Judgment :- The suit property in respect of which a decree for injunction is prayed for belongs to the respondent-Devasthanam. The site which is the subject matter belongs to the Devasthanam. The superstructure had been purchased by the second respondent herein, who has been residing there from 1.7.1993. The second respondent has also been paying the rent for the land to the first respondent who is the plaintiff. As per the conditions of lease, no permanent superstructure can be put up and therefore, neither the second respondent nor his transferees can do so. Since the appellant asserted certain rights claiming from the second respondent and attempted to put up a permanent superstructure without obtaining permission from the first respondent, the suit was filed. 2. The second respondent/first defendant remained ex parte. 3. The appellant while admitting that the site belongs to the first respondent claimed that there can be no condition against putting up a permanent superstructure. According to the appellant, no new superstructure is being put up and only what is existing is being restored and for this, due permission has also been obtained from the Municipality. The first respondent by receiving the rent from the appellant had also acknowledged the right, title and interest of the appellant in the suit property. The Trial Court declined to grant injunction. The Appellate Court interfered and gave injunction and therefore, the second appeal has been filed. 4. The following substantial questions of law were framed by this court at the time of admission: "1. Whether the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that Ex-A1 is true and valid, is correct in law? 2. Even if Ex-A1 is true, whether the terms found therein would bind the appellant, when it has been executed by the vendor of the appellant in favour of the 1st respondent Devasthanam after the sale in his favour under Ex-B1? 3. Whether on the facts of the case, the view of the Lower Appellate Court that only when the plaintiff Devasthanam accepts the transfer of the superstructures, the purchaser can claim to be a tenant of the site, is correct in law?" 5. Ex.A.1 is a lease deed dated 25.06.1984. The second respondent is the lessee. The lease deed contains the following recital: The suit was filed on 4.7.1984. The case of the appellant is that this condition does not bind him. Ex.A.1 is a lease deed dated 25.06.1984. The second respondent is the lessee. The lease deed contains the following recital: The suit was filed on 4.7.1984. The case of the appellant is that this condition does not bind him. It is a unilateral imposition of restriction. It was also submitted that when a lease is a permanent lease, the presumption is that the lease is for putting up a superstructure. According to Mr. Yamunan, who appeared for the appellant there was definitely a privity of estate between the appellant and the first respondent, if not privity of contract. 6. Reliance was placed on (1) SIVAYOGESWARA COTTON PRESS V. PANOHAKSHARAPPA (AIR 1962 SUPREME COURT 413), (2) CHAPSIBHAI V. PURUSHOTTAM (AIR 1971 SUPREME COURT 1878) AND (3) IN RE MUTHYALA LAKSHMINARAYANA (AIR 1954 MADRAS 412), apart from certain passages from Mulla's The Transfer of Property Act, (Ninth Edition). 7. In AIR 1954 MADRAS 412 (cited supra), it was held that permanent tenancy may be inferred when the tenancy is made for building purposes. But the mere fact that the lease of land is made for dwelling purposes does not make it permanent. This cannot help the appellant since the appellant wants to establish the reverse which is where there is a permanent lease, it should be presumed that the lease is for building purposes. 8. In AIR 1971 SC 1878 (cited supra), it was held that where the agreement of lease is for constructing a building and it provides for certain definite period and for continuance of possession on paying agreed rent, the lease is for an indefinite period and hence for lifetime. There Ex-B4 was the document and the Supreme Court held that looking at the document as a whole, lease is rent out for residential structures whereas in this case, Ex-B1, the crucial document is not for building a superstructure. It merely says that the lease is for makes it also clear that there is an existing superstructure. 9. AIR 1962 SC 413 (cited supra) again was a case where the rent was for a fixed period and the presumption was drawn to create a permanent tenant. Therefore, these three decisions cannot strictly come to the aid of the appellant. 10. 9. AIR 1962 SC 413 (cited supra) again was a case where the rent was for a fixed period and the presumption was drawn to create a permanent tenant. Therefore, these three decisions cannot strictly come to the aid of the appellant. 10. The following extract at page 1024 was referred to: "Where land has been held on rent which is variable, the mere fact that buildings have been erected on the land with knowledge of the landlord is not itself sufficient to raise the presumption that the tenancy is permanent." And as regards the Doctrine of Privity of estates, it is found at Pg. 1142, "The phrase "privity of estate" when applied in India, cannot carry precisely the same implication as in English law, since the common law of England attached very special results to the relationship between the tenant of a legal term and the owner of a legal estate in reversion, which differed in many respects from the relationship between a tenant and a landlord who had no legal reversion. But if the expression is used with reference to the relationship of landlord and tenant, there seems no reason why the principle underlying the doctrine, viz., that the assignee, who takes the whole interest of the lessor should take it subject to the burden, should not apply in India." But even this does not appear to come to the aid of the appellant. The Doctrine of Privity of estate itself has a limited application in India. The word "estate" has a different connotation in English Law, since under the Common Law of England, the relationship between the tenant of a legal term and the owner of the legal estate in reversion had special effects. This Doctrine has been applied here to the extent of making the absolute assignee liable by Privity of estate to the lessor in respect of rent and other covenants running with the rent. 11. Mr.Yamunan also asserted that under Section 108(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the lessor is deemed to contract with the lessee subject to payment of rent and performance of conditions of the contract, though the lessee may hold the property for the time limited by the lease without interruption. 11. Mr.Yamunan also asserted that under Section 108(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the lessor is deemed to contract with the lessee subject to payment of rent and performance of conditions of the contract, though the lessee may hold the property for the time limited by the lease without interruption. Therefore, there could be no interpretation of the right of the appellant so long as he pays the rent reserved under the lease and there is no proof that he is not performing the contract. Under Section 108(j), a lessee has the right to transfer absolutely the whole or any part of his interest and under Section 108(b), the erection of permanent structure is subject to consent of the lessor. 12. Mr.Thiruvenkadaswamy, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would further submit that Privity of estate cannot apply to the case under HR & CE act, the provisions of which apply to the first respondent. According to the learned counsel, Exs-A1 and A6 were found to be true and therefore, there is no question of interference in second appeal. Ex-B6 is a sale deed dated 28.6.1964 by one Narayanasamy Iyer in favour of one Krishnaveni Ammal. What is sold under this document is the superstructure in the site belonging to the first respondent together with trees, etc. Ex-B4 is dated 15.5.1984 under which the aforesaid Krishnaveni Ammal had sold the property to the second respondent herein and the schedule of property reads thus: Ex-B3 is dated 18.6.1984 in which again the above phrase is found. Therefore, while the right of the appellant in respect of the superstructure is supported by documentary evidence which shows that the building had been transferred under Exs-B6, B4 and B3, there is no evidence to show that the second respondent had transferred or assigned his rights as a lessee to the appellant herein. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that after Ex-B3, it must be assumed that the appellant alone was the lessee of the land. 13. The Trial Court also has relied on Ex-A6 in which the appellant had addressed a letter to the first respondent herein, undertaking not to put up any permanent superstructure. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that after Ex-B3, it must be assumed that the appellant alone was the lessee of the land. 13. The Trial Court also has relied on Ex-A6 in which the appellant had addressed a letter to the first respondent herein, undertaking not to put up any permanent superstructure. This letter is dated 9.9.1986 and this is rejected by the Trial Court on the ground that "any admission made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress cannot bind the maker of the admission" vide SRI KRISHNAN VS. GURUSHETRA UNIVERSITY ( AIR 1976 SC 376 ). On this ground and because the Trial Court came to the conclusion that Ex-A1 was concocted after the suit, the Trial Court refused to grant a decree for injunction. 14. The Appellate Court has reversed it for the following reasons. (1) The Appellate Court, on a reading of Exs-B6, B4 and B3 came to the conclusion that there was no assignment of leasehold right. (2) The Appellate Court also took note of the fact that from 1976, HR & CE have brought the temple under control and lease deeds have been executed in accordance with the said Act. The Appellate Court also came to the conclusion that it is on this basis Ex-A1 was executed. (3) The Appellate Court also held that there is no proof to show that merely because Exs-B1 and B2 were issued, the first respondent had accepted the appellant as a lessee and even thereafter there is nothing to show that the first respondent had give the appellant the permission to put up permanent superstructure. The admission of the appellant in his evidence is also relevant. (4) The Appellate Court also held that there was no reason to reject Ex-A6, as an undertaking made in ignorance of his rights. 15. When the evidence of the appellant is read along with the undertaking given in Ex-A6, there is no justification for arriving at the conclusion that the undertaking given in Ex-A6 was in ignorance of his rights. The appellant had purchased only the right in respect of the superstructure. The superstructure, that has been described in all the previous documents, appears to be a thatched roof building. What the appellant wants to now build is a permanent building to run a school. The appellant had purchased only the right in respect of the superstructure. The superstructure, that has been described in all the previous documents, appears to be a thatched roof building. What the appellant wants to now build is a permanent building to run a school. Definitely, the appellant cannot put up a permanent superstructure of this nature without obtaining the consent of the owner of the land. None of the judgments relied on by the counsel for the appellant indicate otherwise. 16. Even Section 108(p) imposes upon the lessee the duty not to put up any permanent superstructure without the lessor's consent. There is nothing to indicate that the lease of the land is of a permanent nature. If the appellant is permitted to construct a school, the first respondent's right as the owner of the land will be seriously impaired. 17. In Kurian and another V. Job and others (AIR 1975 Kerala 175), it was held that, "Section 108(p) of the T.P. Act prohibits the erection of permanent structures by the lessee on the leased property without the consent of the lessor. Whether a structure is permanent or not has to be decided on the facts of each case considering its nature and extent and the intention with which it is erected. Where the lessee erects a permanent structure in violation of the provisions of Section 108(p) the lessor is entitled to get a mandatory injunction restraining the lessee from building such a structure. The lessee cannot be allowed to plead that he will remove the structure at the end of the lease." That was a case where the building and room were taken on rent and a suit for injunction restraining the defendants from constructing a building was asked for. The main ground of defence was that the construction was with the consent of the plaintiff and that the defendant could remove it at the time of surrendering the lease. The learned Judge relied on a decision in CHHEDI MANJHI VS. MAHIPAL BAHADUR SINGH (AIR 1951 Patna 600) which in turn cited ISMAI KANI ROWTHAN VS. NAZARALI SAHIB (ICR 27 Madras 211), held as follows: "And there is no reason why during the continuance of the lease, if the landlord objects to the erection of permanent structures, those permanent structures should not be removed. MAHIPAL BAHADUR SINGH (AIR 1951 Patna 600) which in turn cited ISMAI KANI ROWTHAN VS. NAZARALI SAHIB (ICR 27 Madras 211), held as follows: "And there is no reason why during the continuance of the lease, if the landlord objects to the erection of permanent structures, those permanent structures should not be removed. If there is no waiver or acquiescence and if the equitable doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence cannot be invoked, then Cl.(p) of S.108 must operate and the lessee cannot be allowed to construct permanent structures except for agricultural purposes." 18. In Doraikannu Ammal V. T. Ramaswami Mudaliar (AIR 1940 Madras 32), a Division Bench of this Court granted the plaintiff a decree for mandatory injunction for removal of certain buildings on rent leased to the tenant. The land belonging to the Devasthanam, was leased to one Chinna Venkatesa Devar, who in turn transferred it to one Natesa Mudaliar. At that time, there was only a compound wall. As per the agreement, the lease was for the purpose of letting out a flower garden, but Natesa Mudaliar proceeded to erect a cattle shed. Thereafter, Natesa Mudaliar assigned his interest in the property to one Doraikannu Ammal, who was the appellant before the Division Bench. Doraikannu Ammal demolished the cattle shed and put up two storied masonry building work to which the lessor objected. The trustee of the Devasthanam objected to the erection of this building and filed a suit for mandatory injunction. The Trial Court granted an injunction in respect of all the buildings except the house. A learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the appeal filed on behalf of the temple and issued an injunction in respect of the house as well as the other buildings. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the lessee, who had put up permanent superstructure. The Division Bench gave another reason why injunction should be granted and that was Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act which says that a lessee shall not be allowed to commit an act, which is destructive or permanently injurious to the land. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court applies to this case. 19. It is not the appellant's case that he has obtained permission from the temple authorities or the consent of the temple authorities. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court applies to this case. 19. It is not the appellant's case that he has obtained permission from the temple authorities or the consent of the temple authorities. It is evident from the nature of the building that is sought to be constructed that it is not a mere repair of the decrepit building. What the appellant wants to put up a permanent superstructure of the nature of a school in the land, which admittedly belongs to the first respondent and where the appellant had quite consciously undertaken not to put up further construction under Ex-A6. So, there is no warrant for interference under Section 100 CPC. 20. The second appeal is thus dismissed. No costs.