( 1 ) THIS writ appeal by the unsuccessful writ petitioner is directed against the order dated 8-9-1999 passed in Writ Petition No. 1917 of 1999 by the learned single Judge in dismissing the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE appellant-writ petitioner claiming to be the owner and possessor of agricultural land admeasuring Ac. 3-07 cents in Sy. Nos. 148/1, 148/2a, 11513 and 622, situated at Tirupati Urban, Tirupati, applied to the Mandal Revenue Officer - 3rd respondent herein under the provisions of A. P. Record of Rights and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, (for short, the Act ) for grant of Pattadar Passbook in respect of the above lands. The 3rd respondent, on receipt of the application from the petitioner, sought instructions from the District Collector-1st respondent herein as to whether the said application of the writ petitioner should be entertained or not. It appears, after seeking instructions, the 3rd respondent Mandal Revenue Officer by his communication dated 20-10-1998 rejected the request of the writ petitioner to issue the pattedar pass book. The said communication of the 3rd respondent Mandal Revenue Officer, reads thus:"in pursuance of the directions issued in the Collector s reference L. Dis. B4/15006/98, dated 14-9-1998 consequent on the instructions solicited in the matter, it is informed that your request for the issue of Pattadar Pass Book will be considered only after settlement of title in the competent Court of Jurisdiction in respect of Sy. No. 148/1, 148/2, 153 and 622 for an extent of 3. 07 acres of Tirupathi Village and till such time your request cannot be considered. " ( 3 ) THE writ petitioner-appellant herein being aggrieved by the order dated 20-10-1998 of the 3rd respondent filed the Writ Petition. However, the learned single Judge went into the merits of the matter including the issue as to whether the writ petitioner has a valid title to the property or not and ultimately dismissed the writ petition by the order under appeal. ( 4 ) WE have heard Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned senior counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner. In our considered opinion the learned single Judge is not justified in going into the merits of the claim of the writ petitioner appellant with regard to the title of the petition schedule land and in dismissing the writ petition on merit. ( 4 ) WE have heard Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned senior counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner. In our considered opinion the learned single Judge is not justified in going into the merits of the claim of the writ petitioner appellant with regard to the title of the petition schedule land and in dismissing the writ petition on merit. ( 5 ) IT is trite that a statutory authority should exercise power vested in it independently and with due application of mind on the basis of the evidence placed before it and not being influenced by any opinion or dictation of any extraneous agency. A situation of the authority not exercising discretionary power arises when the authority does not consider the matter itself but exercises its discretion under the dictation of a superior authority. This, in law, would amount to non-exercise of its power by the authority and will be bad. Although the authority purports to act itself, yet, in effect, it is not so as it does not take the action in question in its own judgment and independently; as is intended by the statute. The decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji illustrates the point. The Bombay Police Act, 1902 granted authority to the Commissioner of Police to grant licences for the construction of cinema-theatres. The Commissioner granted a licence to the respondent in that case on the recommendation of an advisory committee but later cancelled it at the direction of the state government. The Supreme Court held that cancellation order bad as it had come from the government and the commissioner merely acted as a transmitting agent. In State of Punjab v. Suraj Parkash,2 the Supreme Court held that the State Government could not give any instruction to the consolidation officer functioning under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, as there was no provision in the said Act empowering the state government to give any such instructions to the Consolidation Officer. In Mount Corp. v. Director of Industries,3 an actual user s application for import of raw materials needs to be accompanied by an essentiality certificate from the State Director of Industries. The State government constituted a committee consisting of Deputy Minister as the Chairman, the Director of Industries and two other officers as members. The Committee rejected the petitioner s application for the essentiality certificate. The State government constituted a committee consisting of Deputy Minister as the Chairman, the Director of Industries and two other officers as members. The Committee rejected the petitioner s application for the essentiality certificate. Quashing the decision of the committee, the Mysore High Court held that the Director did not exercise his own judgment but merely acted as the conduit pipe of the committee. To the contention of the Director that the Committee was only an advisory committee, the Court replied that since a Deputy Minister was the Chairman of the Committee it was not possible for the Director to disregard its decision. Similarly, in Purtabpore Company Ltd. , v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar,4 the Supreme Court quashed an order of the Cane Commissioner, Bihar, by which he had excluded 99 villages from the area reserved by him in favour of the appellant sugar company under the Sugarcane Control Order. The reason was that the Cane Commissioner had been dictated to by the Chief Minister who imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. Explaining the position, the Court pointed out that under the sugarcane order, the power was exercisable by the Cane Commissioner. Therefore, he alone should have exercised the power and not abdicated his responsibility in favour of the state government or the Chief Minister. The Court also held that it was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the Commissioner s functions. In State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan,5 an application for the grant of a cinema licence made to the licensing authority, instead of being dealt with by it, was forwarded to the State Government which rejected the same. Such a procedure was adopted under instructions issued by the Government to the licensing authorities. The Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952 prohibits exhibition of cinema in any place other than the one licensed under the Act. Subject to the control of the state government, the licensing authority can grant licences to such persons as it thinks fit if rules made by the government under the Act have been complied with and adequate safety measures have been taken. A person aggrieved by the decision of the licensing authority can appeal to the government. Subject to the control of the state government, the licensing authority can grant licences to such persons as it thinks fit if rules made by the government under the Act have been complied with and adequate safety measures have been taken. A person aggrieved by the decision of the licensing authority can appeal to the government. In the fact situation of that case, the Supreme Court therefore held that the Act conferred the jurisdiction to deal with applications for licences on the licensing authority which could grant or reject the same. The State Government only came into the picture as an appellate authority when the licensing authority refused to grant a licence. It was, therefore, not proper for the State Government to assume to itself the power and authority to deal with the applications on merits in the first instance. Explaining the ambit of the "control" of the government on the licensing authority, the Supreme Court held that howsoever wide its ambit might be, it could not justify the government to completely oust the licensing authority and itself usurp its functions. The Court held that under its "control" function, the government may justifiably issue general instructions to the licensing authorities as to how to deal with applications for licenses; the government may also exercise revisional power over the orders passed by licensing authorities. The Court held that the Legislature had contemplated a licensing authority as distinct from the government and therefore the result of the instructions issued by the government "is to change the statutory provision" and "to obliterate the licensing authority from the Statute-book altogether. ( 6 ) IN the instant case, the 3rd respondent has committed a serious error in seeking opinion of the 1st respondent-District Collector who is an external agency in the decision-making process under the Act, and that the 1st respondent-District Collector also committed a serious error in law in meddling with the decision- making process by the 3rd respondent by opining that the writ petitioner is not entitled to pattedar pass book. The opinion rendered by the 1st respondent District Collector is ultra vires of the Act and the impugned order of the 3rd respondent is the outcome of the dictation of the District Collector. ( 7 ) IN the result, we allow the Writ Appeal and set aside the impugned order of the learned single Judge. The opinion rendered by the 1st respondent District Collector is ultra vires of the Act and the impugned order of the 3rd respondent is the outcome of the dictation of the District Collector. ( 7 ) IN the result, we allow the Writ Appeal and set aside the impugned order of the learned single Judge. We allow Writ Petition No. 1917 of 1999 and quash the impugned proceedings of the 3rd respondent Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupati Urban Mandal, Tirupati. The 3rd respondent Mandal Revenue Officer is directed to consider the application of the writ petitioner-appellant afresh strictly in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment after conducting necessary enquiry and after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the writ petitioner-appellant and the 5th respondent and pass appropriate order without being influenced in any way by the opinion of the District Collector within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. No costs.