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2002 DIGILAW 981 (PNJ)

Pritam Chand v. State Of Punjab

2002-09-25

ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA

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Judgment Ashutosh Mohunta, J. 1. M/s J.S. Kundlas Rice Mills, Behrampur was engaged in the business of shelling paddy. It had entered into an agreement on 5.11.1985 with Punjab State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation (for short Markfed) for the purpose of shelling paddy. In the year 1985-86, the firm was entrusted with 36866 bags of paddy of I.R.8 (quality) weighing 23962.90 Qtls. and 10680 bags of P.R. (quality) weighing 6942 Qtls. for the purpose of shelling the same. As per the agreement, the firm was bound to return the rice after milling the same. However, the petitioner, instead of delivering the rice to the F.C.I., sold the rice in the black market and thereby embezzled an amount to the tune of Rs. 2,26,636.70. As the rice was not delivered a complaint was made by the District Manager, Markfed, Ludhiana to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana. Accordingly, it was found that an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Sections 120-B, 406, 409, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code had been committed by the firm, its partners and its employees Salesman Sukhdarshan Singh and Gursharan Singh, Senior Branch Officer, Machhiwara. An FIR was registered at Police Station Chamkaur Sahib for the aforesaid offences. 2. Mr. Sapra, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that firstly there was arbitration clause in the agreement between the petitioner and the Markfed, according to which, in case of dispute, the matter was to be referred to an Arbitrator. Learned counsel has relied upon Clause V of the agreement, which is produced below : "(V) In case there is short-fall in the recovery of rice provided in sub- clause (i) above the miller shall pay to the Markfed the cost of paddy equivalent to economic cost of paddy to the Markfed." 3. It has been contended by Mr. Sapra that all the terms and conditions of the agreement would at the most attract civil liability and not criminal liability and, therefore, charges against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that if there is no dishonest intention at the time of the transaction, then at the most, it tantamounts breach of trust and, therefore, the petitioner would be liable for the civil liability only. Mr. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that if there is no dishonest intention at the time of the transaction, then at the most, it tantamounts breach of trust and, therefore, the petitioner would be liable for the civil liability only. Mr. Sapra relied on Balbir Kumar Verma v. State, 1991(3) Recent Criminal Reports 301, Surat Singh v. Dalwinder, 1989 Chandigarh Criminal Cases 532 and Ajmer Singh v. State, 1988 Chandigarh Criminal Cases 496 in support of his above contention. 4. Learned State counsel has argued that a prima facie case is made out against the accused under the aforesaid Sections. The petitioner was given the rice for shelling paddy and as per the agreement, he was to return the same to the Markfed, and the petitioner having failed to do so cheated the Markfed. 5. After hearing the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that at the time of framing the charge, only a prima facie case is to be seen. In the present case, the paddy was entrusted to the petitioner for shelling the same and thereafter the petitioner was to return it back to the Markfed. Instead of returning, he sold it in the market. Thus; the petitioner has prima facie committed an offence under Sections 406, 409, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. 6. The contention of the learned counsel that as per the arbitration clause the matter should be referred to arbitration and no criminal liability arises, is also devoid of any merit. In support of this contention, he has relied upon Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, 1985(1) RCR(Crl.) 539 (SC) : AIR 1985 SC 628. Civil and Criminal liabilities are independent to each other and the same can go on simultaneously. The petitioner by not returning the rice after milling from the paddy, which was entrusted to him, has prima facie committed criminal breach of trust. The petitioner has also prima facie committed an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and therefore, I find no ground to interfere with the order of Special Judge, Ropar dated 13.8.1991. 7. In view of the above, I find no merit in this revision and the same is dismissed. 8. The case is a very old case as the FIR was registered on 21.4.1988. More than 14 years have elapsed. 7. In view of the above, I find no merit in this revision and the same is dismissed. 8. The case is a very old case as the FIR was registered on 21.4.1988. More than 14 years have elapsed. In this view of the matter, the trial court is directed to expedite the trial and conclude the same within six months from today.