one geethika, demanded dowry which was accordingly paid, subjected her to cruelty to pressurize her father to get the house transferred in the joint names of herself and y. Raghavardhan and took Rs. 3. 00 lakhs from her parents to take her to USA with him, the learned Magistrate referred the matter to Police Station, CCS, Tirupathi, to investigate into and submit a report. Accordingly, the matter was investigated into, gathered some material and filed charge-sheet, which was taken cognizance by the learned Magistrate and registered as cc No. 489 of 2000. Subsequently, on the representation made by the father of raghavardhan the 3rd respondent herein addressed to the Director General of Police, cid, Hyderabad, dated 20-4-2000, he directed the 2nd respondent to further investigate into the matter. Thus the 2nd respondent in pursuance of the orders of the first respondent took the CD. file from the inspector, CCS, Tirupathi and investigated into the matter. Before investigating into the matter, the impugned memo was filed to stop further proceedings in the above case until further report to be filed by the CID. ( 7 ) IT is the case of the respondents that the power is traceable under sub-sec. (8) of section 173 of the Code for issuance of the above said Memo. ( 8 ) IT is apposite here to refer to Sec. 173 (8) of the Code for better appreciation of the rival contentions,"173. Report of Police Officer on completion of investigation: (1) to (7 ). . . . . . . . . . . . (8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under subsection (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the Officer in- charge of the Police Station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sees. (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-sec. (2 ). ( 9 ) SECTION 173 of the Code contemplates that every investigation under Chapter XII of the Code shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and as soon as it is completed, the Officer in-charge of the police Station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government. ( 10 ) SUB-SECTION (8) of Sec. 173, which is relevant in dealing with the issue involved in this writ petition, starts with a non- obstante clause that nothing in Sec. 173 shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of the offence after a report under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 173 is forwarded to the magistrate and where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police Station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and the provisions of sub- sees. (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-sec. (2 ). Thus power is conferred on the Police Officers to further investigate into the matter and submit a report or reports and forward further evidence, oral or documentary, in the prescribed form, even after cognizance of the offence is taken by the jurisdictional Magistrate. ( 11 ) THERE is no dispute with regard to the power of the Officer in-charge of the Police station to further investigate into the matter, even after he has submitted a report under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 173 and the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence. But the above said provision of law does not entitle the officers in-charge of the police station to file a memo and seek to stop all further proceedings in the case, until further report is filed in pursuance of further investigation. What all sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 173 and the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence. But the above said provision of law does not entitle the officers in-charge of the police station to file a memo and seek to stop all further proceedings in the case, until further report is filed in pursuance of further investigation. What all sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 173 mandates is that the Officer in-charge of the Police station on obtaining further evidence, oral or documentary, shall forward to the magistrate in the form of a report or reports, prescribed by the State Government, regarding such evidence. ( 12 ) AT the outset, we shall deal with the word further investigation. The Supreme court in K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala and others which was a case wherein the state Government had consented for the entrustment of investigation in a case involving offences punishable under Official secrets Act to the CBI, the CBI completed investigation and filed a final report, subsequently the State Government withdrew the consent and sought further investigation in the case by the State Police. In this context, their Lordships quoting dictionary meaning of "further" as additional; more; supplement; has held that further investigation therefore is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether. Sub-section (8) of Sec. 173 clearly envisages that on completion of further investigation, the investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports and not fresh report or reports, regarding the further evidence obtained during such investigation. Subsequent withdrawal of consent by the State government for further investigation of case by State Police is impermissible. ( 13 ) THE Apex Court in yet another decision Om Prakash Naranga and another v. State (Delhi Administration) has held that notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Sec. 173 of the Code, the right of the police to make further investigation is not exhausted and the police can exercise such right as often as necessary when the information comes to light. It is further observed that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which, expressly or by necessary implication barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. It is further observed that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which, expressly or by necessary implication barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Neither Sec. 173 nor sec. 190 of the Code leads to say that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permits repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. Their Lordships further observed that in the interest of independence of the Magistracy and the judiciary, in the interest of purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light. ( 14 ) WHILE reaffirming the above said principle, the Apex Court in a decision State of Bihar and another v. JAC Saldanna and others has observed that the Police Officers should refrain from addressing communications to the Court on pending matters required to be determined judicially and their Lordships disapproved such conduct of the Police Officers. ( 15 ) THE Jammu and Kashmir High Court in a decision Ghulam Mohiuddin Mir and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir has held that notwithstanding the submission of its report under Sec. 173 (2) of the Code and the fact that the Magistrate has already taken cognizance, is its statutory right which cannot be interfered within the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Sec. 482 of the Code. The use of expression re-investigation in the application of the prosecuting officer would not change the position because it actually is the prayer for further investigation for the reasons disclosed in the application and therefore, dismissed the application confirming the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Tangmarg. The use of expression re-investigation in the application of the prosecuting officer would not change the position because it actually is the prayer for further investigation for the reasons disclosed in the application and therefore, dismissed the application confirming the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Tangmarg. ( 16 ) IN that case, FIR No. 29 of 1985 was lodged in Police Station, Tangmarg on 2-7-1985, the police after investigation presented the challans before the Judicial magistrate of First Class, Tangmarg, while the case was pending before the said Court, an application was filed by the Prosecuting officer praying inter alia for reinvestigation on the grounds contained therein, two of which were that the previous investigating officer had not effected the recoveries and that certain other important and salient facts having vital bearing on the case were not brought out. Reliance for these grounds was placed on the statement of a prosecuting witness namely Mr. Baba. The learned magistrate noticed the provisions of sub- sec. (8) of Sec. 173 of the Code and observed that the investigating agency had the right to conduct further investigation in respect of an offence, even after report under subsection (2) of Sec. 173 has been forwarded to the Magistrate. He observed that the investigating agency is at liberty to go in for further investigation at their option. That order was assailed before the High Court seeking to quash the same on the principal ground that there is no right with the police to further investigate the case after the court has taken cognizance and that the magistrate himself can alter the charge under Sec. 227 of the Code, if the material so satisfies. ( 17 ) HAVING regard to these facts and circumstances the Apex Court held that further investigation by the police notwithstanding the submission of its report under Sec. 173 (2) of the Code, 1898 (sic. 1973) and the fact that the Magistrate has already taken cognizance, is its statutory right under Sec. 173 (8) which cannot be interfered with. ( 17 ) HAVING regard to these facts and circumstances the Apex Court held that further investigation by the police notwithstanding the submission of its report under Sec. 173 (2) of the Code, 1898 (sic. 1973) and the fact that the Magistrate has already taken cognizance, is its statutory right under Sec. 173 (8) which cannot be interfered with. ( 18 ) THE ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision Union Public Service commission v. S. Papaiah and others having regard to the law laid down in Bhagwant singh v. Commissioner of Police ( AIR 1985 SC 1285 ) is to the effect that issuance of notice by the Magistrate to the informant at the time of consideration of the final report is a "must". It is further observed that this is the binding precedent which is the law of the land, has not been followed by the v Metropolitan Magistrate and was wrongly ignored by the revisional court also. In this context, the Apex Court has ruled that when the application was filed before the metropolitan Magistrate seeking reinvestigation, the learned Magistrate rejected the petition by his order dated 4-11-1995 and observed that rightly or wrongly that court has passed an order and it was not reviewed earlier. In that context, it was held by the Supreme Court that further investigation in exercise of the powers under sec. 173 (8) of the Code directing the CBI to further investigate the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objections raised by the appellant to the investigation and a new report to be filed by the Investigating Officer would be covered by sub-sees. (2) to (6) of Sec. 173 of the Code, and thus the learned Magistrate therein failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law and his order was set aside. ( 19 ) FROM the above decisions of the Apex Court and High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, it is clear further investigation is not either reinvestigation or a fresh investigation, but it is continuation of the investigation already made. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the first respondent directing the Inspector, CID, to further investigate into the matter amounts to reinvestigation cannot be accepted particularly in view of the decision of the supreme Court in K. Chankrasekhar s case (1 supra ). The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the first respondent directing the Inspector, CID, to further investigate into the matter amounts to reinvestigation cannot be accepted particularly in view of the decision of the supreme Court in K. Chankrasekhar s case (1 supra ). His next contention that the first respondent has no jurisdiction or power to pass such an order when the learned magistrate has already taken cognizance of the offence on the final report submitted by the Police, CCS, Tirupathi, more particularly when np material is filed by the respondents to show that any fresh fact has come to light requiring further investigation, is concerned, on perusal of material on record, I am satisfied that no fresh facts came into light to order for further investigation into the matter by the first respondent except the representation made by the father of smt. Geethika. Whatever evidence that is gathered in pursuance of further investigation, can be brought on record during the course of trial by way of defence evidence. Therefore, on this aspect, I agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner ( 20 ) FURTHER more, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be conceded to, in view of express power provided to the police officers, who are in- charge of the Police Station, in sub-sec. (8) of section 173 to further investigate into the matter, when fresh facts came to light and also in view of the proposition laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts. ( 21 ) IN this case, the subject matter relates to a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and her husband y. Raghavardhan. There is nothing unusual in this matter to order further investigation. This complaint is like one filed by any ordinary citizen of the country, which attracts penal provisions and requires to be proved by leading evidence. It is the allegation of the petitioner that her husband - Y. Raghavardhan has cheated her, that he has already married one Geethika before his marriage with her. Further he demanded and took dowry from her parents by subjecting her to both physical and mental harassment. Therefore, filed the criminal case for the offence under Sections 420, 498-A and 506 read with Sec. 34 of Indian penal Code. Further he demanded and took dowry from her parents by subjecting her to both physical and mental harassment. Therefore, filed the criminal case for the offence under Sections 420, 498-A and 506 read with Sec. 34 of Indian penal Code. Thus, evidently, there is no element of public interest involved in this matter, warranting the first respondent to pass the impugned order. Therefore, on the complaint of the petitioner, under section 156 (3) of the Code, the learned magistrate referred the matter for investigation and report and on submission of the final report, after investigation by the inspector of Police, CCS, Tirupathi, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance. The contention of the respondents that the said Inspector of Police, Sri Sambashivaiah, who is related to the petitioner, has not examined certain witnesses and failed to bring in evidence certain facts cannot be considered at this stage. These are the issues which can only be decided after a full- fledged trial. There is no semblance of any public interest to order for further investigation, more particularly when the respondents have failed either to bring on record as to what are the fresh facts that came to light after filing the report and the magistrate took cognizance of the case. Further they have not obtained permission from the jurisdictional Magistrate to conduct further investigation. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that except the allegations made in his representation by the father of one Smt. Geethika, who is working as Deputy Central Intelligence Officer, hyderabad, no other material is available to order further investigation in the above crime, which according to him is unwarranted and do not attract Sec. 173 (8) of the Code. That apart, it is contended that the 2nd respondent, in an objectionable language, under the garb of direction from the first respondent cannot address the magistrate seeking to stop the further proceedings until a report is filed, which tantamounts to obstructing delivery of justice. The Apex Court in JAC Saldnna s case (3 supra) has observed that the Police officers should refrain from addressing communications to the court on pending matters required to be determined judicially and their Lordships disapproved such conduct of the Police Officers. ( 22 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the ruling of the Supreme Court and other High Courts, firstly I hold that under sub-sec. ( 22 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the ruling of the Supreme Court and other High Courts, firstly I hold that under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 173 of the Code, police officer in-charge of the police station has a right to further investigate into the offence and (sic. even after) the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence, when any fresh facts come to light and after such investigation, he can request the learned Magistrate to take the evidence on record; secondly I hold that when investigation is done and report is submitted as directed by the Magistrate and the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and if fresh facts come to light which requires further investigation, the concerned police officer in-charge of the police station has to obtain permission from the learned Magistrate before conducting further investigation into the offence. Thirdly I hold that the power exercised by the first respondent under sub-sec. (8) of section 173 of the Code, in the absence of any fresh facts that came to light, in ordering further investigation after the II Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupathi has taken cognizance, is unwarranted, illegal and liable to be set aside; fourthly the memo filed by the second respondent on the basis of the impugned proceedings of the first respondent seeking to stop further proceedings in the case until further report is filed by the CID amounts to obstructing delivery of justice, therefore, liable to be set aside. The second respondent should not have filed the impugned memo before the magistrate, he should have filed the said memo through the Prosecuting Officer, who is Officer of the court or any other counsel appearing for CID. This court while disapproving the conduct of the 2nd respondent, directs that the police officers, who are in-charge of the Police Stations, shall not resort to filing such requests directly before the courts hereafter under section 173 (8) of the Code which amounts to obstructing the delivery of justice. This court while disapproving the conduct of the 2nd respondent, directs that the police officers, who are in-charge of the Police Stations, shall not resort to filing such requests directly before the courts hereafter under section 173 (8) of the Code which amounts to obstructing the delivery of justice. ( 23 ) 1 am fortified in my above view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Saldanna s case (3 supra) wherein when a serious objection was taken against the superintendent of Railway Police, mohammad Sulaiman, directly addressing a letter to the learned Additional Chief judicial Magistrate on February 15, 1979 informing him about the decision of the government to continue the investigation and, therefore not to accept the final report, the Apex Court has held that it is true that the police officers should refrain from addressing communications to the court on pending matters required to be determined judicially. Their Lordships have expressed their disapproval of such a conduct. Finally I hold that further investigation contemplated under Section 173 (8) of the code on fresh facts by the Officer in-charge of the Police Station after taking cognizance by the Magistrate on the basis of investigation report does not amount to reinvestigation, but it is continuation of earlier investigation conducted by the officer in-charge of the Police Station as per the direction of the Magistrate. ( 24 ) THEREFORE, for all the above reasons, I hold that the impugned order passed by the first respondent in C. No. 2534 C-13 WPC/ 2000, dated 14-8-2000 consequent to which the second respondent has filed the impugned memo dated 22-8-2000 before the ii Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, tirupathi, in CC. No. 489 of 2000 are liable to be set aside and are accordingly set aside. ( 25 ) THE writ petition is accordingly, disposed of. No order as to costs.