ORDER Gupta, J. -- 1. This is complainant's revision petition against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 6.08.1996 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Multai District Betul in S.T. No. 149/95, whereby accused persons Sunderlal, Anil Vajir and Bharat were acquitted of the charges under sections 302 and 307 read with 34 IPC. 2. The accused persons were alleged to have committed murder of one Fakir, son of informant Pannalal and attempted at the life of Kaluram son of Tutkiya Pawar, in the evening of 14.5.1995. 3. At the trial, the accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded false implication to the charges framed by the trial Court for the alleged commission of the offences punishable under sections 302 and 307 read with 34, IPC. 4. The above charges against the accused persons were sought to be proved on the evidence of as many as 17 witnesses examined by the prosecution at the trial. The accused persons also examined as many as 6 witnesses in their defence. 5. The trial Court on a close scrutiny of the evidence led at the trial, found that the prosecution evidence suffered from serious infirmities and as such could not be acted upon. The trial Court, therefore, recorded the impugned judgment of acquittal of accused persons Sunderlal, Anil, Vajir and Bharat of the charges under sections 302 and 307 read with 34, IPC. 6. Shri L.N. Sakle, the learned counsel for the petitioner complainant, vehemently argued that the trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused persons by discarding the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on flimsy and untenable grounds. 7. The Apex Court, while considering the scope of interference in a complainant's revision petition against acquittal, in the case of Jagannath Choudhary and others v. Ramayan Singh and another reported in (2002) 5 SCC 659 , observed in paras 9 and 10 : "9. Incidentally the object of the revisional jurisdiction as envisaged under section 401 was to confer upon superior criminal Courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction, in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. (see in this context the decision of this Court in Janata Das v. H.S. Chowdhary). The main question which the High Court has to consider in an application in revision is whether substantial justice has been done. If however, the same has been an appeal, the applicant would be entitled to demand an adjudication upon all questions of fact or law which he wishes to raise, but in revision the only question is whether the Court should interfere in the interest of justice. Where the Court concerned does not appear to have committed any illegality or material irregularity or impropriety in passing the impugned judgment and order, the revision cannot succeed. If the impugned order apparently is presentable, without any such infirmity which may render it completely perverse or unacceptable and when there is no failure of justice, interference cannot be had in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 10. While it is true and now well settled in a long catena of cases that exercise of power under section 401 cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary -- this discretion, however, as is popularly informed, has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but be a discretion which stands ''informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system" -resultantly only in the event of a glaring defect in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on a point of law and thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this statute ought not to be called for. It is not to be lightly exercised but only in exceptional situations where the justice delivery system requires interference for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In Nosibolla, Logendranath Jha and Chhinaswamy Reddy as also in Thakur Das v. State of M.P. this Court with utmost clarity and in no uncertain terms recorded the same. It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can be said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power. " 8. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can be said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power. " 8. Of the 17 witnesses examined by the prosecution at the trial, PW 2 Premlal, PW 3 Pannalal, PW 14 Gulabu, PW 15 Kaluram son of Bhauji and PW 17 Kaluram son of Tutkiya Pawar were examined as eye-witnesses of the alleged incident of assault on deceased Fakir and injured Kaluram. 9. At the trial, PW 2 Premlal and PW 15 Kaluram son of Bhauji I did not support the prosecution case at all and were declared hostile. 10. PW 14 Gulabu, on his own admissions in paras 4 to 7 of his cross-examination, did not witness the actual assault on deceased Fakir and injured Kaluram. He admitted that he projected himself as an eye-witness at the instance of PW 3 Pannalal. The evidence of other eye witness PW 3 Pannalal also does not stand on any better footing, as admittedly, he reached the place of occurrence on getting information about the incident from PW 14 Gulabu. On a close scrutiny of his evidence, we are satisfied that the trial Court has rightly discarded his evidence as a got-up eye witness. 11. For the reasons best known to the Investigating Officer, the case diary statement of PW 17 Kaluram son of Tutkiya Pawar for the first time was recorded after one month of the incident, on 15.6.1995. The view taken by the trial Court in holding that it amounted to a serious infirmity in his evidence is perfectly in line with the dictum of the Apex Court, in the case of Balakrushna Swain v. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1971 SC 804 . 12. The evidence of PW 17 Kaluram suffers from yet another infirmity. In para 7 of his deposition, he stated that accused Bharat dealt one axe blow from its sharp side on the head region of deceased Fakir, but the Autopsy Surgeon PW 16 Dr. R.S. Patel did not find any incised wound on the body of deceased Fakir, much less on his head region. 13. The trial Court has given cogent reasons in paras 34 to 40 of the judgment, for discarding the evidence of PW 17 Kaluram, son of Tutkiya Pawar. 14. R.S. Patel did not find any incised wound on the body of deceased Fakir, much less on his head region. 13. The trial Court has given cogent reasons in paras 34 to 40 of the judgment, for discarding the evidence of PW 17 Kaluram, son of Tutkiya Pawar. 14. Thus, on a close scrutiny of the evidence of eye witness PW 3 Pannalal, PW 14 Gulabu and PW 17 Kaluram son of Tutkiya Pawar, and the other evidence led at the trial, we are satisfied that the findings recorded by the trial Court leading to the acquittal of the accused persons do not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any such piece of legal evidence which was not taken into consideration by the trial Court while recording the impugned judgment of acquittal. Mere possibility of another view on the prosecution evidence will not, by itself, be a sufficient ground to warrant interference in a complainant's revision petition against acquittal. In this view of the matter, we do not find any scope for interference. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition filed by the petitioner complainant against the impugned judgment of acquittal fails and is hereby dismissed.